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 Since West Virginia’s founding in 1863, historians have attempted to understand the 
forces that shaped the state’s creation.  Most historians have argued that the Mountain State’s 
admission into the Union represented a grassroots rebellion among democratically-minded 
mountaineers who had long resisted the rule of eastern slaveholding aristocrats.  The tumultuous 
events triggered by secession and civil war provided the opportunity for westerners to inaugurate 
their long desired wishes to free themselves from their allegedly tyrannical brethren and abolish 
the institution that many residents blamed for their woes: chattel slavery. 
 West Virginia’s founding proved more contingent and complex than previously argued.  
During the early antebellum era, western Virginians displayed their loyalty to the state and to 
slavery through public processions, meetings, and editorials.  Residents insisted, however, that 
their eastern brethren assist in reforming and democratizing the state’s constitution.  The 
Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830 failed to include all of western Virginians’ desires but 
the changes included in the new constitution broadened the franchise and reflected powerful 
market forces fundamentally politics in the Old Dominion.   
The 1830 Constitution helped foster, however, a new understanding of the symbiotic 
relationship between slavery and democracy.  Importantly, western Virginians embraced this 
interpretation.  During the 1840s and 1850s, as national events concerning slavery became more 
frequent, western Virginians continued to profess their support for the peculiar institution and to 
the state.  Such assertions contributed to the ratification of a new constitution in 1851, as western 
Virginians’ desire for a democratized constitution finally came to fruition.  The new constitution 
deepened residents’ attachment to chattel slavery and the state, a critical development as 
abolitionists appeared more menacing and Republicans cultivated a presence in the Northwest.  
Few northwesterners supported either party because the destruction of slavery threatened the 
foundation of their political rights, another important development wrought by the new 
constitution.  Rather than drifting farther apart from their eastern brethren in sentiment and 
principle, northwesterners drew closer and became fierce proslavery advocates. 
The national crisis that began to unfold in 1860 threatened to disrupt the harmony 
between western and eastern Virginians.  Western Virginians maintained that remaining within 
the Union and under the protection of the constitution would ensure democratic rights while 
protecting slavery, too.  Though eastern Virginians voted to take the Commonwealth out of the 
Union, westerners differed on the path ahead.  Rather than forging ahead in demolishing slavery 
and the state, residents debated the merits of creating a new state and how to resolve the issue of 
slavery.  After multiple and intense debates and recognizing that the war would not end quickly, 
northwesterners voted to create a new slave state.  West Virginia entered the Union in 1863 but 
its founding reflected the state’s history of slavery, not the democratic revolution posited by 
historians.  Proponents of West Virginia’s founding insisted that the state’s establishment would 
perpetuate, not undermine, racial hierarchy.  While West Virginia’s founders ratified a proposal 
to gradually emancipate slaves, emancipation would unfold over decades and shifting political 
and racial norms threatened to sabotage that process in the future.  West Virginia’s future 
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Introduction: New Contours for an Old Debate: Slavery and Sectionalism in Antebellum 
Northwest Virginia 
 
In 1866, West Virginia Senator Waitman T. Willey responded to proposals considered by 
the Virginia Legislature that sought reunification between the two states.  Willey dismissed 
Virginia politicians who considered the Mountain State’s creation merely “‘a war measure,’” 
arguing instead that long-standing sectional grievances finally dismembered the Old Dominion.  
The “perpetual strife” between eastern and western Virginians, Willey claimed, had threatened to 
divide the state on numerous occasions.  The Civil War provided the “opportunity” western 
Virginians needed to “carry into effect a long cherished desire.”  The “strife” cited by Willey 
reflected geographical, commercial, constitutional, and political grievances that had festered over 
the preceding decades.  West Virginia and Virginia constituted two “geographically distinct” 
states, “physically separated” by mountains that prohibited social and commercial interaction.  
“[L]ittle or no traffic or commerce” existed between eastern and western antebellum Virginians 
while the “different…manners, customs, education, habits, and feelings” exhibited by these 
residents illustrated that two peoples had occupied one state.1       
 West Virginians’ reluctance to embrace their erstwhile brethren manifested their belief 
that their new state constitution contained the democratic measures and principles for which they 
had long pursued.  For decades, antebellum western Virginians had sought equal representation 
in the state legislature, universal male suffrage, uniform taxation, state-supported internal 
improvements, and a public education system, among other issues.  Few of these reforms, 
however, had been inaugurated by 1861.  The Mountain State’s creation, though, provided West 
Virginians the opportunity to democratize their state government.  The “system of free schools 
                                                          
1 Waitman T. Willey, A Letter from Hon. W.T. Willey, on the Redintegration of Virginia (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 
1866), 3, 5.   
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and public education” along with the “improved organizations of county police, 
townships…[and] our constitutional protection against the creation of burdensome public debts” 
represented a few of the fundamental changes West Virginians had instituted in 1863.  A 
“reunion of the States would doubtless result in the surrender of those fundamental reforms 
inaugurated under our new constitution,” Willey explained.  Reunification “would ruin us.”2              
 West Virginia’s creation, however, did not reflect western Virginians’ antipathy toward 
slavery.  Though the “long, loud, and persistent clamors” from eastern Virginians suggested that 
westerners opposed African American bondage and sought the institution’s demise, Willey 
insisted that transmontane Virginians had supported slavery and slaveholders’ rights.  Willey 
could not uncover “a single fact which…warrant[ed] any just apprehension on the part of eastern 
alarmists” on the subject of slavery.  West Virginians had never exhibited “bad faith” in 
defending the “lawful rights of the eastern slaveholder.”  Willey characterized accusations that 
questioned his neighbors’ fealty toward slavery as “unfounded” and slanderous.  West Virginians 
had defended and championed slavery for decades, even when their eastern neighbors doubted 
such fidelity.3 
 Historians have generally agreed with Willey’s argument concerning the inevitability of 
the Old Dominion’s dismemberment during the Civil War but dismissed his interpretation of 
northwesterners’ proslavery credentials.  The sectional strife that Willey emphasized, historians 
insist, represented tangible concerns that divided Virginians along geographic lines.  
Contemporary historians, including Theodore F. Lang and Granville Davisson Hall, maintained 
that political, constitutional, and economic inequalities augmented eastern Virginians’ power 
while restricting that of western Virginians.  Though other southerners had democratized state 
                                                          
2 Willey, Redintegration of Virginia, 6, 8.   
3 Willey, Redintegration of Virginia, 5.   
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constitutions and inaugurated majoritarian rule, Virginia slaveholders resisted such measures for 
decades, worried that democracy and slavery could not coexist.  Efforts to maintain unequal 
representation in the state legislature, tax breaks for slaveholders, and enfranchisement for only 
propertyholders represented slaveholders’ futile attempts to stem the irresistible march of 
democratic reform in Virginia.  Western, nonslaveholding yeomen demanded democratic reform 
regardless of the consequences on slavery.4   
These political and constitutional differences convinced these earlier historians that two 
distinct civilizations occupied one polity.  Hall insisted that the “unnatural” connection between 
them eventually devolved into a “union of force” that “only awaited its opportunity to be 
broken.”5  Eastern Virginians’ “aristocratic communities” reflected their stubborn belief that 
“slave labor” provided necessary “political and social wisdom.”  Western Virginians disagreed 
with their Tidewater brethren.  The “commoner people” who inhabited the western mountains 
rejected slavery and embraced free labor, an ideology Hall considered “the genius of the great 
free Republic.”  Unlike eastern Virginians’ static and hierarchical society, westerners’ fostered 
an egalitarian, vibrant, and dynamic free labor society.6  Looking back, Hall pondered how 
Virginians failed to recognize the “irrepressible conflict” between their two sections.7   
Modern historians have supported this interpretation that two separate societies shared 
one government, a prospect that forecasted conflict.  Henry T. Shanks and Charles Ambler 
averred that inequality in internal improvements, political representation, and constitutional 
powers between the two sections heightened intrastate sectional antagonism and deepened 
                                                          
4 Theodore F. Lang, Loyal West Virginia from 1861 to 1865: With an Introductory Chapter on the status of Virginia 
for Thirty Years prior to the War (Baltimore: Deutsch & Co., 1895) and Granville Davisson Hall, The Rending of 
Virginia: A History (Chicago: Mayer and Miller, 1902).   
5 Hall, Rending of Virginia, 30.   
6Ibid., 34. 
7Ibid., 37.   
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resentment between the two sections.  Western Virginians shipped their manufactured goods and 
natural resources to western markets, including Pittsburgh, Louisville, and Cincinnati, an 
economic characteristic that illustrated Virginia’s geographical diversity and the lack of internal 
improvements created by the state legislature needed to overcome such obstacles.  The statehood 
movement, Shanks concluded, represented “part of a long sectional rivalry” rooted in 
“sectionalism and economic differentiation.”8   
Charles Ambler, a protégé of Frederick Jackson Turner, argued that western Virginians 
embodied the democratic and individualistic ideals of frontier experience.  Eastern Virginians 
languished, meanwhile, in an older and aristocratic society; only their control and manipulation 
of constitutional functions and structures allowed them to fend off westerners’ democratic 
advances.  Northwesterners’ support for the Republican Party during the late 1850s and 1860s 
signaled their attempt to break easterners’ political hegemony and inaugurate majoritarian power.  
Their tactic worked.  Though Ambler concluded his seminal study before 1863, his interpretation 
provided a clear explanation for dismemberment and West Virginia statehood.  Western 
Virginians, tired of living under aristocratic rule, formed a democratic state cleansed from the 
previous political and constitutional ills that had infected the Old Dominion.9  
More recent historians, however, have emphasized the political diversity of western 
Virginia.  Richard Orr Curry, John Alexander Williams, and Ken Noe have dismissed the 
monolithic antislavery and unionist interpretation of the transmontane region offered by previous 
historians.  Curry, utilizing a broader primary source base than his predecessors, stressed the 
                                                          
8 Henry T. Shanks, The Secession Movement in Virginia, 1847-1861 (Richmond: Garnett and Massie, 1934), 3, 211-
212.  For a similar interpretation concerning sectionalism, see George Ellis Moore, “Slavery as a Factor in the 
Formation of West Virginia,” West Virginia History, 18, no. 1 (October 1956): 5-89.   
9 Charles H. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), 3-
10, 116-118, 318, 337.   
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Northwest’s heterogeneous population and diverse political environment.  These differences 
became manifest during the secession crisis and statehood movement, as secessionist meetings 
and anti-statehood gatherings occurred in most northwestern counties.10  The presence of 
southern sympathizers, John Alexander Williams argues, illustrated that a “buckskin elite” 
controlled local politics akin to their more refined eastern neighbors.  Using the county court 
system to consolidate power and land holdings, this “buckskin elite” exercised their brand of 
political hegemony during campaigns and elections.  The democratic west offered by Ambler 
represented a façade, according to Williams.11  Ken Noe’s research on the Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad in southwest Virginia confirms Williams’ argument concerning a more 
politically diverse west.  The railroad, constructed and maintained by slave labor, facilitated the 
rise and expansion of key industries that utilized slave labor, including tobacco, lead mining, iron 
production, salt and plaster, and coal mining.  All of these products found buyers in eastern 
markets including—and arguably most importantly—Richmond.  By the late 1850s, southwest 
Virginians readily identified their interests with those of Piedmont and Tidewater Virginians, not 
their northwestern neighbors.12        
                                                          
10 Richard Orr Curry, A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West 
Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964).   
11 John Alexander Williams, “The New Dominion and the Old: Ante-bellum and Statehood Politics as the 
Background of West Virginia’s ‘Bourbon Democracy,’” West Virginia History, 33, no. 4 (July 1972): 317-407.  
Williams draws a sharp contrast with these “buckskin elite” from the more prominent statehood leaders who hailed 
from the Northwest.  Individuals like Waitman T. Willey, John Carlile, and Francis H. Pierpont operated in a 
different political and economic climate.  They concentrated on mobilizing a literate electorate increasingly engaged 
in industrial and commercial farming operations.  Here, appeals to deference and isolation fell on deaf ears, while 
the ideals of nationalism and democracy gained traction.  Yet, Williams notes, their time as the leaders of West 
Virginia remained brief because of the inclusion of Democrats and former Confederates into the body politic in 
1872.  During this constitutional convention, “buckskin elites” controlled the proceedings and reintroduced the 
country court system along with the viva voce method of voting, too.  Each of these reforms reestablished local 
political control and facilitated the rebirth of the old ruling elite.  After the dust settled in 1872, West Virginia 
operated remarkably like it had before the Civil War.  While traditionalists lauded the emerging egalitarian ethos 
within western Virginia before the war, Williams remained skeptical about a democratic west and the power local 
rulers wielded.   
12 Kenneth W. Noe, Southwest Virginia’s Railroad: Modernization and the Sectional Crisis (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994), 60-61, 63-82.   
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Recognizing western Virginia’s involvement in championing slavery and slaveholding 
interests continues to be overlooked by historians, however.  Indeed, more recent historians, in 
interpreting Virginia’s antebellum sectionalism and dismemberment during the Civil War, have 
stressed the fatal struggle between democratic government and chattel slavery that unfolded in 
the Old Dominion during this era.  William Shade, William Freehling, William Link, Sean 
Wilentz, and Stephanie McCurry maintain that efforts to reconcile or promote equilibrium 
between these two institutions were myopic and doomed.  While economic expansion promoted 
democratic reform in Virginia, William Shade suggests that demographic trends signaled an 
approaching crisis concerning slavery.  Western Virginia’s growing nonslaveholding population, 
increasingly involved in professions outside of plantation agriculture, would invariably demand 
majoritarian power, a prospect eastern slaveholders and elites viewed grimly.13  This 
demographic trend, William Freehling notes, created “white-belts” in Virginia, notably in the 
Northwest, where residents possessed little personal, financial, or political investment in 
slavery.14  White southerners, rather than displaying unity on the issue of slavery and democratic 
reform, exhibited divisions that would widen with time.15 
This alleged inevitable struggle between democratic government and chattel slavery in 
Virginia and in the nation has received broad scholarly support.  William Link argues that 
economic expansion and industrialization alienated northwestern Virginians from the state’s 
                                                          
13 William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System, 1824-1861 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996).     
14 William W. Freehling, The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the 
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).   
15 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) and The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007).  Alison Goodyear Freehling similarly argues that white Virginians remained a divided slaveholding 
community throughout the 1820s and 1830s, as the failure to inaugurate democratic reform in the 1830 Constitution 
or pass some form of comprehensive emancipation following the Nat Turner rebellion placed the state (and the 
nation) on a “drift toward dissolution.”  Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: the Virginia Slavery 
Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).   
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slaveholding culture.  Northwesterners’ alienation encouraged residents to support the 
Republican Party in an effort to limit slavery’s expansion in Virginia and the nation and protect 
the “moral and economic health of herrenvolk democracy.”16  Virginia’s rending reflected the 
endgame in a half-century conflict that pitted slaveholding interests against majoritarian rule and 
democratic principles, a conflict Link considers inexorable.  Sean Wilentz and Stephanie 
McCurry offer similar interpretations stressing the fatal struggle between the institutions of 
democracy and slavery.  Debates concerning democratic reform in Virginia “widened” the 
“breach” between the “western…country democrats and the eastern slaveholder gentry.”  West 
Virginia’s creation offered the only resolution to this issue.17  Stephanie McCurry supports 
Wilentz’s argument, insisting that “modern” political thought and chattel slavery represented two 
antagonistic systems incapable of coexistence.  Only white southerners blinded by their “hubris” 
and an “impoverished political vision” could not forecast conflict concerning black bondage and 
white liberty, McCurry argues.  Slavery’s destruction in 1865, therefore, represented an 
appropriate coda to white southerners’ attempts to balance the two institutions.18   
 West Virginia’s creation appears to support many of the arguments offered by historians.  
Virginia’s intense sectionalism prior to the Civil War strengthens interpretations suggesting that 
two distinct peoples developed on either side of the Allegheny Mountains, with each section 
possessing different political, economic, social, and cultural interests.  Foremost among such 
differences was that concerning slavery.  With few slaves and fewer slaveholders, western 
Virginia appeared as a declining “society with slaves” that showed glimpses of the “free labor” 
                                                          
16 William A. Link, “‘This Bastard New Virginia’:  Slavery, West Virginia Exceptionalism, and the Secession 
Crisis,” West Virginia History: A Journal of Regional Studies, 3, no. 1 (2009): 40.   
17 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2005), 341-347.   
18 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 83.   
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future that awaited northern states.  Western Virginia’s proximity to Ohio and Pennsylvania and 
commercial relations with western and northern markets strengthened the bonds between 
residents and their northern neighbors while attenuating such ties with eastern Virginians.  The 
region’s small and declining slave population encouraged residents to embrace political and 
constitutional principles established on natural rights, not property rights, a mindset that 
contrasted sharply with Tidewater and Piedmont slaveholders.  Western Virginians, unable to 
inaugurate meaningful constitutional and political reform and thoroughly democratize the state 
constitution because of easterners’ paranoia and fear, embraced the Republican Party to manifest 
their democratic desires.  This “free labor” and “free soil” party would guide transmontane 
Virginians through secession and civil war, ultimately helping to construct a democratic state 
freed from slavery’s corrupting influences. 
 This gospel of sectionalism and antislaveryism concerning West(ern) Virginia, however, 
overlooks important developments that shaped residents’ reactions to dismemberment, statehood, 
democracy, and slavery.  The sectionalism that Willey noted and other historians have echoed 
since 1863 existed but not necessarily to the degree posited.  Eastern Virginians’ refusal to 
support internal improvements or endorse constitutional reform frustrated westerners who often 
expressed their outrage at the ballot box, notably in the widespread rejection of the 1830 
Constitution.  And while a few outspoken individuals advocated a division of the state in 1830 
and again in 1850 to permanently sever the two regions and end sectional strife, most 
northwesterners dismissed this ludicrous suggestion.  Two-party politics bound northwesterners 
with other Virginians across the state, as the Democratic and Whig parties transcended 
geographical boundaries and fostered the growth of “imagined” political communities.19  
                                                          
19 Benedict Anderson, Imagine Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: 
Verso Press, 1991).   
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Further, northwesterners held in deep regard their Virginia heritage and expressed reluctance to 
discard their birthright.  Northwesterners and their eastern neighbors shared similar foes, too, 
notably northern abolitionists and Republicans, men who appeared to threaten established and 
traditional hierarchies.  Issues such as free public schools, greater political representation for 
non-propertyholders, and more state-funded internal improvements west of the Alleghenies often 
divided Virginians along sectional lines but such grievances never reached a level of severity that 
threatened state harmony.  Northwestern Virginians affirmed and reaffirmed their fealty toward 
the state on countless occasions throughout the antebellum era, even during the secession crisis 
and beginning stages of the Civil War.  During the statehood movement, leaders and residents 
bickered over the propriety and significance of leaving Virginia, eventually stumbling their way 
to West Virginia’s creation.  While a few northwestern Virginians maintained the steady 
drumbeat of sectionalism in the antebellum era, most residents preferred the rhythm of a unified 
Virginia.      
 While Willey and other historians have exaggerated the intense sectionalism that 
characterized antebellum Virginia, Willey’s argument concerning northwesterners’ deep 
investment in protecting slavery and slaveholders’ interests highlighted a fundamental (and 
accurate) component of Northwest politics.  During the antebellum era, northwesterners stressed 
their fealty toward to the peculiar institution, attempting to calm eastern Virginians’ fears that 
they posed an acute threat to their human property.  At each constitutional convention and in 
1861, northwesterners pledged their support for slavery and slaveholders’ rights, promising not 
to disturb the master-slave relationship while vowing to disarm any perceived threat.  
Northwesterners’ defense of slavery reflected residents’ belief that black bondage ensured and 
generated white liberty.  Indeed, rather than perceiving the two institutions as antagonistic, 
10 
 
northwesterners viewed them as symbiotic.  Existing in a state of equilibrium, chattel slavery and 
democratic government provided the greatest political freedom available to white southerners.  
Regardless of the volatile economic climate or what party ruled the governor’s mansion or White 
House, white northwesterners’ political freedom remained sacrosanct and protected.  But 
democracy and slavery, two fragile institutions, required white northwesterners’ continued 
vigilance lest some force, group, or ism threaten them.  A handful of white northwesterners 
opposed this political dynamic, frustrated about slavery’s centrality to politics while other 
interests appeared to languish.  But the majority of residents embraced this dynamic, cognizant 
that their political representation depended upon African Americans’ exclusion.             
The statehood movement exemplified northwesterners’ stance on slavery and 
dismemberment.  Following Virginia’s adoption and ratification of the Ordinance of Secession in 
early 1861, few northwesterners predicted or advocated a division of the state or slavery’s 
destruction.  An abrupt end to the political and military conflict unfolding around the nation 
threatened to embarrass northwesterners who endorsed radical action, including dividing the 
state or removing slavery from the region.  Indeed, at each key political moment, northwestern 
politicians and residents introduced strong arguments for not dividing the state and not 
destroying slavery.  Only when their democratic rights appeared vulnerable did residents support 
separation but the issue of African American bondage loomed large.  Slavery proponents worried 
about political and racial miscegenation, fearful that the hierarchies that shaped northwesterners’ 
lives would be dismantled with slavery’s abolition.  Accordingly, many such proponents rejected 
statehood lest racial equality be foisted upon them by northwestern Republicans and their alleged 
abolitionist allies.  Statehood supporters, however, assured residents that African Americans 
11 
 
would remain politically marginalized and socially subordinate in the new state.  In short, 
statehood promised to protect western Virginians’ racial democracy.     
The decades preceding West Virginia’s creation demonstrates that previous scholarship 
tracing the state’s genesis to alleged bitter sectionalism and burgeoning antislaveryism 
misinterprets northwestern residents’ attachment and devotion to Virginia and chattel slavery.  
White northwesterners’ demands for greater political representation represented their belief that 
enfranchising non-propertyholders and basing representation solely on the white population 
would protect slaveholders’ investment in human property.  With all white men exercising 
identical political and constitutional rights, possibly divisive differences that could threaten 
slaveholders’ prerogatives and the master-slave relationship would be removed from the body 
politic.  Democracy and slavery, locked in a symbiotic relationship, would guarantee harmony 
and stability within Virginia regardless of sectional differences.20  Though democratization 
arrived later in Virginia than in other southern slaveholding states, the measures inaugurated in 
1851 strengthened northwesterners’ attachment to the state and its institutions and deepened their 
                                                          
20 “Democracy” is a potent, contested, and slippery word to define.  In the strictest political sense, “democracy” 
means “rule of the people,” where citizens have a direct voice in, among other privileges, ratifying or rejecting 
legislation and directly electing candidates.  Majoritarian rule represents a fundamental characteristic of this form of 
government.  While nineteenth-century Americans accepted this definition, limiting “democracy” to solely 
describing a form of government narrows analysis and overlooks “democracy’s” cultural power, too.  “Democracy” 
not only meant broad, if not universal, enfranchisement for white men, direct election of public officials, justice 
meted out irrespective of status, representation based not on property but people, and constitutional equality but a 
society that reflected this broad political equality.  This equality meant, according to Sean Wilentz, “changing 
human relations between governors and the governed,” a seminal transformation that shaped American political, 
social, intellectual, cultural, and economic systems.  Indeed, political “democracy” often precipitated or closely 
followed changes in “human relations” in other arenas, creating an environment conducive to challenging 
established norms in every aspect of American society.  As Wilentz notes and this dissertation emphasizes, however, 
“democracy” represents a fragile system that can be manipulated, limited, or dismantled, requiring vigilance from 
citizens regardless of wealth, political affiliation, or any other cleavage.  Accordingly, this dissertation employs 
“democracy” in its broadest sense, one that encompasses not only the political characteristics embedded in the word 
but its transformative characteristics outside of the political sphere.  Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, XVIII-
XIX.          
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engagement in the “politics of slavery.”  Northwesterners became fiercely loyal to Virginia and 
to chattel slavery. 
This loyalty to the state and its central institution shaped northwesterners’ reactions to the 
political crises of the 1850s.  Residents elected proslavery politicians, censured those who 
wavered, and endorsed slavery’s centrality in politics.  Northwesterners drew closer in Virginia’s 
political orbit, not further away, even with the Republican Party’s arrival.  By 1861, the 
disagreement between northwesterners and their eastern brethren centered not on slavery’s 
propriety or its presence in the Old Dominion but rather how best to protect the institution.  
Though a majority of residents insisted that remaining under the power of the federal 
government and U.S. Constitution would achieve that end, others endorsed the Confederate 
States of America to protect slavery from encroaching Republicans and their abolitionist allies.   
This debate shaped residents’ interpretation of statehood, too.  Statehood proponents 
maintained that separating from Virginia would protect white residents’ political rights while 
preserving their racial superiority even with the adoption of gradual emancipation.  Statehood 
opponents disagreed, arguing that without chattel slavery, racial distinctions would collapse and 
political and social anarchy would reign.  Though statehood divided these two groups, preserving 
racial hierarchy united them.  West Virginia’s creation, therefore, represented neither a clean 
break from residents’ Virginian or southern ethos nor a democratic, antislavery revolution.  The 
Mountain State’s founding represented a triumph of racial democracy, a state created to preserve 
and perpetuate political privileges for white residents.  The liberi expressed in West Virginia’s 
motto applied only to white residents, not African Americans.    
This study employs a chronological narrative to track northwesterners’ deepening support 
for democratic government and chattel slavery.  Chapter One provides background to the intense 
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debate in early antebellum Virginia concerning democratization.  Tidewater and Piedmont 
politicians and slaveholders expressed reticence on this issue, worrying that unmooring political 
and constitutional rights from property threatened stability.  Property meant both landed and 
human, two forms that few western Virginians owned.  Transmontane Virginians maintained that 
natural rights, not property rights, should be the basis for government.  Residents also took great 
pains to display their fealty toward slavery and slaveholders’ rights, a chief concern for many 
eastern Virginians.  This debate reached a crescendo in 1829, as delegates across the state 
convened in Richmond to modify the state constitution. 
Chapter Two explores the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention, a moment many 
historians suggest hastened Virginia’s “dissolution.”  The convention, however, provided the 
foundation necessary for later democratization.  Though northwestern delegates failed to 
inaugurate all the democratic principles they wished, their victory in enlarging the franchise 
validated the changing economic and political context rapidly unfolding around them.  Still, 
residents expressed outrage that eastern elites had prevented democracy’s inevitable march on 
Virginia soil, an outrage expressed at the ballot box and in talk of dismemberment.  Such talk, 
however, quickly faded as residents enjoyed the broader franchise and events in southeastern 
Virginia directed residents’ attention to chattel slavery. 
Nat Turner’s Rebellion, coming on the heels of the constitutional convention, posed an 
important challenge to slaveholders across the state and politicians who championed the 
proslavery cause.  Chapter Three analyzes how Virginia proslavery and prodemocracy 
ideologues reconceptualized African American bondage to broaden its appeal and stress its 
centrality to republican government.  The three principal figures in this movement, Benjamin 
Watkins Leigh, Charles Dew, and Abel P. Upshur, helped establish the contours of a new 
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proslavery ideology that appealed to nonslaveholders in Virginia and across the south.  Their 
tactic worked.  By 1850, northwesterners deepened their engagement in the “politics of slavery” 
and strengthened their commitment to slavery and slaveholders’ interests.  The final piece in 
solidifying residents’ support for the institution and the state rested on democratizing the state 
constitution. 
Chapter Four examines the Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851 and its dramatic 
effects on Virginia’s political culture.  During the convention, northwestern delegates stressed 
their constituents’ fealty toward chattel slavery, the overriding issue at the convention.  Eastern 
planters and politicians doubted such faithfulness.  With northerners becoming more vocal in 
their opposition to slavery and abolitionists possibly operating within the state, slaveholders 
needed property qualifications to protect their investment, easterners insisted.  But, with 
assistance from Henry A. Wise, northwesterners adopted a democratic constitution that 
inaugurated universal male suffrage and equalized representation while strengthening the state 
government’s commitment to slavery.  The impact of the new constitution became manifest 
immediately, as gubernatorial campaigns centered on the issue of slavery.  While the “politics of 
slavery” had characterized northwestern politics prior to 1851, the adoption of the new 
constitution deepened residents’ engagement and heightened the dangers of not protecting 
Virginia’s new racial democracy.       
Not all northwestern Virginians, however, embraced slavery’s increased centrality to 
politics.  Chapter 5 focuses on the emergence of the Republican Party, a political organization 
that attracted some northwesterners with its message of “free soil” and “free labor.”  Those that 
supported the party believed that the Republican Party could alter the political calculus of the 
state by offering residents an alternative to the two-party system that strengthened slaveholders’ 
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power over the state.  Despite previous scholarship arguing otherwise, Republicans remained 
alien to most residents.  Republicans’ policies closely mirrored those of northern abolitionists to 
most northwesterners, drawing condemnation and violence from voters.  Rather, up through the 
1860 presidential election, most northwesterners remained committed to the two-party system 
and supportive of traditional Democratic and Whiggish nominees.  As the secession crisis began 
to unfold following the election, most residents remained steadfast that the Union, not the 
nascent Confederacy, provided the best means for protecting white residents’ democratic rights 
and chattel slavery.   
Chapter Six examines northwesterners’ arguments concerning secession in early 1861 
and the beginning stages of the statehood movement.  During the Richmond convention 
convened in February 1861, most northwestern delegates expressed their constituents’ firm 
attachment to the Union, citing their desire to protect their democratic rights and the institution 
of slavery.  A handful of northwestern delegates opposed the Union, insisting that secession 
would protect those two critical institutions.  President Lincoln’s call for troops following Fort 
Sumter’s bombardment convinced a majority of delegates statewide, including a few from the 
Northwest, that the Republican administration sought slavery’s destruction; accordingly, most 
delegates statewide ratified the secession ordinance.  Northwesterners opposed to secession 
convened meetings and conventions across the region to discuss dividing the state, a proposition 
that appeared fraught with obstacles and far from certain.  But as the idea of statehood gained 
currency in the Northwest, few politicians or residents appeared willing to disturb the master-
slave relationship.  While some national Republicans considered slavery’s destruction in the 




Chapter Seven analyzes how northwestern residents achieved statehood while still 
maintaining the region’s system of racial hierarchy.  Statehood proponents encouraged residents 
to support West Virginia’s creation, insisting that the Mountain State’s founding would 
accelerate a demographic “whitening” of the region already in progress.  Freed and enslaved 
African Americans would be removed from the state while West Virginia’s climate would deter 
other blacks from entering the new state.  The few African Americans who remained would 
reside under draconian antebellum laws concerning freed blacks, as fines and corporal 
punishment remained on the books.  These few blacks would labor in menial service positions, 
leaving more prosperous and prestigious positions for white residents.  While statehood 
opponents maintained that West Virginia’s creation would “blacken” the mountains, most 
residents argued that the state’s founding would protect white equality and racial hierarchy.  
Admitted to the Union in 1863, West Virginia represented a triumph of racial democracy.      
 What unfolded in antebellum West(ern) Virginia and during the Civil War reflected 
broader developments convulsing the nation.  Issues of race, citizenship, and democratic 
development shaped political debates in Virginia, New York, Tennessee, North Carolina, and 
California prior to the Civil War while a marked increase in European immigration post-1848 
further raised the relationship between political fitness and skin color.  The Civil War failed to 
settle these debates, as immediate post-war and Reconstruction developments reflected a 
continuation of these volatile issues. 
 The interplay between slaveholders and nonslaveholders in Virginia likewise reflected 
developments across the South that sought to tether the interests of the latter with those of the 
former.  In states across the Deep South, state constitutions democratized political representation 
and power between the two classes and helped establish a precedent for other southern states.  
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This slaveholders’ democracy promised equal power and voice to all white men regardless of 
status or political affiliation.  Slaveholders often couched their defense of slavery in terms of 
patriarchal defense and familial obligation, hoping these arguments would resonate with 
nonslaveholders.  Numerous slaveholders also generated strong economic ties with their 
nonslaveholding neighbors that directly tied the financial well-being of one family with that of 
the other.  When the war came, these bonds forged over the previous decades between the two 
groups often proved durable and strong as the mobilization of nonslaveholders into the 
Confederate army demonstrated.  In Virginia, a similar dynamic unfolded except in western 
Virginia, where the defense of slavery acquired different meanings and produced different 
results.  While this dissertation focuses on Virginia, in many instances what occurred in the Old 
Dominion reflected broader regional and national developments shaping the country as a whole 
in powerful ways.   
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Chapter 1: Defining Freedom: Freeholds, Republican Citizenship, and the Grassroots Movement 
for Democratic Reform  
 
In June 1824, “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” wrote an open letter in the 
Clarksburg Intelligencer chiding his representative in Congress, Joseph Johnson.  Two actions 
by Johnson drew the constituent’s ire.  First, Johnson refused to support William H. Crawford’s 
candidacy in the upcoming presidential election, turning his back on a candidate who the author 
believed to have “deserve[d] the station.”  Johnson’s other offense was his pro-tariff stance.  
While “all the other representatives from Virginia” had rightly denounced the measure and 
accordingly voted against it, Johnson embraced the tariff.  “A HOUSE KEEPER” warned that such 
actions—especially when the people of western Virginia had unanimously rejected such deeds—
were dangerous for Johnson’s political career.  For now, western Virginians would watch their 
representative in earnest to observe any signs of repentance.1   
A constituent writing a public letter scathing the conduct of a representative should not be 
surprising, especially to modern observers of the political process.  Such actions were and are 
common, and are generally indicative of an engaged citizenry and a transparent democratic 
process, both hallmarks of western liberal democracies that have emerged and been refined since 
the Enlightenment.  What should be surprising, given the context of the letter, is the author’s 
self-proclaimed identity.  The author lived under the 1776 Virginia Constitution, a republican 
document that ultimately regarded a “house keeper” as a dependent, disenfranchised resident 
who existed on the political margins.  White men who owned the requisite amount of land 
decreed by the constitution, meanwhile, enjoyed the privileges, prerogatives, and burdens of the 
political sphere.  But the self-identified “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” considered such 
distinctions artificial and arbitrary.  In publicly chastising his representative, “A HOUSE KEEPER” 
                                                          
1 Clarksburg Intelligencer, June 19, 1824, 2-3.  [emphasis in original] 
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understood that he stepped beyond his proscribed sphere and admitted that Johnson likely found 
his “stile…a little too dictatorial” considering his “signature.”  And the author also confessed 
that he “cannot vote at the elections and thereby express my utmost displeasure at your sins of 
omission and commission.”  Yet he pressed on, looking toward that silver lining in the distance.  
His “prospect[s] of…possessing that right at the next election, or the succeeding one at farthest, 
is increasing daily,” he declared, and soon he would enjoy the sundry benefits and 
responsibilities inherent in republican citizenship.  In the interim, he would continue to “arraign 
[politicians] at the bar of the public,” broadcasting his approbation or disapproval through 
popular media.2  
The letter from “A HOUSE KEEPER” elucidates the central tension in antebellum 
Virginia’s political system.  While the traditional narrative of American democracy chronicles a 
constant, if not inexorable, increase in the political rights granted to free white men following the 
American Revolution, the vesting of such rights proved uneven.3  Indeed, while the national and 
geopolitical consequences of the American Revolution often proved widespread and dramatic, 
the domestic and political effects of the Revolution in Virginia proved limited.  Elite Virginians 
worked diligently to harness the Pandora’s Box that the American Revolution opened, ultimately 
ratifying a new constitution and passing laws designed to perpetuate their hegemony and curtail 
any liberal sentiments.  Rather than inaugurating dramatic political and constitutional changes, 
Virginia elites embraced the status quo, with all the prevailing orthodoxies and ideologies 
inherent in this political system.   
                                                          
2 Clarksburg Intelligencer, June 19, 1824, 2-3.   
3 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York: 
Basic Books, 2000).   
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But the letter from “A HOUSE KEEPER” reveals more than elite Virginians’ refusal to 
embrace democratic reforms.  While previous southern and Virginia historians have focused on 
tracing political and constitutional developments at the state and local levels, Virginia’s political 
transformation cannot be grasped solely, or even mainly, from such a top-down perspective.4  
The resulting interpretations have proven limited, overlooking the often subtle and latent cultural 
practices and values that antebellum Virginians associated with the political process.  Notably, 
this top-down perspective marginalizes an increasing variety of actors engaging in public 
political activities and demanding full and equal political rights, including “A HOUSE KEEPER.”  
A grassroots perspective allows a clearer picture of the increasingly broad realm of politics and 
political culture that came to form a central component of Virginians’ lives, specifically those in 
the Northwest.  And as men (and women) convened in barbeques, meeting houses, courts, and 
other public areas to discuss politics, what unfolded were often intense and rich debates about the 
meaning of politics and how to reconcile politics and power with changing social, economic, 
cultural, and demographic realities.  In the Northwest, such debates and negotiations took on 
added urgency and importance, as many people demanded entry to a political process they 
deemed a natural right.  To effect change in the political system, these residents engaged in 
popular politics to demonstrate the necessary virtues needed in a republic.  In so doing, they also 
sought to direct other Virginians and southerners toward a reformed model of republican 
citizenship, one built not upon land ownership but upon the productive capacity of labor, the 
memory of the American Revolution, and the natural right to self-government.5   
                                                          
4 See, for example, Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, and Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the 
South Atlantic States, 1776-1860: A Study in the Evolution of Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966). 
5 Christopher Michael Curtis uses the phrase “productive capacity of labor” to describe how slaveowners could stake 
a claim to political representation on the basis of their control of their chattel’s labor.  Alternatively, Northwestern 
residents pointed to their ability to control their labor and the benefit such labor provided the Commonwealth as 
grounds for their political representation.  Christopher Michael Curtis, Jefferson’s Freeholders and the Politics of 
Ownership in the Old Dominion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).   
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When elite eastern Virginians looked west toward the Blue Ridge and Allegheny 
Mountains, they viewed this vast western region with a mixture of fear, sublimity, and optimism.  
During the colonial era, elite eastern Virginians looked with trepidation toward the periphery of 
their world, mindful of the region’s natural beauty and resources but wary of Native Americans 
and competing imperial powers.  In an effort to bolster the defense of the colony and, later, the 
state, Virginians promoted settlements to act as a buffer between the more populous Tidewater 
and its western front.6  But the chaotic and disorganized manner in which settlers populated (or 
simply squatted) on the land produced political, cultural, and legal misunderstandings between 
these settlers and eastern elites.  Settlers generally ignored title and ownership rights, flouting the 
traditional means of land ownership.  The diverse ethnic composition of the settlers complicated 
matters further.  Rather than the pure English stock that Tidewater Virginians claimed, Germans, 
Ulster-Scots, Swiss immigrants, and former indentured servants settled along the western front.  
The belief that Tidewater culture could be replanted and replicated west of the mountains 
appeared chimerical and fleeting.  Up through the mid-nineteenth century, elite eastern 
Virginians continued to look skeptically toward their western brethren, seeming to recognize that 
such people, including “A HOUSE KEEPER,” could never fit the narrow definition of what 
constituted “true Virginia.”7         
Elites’ deployment of “true Virginia” as a rhetorical instrument provides an important 
window into their governing ideology.  From Virginia’s colonial beginnings, these elite men 
embraced a hierarchical and patriarchal society based on republican ideology and derived from 
the planter-centered political economy of Tidewater Virginia.  Contemporaries prized the virtues 
                                                          
6 B. Scott Crawford, “A Frontier of Fear: Terrorism and Social Tension along Virginia’s Western Waters, 1742-
1775,” West Virginia History: A Journal of Regional Studies, 2, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 1-29.   
7 Leslie Scott Philyaw, Virginia’s Western Visions: Political and Cultural Expansion on an Early American Frontier 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2004), IX-XXV, 24-39, 64-75, 123.   
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and individual liberty that emanated from land ownership, notably economic self-sufficiency 
(achieved through slave labor) and physical independence.  Both of those qualities, according to 
the tenets of republican ideology, attached these independent men to their community’s interests 
and needs and represented the criteria essential to republican government.8  Accordingly, these 
men governed the colony’s public affairs.  Further, these leading men, labeled the “grandees of 
government” by one historian, expected deference and obedience from all those under their 
authority, including other white men, women, children, slaves, indentured servants, Native 
Americans, and other dependents.  The hierarchical and patriarchal world created by the 
“grandees of government” and reinforced by republican ideology embodied the vision of “true 
Virginia,” a vision that greatly shaped the state’s political institutions and operations and 
political culture.9   
The “grandees of government” enjoyed a fixed and respected place in the body politic.  
These men “imposed, preserved, and profited” from the political world they created, augmenting 
their power and that of their ilk.10  The House of Burgesses, county courts, and colonial governor 
all remained under the direction of these men, with all three branches of government functioning 
to further their power.  Land ownership emerged as a prerequisite for suffrage in 1670, thereby 
excluding the less prosperous and landless.  Supporters for the measure argued that 
landownership provided the strongest evidence of a man’s investment in the colony’s welfare 
and health.  Accordingly, these men’s voices should and did carry more weight.  With their 
control of government nearly absolute, the grandees regulated everything from indentured 
servants’ and enslaved laborers’ behavior to religious beliefs to tobacco prices under the guise of 
                                                          
8 Curtis, Jefferson’s Freeholders, 54.   
9 Brent Tarter, The Grandees of Government: The Origins and Persistence of Undemocratic Politics in Virginia 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013).   
10 Tarter, Grandees of Government, 8.   
23 
 
patriarchal control and protection and republican virtue.  The solidarity and harmony expressed 
by the grandees further shielded them from external assaults, solidifying their political power and 
their control over colonial governance.11 
While the grandees’ faces and names changed over the course of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, their worldview and ideology remained relatively static.  The grandees’ 
descendants continued to disproportionately control county and local offices, even as Virginia’s 
population grew outside of the Tidewater.  The handful of judges comprising the General Court 
crafted legislation, directed the course of the governor’s administration, and used their influence 
over the governor to appoint family members to lucrative governmental posts.  This small group 
of judges also navigated land grants through complex bureaucracy, gaining valuable information 
on land.  And as the number of qualified voters, candidates, defeated incumbents, and contested 
election results declined, the grandees continued to exert greater hegemony over the political 
system they created.12   
But the American Revolution altered the power dynamic, threatening that carefully 
crafted hegemony.  In the years leading up to and surrounding the Revolution, a powerful 
“evangelical counterculture” jeopardized elites’ loci of power, including courthouses, by 
challenging the cultural authority wielded by leading men.13  Residents increasingly petitioned 
the state legislature on elective matters, notably on the issue of voter qualifications.   Women, 
free blacks, and, less often, slaves, authored other petitions touching on private and communal 
matters.14  In November 1775, the high turnover of elected officials in county elections reflected 
                                                          
11 Tarter, Grandees of Government, 59-71.   
12 John Gilman Kolp, Gentlemen and Freeholders: Electoral Politics in Colonial Virginia (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 36-80.   
13 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).   
14 Richard Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 56-57.   
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an increasingly restive constituency and tenant farmers protested the high rents that landholders 
charged.15  Such actions revealed the democratizing potential of the war and perhaps presaged a 
slow move toward more popular politics.  While many of the actors who argued for redress and 
change lacked political representation, their actions suggested that the fervor and rhetoric 
surrounding the American Revolution permitted such measures.  These actions suggested an 
alarming trend for Virginia’s elites who could not help but fret about their loosening grip over 
the colony’s dependents and public affairs.16      
The means for re-securing elites’ political power rested on two legislative achievements.  
In June 1779, the General Assembly passed two statutes both aimed at strengthening the rights 
and power of freeholders, men who owned a tenure of land for life.  One statute abolished all 
forms of feudal tenure while the other statute proclaimed that all lands in Virginia would now be 
under the sole jurisdiction of the landholder.  Both laws strengthened the hands of freeholders by 
allowing them to develop, transfer, or sell their land at will, a move directed toward reconciling 
the increasing commodification of land with the republican political virtues inherent in land 
ownership.  Equally important, the laws represented the state legislators’ reaffirmation that the 
freehold would constitute the new state’s constitutional foundation.  Propertied men would 
continue to preside over and protect the republic, prizing their interests and voices and those of 
their ilk over those of dependents across the Commonwealth.17             
Along with tackling the politics of landownership, the legislature also ratified a new 
constitution.  Rejecting the revolutionary ideals of egalitarianism and inclusivity, the framers 
                                                          
15 Michael McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class, and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 127-128, 190-191.   
16 Landon Carter perhaps best exhibited this type of fear.  Carter watched as his political world and personal world 
on his plantation transformed around him, testing his ties to the British Crown, fellow Virginians, his family, and his 
slaves.  Rhys Isaac, Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom: Revolution and Rebellion on a Virginia Plantation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004).     
17 Curtis, Jefferson’s Freeholders, 53-54.   
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crafted the state constitution to perpetuate and strengthen many of the operations, practices, and 
structures imposed by their forebears.  The framers also included no formal mechanism for 
amending the constitution, implying that this body of laws and statutes would operate ad 
infinitum.  The 1776 Constitution handicapped the power of the executive by permitting the 
General Assembly oversight of the executive office.  The General Assembly elected the 
governor, who served three one-year terms, limiting his power and providing the governor little 
opportunity to check the power of the legislative branch.  The legislature’s election of the 
governor also meant the governor often acted as a puppet for the grandees, making him little 
more than a figure head.  In one final gesture showcasing the ultimate power of the General 
Assembly over the governor, the legislature could pass legislation without obtaining the 
governor’s signature via a simple majority.  The subsequent legislation was not subject to 
executive veto, either.18   
Though the governor remained under the watchful eye of the General Assembly, the 
position did include an important judicial privilege.  The constitution empowered the governor to 
appoint justices of the peace to county courts, an important role considering that these local 
courts projected the state’s power.  These appointments came with an important caveat: the 
governor could only appoint those nominated by members already on the bench.  As the majority 
of those sitting members came from prominent families, the appointment process worked to the 
advantage of these families, allowing them to perpetuate and consolidate power in the 
community.  Furthermore, this process of appointing new judges allowed these prominent 
families to insulate themselves from public challenges to their power.19  One such family, the 
                                                          
18 Francis Pendleton Gaines, Jr., “The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1850-51: A Study in Sectionalism” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1950), 32; Dickson Bruce, Jr., The Rhetoric of Conservatism: The Virginia 
Convention of 1829-30 and the Conservative Tradition in the South (San Marino, CA: Kingsport Press, 1982), 8-9.   
19 Tarter, Grandees of Government, 108.   
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Jacksons from Clarksburg, built an impressive network of patronage, jobs, land holdings, and 
local and state elected offices in the Northwest through this practice well into the mid-nineteenth 
century.20  
Still, of the three branches of government, the legislative remained the strongest, a 
reflection of the distrust of monarchical figures and the continued perpetuation of grandees’ 
power.  The formula used to determine representation, the method of voting, and the 
requirements for voting all worked to solidify legislative power (and the elites they represented) 
while limiting the power of the disenfranchised.  Indeed, all three measures worked to achieve 
the same end: to make sure that government and politics remained the purview of “civilized men, 
not for a horde of savages just emerging from an imaginary state of nature,” as one noted 
conservative later commented.21  To limit the power this “horde of savages” could wield, 
representation in the state legislature favored the Tidewater region, the area where most elites 
resided.  The state constitution allotted each county two representatives in the House of 
Delegates regardless of the county’s white population or aggregate population of white and black 
residents.  While on the surface this apportionment appeared equal, important demographic shifts 
following the American Revolution highlighted this apportionment’s inherent inequality.  
Numerous Tidewater counties’ population stagnated or declined as free white people and white 
families, along with their slaves, moved west and settled in the western part of the state or in 
fertile land opening beyond the Appalachian Mountains.22  This constant and steady migration 
increased the populations of western Virginia counties, including those in the Northwest.  And as 
                                                          
20 Matthew C. Foulds, “Enemies of the State: Methodists, Secession, and the Civil War in Western Virginia, 1845-
1872” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2012), 70.  
21 Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830: to which are subjoined, the new 
constitution of Virginia, and the votes of the people (Richmond: S. Shepherd & Co., 1830), 160.  [hereafter cited as 
Proceedings and Debate] 
22 David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia and the Westward Movement (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2000).   
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this demographic shift continued, residents became increasingly aware of the political paradox of 
a minority ruling a majority.  As one Monongalia County resident later grumbled, “a defect in 
the Constitution” authorized “one third of the free people…[to] rule the other two thirds of the 
people.”23  A governing minority flouted equality and democracy for white men while betraying 
the legacy of the American Revolution.        
The declining population of eastern counties and the increasingly populous western 
counties captured Virginians’ attention, including Thomas Jefferson, who ruminated on this 
disparity in his Notes on the State of Virginia.  Using militia returns, Jefferson compared the 
population figures of Warwick County in southeast Virginia against Loudon County in north-
central Virginia.  The dramatic population swings in both counties and subsequent political 
ramifications confirmed what Virginians believed: a minority residing in eastern Virginia 
controlled and benefited from the operations and structures of the state government.  As 
Jefferson later averred, the “exclusion of a majority of our freemen from the right of 
representation is merely arbitrary, and an usurpation of the minority over the majority.”24  
Although Warwick County had experienced a declining population in the preceding years, its 
representatives still wielded the same amount of political power as the increasingly populous 
Loudon County.  When Warwick’s delegates joined with other Tidewater delegates, their 
numerical advantage proved practically insurmountable, often at the expense of projects 
designed to develop the minds and natural resources of the state.  A public education system, 
numerous internal improvements including canals, roads, and railroads, and greater development 
                                                          
23 Monongalia Chronicle, December 31, 1825, 3.   
24 Niles Weekly Register, 26 (1824), 179.   
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of the state’s coal fields all faced immense opposition from this minority, with few projects 
garnering the state legislature’s approval.25   
Perhaps of all the statutes contained in the Virginia bylaws none garnered more scrutiny 
than the freehold requirement.  A freehold represented the ownership of some quantifiable 
amount of land; its political significance, though, greatly outweighed its measureable quality.  
Virginia’s colonial government first adopted the freehold requirement in 1670 as a way to 
strengthen the relationship between the colony’s planters and landowners and the fledgling 
government.  In return for financially and personally supporting the government, colonial 
legislators decreed that only propertied individuals could vote and hold public office, and that the 
freehold would be used to calculate representation.  Small farmers, indentured servants, laborers, 
and other dependents not meeting the freehold requirement lost their voice in government.  
Proponents of this policy pointed to landowners’ support of the government and, as land 
represented the source of wealth, legislation, taxation, suffrage, and political office, those with 
the most at stake deserved a stronger voice in politics.   
Finally, advocates defended the freehold with an ideological justification.  Propertied 
men represented the proper stewards of liberty and were best suited to perform the necessary 
civic duties required for the maintenance of the republic, supporters insisted.  Such physical and 
economic independence allowed these men to insulate themselves from outside interests and 
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voices.  As a Clarksburg resident later proclaimed, the freehold requirement allowed freeholders 
to “remain beyond the reach of bribery and corruption.”  Alternatively, nonfreeholders “may be 
swept away by every favourite breeze.”26  Ultimately, the health of the government and the 
future of the republic, defenders argued, depended on the freehold requirement.27   
Within these grand pronouncements of protecting the republic, a latent current of distrust 
existed in the minds of freeholders about the intentions of their non-freeholder neighbors.  For 
numerous freeholders, especially those in positions of power, non-freeholders appeared as an 
uncertain ally or a possible enemy.  Freeholders worried that men like “A HOUSE KEEPER of 
Harrison County” would revolt against the ruling order or join forces with sympathetic 
freeholders and institute draconian legislation that could upset Virginia’s hierarchical 
foundations.  Land, slaves, material wealth, and raw power could all vanish from the hands of 
freeholders if such an apocalyptic scenario reached fruition.  Nonfreeholders’ numerical majority 
heightened such concerns for freeholders.  When rumors of war swirled about Virginia in the 
mid-1670s, freeholders’ concerns nearly became manifest, as nonfreeholders lashed out in 
protest.28  Although the freehold fluctuated in acreage requirement over the proceeding decades, 
the original purpose of limiting participation and centralizing power in the minority continued 
throughout the early nineteenth century.     
Nonfreeholders often found freeholders’ arguments and fears absurd.  The increasing 
commodification of land and absentee ownership undermined freeholders’ noble arguments 
about the inviolability and sanctity of land.29  Rampant debt, penury, and political corruption 
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among freeholders undermined freeholders’ arguments of political independence and piety.30  
Freeholders displayed similar reckless behavior during campaigns.  As one newspaper 
sarcastically remarked, nonfreeholders should step aside in order to “give place to that drunk 
freeholder just behind you.”31  Though imbibing on alcoholic beverages remained widespread 
throughout the nineteenth century, inebriated freeholders weakened assertions about their alleged 
moral and political superiority.32  Despite such actions, the freehold remained, disenfranchising 
approximately forty-percent of eligible white men west of the Alleghenies.33  Housekeepers, 
renters, laborers, and other dependents, including “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County,” 
constituted nonfreeholders.  This political marginalization frustrated nonfreeholders, who 
pondered when the American Revolution’s legacy would finally be realized.         
Reformers advocating for a revised constitution cited two more egregious flaws.  One, 
voters cast their ballot viva voce.  This method of oral balloting exposed voters to scrutiny, 
intimidation, and outright threats from neighbors.  Further, viva voce balloting allowed 
politicians and local elites to persuade voters to support certain candidates through bribery and 
patronage, allowing powerful families to preserve their hegemony.  Reformers grumbled that 
“dependent men went to the polls under duress” while “[o]nly those in independent 
circumstances could vote with entire freedom.”34  Reformers supported private ballots, insisting 
that this practice would shield voters from outside influences.     
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Reformers not only opposed how ballots were cast but also how frequently freeholders 
could vote in state elections.  Freeholders were eligible to vote in each county in which he owned 
a freehold.35  With county elections often occurring on different days and occasionally lasting 
multiple days, it was not uncommon for some freeholders to cast multiple ballots.  Older 
Tidewater counties’ close proximity and smaller size complemented this policy, increasing 
easterners’ political power.  Western counties larger geographical size and rugged topography 
generally prevented trans-Alleghany freeholders from casting multiple ballots.  While politicians 
stressed “one man, one vote” while campaigning, this phrase rang hollow for northwestern 
residents who witnessed what they considered a denial of their natural rights.36  
The high rate of disenfranchisement in the trans-Alleghany, the preponderance of 
political power in the Tidewater, and West Virginia’s founding in 1863 has caused subsequent 
historians to interpret Virginia politics through an east-west prism.37  In reality, no such clear 
demarcation existed.  Prominent landed families and individuals in northwestern and western 
Virginia benefited from the current political system as much as Tidewater elites and often 
worked across the sectional divide to accomplish shared goals.  For example, the General 
Assembly altered the method of electing the president from a district system to a general-ticket 
system.  This seemingly arcane modification, championed by Thomas Jefferson, allowed elites to 
mute dissent and create the façade of a unified electorate.38  Elites on both sides of the mountains 
also used vast webs of patronage and their control of and access to the county courts to acquire 
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valuable information on available land.  In western Virginia, this “buckskin elite” exercised 
hegemony over residents by establishing alliances with their eastern brethren and shielding 
themselves from public censure via the county court system.39  For example, the Jackson Family 
dominated northwestern politics through the middle of the nineteenth-century using the judicial 
system to accumulate wealth, land, patronage, political offices, and power across the 
Northwest.40  Such individuals and families felt little need to reform the political system to 
appease their disenfranchised and dissatisfied neighbors.   
Political changes occurring outside Virginia, notably in other slaveholding states, 
amplified voices demanding reform.  New slave states entering the Union in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries democratized their political systems, flattening distinctions 
between white men and embracing the burgeoning democratic ethos.  A Morgantown resident 
remarked that if he lived in another slaveholding state, such as Kentucky, he would possess “that 
most important privilege of freemen, the right of suffrage.”41  Attempts to align Virginia with 
more democratic slaveholding states by adopting a new constitution, including one penned by 
Thomas Jefferson, encountered heavy criticism and defeat at the hands of the state legislature.42  
Though the General Assembly passed laws abolishing primogeniture and entail, such moves 
failed to quiet the clamor for deeper and broader constitutional reform.43  In the Northwest, 
advocates for reform demanded a democratized state constitution that reflected changing 
demographic patterns and embraced what they believed were the natural consequences of the 
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American Revolution.  Further, they hoped that the new constitution would recognize that men 
could stake their claim for political representation on their productive capacity of labor and their 
natural right to self-government.  Incorporating these new dynamics into Virginia’s constitution 
meant shifting the locus of political power from land to the individual, an uncertain prospect 
considering the innuendo and suspicion surrounding moves toward popular government.44 
Popular manifestations advocating for constitutional and political reform emerged across 
the Northwest through various forms.  In November 1795, a group of Monongalia County 
residents gathered to sign a petition addressed to the General Assembly to protest what the 
petitioners considered an aristocratic, inefficient, and broken government.  The flaws with the 
current political system were numerous.  Petitioners chided their rulers for not providing 
sufficient checks and balances between the branches of state government; questioned why the 
state legislature needed to meet so frequently and thus drain the state coffers; and argued that the 
method for electing senators should be changed, perhaps even instituting popular elections for 
the position.   
While the operations of the state needed repairs, the ideological basis upon which these 
operations rested required a drastic reorientation.  The petitioners reminded the legislature that 
“the people are the source of all legitimate power” and that the “equality of man” represented a 
ubiquitous sentiment among residents.  Further, those currently excluded were “neither less 
virtuous, less wise, less experienced, nor less republican” than their forebears who fought in the 
Revolution.  Many Virginians—notably those among the governing class—rejected such beliefs. 
“[T]hey are afraid to trust the people,” the petitioners declared, a clear marker of the “language 
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of aristocracy.”  Indeed, these aristocrats sought to “degrade the mass of the people, and sacrifice 
public rights to private interest.”  To achieve political equality, the petitioners asked the 
legislative body to listen to the “will of the PEOPLE” and support a call for a constitutional 
convention to create a new constitution that redressed these grievances and embraced the legacy 
of the Revolution.45 
 The petition’s first section stressing the state’s dysfunctional political system reflected a 
central grievance for northwestern residents.  Such grievances should not be surprising, as 
previous historians have used such evidence to portray a state riven by sectionalism.  The 
petitioners’ rhetorical strategy, though, reveals an important way northwesterners’ attacked the 
ruling classes’ ideological flaws.  This exercise centered on degrading elites’ republican virtue 
while demonstrating the public good nonfreeholders provided.  While rulers supposedly sought 
to protect the common good, “private interest” constituted their primary concern.  Further, an 
aristocracy by definition implied a class of men who possessed certain titles of nobility or 
positions of status and power; aristocrats were not avatars of the common man.   
While the “mass of the people” exercised the same republican virtue as their ancestors, 
these men continued to find themselves under the dominion of aristocrats.  It should not be 
surprising, the petitioners proclaimed, that “the legitimacy of the government itself [was] being 
doubted” because it rested on an unstable foundation.  In order to be legitimate, a republican 
government needed the “constitutional authority” that could only be granted by the “majority” 
for the “majority” represented the true rulers of Virginia.  Consequently, this proclamation meant 
that Virginians, notably the governing class, needed to embrace the widest possible definition of 
“the people” and a republic.  A broader definition of “the people” meant recognizing all white 
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men as equals regardless of wealth, holdings, or status; accordingly, a broader definition of “the 
people” should be reflected in a new form of government, one that constituted a hybrid of 
republicanism and democracy.46  Accomplishing both projects meant constructing new 
assumptions about power and legitimacy, a breakthrough in political thinking that would 
inevitably lead to conflict.       
 The immense task of altering the state’s political operations failed to deter 
northwesterners, who continued to petition their government.  Following the War of 1812, 
petitioners reminded the legislature of the military duty many signees performed during the 
conflict and their continued service in the local militia.  But, Ohio County residents lamented, 
“not more than one half” of those who served in the war and currently served in the militia “were 
entitled to vote for their Rulers.”  Further, these disenfranchised militia men patrolled the 
community at night on the lookout for runaway or rebellious slaves while working during the 
day to keep the “roads and streets in good order & condition.”  Meanwhile the enfranchised “are 
in a great measure exempt from any participation in those duties.”47  The exemptions enjoyed by 
the latter group physically burdened the community while elevating those men above their 
neighbors.  It created, in the eyes of the petitioners, an artificial aristocracy that rang hollow with 
the memory of the Revolution, the recent military conflict, and the duties required in a republic.  
A nearly identical petition in neighboring Brooke County demonstrated that such thoughts 
received widespread currency in the Northwest.48     
The petitioners touched on something deeper and more profound than the creation of an 
artificial aristocracy.  In both counties, residents reminded their representatives of the powerful 
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gendered and symbiotic relationship between politics and military service.  White men staked 
their claim to political representation and patriarchal power in the household on their ability to 
protect dependents in both spheres, as the public power of military service and politics translated 
to private power within the household.  This ideological conflation between public and private 
power expressed in gendered terms promoted harmony between slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders across the South by cutting across class, socioeconomic, and political lines.49  
Further, the “public performance” of politics allowed men to distance themselves from 
dependents who lacked the right to vote, including women.  Once again, the “gendered virtues of 
manliness, honor, and character” were on full display for the community to witness.50  But in 
Virginia the deprivation of this public power threatened to undermine private power.  And by 
depriving all white men, but especially those who performed military duties, of their full political 
representation, the governing class questioned those men’s masculinity, their control over 
dependents, and ultimately their worth in a republic.     
The Northwest’s changing economic landscape further reminded residents of their 
political exclusion.  While the majority of northwestern residents in 1820 claimed agriculture as 
their primary occupation, the number of those engaged in manufacturing and commerce 
surpassed other regions across Virginia, though substantially less than areas around Richmond.51  
Still, the demand for political reform simultaneously increased as residents engaged in industrial 
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labor, notably in Wheeling.  Residents extolled Wheeling’s development as an emerging 
commercial and industrial hub, praising the city’s “inexhaustible mines of her hills, her 
manufactories, [and] the industry and enterprise of her citizens.”52  The city’s proximity to coal, 
limestone, and iron ore deposits fueled its industrialization during the nineteenth century while 
its location on the Ohio River facilitated the shipment of manufactured goods to western and 
southern markets.  Wheeling’s location also allowed it to emerge as the locus of the slave trade 
in the region.  The completion of the National Road to Wheeling in 1818 connected the city to 
eastern markets while further cementing the city as an important commercial nexus.  Iron 
foundries, nail works, cotton mills, flour mills, and coal mining in and around Wheeling 
provided employment and opportunity for residents, immigrants, and job seekers.  While some 
jobs relied on plantation goods, most produced commodities unaffiliated with the planter-
centered political economy.53   
Wheeling’s economic growth created an important variable in residents’ pursuit of 
political reform.  As Wheeling developed into an industrial-commercial center throughout the 
early nineteenth-century, the rise of new industrial and (later) professional classes such as 
mechanics and merchants reflected a significant shift away from the planter-centered political 
economy of previous generations.  Further, the capricious and volatile labor market and economy 
decreased workers’ economic stability and independence.  Without fixed income, residents 
desired to fix their place within the body politic, a sentiment that increased as the Market 
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Revolution unfolded.  By obtaining political representation and equality, this new class of 
workers hoped to shield themselves from the Market Revolution’s dislocating effects.54   
In Ohio County, residents lamented that emerging classes of workers performed valuable 
work yet lacked political representation.  Many felt “aggrieved” that the “right of suffrage is not 
sufficiently extended,” most notably to the working-class and yeomen.  “Laborers and 
agriculturalists, the industrious mechanicks, and the useful Merchants” all contributed to the 
wealth and stability of the state; yet they remained under the political rule of the “landholder (be 
his moral character what it may).”  The planter-centered political-economy and the political 
structures based on that dynamic failed to adapt to Virginia’s changing economic landscape.  
Those engaged in emerging new professions probably owned little or no landed property but still 
contributed to the general welfare of the republic through the productive capacity of their labor.  
Further, these “industrious” and “useful” workers were not exploitative, selfish individuals who 
would threaten the republic; landholders’ capricious moral and political compasses constituted a 
republic’s true enemies, reformers maintained.  As the Northwest’s industrial and commercial 
sector continued to grow throughout the antebellum period, the voices demanding reform would 
increase in size and gain various accents.55   
 Reformers’ expressed their demands through various channels.  Mass meetings, 
especially on the Fourth of July, presented some of the strongest language demanding reform 
while providing an important window into residents’ worldview.  Common among the scripted 
and volunteer toasts were those that stressed the global struggle for democracy, aligning 
Virginia’s struggle for democratic reform with those occurring internationally.  In Clarksburg in 
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July 1824, residents gathered in the town square and enjoyed the usual celebratory festivities, 
including a military parade, sermon, and banquet.  After these festivities, the toasts began in 
earnest, officiated by, among others, Thomas P. Moore, a slaveholder.56  The scripted toasts 
extolled the memory of George Washington, the U.S. armed forces, internal improvements, and 
noted that “the Cause of the Greeks” and “Our Brethren of South America” remained locked in 
the same struggle for democracy that the United States endured.  In Wheeling, gatherers also 
toasted the efforts of Ireland and Greece, along with the “Liberator of the South,” Simon 
Bolivar.57  Virginians could take solace in knowing that their fight for democracy mirrored those 
around the world.  Such pronouncements also steeled residents to continue the fight, aware that 
the tide of democracy would soon wash away tyranny.     
Volunteer toasts touched on similar themes but also focused on pertinent state issues, 
notably constitutional reform.  Paraphrasing Patrick Henry, one celebrant in Clarksburg 
proclaimed, “If to change [the constitution] be treason, may we all turn traitors.”58  In Wheeling, 
one toaster prayed that a “constitution [based] on liberal principles” would “restore [Virginia] to 
her former glory.”  While the toaster failed to identify those “liberal principles,” one can infer 
that political equality and popular sovereignty topped that list.59  Another Fourth of July 
celebration in Wheeling two years later echoed many of the same themes.  One resident 
expressed his hope that an amended constitution and reformed political system would remove the 
“weight of a selfish oligarchy” and allow “her citizens [to] enjoy their equal and unalienable 
rights.”60  The memory of the American Revolution informed residents’ interpretation of 
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Virginia’s contemporary political paralysis but the means for reviving the state remained 
obvious.  Virginians needed to recognize the natural consequences of the American Revolution 
and embrace a reformed political system that valued the political weight of all white men, the 
true “people” of the Commonwealth.            
Fourth of July celebrations offered more than an opportunity to exalt the exceptional 
history of the United States.  Indeed, one of the latent cultural aspirations of such gatherings 
centered on communal expression and solidarity.  Residents from various socioeconomic, 
political, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds convened and debated politics, often doing so with an 
accessible vernacular.  While a farmer or laborer attending the celebration may not have fully 
grasped the political minutia of constitutional reform, he probably understood politics when 
filtered through the prism of the American Revolution and when debated with neighbors.  
Reformers hoped to wield this common vernacular against the governing class to effect political 
change from the grassroots.  Therefore, when residents spoke of “oligarchy” and “inalienable 
rights” during these democratic celebrations and meetings, these words carried tremendous 
political significance accessible to residents.61   
The harmony expressed during meetings and Fourth of July celebrations overshadowed 
disagreements that commonly arose.  Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson both received their 
respective toasts in one Wheeling celebration, for example.62  Another celebrant praised John 
Randolph, a vociferous opponent of democratic reform and supporter of the present ruling 
order.63  Such political fractures were common during the 1820s, especially as national political 
parties emerged and mobilized voters.  Yet one issue received nearly universal approbation from 
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northwestern residents: slavery.  While home to fewer slaves than other regions of Virginia, the 
Northwest nevertheless held thousands of slaves and remained part of the largest slaveholding 
state in the country.64  Although sometimes not explicitly stated, the political issue of slavery 
always hovered around political discussions.  Reformers’ demands for a new constitution often 
contained assurances that democratizing the state would secure, not threaten, slavery.                 
To strengthen their arguments, reformers often recruited slaveholders to sway public 
opinion in favor of constitutional revision.  In 1825, Monongalia County residents delivered a 
petition to the state legislature demanding constitutional reform.  Among the signatures were 
Thomas Ewell and George Jenkins, the former owning three slaves and the latter owning one.65  
Alongside their names were farmers such as Nathan Johnson, who lived in adjacent Harrison 
County and Monongalian Arby Pool, both of whom relied on family labor, not slaves, to farm 
the land.66  The signatures of Ewell and Jenkins manifest their beliefs and reformers’ arguments 
that an amended constitution posed no threat to slave property.  Though democratization would 
alter the state’s operations and structures, slavery’s status in Virginia’s political constellation 
would remain secure.67   
 Some reformers expanded this argument, declaring that a democratized political system 
would tether eastern slaveholders’ interests more tightly to western nonslaveholders.  One 
Monongalia County resident reassured his eastern brethren that should that “internal foe, which 
forms the principal part” of the region’s wealth revolt, the “Western mountaineers [will] rush 
down from their rocks, and roaring streams, to the help of their eastern brethren.”68   A 
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democratized state government would secure slave property and promote greater harmony 
among Virginians across sectional and political lines.  Reformers likewise deflected arguments 
that their natural rights argument invariably extended to Native Americans, women, children, 
slaves, and free blacks.  “Free negroes & mullatoes,” the author proclaimed, “never did, and 
never will [vote] in Virginia.”69  Instead, allowing white men to exercise their natural right to 
self-government and building a state government that recognized that reality would secure racial 
boundaries.  And as racial lines hardened, the institution generating that demarcation would 
become more secure as all white men would aid in its protection.  The symbiotic relationship 
between democratic citizenship and an ardent commitment to slavery would reach full fruition.   
Though reformers professed greater security for slavery and enlisted slaveholders to 
assist their push for constitutional reform, the special privileges that slaveholders, especially 
large slaveholders, commanded, remained open to scrutiny.  Slaveholders often avoided serving 
in the local militia except when they served as officers, enjoying the lofty and prestigious 
position while leaving the drudgery of militia work to the “farmer, mechanic, & the poor man—
the bone and sinew of the country.”  Such a privilege led one observer to argue that the 
“aristocracy of the country…rest[s] with the man of wealth and the large slave holder.”70  In 
Morgantown, the editor of the Monongalia Chronicle wondered why the burden for maintaining 
local roads fell disproportionately upon the “poor man who…though his locks are whitening 
with age” still sent his “five or six sons” to repair dilapidated roads.  An elder patriarch would 
certainly miss the labor his sons on the farm or around the house.  The “slave-holder that has two 
slaves,” though, could send out his slaves to work while keeping his sons at home.71   The 
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possibility existed that the poor man’s sons would labor alongside African American slaves, a 
scenario fraught with indignity and shame for free white Virginians.  The color line that 
supposedly demarcated freedom from bondage became blurred in such instances, leading many 
residents to openly question the privileges slaveholders enjoyed.  Still, slavery remained immune 
from criticism; only the special benefits slaveholders received drew the ire of reformers.   
While reformers carefully parsed their language concerning African American bondage, 
slavery’s vocabulary represented a powerful language that underscored nonfreeholders’ political 
inequality.  A nonfreeholder in Wheeling wrote a lengthy missive excoriating the “aristocratical 
rulers of Virginia” for fastening the “yoke” around the “disenfranchised.”  Virginia’s leaders 
controlled the “lives,” “liberty,” and “property” of nonfreeholders, governing without the 
“consent” of “the people.”  The moral was clear.  The relationship that existed between 
freeholders and nonfreeholders mirrored the master-slave dynamic, and it was painfully obvious 
that nonfreeholders performed the role of the slave.  Further, as a political slave, the 
nonfreeholder possessed no honor or voice and submitted to the direction of the freeholder.  The 
lack of honor was especially embittering for white southerners whose culture placed a heavy 
emphasis on the public maintenance of honor.  Without redress, the political “chains” that 
nonfreeholders wore would be tightened and passed down to posterity while the absence of 
honor would result in public emasculation and shaming.72  The threat of white slavery paralyzed 
white men with fear.  Indeed, the disconcerting analogy between themselves and enslaved 
African Americans was anathema, the worst degradation a white man could suffer.  And the 
threat of white slavery mocked notions of political equality, popular sovereignty, and racial 
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boundaries.  But a democratized state constitution could emancipate nonfreeholders from the 
political slavery they currently endured.     
This increasing restlessness for political reform divided many elites.  Thomas Jefferson, a 
sympathetic figure to many northwesterners and nonfreeholders, supported a more equitable 
form of representation.  “The exclusion of a majority of our freeman from the right of 
representation,” he lamented, “is merely arbitrary and an usurpation of the minority over the 
majority.”  The nonfreeholding majority felt the greatest pains of this political marginalization.73  
The minority, Jefferson worried, constituted a homogenous body that, without a larger and more 
diverse voter and candidate pool, would reign similar to a king.74  James Madison’s stance 
proved elusive.  Although he had warned of oppressive majorities in the Federalist papers, he 
previously criticized the Washington administration for its coddling of financial elites at the 
expense of citizens.  He worried that a similar cadre of elites would invariably bend the will of 
the state government to satisfy their needs.75  Madison also supported a call for a new 
constitutional convention to reform what he considered Virginia’s “bad” constitution, and even 
cautioned new states from reproducing the Old Dominion’s form of government.  For immediate 
remedies, he proposed the popular election of the governor and greater independence for the 
judiciary system.  Still, Madison expressed caution about constitutional reform, vacillating 
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between a proponent and one worried about the larger and possible unforeseen consequences of 
revision.76       
Other elites cast askance at the more progressive ideas promulgated by Jefferson and 
Madison.  Abel Parker Upshur and John Taylor of Caroline both passionately believed in the 
close relationship between slavery and political power.  Democratic reform, Upshur insisted, 
inherently threatened slavery by placing the peculiar institution within nonslaveholders’ power.  
Accordingly, any whiff of political change that threatened that power dynamic drew the scorn of 
both.77  John Randolph of Roanoke remained ever defiant against the democratic tendencies that 
emerged in post-colonial Virginia.  He assailed the “pernicious falsehood” of egalitarianism 
found in the Declaration of Independence, declaring equality between white men a mere 
chimera.78  Further, he ardently defended slaveholders’ political rights on both the national and 
state level.  Attempts by the majority—whether represented by northerners or nonfreeholders—
to interfere with slaveholders’ property had to be dispatched.79     
Eastern Virginians expressed many of the same concerns shared by Upshur and Parker.  
Residents of Essex County insisted that they were “perfectly content with their ancient 
institutions and most jealous and fearful of the spirit of innovation.”  The spirit of innovation that 
residents feared was democratic reform.  Residents worried that embracing democratic reform 
would “disturb or put [our institutions] in…jeopardy.”80  In Louisa County, the same specter of 
democratic reform hung over the heads of its citizens.  “Free men perceive no difference,” they 
maintained, “in the acts of a single Tyrant and a numerous body of Tyrants.”  Majoritarian rule 
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frightened eastern Virginians, who feared the arbitrary and violent rule of mobs.  The current 
model of government, these residents stressed, worked best to protect their interests and those of 
all Virginians.81     
Though previous historians have interpreted the clamor for political reform as evidence 
of sectional discord, conservative voices emerged from western Virginia.  Writing from his home 
in Staunton, Archibald Stuart recognized the momentum reformers generated in favor of 
amending the constitution.  “The public feeling on this subject has become too strong to be 
resisted,” he observed.  “The people appear determined that the Minority in the state shall not 
continue to hold the reins of government.”  Along with embracing majoritarian rule, a new state 
constitution would invariably broaden suffrage, too.  These changes “would sow the seeds of 
[our] destruction,” Stuart predicted.  “The rights then of those who own the country will be 
invaded by those who hold no part of it,” he prophesized, “& it will become in the progress to 
that state of things an objection to a Candidate to be either a Man of Talents or property.”  Stuart 
foresaw the bitter fruits of democracy.  Social and political hierarchy would be extirpated, as 
those without power and property would seize both from the wealthy.  Campaigning and 
electioneering would meet a similar fate.  Those men best suited for political office—men such 
as Stuart and his ilk—would be shunned because they were not avatars of “the people.”  Instead, 
demagogues, political charlatans, and deceitful orators would seize power by duping uneducated 
and easily malleable voters.  The fate of the republic hung in the balance, Stuart reasoned, 
compelling him to oppose reform.82   
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Even in the supposedly solid Northwest, conservatives voiced their opposition to 
democratic reform.  One anti-reformer shared the same grave concern as Stuart, fearing that “the 
people” lacked the necessary political acumen required in a republic.  The “people are too 
ignorant and corrupt to equalize their government,” he explained.  Permitting “the people” to 
govern the state would invariably debase the sacrosanct government handed down by the 
Revolutionary generation, inaugurating a new political and social order.  Conservatives would 
“be hereafter oppressed, when put upon equality” with their poor, nonfreeholding, uneducated 
neighbors.  And while propertied and wealthy men would continue to furnish the lion’s share of 
tax revenue, their money would benefit those who paid few taxes.  Conversely, the current 
government accurately prioritized interests and appropriately meted out political and financial 
wealth.  Political and social institutions and relations worked harmoniously and for the greater 
good of all.  Why, then, all this rancorous talk of reform, one anti-reformer wondered?83   
While northwestern anti-reformers faced social and political intimidation and pressure 
when broadcasting their arguments, such opinions were not isolated incidents.  Some opponents 
of reform echoed similar arguments as the one above, stressing that “the people” were power-
hungry, myopic, and easily corruptible.  The blather about a defective constitution emerged from 
“men without authority,” demagogues who wished to drag Virginians through the same “oceans 
of blood” spilled during the French Revolution, one opponent insisted.  These “men without 
authority” sought reform for one sole reason: to “freely…hold the bottle.”84  Further, opponents 
deployed the racial argument, claiming that a democratized constitution would inevitably include 
African Americans.  White men would be placed “on an equal footing, at elections & in courts of 
justice, with free Negroes and Mulattoes,” a haunting specter for white men.  While reformers 
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might receive their wish of political equality, it would arrive simultaneously with racial equality, 
too, anti-reformers averred.  In one move, the pillars of hierarchy, patriarchy, and republicanism 
would be demolished, creating a world full of uncertainty and instability. 
Serving as a backdrop to these debates were two unofficial reform conventions—one in 
1816 and another in 1825—that both convened in Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley.  
Representatives from thirty-five counties across the Commonwealth attended the 1816 meeting, 
including many men from the Northwest.85  The diverse nature of delegates prevented cohesion 
around specific reforms, but demands for white universal male suffrage and representation based 
on white population constituted the crux of their demands.86  Delegates couched such demands in 
Revolutionary language.  Notably, representatives assailed the right of the minority to govern 
and legislate over the majority and that the archaic state constitution made a mockery of the 
American Revolution’s legacy.87  The state legislature, hoping to appease reformers, responded 
by reapportioning the state senate by doubling the number of representatives from the west; 
created a Board of Public Works with the power to plan roads and canals; placed banks in 
Wheeling and Winchester to provide greater accessibility of capital; and devoted more money to 
internal improvements.88  While reformers accepted these changes, political harmony proved 
fleeting.  
Delegates from across Virginia met once again in Staunton in July 1825, hoping for 
greater success than the previous convention.  Approximately one-hundred delegates attended, 
and media coverage from prominent newspaper editors Thomas Ritchie and John Hampden 
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Pleasants assisted delegates’ push for constitutional revision.89  Delegates once again advocated 
for legislative apportionment based only on the white population, excluding African American 
slaves and land.  Further, delegates demanded universal male suffrage.  But divisions within the 
ranks of reformers stalled their efforts and anti-reformers exploited such cleavages.90  Still, many 
northwesterners remained sanguine that the “aristocracy of the legislature” could only 
temporarily delay democracy’s arrival in the Old Dominion.  Indeed, the “enlightened people” of 
Virginia “have long been sensible of…their power” to instigate political reform, and needed only 
to look to their Revolutionary ancestors for confirmation.91     
While the putative representatives bickered, their constituents convened mass meetings 
across the state during the late 1820s.  These meetings welcomed men regardless of class or 
political status, illustrating residents’ widespread desire for reform and opposition to the present 
state constitution.  Meetings in Richmond, Rockingham County, Louisa County, and Loudon 
County all witnessed significant gatherings of “non-freeholders, and others friendly to the 
extension of the right of suffrage.”  Residents declared that they would no “longer…tamely 
submit” to the chains of “political bondage” that the minority had forged around the majority.  
Should this form of political slavery continue, residents rhetorically asked.  “Every man in the 
country must answer NO!!”92   
In the Northwest, advertisements emphasized the meetings’ inclusivity, pleading for all 
men regardless of political affiliation or personal fortune to mobilize and support a constitutional 
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convention.  In Ohio County, an advertisement requested all citizens to assemble at the 
courthouse to “adopt such measures in regard to the Convention as may be thought necessary.”93  
A proposed meeting south of Wheeling requested the “non-freeholders of this election district” 
to assemble and “adopt such measures as they shall deem just and expedient” concerning a 
constitutional convention and the election of representatives to that gathering.94  Rather than 
limiting participation in these meetings to only freeholders, the meetings offered a forum for 
Virginians to discuss the current political system and mobilize for its alteration.   
The demands for a constitutional convention reached critical mass during the 1827-1828 
legislative session.  Reformers across the state continued to wield the powerful language of 
liberty and equality while maintaining the steady flow of petitions and meetings.  Newspaper 
editors, including Ritchie and Pleasants, published such appeals, helping to generate sympathy 
for political reform.  Enough political pressure emerged that the General Assembly approved a 
call for a public referendum in 1828 on the subject of convening a constitutional convention the 
following year.  Virginia freeholders approved the measure by a five-thousand majority, with a 
nearly unanimous Shenandoah Valley approving the call while approximately three-fourths of 
the Trans-Alleghany sanctioned the measure.  Conversely, nearly seven-eighths of the Tidewater 
and one-half of the Piedmont rejected the call.  But the votes of the populous West carried the 
day.  The General Assembly passed an act summoning a convention for the following year, and 
required the revised constitution be submitted to voters for ratification or rejection.95   
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In the months preceding the constitutional convention, residents expressed hope that 
Virginia’s political salvation was at hand.  And, once again, Fourth of July celebrations provided 
the forum needed to express such hopes.  At the Methodist meeting house in Wheeling in 1829, 
“a highly respectable audience of Ladies and Gentleman” articulated, heard, and cheered the 
usual patriotic toasts associated with the national holiday.  One official toaster prayed that the 
members of the convention would form a “Constitution adapted to the character and permanent 
interests of Virginia.”  Following that toast, one reveler toasted “The West. – Yesterday a 
wilderness—to-day a country great in the improvements of art, and teeming with a wealthy and 
healthy population.”  The sequence of these two toasts represented an effort to emphasize the 
close relationship between a new constitution and embracing the democratic and progressive 
ethos emerging in the Northwest.  A new constitution would unleash the immense potential 
found in western people and resources, ushering in a new era for the region and state.96 
In nearby Elizabethtown, Fourth of July celebrants echoed similar sentiments.  After the 
conventional patriotic toasts, revelers once again focused on the upcoming constitutional 
convention.  They hoped that the “constellation of political talents and experience” to be 
gathered in Richmond would be equaled by a “liberality of sentiment.”  Immediately following 
that toast, those gathered lamented the “degraded” and “enfeebled” character of Virginia, a state 
that had long languished under the “weight of a selfish oligarchy.”  Still, residents expressed 
their profound hope that “the day of her political regeneration is drawing near.”  The coupling of 
the two toasts illustrated what residents considered the state’s ailments and antidote.  Only by 
embracing progressive and democratic principles could Virginians resurrect their political 
fortunes, reinvigorating residents and returning the state to its erstwhile lofty national status.97                   
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As northwestern residents awaited the convention in late 1829, they could not help but 
believe that Virginia’s aristocratic government was in its death throes.  History appeared to be 
moving in that direction.  Internationally, the overthrow of monarchical rule in South America 
and parts of Europe demonstrated that the wave of representative democracy would inevitably 
sweep away all the vestiges of tyrants.  Events closer to home gave greater hope.  The emergence 
of Jacksonian Democracy and political parties appeared poised to usher in a new era of politics, 
where property, wealth, or birthright would no longer carry political weight.  Southern 
slaveholding states, including Alabama and Mississippi, had already embraced democratic 
principles while not threatening slaveholders’ property.  Arguments extolling the compatible if 
not symbiotic relationship between slavery and democratic government gained increased 
currency across the South.  Interpreting such events, countless Virginians and Americans 
increasingly believed that a representative democracy was the normative political model.    
And for many northwestern Virginians, that political model transcended the current and 
archaic model that shackled peoples’ energies and political rights.  Principally, the structures and 
operations of the state appeared as a colonial relic.  A malapportioned general assembly, strict 
suffrage requirements, a hegemonic legislative branch, and a flagrant omission of checks and 
balances illustrated to reformers that the state languished under an aristocracy.  Equally 
egregious, this aristocracy seemed unwilling to listen to its constituents.  Judge Lewis Summers 
of Kanawha County noted that upon receiving petitions demanding constitutional reform, the 
legislature did “nothing” with them except to “send them, with…recommendations to 
committees.”  The prospects for these petitions seemed dim at best.98  Armed with such 
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evidence, northwestern residents assailed the state’s conservative structures and operations and 
the aristocratic men who perpetuated them.  These aristocrats made a mockery of the memory of 
the American Revolution, rejecting equality and self-government.  Only by embracing 
democratic principles could the state be set aright.  
The petitions, Fourth of July celebrations, letters, and public meetings reveal not only the 
grievances northwesterners possessed but also the workings of a dynamic and flexible political 
culture.  Nonfreeholders petitioned the state government demanding redress, signing their names 
beside men who possessed landed and human property.  In Brooke County, three residents—
Andrew Young, Roger Hill, and Thomas Allison—all signed a petition demanding a new 
constitutional convention to fix the inadequacies in the present constitution.  None of these men 
owned property.99  Further, men (and women) aired their hopes and aspirations during meetings 
and Fourth of July celebrations, cheering toasts and rubbing shoulders with their neighbors.  
Fourth of July celebrations and political meetings welcomed men of all political stripes and 
status, allowing all assembled to converse and debate.  The burgeoning print medium allowed 
men like “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” to publish a letter excoriating the conduct of an 
elected official.  While Virginia’s official political sphere only permitted propertied men and 
men of wealth, the broader political sphere welcomed all white men (and women) regardless of 
property, birthright, or wealth.  In essence, Virginia’s system of government appeared rigid yet 
flexible, static yet dynamic, tethered to the past while showing glimpses of its possible future.  
But reform-minded residents and their representatives wanted a full embrace of democratic 
principles, structures, and operations, and the most effective means of achieving such dramatic 
change started with constitutional reform.     
                                                          
















Chapter 2: Reformers’ Victory: the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention  
 By April 1830, the constitutional convention that had assembled in Richmond the 
previous October had accomplished its task.  Delegates had approved a new constitution and 
submitted it to voters who would shortly ratify it by a comfortable ten-thousand vote margin.1  
While the new constitution received nearly universal acclaim east of the Blue Ridge Mountains 
and warm support in the Shenandoah Valley, its passage met with widespread resistance in the 
Northwest.  Residents mobilized en masse against this new body of laws, decrying the 
“aristocratic” principles that shaped the document.  The new constitution, according to these 
residents, perpetuated the constitutional inequalities that plagued the state under the previous 
constitution.  The hope that residents’ expressed prior to the convention had turned to bitter 
disappointment.   
 Northwestern residents lashed out in disbelief and anger.  Editorials, meetings, 
correspondence, and extralegal political action illustrated residents’ disapproval of the 
constitution.  In Monongalia and Preston counties, “Many Non freeholders” published a letter in 
the local newspaper addressed to other nonfreeholders in the region.  Angry about their 
continued political exclusion, these nonfreeholders interpreted their status in the body politic as 
akin to African American slaves.  Nonfreeholders languished as “political slaves...journing in a 
land not ours” while performing as “servants of the Noble Lords of this land.”  Adding to 
residents’ “degraded and servil condition” were rumors that the eastern “landholding party” 
supported “the rejection of the new Constitution because their power is not adjusted to please 
them,--forgetting us altogether.”  The authors, apoplectic about such political manipulation, 
constructed a plan to demonstrate that though they remained “Bondsmen” they would publicly 
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express their frustration.  “[W]e feel proud,” these men confidently stated, “that at least two 
hundred and fifty of us will be at liberty to come to the polls in this county and stand up erect, 
and speak for ourselves.”  Though disenfranchised, these men believed their presence, rhetoric, 
and actions around the polls would generate sympathy among voters.  While the new constitution 
lacked democratic reforms, these men would manifest the democratic sentiment that burned 
brightly in their hearts and minds.2    
 The disappointment expressed by “Many Non Freeholders” reflected their disbelief that 
delegates adopted few, if any, democratic reforms.  Legislative apportionment in both houses 
continued to favor eastern Virginians.  This malapportionment continued to underrepresent 
northwesterners and ensured that state funding for internal improvements or a public school 
system would remain uncertain.  While the new constitution extended the right of suffrage, the 
extension appeared modest, falling well short of universal male suffrage.  The state legislature 
would continue to appoint government officials while prospective politicians still had to possess 
a freehold, too.  The county court house system remained intact, perpetuating prominent 
families’ program of consolidating power through patronage and land acquisition.  Virginia’s 
constitution appeared to have undergone few revisions.   
 Numerous northwesterners panned the new constitution.  Residents’ energy and optimism 
contained in editorials, Fourth of July speeches, meetings, and legislative petitions leading up to 
the convention seemed wasted.  Though voters could vote against the proposed constitution, 
reports across the state strongly suggested that its ratification was a fiat acompli.  
Northwesterners would continue to languish under a constitution that extended special privileges 
and powers to a certain class of individuals, bestowing increased representation, an insulated 
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court system, and a limited electorate to men determined to consolidate political power at all 
costs.  The constitution’s lack of a formal amendment mechanism increased residents’ 
disappointment and anger.   
 Previous historians of the 1829-1830 Virginia Constitutional Convention explain the 
outcome as a defeat for democratic proponents and a victory for reactionary conservatives.  
Frequently, this body of historiography posits the convention as a manifestation of sectionalism 
and a harbinger of eventual dismemberment for the Old Dominion and the nation over the issue 
of slavery.3  One northwestern historian contended that “the people of West Virginia replied” to 
this convention, along with other numerous injustices, in their refusal to support eastern 
Virginians’ secession movement in 1861.4  Another contemporary historian agreed, declaring 
that the constitution ratified in 1830 “sow[ed] the seeds of injustice and distrust which bore fruit 
in later years.”5   
Modern historians have generally agreed with these previous interpretations.  
Conservative eastern planters, wary of democratic reform and fearful for their slave property, 
maintained their control of the state government, refusing to embrace the democratic principles 
championed by western nonslaveholders.  This debate over slavery foreshadowed the national 
debate that would take place thirty years later.  And though some historians have disagreed over 
the convention’s sectional nature or slavery’s centrality to the debates, the consensus persists that 
conservatives’ overwhelming interest in slavery convinced enough delegates to defeat 
democratic reformers.  For these historians, the convention represented a counterrevolution 
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against the democratic forces that threatened to overtake the government and threaten chattel 
slavery.6  
As Christopher Michael Curtis has recently argued, though, historians’ preoccupation 
with the convention’s refusal to embrace democratic reforms obscures the important ideological, 
political, and practical changes manifest in the new constitution.  Specifically, seemingly minute 
and modest changes made to suffrage requirements accelerated the process of converting 
Virginia into a slaveholding democracy.  While the traditional basis of the freehold rested on its 
acreage and its inherent association with republican ideology, the new constitution redefined the 
freehold in terms of its commercial value.7  By removing the freehold from its classical 
republican moorings, Virginians embraced the new political and economic context rapidly 
unfolding around them.   
But this important change did not mollify many northwesterners.  In the decades leading 
up to the convention, the majority of northwesterners passionately supported universal white 
male suffrage.  Allowing all white men to vote, proponents argued, accurately reflected their 
interpretation of the American Revolution, helped secure private and public power for these 
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white men, and rightfully validated the “common man” shibboleth of Jacksonian Democracy.  
The new suffrage requirements, however, fell woefully short of reformers’ desires.  This defeat 
in the convention, coupled with failed reforms of legislative apportionment, popular elections of 
government officials, and the county court system, embittered residents who believed their 
failure rested at the feet of eastern planters and slaveholders determined to slay “the demon of 
Reform” and protect their chattel at all costs.8     
This perception that eastern slaveholders cared more about their African American slaves 
than equality with their white neighbors had profound and lasting consequences on intrastate 
sectional relations, the formation of political parties, the cultural debate over immigrants, and 
relations between neighbors.  In the Northwest, these consequences possessed special import, as 
the region would become a flashpoint for these developments over the next four decades, 
embroiling residents in pitched political and cultural battles.  But the importance of the 
convention went deeper than these issues.  The convention’s denouement and the new 
constitution did more than crystallize the perception that eastern slaveholders valued their slaves 
more than white equality.  Indeed, the changes manifest in the new constitution presented the 
possibility that slaveownership and a racially based democratic polity could determine 
republican citizenship and provide the foundation for Virginia’s republican government.  
Virginians’ counterrevolution in 1830 protected slavery by paving the way for a modern 
slaveholding democracy.      
 As northwestern residents looked toward the upcoming constitutional convention set to 
convene in October 1829, many expressed optimism that deep and profound political change was 
imminent.  Some argued that the august body of delegates set to assemble in Richmond would 
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lead the state out of political darkness and toward the light of democracy.  “What good may we 
not anticipate,” one Fourth of July toaster in Wheeling boldly proclaimed, “when Madison, 
Monroe, and Marshall are at the helm.”9  Along with former presidents James Madison and 
James Monroe and sitting Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, the assemblage included 
Governor William Branch Giles and the state’s two senators, John Tyler and Littleton W. 
Tazwell.  The gathering of such intellectuals and Founding Fathers, combined with the national 
march of Jacksonian Democracy, convinced residents that their long political suffering would 
soon end.      
Northwestern residents also placed great hopes in their delegates to the convention.  
Those delegates included Alexander Campbell, an evangelical minister and Christian reformer, 
and Philip Doddridge, a lawyer and outspoken proponent of democratic reform.  Both men hailed 
from Brooke County.  Eugenius M. Wilson, a merchant and erstwhile Federalist, and Charles S. 
Morgan, both Monongalia County residents, joined Campbell and Doddridge in representing the 
northwestern counties of Ohio, Tyler, Brooke, Monongalia, and Preston.10  Even before the 
convention’s opening, though, western delegates’ numerical disadvantage threatened to derail 
their hopes of consummating a democratic constitution.  The constitutional convention bill 
passed the previous year allotted representation on senatorial districts, where eastern Virginians 
held a distinct advantage.11  Still, northwestern residents and representatives remained aplomb.  
“The friends of the Convention appear to be contented with the progress which they have made 
towards reforming the state government,” a Wheeling newspaper editor reported.12   
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 Delegates commenced work on October 5, 1829.  As the convention began, the cultural 
differences between northwestern delegates and their counterparts from beyond the Blue Ridge 
Mountains quickly became manifest.  Tidewater delegates, some of whom claimed the dignified 
status as members of the First Family of Virginia, arrived with powdered wigs, expertly tied 
cravats, and knee britches and silk stockings that complemented their attire.  Such men looked 
the part of eighteenth-century aristocrats and classical republican government.  Western and 
northwestern delegates, in contrast, resembled the hardscrabble environment from which they 
traveled.  They arrived with disheveled hair, ties askew, and wearing homespun (and often 
mismatched) clothes.  While Tidewater gentlemen traveled upon purebred horses (and, in the 
case of John Randolph of Roanoke, from imported English horses and carriages), western 
delegates descended from ragged and ill-bred horses that displayed the wear and tear of the 
journey across the mountains.13  These “uncouth looking” men, often scions of immigrants, 
lacked the “bland and polish manner belonging to the South,” a distinction that became manifest 
when compared to their Tidewater colleagues.14  But northwestern delegates wore these 
distinctions with pride.  While their fellow delegates from beyond the Blue Ridge embodied 
aristocracy, they embodied democracy.   
 The differences in delegates’ clothing reflected differences in their speech patterns.  
Contemporaries often remarked at the “bold” and “eloquent” voices emanating from Tidewater 
and other conservative delegates as they “strove manfully against” reform measures.15  Their 
voices reflected their generally pure English heritage, education, and training in classical theories 
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of government, politics, political science, and philosophy.  The voices emanating from 
northwestern delegates, specifically Philip Doddridge, often registered as unintelligible because 
of thick Scotch Irish accents.16  Reformers shot back, arguing that the “English way” of electing 
politicians inexorably led to the “English way of speaking to them.”17  The diversity of political 
and linguistic accents, reformers argued, was one marker of a new political and social context 
where men no longer needed a freehold to vote or express deference when talking to politicians.   
For reformers, the “English way” of structuring politics and relations between governors 
and the governed appeared as vestiges of colonial and aristocratic rule.  Simply put, the “English 
way” was incongruous to this new political age.  Reformers, hoping to fully inaugurate this new 
political age, aimed to remove other relics of colonial and aristocratic rule.  Eugenius Wilson of 
Monongalia County wondered aloud about the effects of including a statute in the proposed 
constitution that would “stamp the seal of perpetual disenfranchisement” for those Virginians 
who engaged in dueling.18  Dueling, a gentleman’s custom used to defend a man’s honor and 
reaffirm social hierarchy, had faded in popularity but still retained a certain following among 
culturally orthodox planters and social and political elites.19  Other delegates commented on the 
measure and recommended the matter to the General Assembly, but Wilson’s later tacit 
endorsement suggests a real cultural divide between northwestern delegates and their Tidewater 
counterparts.  Delegates at the convention not only had to contend with diverse political 
principles; they had to navigate equally diverse cultural understandings that generated and 
shaped those political principles.                                    
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As the debates unfolded in Richmond, representatives quickly found themselves clashing 
over two divisive issues: whether or not to expand suffrage and addressing malapportionment in 
the state legislature.  On the former issue, northwestern representatives agreed that suffrage must 
expand beyond the archaic freehold requirement.20  Alexander Campbell argued that the freehold 
represented “as great an uncertainty as can be well conceived,” finding the whole edifice upon 
which Virginia’s system of government rested as “precarious.”21  Eugenius Wilson found the 
freehold equally distasteful.  Wilson exclaimed that it was “absurd and unjust” to base 
citizenship on a “fixed number acres of land, because of the inequality of the value of land.”  
Wilson, acutely aware of land commodification and absentee ownership, especially in the Trans-
Alleghany region, believed that the value of land was “too fluctuating, and its tenure too 
uncertain” to measure a person’s attachment to the community.  Confronted with the realities of 
a market society, he averred, Virginians required a different litmus test for republican 
citizenship.22   
But if the convention expunged the freehold requirement from the constitution, what 
would replace it?  Or, as Wilson asked, “What test shall we apply?” to determine one’s 
attachment to the republic.23  Here delegates differed, a key example of the fluid coalitions that 
hampered reformers’ efforts.  Alexander Campbell, who later founded the Disciples of Christ, 
believed that the Old Testament provided delegates with a blueprint for expanding suffrage.  He 
argued that the “God of Israel first proposed a social compact” called a Berith in Hebrew; when 
translated, the Berith was “precisely equivalent to our English word Constitution.”  After the 
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Israelite leaders wrote the Berith, they “submitted to every man on the muster roll of Israel.”24  
The political implications were clear.  All men—not just landowners, religious clergy, or the 
governing class—voted to ratify or reject this constitution.  Accordingly, Campbell offered an 
amendment for extending the right of suffrage to “every free white male of the age of twenty-two 
years, born within this Commonwealth.”25  His plan to expand suffrage based on age and 
residency represented the most democratic plan offered during the convention; moderate and 
conservative delegates deemed it too radical and dismissed it. 
Eugenius Wilson of Monongalia County spoke highly of the connection between natural 
rights and political participation.  He maintained that “Nature, or Nature’s God rather, had 
conferred certain original rights upon man.”  Foremost among these rights was the “right of 
appointing our own agents.”  The argument that all white men possessed a natural right to self-
government largely reflected his and other reformers’ beliefs that the American Revolution had 
wiped away the vestiges of aristocratic rule and ushered in the rule of the “common man.”  But 
Wilson could not completely shake the belief that Virginians needed to demonstrate their 
attachment to the Commonwealth, a reflection of rampant absentee ownership and land 
speculation in western Virginia.  His proposal increased those eligible to vote but was more 
modest than Campbell’s proposal.  Under Wilson’s plan, free white males who had resided in the 
Commonwealth for a minimum of two years, paid taxes during that election year, satisfied 
military or militia obligations, and fulfilled any road service requirements would be eligible to 
vote.26  Those who shared the burdens of government, he maintained, should enjoy the franchise.  
His plan eschewed property qualifications for suffrage, finding the capricious market value of 
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property too unstable a foundation.  But the proposal still proved too radical for many moderate 
and conservative delegates, meeting the same fate as Campbell’s proposal. 
Other northwestern delegates looked to other slaveholding states for guidance on 
expanding suffrage.  Monongalian Charles Morgan argued that Virginia should align itself with 
the other slaveholding states that had democratized their constitutions to include liberal suffrage 
requirements and direct election of government officials.  Morgan offered a synopsis of each 
slaveholding state’s constitution, noting residency, age, property, or other requirements needed 
to vote.  Morgan’s efforts were more than a simple civics lesson.  Rather, he believed that these 
constitutions conclusively illustrated “that the principle of General Suffrage is neither new nor 
dangerous.”27  These slaveholding states had broadened the franchise (and many had equalized 
representation, too) without endangering their chattel, compromising private property, or 
inaugurating civil anarchy.  Slaveholders and nonslaveholders in such states possessed similar 
political interests and worked harmoniously to protect those interests.  Only Virginia and North 
Carolina refused to follow their fellow slaveholding states.   
Morgan’s proximity to Ohio and Pennsylvania—two nonslaveholding states that operated 
with more democratized constitutions than Virginia—strengthened his argument.  “[My 
constituents] see and know the benefits of General Suffrage on society,” Morgan insisted.  
Indeed, the nearly daily economic, political, and personal interactions between northwesterners 
and residents in Ohio and Pennsylvania confirmed the lack of political rights Virginians enjoyed 
compared to other states.28  And as the Northwest followed a similar economic trajectory as that 
of Ohio and Pennsylvania, Morgan believed that the voices emanating from northwestern 
laborers would only increase in intensity and volume.  Those white men who labored in the 
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fields, shops, and manufactories “constitute the great mass of actual productive labourers of the 
State” and deserved political representation.  These men manifested the productive capacity of 
labor, Morgan maintained, and offered more to the Commonwealth than indolent aristocrats 
adorned with powdered wigs who subsisted off of slave labor.29  Alexander Campbell agreed 
with his colleague.  The manual labor required of and performed by western Virginians ensured 
that their “Republican principles” remained “pure and uncontaminated.”  On the other hand, 
eastern Virginians, Campbell remarked, owned “negroes” who “fan[ned] them to sleep,” strongly 
suggesting that the lack of physical labor made such men not only physically weak and 
effeminate but politically enfeebled, too.30  Manual labor not only promoted masculinity in the 
public and private spheres for white men but ensured a hearty citizenry capable of protecting the 
republic.            
Morgan’s support for expanded suffrage and democratic reform reflected a different 
understanding of politics and government than what conservative delegates understood.  
Opponents of suffrage reform feared that an enlarged electorate comprised of propertyless men, 
drunkards, paupers, and other degraded and dependent classes led inexorably to “mobs, 
confusion, and turmoil at the polls.”31  Noted conservative Benjamin Watkins Leigh reminded 
the convention that every state that had embraced the “extremes of democracy” soon devolved 
into “licence and anarchy.”32  Where conservatives perceived chaos, though, Morgan interpreted 
a healthy democratic society.  Morgan conceded that when “many thousands of persons are 
brought together upon election days, there will be disputes, and sometimes turmoils.”  But 
delegates should embrace such displays.  “These disputes only serve to show,” he declared, “that 
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the body politic is in a good and healthy condition; that it has energy and power.”  While eastern 
conservatives and opponents of reform preferred the “cold calm” of present elections “where few 
men dare express opinions on the public affairs,” democratic elections meant that “all are free to 
discuss the affairs of Government.”33  Indeed, the arguing, bantering, debating, and politicking 
that occurred during elections showcased democracy in action.  For during these interactions 
citizens offered their respective political interpretations, negotiated these understandings, and 
arrived at an accord that ultimately reflected the will of the majority.  The “cold calm” displayed 
during current elections signaled widespread apathy and disinterest and permitted political 
manipulation by a vocal minority.  The will of “the people” could not be accurately ascertained 
from elections.  Morgan hoped that the inauguration of democratic reform would revitalize the 
state and the people and usher in dynamic and universal participation.     
Morgan’s interpretation of democracy reflected the growing leviathan of Jacksonian 
Democracy, a nascent movement that encompassed reforming constitutions, flattening 
distinctions between white men, and inaugurating a more raucous form of popular politics.  
Opponents of expanding suffrage specifically and Jacksonian Democracy generally considered 
northwesterners’ arguments rubbish.  Conservative Benjamin Watkins Leigh considered 
democratic principles, including the “Circuit Court System” and “Universal Suffrage,” as a 
northern “plague” that threatened to sicken the body politic.34  Leigh’s epithet of “plague” was 
revealing.  With the causes of many contagious diseases still unknown in the nineteenth-century, 
Americans feared the unpredictability, rapidity, and arbitrariness with which illnesses struck.  
Leigh’s figurative equation of a plague and democratic reforms, therefore, sought to refute 
reformers’ ideological motivations, for these reforms, like contagious diseases, possessed no 
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political agenda nor could they control their own actions.35  These democratic reforms, like 
“influenza” or “small-pox,” struck randomly and would ravage Virginia’s body politic.  Further, 
the “plague” of democratic reforms emerged not from the ideals of the American Revolution or 
the context of Jacksonian Democracy; rather, they represented a dangerous and frightening 
northern outbreak that sought to replicate the heathen northern milieu on southern soil.  Leigh 
proposed a simple solution to this malady.  Stop the madness of democracy before it infected 
Virginia by maintaining the current power structure, thereby quarantining the body politic from 
nonfreeholders and other dependents who transmitted such “plague[s].” 
Other opponents of reform spoke fondly of the freehold as the only proper and secure 
source of civic security and tranquility.  Philip Norborne Nicholas, a Richmond banker, found 
little wrong with the freehold requirement and limiting suffrage to landholders.  Nicholas railed 
against the idea that “[s]uffrage is derived from nature,” arguing that the “lasting ownership of 
the soil of the country…is the best evidence of permanent attachment” to the commonwealth and 
thus afforded the best means for determining suffrage.36  John Randolph of Roanoke spoke 
forcefully against any suffrage or representation proposals that he believed would “divorce 
property from power.”37  He feared that proposals to expand suffrage beyond its current 
requirements would result in “bondage” for him and his ilk, as nonfreeholders would exercise 
limitless power over property.  Randolph believed that the current constitution correctly 
distributed political power and rightly recognized the immense political weight that property, 
whether landed or human, exerted.  For Randolph, the “pernicious falsehood” of egalitarianism 
promulgated by reformers misinterpreted the memory of the American Revolution and seemed 
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destined to destroy the Commonwealth.38  Accordingly, he passionately supported the freehold 
and castigated proposals that failed to maintain that scheme.    
Other delegates opposed to changing the freehold requirement found arguments extolling 
man’s natural right to self-government quixotic and baseless.  Abel P. Upshur, representing the 
Eastern Shore county of Northampton, rhetorically asked if the “savages” in the “forests of 
America” or who “inhabit the Asiatic islands” possessed the natural right to self-government that 
reformers claimed all men enjoyed.  Of course not, he sneered.  Such “savages” lived in a crude 
and chaotic environment, not the hierarchical and patriarchal world of Virginia.  An individual’s 
political representation and power derived not from natural rights but rather from the society’s 
structure in which he lived, he maintained.39  Accordingly, only those individuals in possession 
of certain forms of property should be allowed to vote.  Private property, particularly land, 
satisfied that requirement.40   
Upshur was not alone in his denunciation of “natural rights.”  Numerous conservative and 
moderate delegates supported Upshur’s rationale, arguing that reformers’ emphasis of “natural 
rights” in connection to enfranchisement undermined their own argument.  Philip Pendleton 
Barbour of Orange County, in a pointed speech directed to reformers, wondered if “individuals 
of the discarded classes” should also be allowed to vote considering they supposedly possessed 
natural rights.  Women, children, laborers, the disabled, and other dependents, were among the 
“discarded” who lacked sound political or moral judgment.41  Some delegates sarcastically 
wondered if the “natural rights” argument could be extended to African Americans.  Littleton 
Waller Tazwell, representing Norfolk, and Upshur, both asked reformers how they can “limit 
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themselves to white population alone.”   For if all men possessed the same natural rights, how 
could reformers exclude African Americans, Native Americans, or other “savages,” they 
inquired.42  The inclusion of such “discarded classes” threatened to make a mockery of 
Virginia’s slaveholding society and nullify the color line that supposedly demarcated freedom 
from bondage.  Even the most avid reformers refused to countenance black voting.  The “natural 
rights” argument, once thought to be a powerful weapon for reformers, now emerged as a 
formidable stumbling block as they pursued expanded suffrage.     
The debates over reapportioning the state legislature were as equally divisive as those on 
suffrage, with the two issues often intermingling.  As with suffrage, northwestern delegates 
believed their proposals reflected the correct interpretation of the American Revolution by 
recognizing white equality.  Accordingly, northwestern and western delegates supported the 
“white basis” plan.  Under this proposal, only the free white population would be considered 
when calculating representation, excluding African American slaves and taxes.  Cognizant of 
their rapidly increasing white populations, delegates from Northwest and western Virginia 
generally argued that this plan would correctly recognize majoritarian power and reflect the 
current demographic shifts altering the state’s human geography.  Armed with a majority in the 
state legislature, western Virginians could soon realize their hopes of internal improvements to 
enhance communication and commercial access and a public education system to educate 
residents. 
Proponents of the “white basis” contended that this proposal recognized the memory of 
the American Revolution.  Only white citizens, reformers contended, deserved political 
representation because they constituted “the people.”   Opponents of the “white basis,” though, 
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perceived in this plan the “tyranny of the majority” that some Founding Fathers feared.43  These 
opponents of the “white basis” caustically referred to it as “King Numbers.”  John Randolph, one 
of the plan’s more vocal opponents, stated unequivocally that he “would not live under King 
Numbers.”  He would neither allow “King Numbers” to act as his “steward” nor “task-master.”44  
For Randolph and his ilk, the implications of living under “King Numbers” were dire, as they 
would be powerless to control “King Numbers,” unlike their current dependents.  The carefully 
ordered world that Randolph reigned over would be upset.   
The epithet “King Numbers” was an important rhetorical tool wielded by anti-reformers 
and opponents.  These men wielded this moniker to deny reformers’ ideological motivations, 
arguing that this plan sanctioned mob rule and political anarchy.   Indeed, “King Numbers” 
succinctly and powerfully captured opponents’ fears in widely accessible phraseology while 
simultaneously advancing their interpretation of the American Revolution.  The word “king” 
reminded Virginians about the abusive, tyrannical, and arbitrary nature of despotic rulers.  
Virginians needed no clearer evidence of such behavior than their experience with King George 
III during the American Revolution.  His capriciousness and dismissive attitude toward the 
colonies still burned brightly in the minds of Virginians, especially as their home represented a 
locus of political independence and military engagement.   
Further, by connecting “King Numbers” to King George III, anti-reformers appropriated 
the memory of the American Revolution to reflect their interpretation and outcome of that 
seminal moment.  The colonies revolted to free themselves from a tyrant, conservatives argued, 
not to inaugurate the dangerous doctrine of majoritarian rule.  Why replace one tyrant with a 
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thousand tyrants?  What Virginians needed were men trained in classical thought, not trained 
behind a plough, to lead them and protect the republic.  The narrative of the American 
Revolution propagated by northwestern and western delegates represented a dangerous canard, 
conservatives and opponents insisted, designed to overthrow benevolent and educated rulers and 
replace them with the uneducated and crude masses.   
This uneducated and crude mass of men represented the seemingly overwhelming and 
limitless power of “Numbers.”  Faceless and nameless, this mob of men welcomed violent 
confrontation, willfully flouting proper legal and political boundaries to achieve a desired end.  
This corrupt and uneducated mass possessed no guiding political principles but rather operated 
under the control of slick orators with deep pockets or libations.  This majority would “oppress, 
harass, and plunder the minority,” leaving private property and wealth vulnerable.45  The effect 
of “Numbers” would extend to the ballot box, too.  Elections would not be won by the most 
deserving candidate but by the one who mobilized the required “numbers” to the polls, sullying 
elections and overturning traditional authority.  Corrupt political manipulators would replace 
benevolent and selfless politicians, using their position to consolidate power rather than using it 
to protect the republic.  “[N]o inherent virtue” could be found in such circumstances, 
conservatives maintained, only an abusive majority that used its “physical power” to achieve its 
political goals.46  Put simply, the reign of “King Numbers” would prove fatal to the body politic.   
Northwestern delegates understood the damage the epithet “King Numbers” inflicted and 
tried to soften its blow.  Alexander Campbell contended that this plan of representation would 
“operate to the advantage of the whole state” by replacing the state’s current “monarchical and 
aristocratical” form of government.  Nonfreeholders and nonslaveholders who lived in the 
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shadows of their powerful neighbors would enjoy the political representation and equality they 
deserved as white men under the “white basis,” as well.47  Charles Morgan maintained that 
“King Numbers” accurately reflected the new political and social context unfolding around them.  
“King Numbers” represented the “legitimate sovereign of all this country,” he stated, and that 
“General Jackson” was the only “lawful representative of King Numbers.”  The glorification of 
the “common man” at the heart of Jacksonian Democracy appeared unstoppable with President 
Andrew Jackson at the helm.  And while this movement was nascent, its supporters had already 
toppled tyrannical rulers and rewrote aristocratic constitutions elsewhere.  Opponents of “King 
Numbers” stood against the tide of history, Morgan declared, for a more “wise, benevolent, 
patriotic and powerful” ruler could not be found in the United States or the world.  By 
inaugurating “King Numbers,” Virginians would embrace the dynamic that power rested in the 
“supreme tribunal” of the state, “public opinion.”48   
Still, few, if any, conservatives, anti-reformers, or even moderates welcomed the prospect 
of living under “King Numbers.”  Opponents declared that Virginia would witness the same 
scenes of popular unrest and violence that beset France during the tumultuous years of the 
French Revolution.  Benjamin Watkins Leigh cautioned the convention of “experiment[ing] on 
the body politic” in the same manner as France.  The “large dose of French rights of man,” 
nearly identical to the “natural rights” advocated by western reformers, inevitably led to “fever, 
frenzy, madness and death,” he warned.49  Once again, Leigh employed a revealing metaphor to 
express his fears.  Nineteenth-century medical procedures often proved dangerous, if not fatal, 
and medicine often enjoyed the same infamous notoriety from skeptical Americans who 
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distrusted medical quacks and the “cures” they peddled.50  France’s condition worsened as 
democratic reformers administered more and more of their “rights of man” dosage, Leigh 
reminded his colleagues, and reformers continued this prescription until France’s body politic 
violently convulsed and died.  The implications for the Old Dominion were clear.  Unless 
delegates rebuked reformers and their quack medicine, Virginia awaited the same fate as the 
French Republic.   
Imagery and rhetoric derived from the French Revolution became so ubiquitous among 
anti-reformers that it provoked an outburst from Philip Doddridge.  “We should imagine that we 
are listening to [Edmund] Burke on the French Revolution,” he remarked.  “All the horrors of 
that volcano are set before us,” he protested, “as if in our madness, we were ready to plunge into 
it.”51  But the frequent references to the French Revolution—and Doddridge’s outburst—
illustrated the power of that moment’s historical memory to inform delegates’ interpretation 
about constitutional revision in Virginia.  To opponents of reform, the French Revolution 
represented the dangers of democracy.  That moment encapsulated opponents’ fears of an 
enlarged (and largely landless) electorate, the reign of “King Numbers,” and the vulnerability of 
private property.  The fears appeared tangible enough for opponents and numerous moderates to 
oppose “King Numbers” and support another form of representation that took into consideration 
the white population and private property.  Delegates referred to this plan as the “mixed basis.”52        
Apportionment in the state legislature based on the “mixed basis” reflected supporters’ 
fears of private property in a democratic society.  Private property deserved extra security, 
supporters argued, both because of its inherent vulnerability and taxable nature.  Perhaps no 
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species of private property appeared more vulnerable than African American slaves.  During the 
convention, approximately eighty-two percent of the state’s political elite owned at least one 
slave; nearly one-third were planters.53  By 1830, Virginia was home to more slaves than any 
other state in the Union, nearly 470,000 slaves.54  Though the majority of slaves lived east of the 
Blue Ridge Mountains, every county in the state, including the Northwest, held slaves.  Ohio 
County had 360 slaves, while residents in Brooke County, the northernmost extension of the 
state, owned 228 slaves.55  While delegates considered slavery solely an issue for eastern 
Virginians, the ubiquitous presence of enslaved African Americans across the state produced 
constitutional debates over slavery and slaves’ political weight that were critical to all 
Virginians.     
Tidewater and Piedmont delegates, representing districts with larger numbers and a 
higher density of enslaved African Americans, contended that their constituents required greater 
political and constitutional protection.  This need for extra security was urgent, too.  The recent 
violent overthrow of Santo Domingo’s slaveholding regime, coupled with the memory of Gabriel 
Prosser’s failed rebellion in 1800 (and Denmark Vessey’s in South Carolina in 1822), convinced 
many Virginians (and numerous white southerners) that egalitarian rhetoric and ideals were too 
dangerous in a slave society.56  Philip Pendleton Barbour justified his reticence for embracing 
democratic principles by connecting this system of government to “the frightful and appalling 
scenes of horror and desolation” that marked the downfall of Santo Domingo’s slaveholders.57  
Benjamin Watkins Leigh candidly confessed that slaveholders “cannot admit any interference” 
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with their property “without the greatest danger.”58  Conservative delegates believed that any 
outside interference with their chattel imperiled the master-slave relationship and their sacrosanct 
right to private property.  In a democratic society, such fears were heightened by white residents 
openly discussing equality and natural rights, words that slaves might hear, internalize, and act 
upon.  Nonslaveholders, conservative delegates reasoned, especially those living in an area with 
few slaves, failed to appreciate such fears.  Extra constitutional and political protection for 
slaveholders, though, would help calm slaveholders’ fears and ensure that Virginia’s 
slaveholding regime prevented any uprising.   
Conservatives’ skepticism concerning democratic reforms in a slaveholding state also 
reflected their doubt that African American bondage could flourish in the Northwest.  Various 
reasons existed for such reasoning, Abel Parker Upshur explained.  “[A] rooted antipathy to this 
species of population” existed beyond the Alleghenies, he stated, intimating that a crude form of 
antislaveryism could be found in western Virginia’s hollows and hills.  Upshur also wavered on 
whether slavery could exist so close to free states.  The region’s proximity to Ohio and 
Pennsylvania would “forever render this sort of property precarious and insecure,” he warned, 
and remarked that the Ohio River or an abstract state boundary was inadequate for stemming 
northerners’ increasing hostility against slavery.  The region’s climate prohibited widespread 
plantation agriculture, notably cotton and tobacco, making the need for slave labor unnecessary.  
Rather, northwesterners relied on “personal industry” and “personal exertion,” not slave labor, to 
improve their homes and farms.  For the foreseeable future, Upshur maintained, slaveholders 
would constitute a minority and slavery would never flourish on the windward side of the 
Alleghenies.59 
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Upshur’s claims about the Northwest reveal his and other conservatives’ ignorance of the 
region and static view of slavery.  Slavery existed in every county in Virginia, including those in 
the Northwest, such as Brooke, Ohio, and Monongalia.  The first two counties bordered Ohio 
and Pennsylvania while Monongalia shared a border with the Keystone State.  Conservatives, 
accustomed to living in a slaveholding society where slaves comprised the dominant labor force, 
overlooked how slave labor constituted one form of labor available in northwestern counties.60  
Though slave labor was not the dominant labor force in the region, northwestern slaveholders 
exploited this type of labor like other slaveholders across the state.  One local historian stated 
that slaves were “employed in domestic service, driving teams and ordinary labor.”61  
Slaveholders across the Northwest and Appalachia used their slaves to tend sheep, prepare wool 
for market, export livestock down the Ohio River and to New Orleans, and rear cattle and pigs 
for slaughter and transport to Baltimore.  While not engaged in traditional slave labor agriculture, 
northwestern slaves demonstrated the dynamism and adaptability of slavery to a new and 
different physical landscape and political-economy.   
Other practices concerned with slavery would have reminded easterners of their society.  
Northwesterners meted out corporal punishment against rebellious or unrepentant slaves, 
including by whipping and burning.62  Northwestern slaveholders, similar to other slaveholders 
across the state and South, sought to protect their slaveholding rights by including local whites in 
various functions.  Some slaveholders hired local poor whites to oversee their slaves on seasonal 
cattle drives, allowing these men to exert mastery over African American slaves and enjoy the 
fruits of white supremacy.  Slaveholders also rented pastures from nonslaveholders for their 
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animals to graze.63  These actions helped slaveholders further their investment in slaves while 
promoting amicable (and often profitable) relations with their nonslaveholding neighbors.  The 
bond established between slaveholders and nonslaveholders also sought to promote a shared 
interest in the future and security of slavery, a critical relationship if and when slavery seemed 
threatened.  Renting slaves, though it occurred less frequently in the Northwest than near 
southwestern Virginia’s Kanawha salt mines, allowed northwestern slaveholders to extract more 
money from their chattel while encouraging nonslaveholders to support slavery and the 
slaveholding regime.  Renting slaves also promoted harmonious relations between slaveholders 
and nonslaveholders, with the latter group able to take advantage of an extra set of hands for 
domestic duties or harvest time.64  Though the majority of northwestern residents maintained 
their farms through family labor and “personal industry,” slave labor was also readily available.   
With their fealty to slavery questioned, northwestern delegates attempted to persuade 
skeptical delegates about the benefits of a democratized slaveholding polity and the compatibility 
of slavery and democracy.  Eugenius Wilson posited that a democratized constitution would 
forever bind the interests of the slaveholder and nonslaveholder.  Inferring that the Missouri 
Compromise and the Nullification Crisis were harbingers of future conflicts over slavery, Wilson 
pleaded with delegates to “unite” all “free white” men in preparation of an inevitable “crisis.”  
With the slaveholder and nonslaveholder possessing identical political interests, Virginians 
would stand united against any threat to slavery.65  Philip Doddridge believed that the latest 
census data showing an increase in the slave population in the Northwest demonstrated that 
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slavery and democratic supporters could peacefully coexist.66  Skeptical delegates needed to look 
no further for evidence of such a claim than Doddridge, a slaveholder and passionate exponent of 
democracy.67  Richmond banker Chapman Johnson broke ranks with his eastern colleagues and 
supported these assertions by northwestern delegates.  Johnson declared that fixing legislative 
apportionment on the “white basis” would foster “a feeling of affection and sentiment of justice” 
between western nonslaveholders and eastern slaveholders and ultimately protect slavery.68  Near 
the convention’s conclusion, Alexander Campbell attempted to introduce an antislavery petition 
only to be dissuaded by colleagues.  While Campbell’s motives remain murky, his colleagues 
feared that this petition would only stoke sectional tensions, incorrectly brand all westerners as 
antislavery, and validate opponents’ arguments about westerners’ unsound position on slavery.69  
Northwestern delegates remained publicly mum on Campbell’s conduct.  Rather, they continued 
to proclaim that they sought only to protect slavery while prohibiting eastern slaveholders 
exercise of “political dominion” over northwestern residents.  Democratic reform promised to 
secure both.70     
 In the Northwest, the convention played out in newspapers, keeping residents abreast of 
debates, suffrage and apportionment proposals, the conduct of their elected representatives, and 
overall pursuit of democratic reform.  As the convention commenced, residents expressed 
optimism that their representatives’ arguments and evidence would convince other delegates to 
embrace reforms.  The obduracy displayed by “tide-water men,” though, incited anger and 
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dismay in many residents.  Such men, residents decried, “are not inclined to trust the people at 
large with any powers.”71  In Wheeling, the local newspaper editor excoriated conservative 
delegates who wondered about the efficacy of a constitutional statute that would prohibit new 
residents to the state from voting for five years.  This political quarantine imposed upon new 
residents threatened to undercut western Virginia’s growing white population, especially that 
around Wheeling, where industrial jobs attracted prospective employees.  Immigrants from 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey accelerated the region’s demographic growth, as the 
population rose approximately forty percent between 1820 and 1829.72  Wheeling, above other 
towns in Virginia, the editor maintained, depended on this influx of immigrants from other states 
for their “capital, industry, and enterprize.”  The five year quarantine amounted to an attack on 
Wheeling and its growing industrial sector, and further sowed seeds of competition and distrust 
between residents of Wheeling and eastern Virginia.  The newspaper editor nonetheless 
expressed his optimism that this “obnoxious and preposterous proposition” would meet its due 
fate.73   
Perhaps more galling for northwestern residents than the rumored five year political 
quarantine was the rhetoric and logic of Benjamin Watkins Leigh.  Leigh, foreshadowing James 
Henry Hammond’s “mud-sill” speech, equated the tasks that slaves performed in eastern 
Virginia with those performed by poor yeomen and landless peasants in western Virginia.  But 
while the latter group would receive political representation under reformers’ plans, slaves 
remained excluded (and rightfully so, according to Leigh, for they lacked proper morality and 
intellect).  Still, Leigh questioned whether “those who are obliged to depend on their daily labour 
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for daily subsistence” should be engaged in “political affairs.”  According to Leigh, the answer 
was simply “no.”  The “peasantry of the west,” he confirmed, were ill-prepared and uneducated 
for the rigors of republican citizenship.  These men lacked the political fitness to participate in 
politics, and their inclusion would inherently threaten all Virginians and private property.  The 
security of the state depended on the continued exclusion of these “peasants.”74    
Not surprisingly, Leigh’s comparison of enslaved African Americans and western whites 
went over poorly with western residents.  His words were met with a mixture of apoplexy and 
disbelief, as northwestern white residents considered their equation with slaves as anathema.  
Such a comparison represented one of the basest and degrading insults a white southerner could 
receive as it appeared to flout the color line that supposedly demarcated white from black, 
freedom from bondage.  Now Leigh, and possibly other members of his ilk, seemed comfortable 
in imposing the same shackles on white residents as their slaves.  Residents assailed such 
possibilities.  Those white men who toiled behind the “plough” or worked with “mechanic’s 
tools” sharpened their moral and physical skills, they argued, which prepared them for the rigors 
of republican citizenship.  These white men controlled their labor and deserved the political 
representation to protect that labor.  “[T]ide-water gentlemen” such as Leigh, though, enjoyed 
“amusements and vices” while they lived off the “labour of their slaves.”75  Indolent planter-
politicians like Leigh contributed little to the Commonwealth and failed to recognize that 
political representation for the “peasantry of the west” would ensure security for private property 
and a healthy body politic.  Rather, Leigh and his colleagues preferred to rest on the security of 
antiquated political reasoning, favoring paranoia to practicality.   
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Leigh’s figurative equation of African American slaves to white westerners coupled with 
news of the convention’s rejection of reforms worried northwestern residents.  And, by the end 
of 1829, their delegates shared that sense of disappointment and frustration.   Efforts to directly 
elect the governor failed, even though most delegates agreed that the governor should remain 
politically weak.  The prospect of the people electing the executive still seemed too dangerous 
for many delegates to accept.76  Alexander Campbell introduced a measure to promote common 
schools; the convention refused to debate its merits.77  Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Marshall countered accusations that the county court system encouraged nepotism and 
corruption, maintaining that the current system enabled judges to mete out punishment 
judiciously and independently without fear of rebuttal from an oversight body.  The system also 
ensured an unrivaled form of “internal quiet” that other states, especially those in the North, 
envied.78  Northwestern delegates hoped that the two former presidents’ support for reform 
would sway moderates and undecided; instead, Monroe only warmly supported some measures 
while Madison consistently voted with opponents of reform.79   
Opponents of democratic reform measures enjoyed numerous victories, including 
representation in the state legislature.  A modest change to the formula calculating representation 
still allotted the majority of delegates to Piedmont and Tidewater counties, forty-two and thirty-
six respectively.  Voters in the twenty-six counties west of the Alleghanies, where the majority 
of the white population resided, received thirty-one delegates.  The convention applied the same 
arbitrary scheme of apportionment to the Senate.  The forty counties west of the Blue Ridge 
Mountains received thirteen senators while the sixty five counties on the eastern side of the Blue 
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Ridge received nineteen.  This favorable allocation of representation to eastern districts 
represented a measure of “double security” for eastern slaveholders who paid taxes on their 
slaves and on products purchased from the profits of slave labor.80  Northwestern delegates and 
residents hopeful that a future amendment could change the formula used to calculate 
representation were dismayed that the new constitution forbid the General Assembly to alter the 
number of delegates or senators allotted to each district.81  What one Wheeling newspaper 
labeled as “THE BASIS OF ABSURDITIES” further cemented the preponderance of political power 
wielded by planters, slaveholders, large landholders, and the political elite.82   
Reformers’ hopes for expanding suffrage met the same fate as their aspirations for 
altering representation in the state legislature.  Northwestern delegates championed plans that 
either would have inaugurated universal male suffrage or a form of general suffrage fell victim to 
conservatives and moderates who feared the repercussions of democratic reform.  Instead, 
delegates ratified a proposal that appeared only to modestly increase those eligible to vote.  
Among those now permitted to vote included those enfranchised under the previous constitution; 
owners of a freehold worth at least twenty-five dollars; leaseholders whose annual rent was at 
least twenty dollars and who had held that lease for a minimum of five years; anyone who legally 
stood to inherit a freehold; housekeepers in charge of maintaining a residence; tenants and joint-
tenants; and those who possessed land as part of a corporation, held a title in equity, and who 
held a mortgage.83  The addition of these new groups to the electorate signaled a marked 
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departure from the values of economic and political independence and civic virtue that defined 
republican citizenship, although it still fell short of reformers’ goal of universal suffrage.    
The denial of universal male suffrage or a form of general suffrage incensed northwestern 
residents, and historians have seized on this frustration to argue that delegates ratified a facsimile 
of the previous constitution that included only modest alterations.84  But the changes made to 
suffrage revealed important developments occurring in Virginia, and signaled delegates’ 
acknowledgement of a new economic context.  Though officeholders still had to own a freehold, 
the increased electorate meant increased power for voters to check politicians’ conduct.  While 
previous definitions of the freehold focused on its acreage, delegates at the convention, cognizant 
of market forces, redefined the freehold in terms of its commercial value.  This redefinition 
recognized land’s economic qualities and its status as a transferrable commodity.  Freeholds 
could be divided and transferred without undermining the principal ownership, allowing men to 
purchase parcels of a freehold as a stock or bond and vote without outright owning the freehold.  
This change reflected a critical shift from classical republican ideology that had informed the 
initial interpretation of a freehold.  Perhaps more importantly, this redefinition and 
reconceptualization of republican ideology presented the scenario of slaveownership constituting 
a basis for republican citizenship in the future.85    
The enfranchisement of tenants, leaseholders, and housekeepers likewise signaled an 
acknowledgement of current economic forces and an important ideological transformation of 
republicanism.  Charles Fenton Mercer, the measure’s principal author, believed that land 
represented only one form of capital and that sundry other forms attached Virginians to their 
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state.  Those men in possession of other forms of “other property besides land,” he suggested, 
showed their fealty and support to Virginia similar to a “land-owner.”  Further, Mercer and other 
supporters of this proposal recognized that both land and labor generated important capital, and 
that the “proprietors” of this capital deserved political representation to protect their interests.86  
Mercer’s suffrage proposal “bridged the antagonistic arguments of democratic and conservative 
delegates,” although some conservatives, including Benjamin Watkins Leigh, feared that this 
redefinition of citizenship would affect universal male suffrage.87  While the proposal did not 
inaugurate universal male suffrage, the reconceptualization of property as principally a form of 
capital represented a critical ideological shift away from classical republican ideology and to a 
more democratized government.     
Western and northwestern Virginians applauded many of these reforms and signaled their 
desire to ratify the new constitution.  In Martinsburg, one newspaper editor considered the 
constitution’s ratification the “desired policy of the West.”  The new constitution “contains many 
beneficial reforms, and, secondly, because it encreases its relative political weight and enables it 
at some future day to assert more effectually, the proper basis of representation.”  The 
constitutional revolution demanded by westerners “must be gradual,” the editor conceded.88  
Philip Doddridge “admit[ted] the superiority of the new [constitution] over the old one,” a phrase 
some western Virginians interpreted as his tacit approval.89  A Shenandoah Valley newspaper 
identified northwestern newspapers that supported ratification, including one in Wheeling, 
Clarksburg, and Morgantown.  The newspaper also noted that Monongalia delegate Charles 
Morgan endorsed the new constitution, “declar[ing] his determination to vote for the new 
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Constitution, and urg[ing] such arguments in favor of the expediency of its ratification.”  
Morgan, “an ardent friend of reform,” would persuade his constituents to ratify the new 
constitution as his words carried “great weight” in the region.90  
Western and northwestern Virginia’s denunciations, however, drowned out such 
favorable interpretations of the proposed constitution.  Numerous transmontane residents lashed 
out in frustration and anger because delegates failed to fully democratize the state constitution, 
notably in refusing to inaugurate universal male suffrage and equal representation.  By early 
1830, two northwestern delegates emerged as outspoken critics.  Philip Doddridge and 
Alexander Campbell assailed James Monroe, James Madison, and Frederick County delegate 
John Cooke, the lone western representative to support ratification, for their apostasy to the 
democratic cause.  Doddridge lamented the divisions that arose between western delegates on 
matters of reforms, which hindered their ability to form a united front and parry attacks from 
moderates and conservatives.  Perhaps most concerning for Doddridge was what he interpreted 
as residents’ capitulation toward the new constitution’s ratification.  This posture of 
“submission,” he declared, represented what eastern slaveholders desired to see in their chattel.  
Northwestern whites appeared consigned to live under a “political compact” that promised 
“slavery of us and our children,” turning a once bright political future for the region into one 
dominated by eastern planter-politicians consumed with their pursuit of absolute power and 
absolute protection for their chattel.91   
Alexander Campbell’s interpretation of the convention’s denouement and future 
prospects for the Northwest seemed equally foreboding.  In a series of letters printed in the 
Wellsburg Gazette, Campbell denounced the machinations of a manipulative “faction” that 
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flouted the will of the majority.92  The minister found conservatives’ and anti-reformers’ 
characterizations of western reformers abhorrent, along with their fear mongering tactics.  Such 
delegates, Campbell declared, willfully spread rumors about westerners imposing draconian 
taxes upon the ratification of a democratic constitution.  The fear generated by this canard 
resulted in countless “[p]etitions, remonstrances and expostulations, inflammatory speeches and 
addresses” produced by eastern Virginians who immediately became “alarmed for their negroes 
and their estates.”93  This canard produced the desired effect, Campbell lamented, as moderate 
and conservative delegates expressed their constituents’ fears through the rejection of democratic 
reforms.   
Campbell found little to support in the new constitution.  What good was the extension of 
suffrage, he questioned, “when it can be of no use to use except annually to meet, [and] to 
murmur at our masters.”  While their “masters” denied northwesterners political representation, 
they would willfully impose taxes to support a “standing army…to keep down the slaves” or 
impress them to quell an “insurrection.”  White northwesterners would be compelled to support 
the institution that denied them political equality.  “[W]e must be demislaves, or an Irish 
peasantry, or a species of heliots,” Campbell decried, serving at the whims of the state’s 
slaveholding regime.  African American slavery, that “curse of curses, which has deluged every 
country with crime, and engulphed it in ruin,” now prevented white northwesterners from 
enjoying the political privileges that rightly belonged to them.  Until Virginians had a frank 
discussion about that “black cloud in our horizon,” northwestern residents would continue to find 
themselves under the dominion of slaveholders.94      
                                                          
92 Wellsburg Gazette, reprinted in Wheeling Gazette, February 27, 1830, 2.   
93 Wellsburg Gazette, reprinted in Wheeling Gazette, March 6, 1830, 2.   
94 Wellsburg Gazette, reprinted in Wheeling Gazette, April 3, 1830, 2.   
88 
 
Northwestern residents, like their representatives, found little in the proposed constitution 
to applaud.  Earlier drafts of various proposals that delegates transmitted to constituents in late 
1829 stirred emotions among proponents desirous of universal male suffrage specifically and 
democratic reform in general.  Rather than expunging the “antiquated and anti-republican 
principles” that shaped the state’s political institutions and culture, the convention has been 
busily “fastening the yoke of the slaveholder’s supremacy upon the necks of the white 
population.”  Reforms championed by residents had all seemingly failed, with the blame resting 
at the feet of planter-politicians, large landowners, and the political elite.  “Honest labour” and 
“[i]ntelligence and industry” disqualified northwestern white men from enjoying political 
representation, as such virtues apparently meant little in Virginia.  Rather, the status of a 
landholder “gives a better title to the enjoyment of civil rights.”95   
By early 1830, northwestern residents, in possession of the proposed constitution, argued 
that the constitution represented a reaffirmation of divisive and dangerous sectionalism.  
“[E]astern Virginia will never conform to the interests or views of Western Va.,” one anonymous 
writer grumbled, arguing that the two possessed incompatible and antagonistic interests.  To 
remedy this, western Virginia should explore annexation to Maryland.  The “greater intercourse” 
between western Virginia and Maryland would politically revitalize the region and promote 
commercial interests.96  Another writer compared Virginia to neighboring Ohio and remarked at 
the “Egyptian darkness” that enveloped the “Antient Dominion.”  The new constitution ensured 
this “Egyptian darkness” while the document’s prohibition on alteration ensured that Virginia’s 
planter-politicians would continue to wield power over their “white slaves, as well as black.”  A 
                                                          
95 Wheeling Compiler, December 2, 1829, 3.   
96 Wheeling Gazette, November 6, 1830, 3.   
89 
 
division of the state along the Alleghenies presented the only means of achieving political 
representation for white northwesterners while freeing themselves from political bondage.97 
 Many northwestern residents spoke frankly about slavery’s role in denying their pursuit 
of democratic reform.  One resident was incredulous that a “race of beings, having no political 
exestinence, and who are moreover deprived of their every natural right” seemingly enjoyed 
political representation while countless northwesterners remained locked out.  Planter-politicians 
“white-washed” their slaves so it would appear these men still abided by the color line that 
separated freedom from bondage.  Instead, in their pursuit of power and security, these 
slaveholders’ made a mockery of the color line.98  An anonymous writer, “JUSTICE,” recounted 
the “memorials,” “writings,” and “conventions” over the past thirty-five years undertaken by 
residents who, once hopeful for a democratic constitution, now discovered themselves in 
“political bondage.”  The author saved his most caustic remarks for the proposed constitution’s 
arbitrary means of allocating representation.  He warned his audience of the dangers of 
“amalgamating…the free white and slave population,” believing that the two races should 
remain separate.   
The author’s verb selection was revealing.  In nineteenth-century lexicon, “amalgamate” 
generally referenced the interracial sexual contact between white men and enslaved female 
African Americans.  Eastern Virginia’s long history of slavery and large number of slaves 
increased the likelihood of such contact, but slaveowners refused to acknowledge this tawdry 
history.  The appearance of mulatto children on the plantation and at auctions, though, seemed to 
validate such rumors.  A “large percentage of human stock shipped to the Gulf States,” one 
contemporary later remarked, “bore the best blood of the F.F.V.” as a result of this “cross-
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breeding.”99  The author’s use of “amalgamate” recognized not only the long history of 
interracial sexual contact between whites and blacks but the verb also served as an underhanded 
swipe at eastern slaveholders.  While such men spoke of the need to protect private property and 
minority rights, these pronouncements were timeworn bromides designed to obscure their true 
intentions.  Eastern slaveholders prized their chattel over their white neighbors and the proposed 
constitution manifested that sentiment.100           
 Prior to the vote on the proposed constitution, residents convened across the region to 
discuss the constitution and its implications.  Residents gathered at the Wheeling courthouse in 
December 1829 to voice their displeasure with conservatives’ and moderates’ refusal to embrace 
democratic reform.  The gathered men expressed outrage concerning the convention’s rejection 
of the “white basis,” and strongly denied that the “free laborers of the West” shared the same 
degraded status as “the slaves of the East, or the peasantry of Europe.”  Their labor, morality, 
and intellect separated them from such degenerates.101  In nearby Randolph County, residents 
declared the proposed constitution to be “distructive of the natural rights of man” and perceived 
in the document the same principles that the “British Crown” foisted upon their forefathers.  
While much of the nation and slaveholding South enjoyed a “free elective democracy,” the new 
constitution seemed prepared to throw northwesterners “into the dark and gloomy abyss of 
aristocracy.”102   
In March 1830, a few weeks prior to the official popular vote on the proposed 
constitution, a spontaneous gathering of residents met at the home of Samuel Woods, a 
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prominent lawyer and slaveholder.103  Woods, called to chair the meeting by those gathered, 
oversaw the passage of four resolutions that emphasized residents’ belief that “the new 
constitution, both in letter and spirit, opposed” the “principles” found in the Bill of Rights.  
Residents concluded that they would oppose the constitution “by our votes” or, for those 
disenfranchised, through “all fair and honorable means.”104  In one final plea before the popular 
vote, a Monongalia resident urged all of his neighbors, freeholder and nonfreeholder alike, to 
convene during the next court day to “adopt some measure in opposition to the ratification” of 
this “most ARISTOCRATICAL charter.”  Perhaps a united front comprised of men from all classes 
would illustrate the animus against the new constitution and persuade eastern politicians to 
discard that document and start anew.105     
 Prayers for a new convention or constitution went unanswered.  Delegates’ approval of 
the proposed constitution by a 55 to 41 margin in January presaged the popular vote in April.  By 
a comfortable ten-thousand vote margin, Virginians overwhelmingly ratified the new 
constitution, with the majority of the support for the constitution coming from counties east of 
the Alleghenies.106  In the Northwest, final poll numbers revealed residents’ profound opposition 
to the constitution.  In Ohio County, residents rejected the constitution, 643-3.  In Philip 
Doddridge’s Brooke County, residents polled unanimously against the constitution.107  Further 
south in Harrison County, over one-thousand voters opposed its ratification while less than ten 
braved the hostile crowds to support the proposed constitution.  Supporters of the new 
constitution, though, found solace in returns from Monongalia and Preston counties.  Though a 
                                                          
103 1830 U.S. Federal Census: Ohio, Virginia; Series: M19; Roll: 198; Page: 253; Family History Library Film: 
0029677 [Ancestry.com][accessed 28 January 2015].   
104 Wheeling Gazette, March 20, 1830, 3. 
105 The Republican Monongalia & Preston Advertiser, March 16, 1830, 3.   
106 Bruce, Rhetoric of Conservatism, 67-68.   
107 Bruce, Rhetoric of Conservatism, 68 and Proceedings and Debates, 903.   
92 
 
majority of residents rejected the proposed constitution, over seven-hundred voted for its 
ratification.  This figure represented one of the highest totals in the region.108 
 The high levels of support for the new constitution in Monongalia and Preston counties 
seemed out of character for the supposedly monolithic Northwest.  Delegates and constituents 
appeared united in their pursuit of democratic reform in the decades leading up the convention, 
but the returns reveal a divided populace and warm support for the constitution.  Evidence 
suggests little correlation between the percentage of slaves relative to total population and 
voters’ support or rejection of the constitution.109  Both Monongalia and Preston had higher-than-
average slave populations for the region but Harrison was home to more slaves than those two 
counties combined and voters there overwhelmingly rejected the new constitution.110  Supporters 
of the new constitution in these two counties may have believed that the changes to suffrage laws 
would eventually prove beneficial.  This interpretation may have emerged from their 
representative, Charles S. Morgan of Monongalia, who threw his weight behind the 
constitution’s ratification.  During the convention, Morgan at times appeared apathetic, even 
garnering the censure of his constituents for his “anti-republican course” on certain democratic 
reforms.111  Unlike the outspoken proponents of democratic reform in Alexander Campbell and 
Philip Doddridge, who mobilized opposition to the constitution, Morgan “harangue[d]” voters as 
they arrived at the polls in Morgantown, exhorting them to support the new constitution.  His 
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“mighty influence” was evident in the final tally.112  This personal style of politicking perhaps 
best explains the vote totals in the two counties while showing the uneven advance of democratic 
reform across the slaveholding South and nation.  Further, the vote revealed that the divisions 
present during the convention carried through ratification, underscoring the Northwest’s political 
diversity and shifting coalitions.113     
Historians have generally neglected interpreting residents’ support for the new 
constitution, focusing instead on the widespread resistance manifest in the region.  Few 
outspoken supporters left an historical record, making it challenging to analyze their arguments.  
Dissenting voices likely found it difficult, if not impossible, to speak freely without garnering 
threats from opponents.  And while some supporters of the new constitution voted to ratify it, a 
high probability remains that not all advocates exercised this right.  Virginia’s viva voce method 
of voting opened voters to discrimination, ostracism, and violence, especially those with 
different interests than those of the majority.  (Free Soilers and Republicans in the region would 
face this same harassment in the 1850s and 1860s).  Supporters who journeyed to the polls likely 
encountered mobs of discontented men determined to prevent votes being cast in favor of the 
new constitution.  Faced with this dilemma, men could bow to peer pressure and vote against the 
constitution, turn around, or face public censure (or worse) for their opposition vote.  The 
“interested and overbearing majority” that eastern planter-politicians feared in the guise of “King 
Numbers” operated on both ends of the political spectrum, advocating democratic reform while 
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squelching opposition.114  This dynamic would become increasingly important and visible as the 
politics of slavery occupied state and national politics in subsequent years.    
Speaking forty-five years after the conclusion of the 1829-1830 Constitutional 
Convention, Waitman T. Willey presented a brief biographical treatment of Philip Doddridge at 
the West Virginia Historical Society’s meeting at West Virginia University in Morgantown.  
Willey, a veteran politician who had himself challenged eastern Virginians’ hegemony in the 
1850-1851 Virginia Constitutional Convention and had helped guide West Virginia’s statehood 
movement during the Civil War, reduced the debates of the early convention to one issue, 
slavery.  All the theories of government espoused by conservatives like Leigh, Upshur, and 
Randolph represented a guise for “the protection of slavery,” he proclaimed.  These leaders 
apprehended that increased democratization of the state and inclusion of nonslaveholders would 
inexorably result in oppressive taxation of chattel and perhaps slavery’s “total abolition.”  
Doddridge had battle against this powerful ideology, and though he lost, his arguments resonated 
with West Virginia’s founding fathers during the Civil War.115  
Willey’s interpretation of the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention suggests that the 
convention represented a conservative counterrevolution, one designed to entrench slaveholding 
interests and reject democratic reforms.  Demagogues such as Leigh and his ilk believed that 
slavery and democracy represented two antagonistic elements.  Doddridge battled this ideology 
during the convention, only to be overwhelmed by the state’s slaveholding regime.  This regime, 
consumed with its pursuit of absolute power and absolute protection for its chattel, would 
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eventually lead the state to civil war and place in motion western Virginia’s statehood 
movement.  
What Willey misinterpreted about the convention, though, was that it constituted a 
critical moment on Virginia’s path toward a slaveholding democracy.  While delegates at the 
convention embodied and expressed conservative values and ideologies, the new constitution 
represented a marked departure from classical republican ideology.  Virginians, who had extolled 
the freehold’s virtues of independence and permanence, now spoke of the freehold in terms of 
the cash nexus.  This reconceptualization of republican ideology contained important 
implications.  Sundry forms of private property or capital could be used to determine republican 
citizenship, moving Virginians closer to the idea of the person-based democratic government 
advocated by reformers.  This commodification of the freehold lessened its attractiveness for 
determining republican citizenship, requiring Virginians to search for a new litmus test.  The 
belief that slaveownership and herrenvolk democracy could constitute that basis gained increased 
currency and acceptance across the state, as a racially based democracy would protect and 
strengthen chattel slavery.116  Slavery was not an obstacle to democratic reform, as argued by 
Willey; it became the essential ingredient. 
The convention and new constitution hardened many northwestern residents’ perspective 
of eastern politicians, planters, and slaveholding elites.  Transmontane Virginians perceived little 
in the constitution that reflected the burgeoning democratic ethos that championed the cause of 
the “common man.”  Indeed, the constitution seemed antiquated and obsolete before the ink on 
its parchment dried.  A Fourth of July reveler in Wheeling in 1830, hoped that the new 
constitution would enjoy a “short life” and that the “rights of man” in Virginia would soon 
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receive political representation.117  One historian describes the new constitution as “antediluvian, 
even in terms of its own times,” inferring that it represented a counterrevolution of conservative 
and slaveholding interests and a stinging defeat for democratic proponents.118  But this 
mischaracterization overlooks the salient ideological, political, and practical changes manifest in 
the new constitution.  The constitution was not “antediluvian”; rather, it represented a blending 
of nineteenth century conservative and progressive ideals, a reflection of delegates’ awareness of 
a new economic and political context unfolding around them and the uneven march of 
democratic reform.  More importantly, the new constitution accelerated Virginia’s development 
as a modern slaveholding democracy, a movement that received increased support over the next 
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Chapter 3: A Peculiar Détente: The Rise of Proslavery and Pro-Democratic Thought, 1830-1850 
In 1850, Virginia appeared on the verge of dramatic political and constitutional reform.  
Two decades after the conclusion of the previous constitutional convention, Virginians supported 
the convening of another body to once again reform the state’s laws and (hopefully) address the 
“political degradation” experienced by many northwesterners.1  Randolph County lawyer and 
slaveholder David Goff presented one guiding principle to his representative to the convention, 
Gideon Draper Camden of Harrison County, a principle Goff believed would prove beneficial for 
all Virginians.2  “Let the East have any guarantee they want to protect their slave property,” Goff 
insisted.  Though he supported the “white basis,” a platform opposed by many eastern 
Virginians, Goff supported constitutional safeguards and other political measures to protect 
eastern slaveholders’ peculiar property.  Indeed, Goff believed that the “white basis” and extra 
protection for slaveholders would “operate to the protection to the West as well as the East.”  
White northwesterners would obtain the political equality they desired while eastern slaveholders 
would acquire greater protection on their chattel.  Long desired sectional harmony would be 
achieved through a slaveholding democracy.3   
What important changes over the previous two decades led to the 1850-1851 
Constitutional Convention?  Why did Goff declare unflinching support for extra “guarantee[s]” 
 for eastern slaveholders, men who had long denied white northwesterners political and 
constitutional equality?  These questions take on greater importance when they are considered 
alongside the anger and disappointment expressed by northwesterners following the ratification 
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of the 1830 Constitution.  Historians exploring this episode in Virginia history have arrived at a 
general consensus that the failure to obtain democratic reforms in 1830 represented one of the 
mileposts on Virginia’s road to eventual dismemberment.4  This anachronistic narrative, though, 
sacrifices contingency for convenience, specifically the convenience of knowing and confirming 
the conclusion of this important political and constitutional struggle.  Goff’s instructions to 
Camden and his belief in the symbiotic nature of slavery and democratic reform reveal the 
synthesis of two decades of important political and ideological developments in Virginia.  Most 
notably, changes in political thought and the perceived increased dangers against slavery, 
including the rise of northern antislavery groups, during the 1830s and 1840s ultimately help 
lead Virginians to support a new constitutional convention.       
The changes and issues that compelled Virginians to once again amend their constitution 
reflected national and state developments concerning slavery.  National crises concerning 
slavery, notably the Wilmot Proviso, the Mexican-American War, and the rise of abolitionism in 
the North, convinced some eastern planters and politicians that constitutional reform would align 
the interests of nonslaveholders with those of slaveholders and promote unity among Virginians 
on the issue of slavery.  In 1848, Governor William Smith announced his continued support for 
“revising our state constitution,” arguing that the North’s “oppressive policy” toward slavery 
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necessitated a united front among all white Virginians against such tyranny.5  The following 
year, Governor John B. Floyd echoed the sentiments of his predecessor.  “[C]onstitutional reform 
will satisfy the demands of the people,” Floyd concluded, and unite “all the interests of the 
Commonwealth.”  The “sooner” such reform could be “accomplished the better,” he 
maintained.6  By closely linking constitutional reform with protecting slavery, Virginians 
cemented that symbiotic relationship and thus made any attack on slavery an assault on all 
Virginians’ political independence. 
Concerns over slavery within the state manifested, too, as threats to the peculiar 
institution seemed increasingly tangible and serious.7  Slaveholders across the state worried that 
abolitionists operated secretly within the state (and perhaps with aid from sympathetic 
nonslaveholders), helping slaves flee and indoctrinating blacks and whites with their dangerous 
and troubling beliefs.  In September 1845, the Wood County Circuit Superior Court tried three 
Ohio residents arrested on providing “countenance, protection, and assistance to six negro 
slaves.”  Wood County’s location on the Ohio River made it an attractive target for abolitionist 
activity and slaves hoping to flee to the North and possibly into Canada.  These three Ohioans 
“feloniously entice[d], advise[d], and persuade[d]” the six slaves to “abscond and from the 
possession and service” of their master.  Such subversive actions, Judge David McComas 
argued, threatened the “peace” and “stability” of Virginia.8   
The threat of abolitionists invading the state amplified concerns that some 
nonslaveholding residents looked longingly for the end of slavery.  In 1847, Washington College 
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President Henry Ruffner published his Address to the People of West Virginia, a tract that 
elucidated the political, economic, and social ills spawned by slavery.  The immense and myriad 
ills produced by slavery required immediate action, he concluded.  Ruffner supported gradual 
emancipation to prevent western Virginia from being overrun by African American slaves and, 
in the process, release westerners from the political power wielded by eastern slaveholders.  
Ruffner’s plan garnered mainly negative reviews but nonetheless illustrated that such ideas, 
though relatively dormant since 1832, still received circulation within the nation’s largest 
slaveholding state.  Constitutional reform would hopefully ameliorate nonslaveholders’ overt and 
clandestine attempts to undermine slavery and the power of the slaveholding regime while 
generating a united front against abolitionists’ assaults.     
The rise of Jacksonian Democracy during the 1820s and 1830s and the entrenchment of 
the two-party system across the South bolstered support for slavery, but in Virginia this narrative 
proved more complex.  Proponents of Jacksonian Democracy in Alabama and Mississippi 
ratified and amended state constitutions so that by 1832 both states had established universal 
white male suffrage and increased the number of popularly elected political offices.9  In 
Tennessee and North Carolina, Jacksonians reformed their states constitutions in 1834 and 1835, 
respectively, removing vestiges of colonial and early republic limits on political participation.  
Most importantly, the new state constitutions excluded African Americans from politics and 
rejected any emancipation plan, preventing the few free propertied blacks that resided in those 
states from voting or allowing future freed slaves any opportunity of political representation.10  
The democratic actions undertaken by these southern states promoted a formal hardening of 
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racial lines, a flattening of social and class distinctions among white men, and an increased 
commitment to “herrenvolk republicanism.”11  Politics became the domain of free white men in 
the 1830s and 1840s across the slaveholding South, ensuring greater political independence for 
white men and a more ardent commitment to slavery. 
Virginians experienced the effects of the two-party system.  Partisan newspapers, party 
platforms, caucuses and nominating committees, and canvassing candidates were common sights 
throughout the state, including the Northwest.12  Though reformers lamented the suffrage 
restrictions imposed by the 1830 Constitution, the number of those eligible to vote increased and 
practically all white men could engage in party functions.  But as politics increasingly emerged 
as the purview for white men across the slaveholding South, white, disenfranchised Virginians 
grumbled about their political exclusion.  The disenfranchised felt the “unjust and injurious 
bearing” produced by the “foolish and anti-republican restriction upon the right of suffrage,” a 
Parkersburg newspaper lamented.  The lack of universal male suffrage represented one marker of 
Virginia’s “constitutional misfortunes” that generated needless social and political divisions.  
These divisions, planters and slaveholders across the state feared, could eventually erode 
nonslaveholders’ fealty toward slavery.13     
In each reason that compelled Virginians to once again amend their constitution two 
decades after the previous revision, the same fundamental truth became manifest.  Slavery and 
democracy for white man became inseparable and practically indistinguishable, a southern alloy 
that promised political and social independence and public and private power for all white men 
while generating an army of passionate defenders for chattel slavery.  The defense of slavery 
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invariably thus became a defense of democracy, with the inverse holding equally true.  In the 
Northwest, the majority of residents, including men like David Goff, willingly embraced this 
political dynamic.  Though some residents protested the inordinate power wielded by 
slaveholders and the political “double security” placed on chattel property, the outcry against 
slavery was minimal and isolated, especially after 1832.14  Northwestern residents understood 
and accepted the southern axiom that political liberty for white men depended on enslaved 
African Americans. 
In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the 1830 Constitution, the clamor over 
annexation, demands for another constitutional convention, and even rumors of violent resistance 
quickly faded by the end of the year.  Various reasons existed for this decrease in tensions.  “A 
dismemberment of the old dominion is to be deprecated,” one northwestern resident stated, 
believing that the national and state political ills produced by such action would outweigh 
possible benefits.15  Other western Virginians provided an optimistic perspective on the new 
constitution.  Within scathing reviews of the new constitution, critics often applauded the new 
requirements for suffrage, noting that the “right of suffrage is extended” before focusing on the 
constitution’s drawbacks.16  Though not possessing all the democratic principles advocated by 
reformers, the 1830 Constitution represented “one great step towards a perfect reform of the 
government.”  Western Virginia’s continued demographic growth and economic expansion 
would eventually compel eastern Virginians to accept democratic reforms, residents maintained.  
The new constitution represented a minor and temporary setback in democracy’s eventual 
triumph.17   
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Other northwestern residents expressed tangible concerns about annexation to 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Maryland.  Residents in Wheeling worried about the economic 
ramifications of annexation to Pennsylvania, as the city competed with nearby Pittsburgh for 
national prestige, economic power, and commercial clout.18  “What would Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh agree to do for Wheeling and Clarksburg?”19  Though many residents still believed 
that politicians in Richmond attempted to stifle Wheeling’s economic growth and political clout, 
securing financial support in the Keystone State would be highly competitive and uncertain.  
Wheeling politician Archibald McClean believed that the bluster surrounding annexation and the 
dissatisfaction with the constitution emerged from a vocal and disgruntled minority.  If the 
“whole voice” of the Northwest could speak on this issue, he insisted, “a different result” would 
be manifest.  The supposed “undivided voice” of the Northwest, while manifest in the years 
preceding the convention, fractured as residents began to appreciate how the new constitution 
furthered their respective interests.  Self-interest, not political principles, swayed many 
residents.20  The immediate response to the new constitution varied across the Northwest.  Many 
residents pined for another convention that would implement democratic reform and liberate the 
“politically cursed” majority.21  Still others accepted the constitution’s provisions, enjoying the 
extension of suffrage while dismissing possible alternatives.  The supposedly monolithic 
Northwest once again illustrated its political diversity.     
Any further discussion of the 1830 Constitution quickly faded by 1831 as news of the 
Southampton uprising in August reached the Northwest.22  Nat Turner’s rebellion in Southside 
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Virginia, outside of its human cost, challenged the emerging southern ideology of paternalism.  
Paternalism, a lower South remedy to the quandary of slavery and Christianity, progressed in 
starts and fits.  In the Old Dominion, few openly accepted paternalism, with most adherents 
residing in the heavily slave-populated Tidewater and Southside regions.  The majority of 
Virginia slaveholders, according to Lacy Ford, argued that sagging economic profits 
demonstrated the limitations of a slave-based economy, leaving some in the state searching for a 
way to remove slaves and free blacks.23  Turner’s rebellion appeared to provide that opportunity. 
Virginia Governor John B. Floyd proposed a plan to remove all African-Americans from 
the state.  In a letter to South Carolina Governor James Hamilton, Jr., Floyd stated he would 
support legislation curtailing slaves’ mobility.  This included confining slaves to their masters’ 
plantations, prohibiting all black preaching, and removing all free African-Americans from the 
state.24  This short-term solution, Floyd hoped, would preclude imitators and calm white 
Virginians’ fears about another revolt.  His long-term solution appeared more polarizing.  He 
proposed using surplus state revenue to remove all blacks from Virginia, a “first step to 
emancipation.”  Floyd assured Hamilton he would proceed “tenderly and cautiously,” and invited 
responses from the South Carolina governor and Georgia’s governor, too.25 
Floyd’s plan for emancipation may not have been as audacious as it first appeared.  
Virginia, like Maryland and Delaware, initiated steps in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries to decrease its slave population.  For example, in 1816 the Virginia Legislature quietly 
endorsed colonization and private manumission as part of a larger program to “whiten” the upper 
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South through demographic reconfiguration.  Northwestern residents generally supported this 
demographic reconfiguration.  Parkersburg lawyer Peter G. Van Winkle supported colonization, 
echoing economic arguments that the “value of slave labor has probably reached its maximum.”  
This realization would eventually compel slaveholders to rid themselves of their chattel.  Rather 
than being inundated with a population of “free blacks” who exhibited a “tendency to crime,” 
removing such a troublesome population became the “duty of the country.”26  A large majority of 
northwestern residents supported colonization, characterizing colonization societies as “humane 
and liberal” as they offered African Americans the opportunity to return to their ancestral home 
civilized and Christianized.27  Once in Africa, these colonized men and women would elevate the 
“political and moral character” of their continent.28  This process of “whitening” Virginia would 
remove “a black population [northwesterners] do not want,” stop the illegal smuggling and 
importation of slaves to the Deep South, and invalidate the “unnatural and unpatriotic” northern 
doctrine of abolitionism.29  
In the Northwest, the public reaction to the fallout from Nat Turner’s rebellion remained 
cautiously guarded.  In Morgantown, the Monongalian reprinted a memorial from Richmond 
slaveholders petitioning the state legislature for inaugurating some means of removing free 
blacks and colonizing slaves.  The “existing curse of slavery” demanded immediate attention, 
lest the increasing free and enslaved populations eventually overrun Virginia’s white 
population.30  The editor of the Monongalian also rebuked any discussion of revisiting a division 
of the state in the wake of Nat Turner’s rebellion.31  In Wellsburg, the editor of the Wellsburg 
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Gazette republished an article from the Niles Weekly Register that advocated emancipation with 
removal.32  Few men attacked slavery outright and none demanded its immediate abolition.  
Indeed, one of the few public attacks on slavery centered on its “deleterious” economic effects, a 
sentiment that previous generations of Virginians had articulated.33  Economic concern may have 
proven to be the most important for many northwestern residents but not because of slavery’s 
effect on the state’s overall economy.  Newly emancipated slaves, if not removed or colonized, 
could, along with free blacks, head north in search of employment.  African Americans would 
flood local job markets, depress wages, and increase unemployment among white men.  Growing 
industrial cities such as Wheeling and, to a lesser extent, Wellsburg, could represent a possible 
destination for these emancipated former slaves.  Unless an ironclad agreement could be reached 
that ensured the removal of all emancipated African Americans from the state, many 
northwestern residents remained pessimistic about emancipation’s efficacy.   
Residents around Charleston expressed similar concerns but noted the possible political 
ramifications of emancipation.  For numerous years, Judge Lewis Summers decried, “eastern 
gentlemen” acquired their “political power either as derived from the slave population, or under 
the pretext of guarding that species of property.”  Yet he worried about the larger, possibly 
unforeseen consequences of emancipation.  If delegates pushed too hard and actually achieved 
emancipation, Summers worried “nothing will be left for rail-roads or canals in any quarter.”34  
After appropriating capital for removing free blacks and slaves, the state government would have 
little left in the treasury for internal improvements for western Virginia.  Even the prospect of 
voting for emancipation could prove dangerous.  Eastern politicians could “make reprisals” 
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against the west “for its course on the slave question,” a dangerous proposition considering the 
immense power wielded by such men.35  Instead of advocating for emancipation, Summers 
remarked that considering slavery’s position in electoral politics and its future in Virginia “may 
be the work of time.”36   
The debate over slavery and emancipation unfolded in the state legislature during the 
winter of 1832, exhibiting similar sectional divisions as those present during the 1829-1830 
Constitutional Convention.37  Across the Tidewater and Piedmont, proslavery advocates sought 
to minimalize the threat of insurrection and quash talk of emancipation.  Many of these 
legislators supported removing free African Americans, a group they viewed with suspicion.  In 
areas with few slaves, including the Northwest, delegates took a strong stance for emancipation 
and removal, reminding their colleagues that slavery retarded economic growth and precluded 
democratic reform.38  Accordingly, northwesterners coalesced around Thomas Jefferson 
Randolph’s post-nati plan.39   
Most western delegates openly professed their disdain for chattel slavery, arguing that 
this “cancer on the political body” required immediate removal lest the symptoms worsen.40  
Other western delegates reminded their colleagues that their section cared “deeply” about the 
outcome of this debate, rebuking arguments that slavery represented an issue solely for eastern 
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Virginians to debate.41  Kanawha County delegate George W. Summers emerged as an avid 
proponent of emancipation and colonization, believing that the removal of African Americans 
would eventually beget political equality for white westerners.  Slavery, he declared, poisoned 
slaveholders’ republican values, producing the “embryo tyrant of its little domain” while 
inculcating “abusive epithets” within masters.  When property rights came in conflict with the 
common weal, he averred, the former must yield to the latter.42  Brooke County representative 
John C. Campbell, a disciple of Philip Doddridge, supported voluntary colonization, reflecting 
his constituents’ demand of “whitening” the state and protecting white, laboring northwesterners.  
To manifest these demands, Campbell worked during the debates to secure sufficient funding for 
transporting African Americans outside of Virginia.43 
Eastern representatives, especially those from the Southside, attempted to downplay Nat 
Turner’s rebellion.  As Lacy Ford argues, these delegates portrayed the rebellion as an isolated 
incident that the militia quickly extinguished.  Governor Floyd, while a westerner, echoed this 
interpretation.  The “banditti of slaves” never constituted a significant numerical group, and their 
reign of terror lasted only twenty-four hours.  Once alerted, local citizens and militia groups 
“speedily terminated” these “deluded fanatics.”44  Other slaveholding proponents, including 
Wiliam O. Goode of Mecklenburg County and James H. Golson from Southside Virginia, 
wielded similar arguments as those espoused during the previous constitutional convention.  
Specifically, they deflected assertions that slavery stifled economic growth, blaming instead the 
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Tariff of 1828 and meddlesome abolitionists and other outside agitators.  True safety, such men 
averred, could be achieved by removing the state’s free African American population, not 
slaves.45   
As during the previous constitutional convention, numerous eastern delegates denied that 
western nonslaveholders deserved a voice in this debate.  Western Virginians possessed “no 
pecuniary interest” in slavery and only sought emancipation as a means of inaugurating the 
dreaded “white basis” that eastern delegates defeated two years earlier.46  This debate over 
slavery “chiefly and peculiarly” affected eastern Virginians, especially since the “farmers and 
graziers” of western Virginian needed only a “few slaves” to perform the “menial, domestic” 
tasks.  The minimal impact of slavery on western Virginia’s economy and society paled in 
comparison to the slave society of eastern Virginia.47  Some men echoed Upshur’s assertion that 
a “rooted antipathy” against slavery existed among western Virginia’s hollows and hills, and 
residents sought only the opportunity to strike against the institution.  If this variant of 
antislaveryism could not be quarantined to the western side of the Alleghenies, Goode warned, a 
division of the state would emerge as the only possible remedy.48     
Most delegates generally agreed that emancipation and removal through colonization 
would, in the end, preserve the Old Dominion as a white man’s republic.  But they divided over 
the means to achieve that end.49  Virginians were acutely aware of the burdensome costs 
associated with colonization, and slaveholders across the state posited that taxes needed to 
support such a plan would come from their pockets.  This form of government overreach worried 
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even the most ardent emancipationists, including those in the Northwest.50  Randolph’s plan 
constituted an “unconstitutional and unrepublican confiscation of property” that lacked 
compensation, endangered the “exclusionary” right of private property, and could ultimately 
establish a dangerous precedent on future political and constitutional actions.51  Ultimately, such 
drawbacks proved the unraveling of Randolph’s post-nati plan and other emancipation 
proposals.52  Northwestern delegates salvaged a political victory, though, voting unanimously for 
a resolution that laid the groundwork for colonizing free African Americans.  This proposal, 
passed by the state legislature, evinced northwesterners hopes for a “whitened” Virginia.53   
Few Virginians felt satisfied at the conclusion of these debates.  Conservatives 
reproached each other for permitting western nonslaveholders to broadcast their disdain for 
slavery.  Northwestern delegates, while pleased to obtain a tentative plan for the removal of 
African Americans, hoped the debates would awaken Virginians from their “fatal lethargy on 
this subject.”54  A Wellsburg resident, reflecting on these debates, aptly captured his neighbors’ 
sentiments regarding slavery.  In a series of letters published in the Brooke Republican, 
“W.T.W” spoke plainly about slavery’s effects on the state.55  The author stated unequivocally 
that slavery deluded Virginians into supporting the dangerous doctrines of nullification and 
secession, believing that the latter two spawned from a desire to protect the peculiar institution.  
Northwestern Virginians, to avoid being dragged into such a perilous situation, should adopt all 
“honest measures to prohibit…the dark tide of slavery” from washing over their region.  These 
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measures included emancipation and colonization along with a vigorous interstate slave trade.56  
Northwesterners “should lend ready assistance” to eastern Virginians in achieving this important 
goal, even conceding to eastern Virginians sole discretion on state laws concerning slavery.  
Refusal on the part of eastern Virginians to “whiten” the state could compel northwesterners to 
pursue a division of the state.57   
As with other western representatives during the debates over slavery, “W.T.W” believed 
that emancipation and removal would protect the white, laboring northwesterner.  While a 
proponent of emancipation, “W.T.W.” believed that manumission should occur gradually lest the 
Northwest be inundated with a “vast mass of miserable population, deplorably ignorant and 
utterly incapable” of self-sufficiency.  The “intelligent laboring classes” of the region would 
invariably suffer.  Western arguments demanding political representation for their labor would 
be undermined by African Americans who would depress wages, increase competition, and 
devalue manual labor.58  If emancipation could not be properly paired with colonization, then 
African Americans should remain in bondage.59  
The removal of African Americans from Virginia would also promote sectional harmony.  
Slavery brought eastern interests “into direct conflict, with the interests of the west,” this 
Wellsburg resident insisted, with internal improvements, political representation, and public 
education presented as casualties in this political strife.  Only two alternatives existed for 
producing “an identity of policy” for Virginians.  Either western Virginians would yield and 
purchase slaves until their society mirrored that of eastern Virginia or the slaveholders east of the 
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Blue Ridge would emancipate themselves from slavery, making the Old Dominion a free state.60  
Racial purity, employment for white men, republican virtue, and sectional harmony demanded 
some form of action, “W.T.W” concluded.  Having failed to adequately address these concerns, 
northwesterners then could seek a division of the state, the final act in this intrastate drama.    
Historians interpreting the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates have generally agreed that 
these debates presaged Virginia’s eventual dismemberment.  The threat to divide the state 
because of Virginians’ inability to resolve the issue of slavery appear to reaffirm that 
interpretation.  The “breach” between western nonslaveholders and eastern slaveholders 
“widened” as a consequence of the debates, Sean Wilentz asserts, foreshadowing both the state 
and national crisis over slavery in 1860.61  Alison Goodyear Freehling traces Virginia’s 
“dissolution” into two states during the Civil War to these debates, as western, pro-democracy 
reformers battled eastern, aristocratic slaveholders for control of the state legislature, political 
power, and the future of the Commonwealth.  The inability for these two factions to coexist, 
according to Alison Freehling and William Freehling, clearly illustrated a “white community 
irrepressibly divided by slavery,” a debilitating internal division that continually resurfaced and 
later weakened the Confederate States of America.62  William Shade’s core-periphery analytical 
paradigm adds greater nuance to the clear sectional division posited by Alison Freehling, but he 
also argues that subsequent discussions over slavery in Virginia followed the same general 
contours sketched out by Virginians during this debate.63          
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This historiography suffers from an anachronistic perspective.  Aware of West Virginia’s 
separation from Virginia during the Civil War, historians have searched for antecedents to that 
movement, sacrificing contingency and context for a selective reading of the evidence.  
Dissatisfaction arising from the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates and threats of division from 
the Northwest, for example, seemingly represent an important milepost on the road to 
“dissolution.”  When considered alongside the previous constitutional convention, West 
Virginia’s separation appears inevitable.  But Virginians were not privileged with such 
information.  Rather, many placed their faith in the marketplace and the legislature’s voluntary 
emancipation scheme to begin the deliberate, if slow, process of “whitening” the state.  This 
demographic reconfiguration would not be achieved overnight, residents understood.  Further, 
talk of division represented an ultimatum or last resort designed to impress upon eastern 
slaveholders the severity of political injustice suffered by northwesterners.  Only after exhausting 
all political and constitutional options would northwesterners have explored a division of the 
state.   
The true legacy of the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates emerged from the writings of 
proslavery advocates Benjamin Watkins Leigh, Thomas Roderick Dew, and Abel Parker Upshur, 
not in the seemingly inevitable “dissolution” of the Old Dominion.  In the span of a few years, 
these men witnessed slavery come under increasing attack both from within and without.  
Eastern delegates fended off accusations in the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention that 
slaveholders and freeholders wielded inordinate power to the detriment of political 
representation for white men.  While eastern delegates defeated reform initiatives such as 
universal suffrage and equal representation, the freehold underwent a dramatic redefinition that 
broadened the electorate but diminished its political viability.  Two years later, Virginians 
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revisited slavery and its role in the state, with many westerners advocating some means of 
emancipation and removal.  Once again, easterners closed ranks and defeated serious, detailed 
proposals that called for slavery’s eventual removal.  Even with these political victories, 
slavery’s future in Virginia appeared uncertain.   
The internal political debates over slavery emerged as national discussions over slavery 
came to the forefront.64  The rise of immediate abolitionism in the North, the “Tariff of 
Abominations,” South Carolina’s threat of nullification and secession, and David Walker’s 
bellicose Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World impressed upon proslavery advocates that 
opposition to slavery appeared increasingly tangible and militant.  Few solutions seemed to exist 
to convince Virginians of the need to maintain slavery and confront threats to the institution.  
The “positive good” argument posited by Deep South politicians, clergy, and residents had failed 
to gain traction in Virginia outside of the Tidewater and Southside.  Eastern slaveholders’ 
economic arguments about slavery’s profitability rang hollow, especially considering the state 
remained mired in a depression.65  Rather, Leigh, Dew, and Upshur sought to recast slavery as 
essential to republican government.  These theorists saw slavery as a wellspring and model of 
republican virtue, not tyranny.  Further, they wanted slaveholding to replace the freehold as the 
basis for republican citizenship and government, thereby representing the source of political 
freedom and independence for white men.  Slavery’s future would be tethered to that of the state, 
providing the greatest security possible for the peculiar institution.    
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Leigh, Dew, and Upshur’s campaign to reconceptualize slaveholding as the source of 
republican citizenship signaled an important political and constitutional shift.  The 
democratization of southern state governments in the 1830s, notably in Tennessee and North 
Carolina, occurred concomitantly with a more aggressive defense of slavery.  Democracy for 
white men and slavery for African Americans became inseparable, existing in a powerful 
symbiotic relationship that flattened class distinctions and promoted unity between 
nonslaveholders and slaveholders.  This dynamic would unfold in Virginia, too.  The 
“whitening” sought by northwestern residents would not be achieved solely through 
demographic shifts but through the manifestation of “herrenvolk republicanism.”66          
Benjamin Watkins Leigh served as the principal figure in refashioning a defense of pro-
slavery republicanism by replacing the freehold with slavery as the basis for republican 
government.  In his 1832 Letter of Appomatox [sic], Leigh reflected on the Virginia Legislature 
Debates over slavery, scolding delegates for mischaracterizing the evils of slavery and for their 
reckless discussion of seizing private property.  Leigh mocked the supposedly divine revelations 
received by Turner, insisting instead that a “hallucination” seized the slave and distorted his 
moral compass.67  Any subsequent insurrections would not be traced back to “hallucinations,” 
the “incendiary writings” of northern abolitionists, or the “seditious practices of negro 
preachers,” he warned.  The blame would fall upon the “measures proposed” and the “speeches 
delivered, in our own legislature.”68  Indeed, Virginians needed to stop the wild and irresponsible 
talk of abolition, emancipation, and removal lest slaves internalize these words and pursue 
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freedom through their own means.  Leigh proposed an increased militia presence and greater 
vigilance among citizens, including nonslaveholders, to prevent another slave rebellion.69  
Leigh also refuted delegates’ assertions about slavery’s degrading effects on the white 
population.  Though New England enjoyed a superior system of “elementary education,” Leigh 
dismissed thoughts that slavery’s absence resulted in educated and literate residents.  Moreover, 
talk of slavery corroding morals or producing the “embryo tyrant of its little domain,” as 
suggested by George Summers, represented a “pernicious” exercise that focused on the few evil 
deeds publicized by delegates and sympathetic newspaper editors.  Greece and Rome, both 
slaveholding societies, represented the acme of manners and civilization.70  Delegates, including 
those from the Tidewater and Piedmont, had “exaggerated” the evils generated by slavery, 
confirming westerners’ assertions that the health of the republic depended on slavery’s abolition.  
Indeed, these “unwise, [and] ill-judged” mischaracterizations of slavery undermined easterners’ 
defense of slavery, providing an opportunity for opponents of slavery to exploit.  Leigh implored 
slaveholders to broadcast slavery’s benefits, believing that such efforts would appease 
nonslaveholders and quiet any discussion of emancipation.71     
As Christopher Michael Curtis has noted in his interpretation of the Letter of Appomatox, 
Leigh avoids any defense of private property in terms of the freehold.  Rather, Leigh situated 
private property in slavery and the master-slave relationship at the center of republican 
government.72  Delegates’ plans for emancipation represented a “violent abrogation of the rights 
of slave property without the consent of its owners.”73  The dangerous and revolutionary 
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proposals advanced by emancipationists lacked authorization from slaveholders, violated state 
law concerning private property, and appeared to validate the “tyranny of the majority.”  
Slaveholders possessed an invested right in their current slaves and their future increase, a 
fundamental law that the “legislature cannot constitutionally take away.”  Leigh’s conclusions 
were clear.  Slaveholders’ rights to their chattel were “inviolable,” deserving of constitutional 
and political safeguards to keep it safe from the “power of the public.”74  Indeed, the health of 
Virginia’s republican government depended on the protection of such rights.     
The fruits of Leigh’s Letter of Appomatox would not be manifest for some time.  But his 
argument that slavery represented a “positive source of republican virtue” and required 
constitutional safeguards in order to protect it and, by extension, the republic, occurred at a 
critical moment in Virginia and national politics.75  With opposition to slavery and slaveholders 
increasing, proslavery Virginians needed an ideological defense of the peculiar institution that 
would ensure its longevity and generate passionate supporters.  By tethering slavery to the 
republic’s health, Leigh proposed a powerful symbiotic relationship that would ensure slavery’s 
survival.  Few, if any, would attack slavery if it constituted a cornerstone of the state 
government.  Further, by championing the virtues that emanated from the master-slave 
relationship, Leigh sought to discredit abolitionists from without and emancipationists from 
within.  Finally, his defense of slavery reflected his abandonment of the freehold, providing an 
opportunity for future constitutional reform on suffrage and political representation.  Slavery, not 
the freehold, would serve as the guarantor of republican virtue and the basis for republican 
citizenship. 
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William & Mary Professor Thomas Roderick Dew furthered this reconceptualization of 
republican government championed by Leigh.  In his Review of the Debate in the Virginia 
Legislature of 1831 and 1832, Dew dismissed emancipation and colonization schemes, extolled 
the civilization of African Americans in the United States, and offered a pro-democracy theory 
based upon slavery.  Dew found common ground with Leigh.  Both men rejected Thomas 
Jefferson’s assertion that slavery corrupted the moral character of the slaveholder and, by 
extension, the republic.  Further, both Leigh and Dew perceived in the master-slave relationship 
the necessary attributes for republican citizenship.  Masters, Dew maintained, acted “humanely” 
and were “kind and indulgent” to their slaves.76  Indeed, the master introduced the “exalted 
principles of morality and religion” to his slaves, principles the master and slave continually 
refined during their interactions.77  The examples of cruel masters, such as those paraded out by 
western delegates, illustrated that those slaveholders failed to understand the nuanced master-
slave relationship.  Dew traced this failure to white northerners who married into slaveholding 
families, reaffirming his argument that a dearth of political virtue resulted from slavery’s 
absence.78  A healthy republican government depended on the exceptional virtues that emanated 
from slavery and the master-slave relationship, notably benevolence and stewardship.79       
The benefits of slavery and the master-slave relationship extended to all white men, too, 
offering equality and independence to nonslaveholders.  Liberty for freemen, Dew contended, 
burned brightly in ancient slaveholding societies such as Rome and Greece because freemen 
possessed an intimate understanding of bondage.  An identical dynamic prevailed in the 
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slaveholding South.  A “perfect spirit of equality so prevalent among the whites” demonstrated 
the great leveling effects of slavery.  Because African American slaves occupied the “low and 
menial offices,” the “distinctions” that wracked nonslaveholding societies were practically 
nonexistent in slaveholding states.80  Race was the only “distinction” that existed.  “Color alone,” 
Dew proclaimed, represented the sole “badge of distinction…and all who are white are equal in 
spite of the variety of occupation.”  The political implications were profound.  The “spirit of 
equality” that characterized slaveholding societies also represented the “generator and 
preserver…of liberty.”81  With all other distinctions subsumed by slavery, Virginians could 
inaugurate a racially based, democratic polity that offered independence for all white men and 
increased protection for slavery.  Democracy and slavery would more than coexist; they would 
strengthen each other.     
Eastern Shore politician and John C. Calhoun ally Abel Parker Upshur complemented 
this emerging proslavery discourse seven years later.  Upshur posited that racial slavery refined 
the characteristics of benevolence and stewardship, two important qualities required for a 
republican government.  Slaveholding “prepare[s] [the master] for the love of freedom, and to fit 
him for the enjoyment of it,” Upshur declared.82  Slaveholders possessed “more elevated 
principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and a juster estimate 
of…liberty,” a reflection of the exceptional qualities derived from slavery.83  The master-slave 
relationship equipped slaveholders with the ability to judiciously and fairly mete out punishment 
and justice, ensuring the health of their republican government, the safety of their neighbors, and 
the perpetuation and stability of their patriarchal world.  Indeed, the “personal independence and 
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self-respect” derived from “the relation between master and slave” provided the strongest 
foundation for “political liberty.”84  And with slavery constituting the foundation of a healthy 
republican government, white men sought to “preserve unbroken” that relationship that bestowed 
political independence.85 
White men also sought to “preserve unbroken” the master-slave relationship and slavery 
in general because of the social benefits derived from the peculiar institution.  Upshur, like Dew, 
posited that slavery flattened social distinctions among white men, generating a powerful sense 
of equality.  “Here the slave is black, and the white man is never a slave,” he remarked.  Indeed, 
the “color of the slave,” he proclaimed, that “eternal, ineffaceable distinction of nature” 
bestowed independence for white men and bondage for African Americans.  Regardless of how 
“poor, or ignorant or miserable” a white man may be, the presence of African American slaves 
ensured a certain level of respectability and status in the community.86  Moreover, white men 
could exercise mastery without being a slaveholder.  A white nonslaveholder wielded “absolute 
authority over the negro, and…receive[d] from him continual proofs of deference and respect.”87  
Renting a slave elevated a nonslaveholder into the social ranks of the master class, allowing him 
to experience the southern ideal of mastery.  This temporary entry into the master class 
increasingly aligned the interests of slaveholders and nonslaveholders, ensuring greater security 
for the institution that provided social independence and freedom for white men.                  
Virginians needed to support and maintain slavery, Upshur concluded, because the 
institution prevented the farcical and dangerous doctrines of abolitionism from upsetting racial 
hierarchy.  The presence of African American slaves cultivated an acute sense of “independence, 
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freedom, and equality among all classes” of white men.  The political spirit that emerged from 
this dynamic was not “that rude and levelling democracy, which seeks to establish a perfect 
equality.”  Northern states, under the corrupting influence of abolitionism, had begun to 
inaugurate this “perfect equality” in their society.  Rather, white southerners enjoyed a 
“republican equality” that permitted white men and only white men to participate.88  The benefits 
of slavery touched and supported white southerners in a myriad of ways, thus demanding 
vigilance and fealty from white southerners every day.     
The proslavery defenses promulgated by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur reflected Virginia’s 
changing political, economic, and social contexts.  Proslavery Virginians recognized that the 
longevity of slavery required situating slavery as the basis for republican government, a 
reconceptualization that sought to inextricably bind the health and future of two institutions.  
Slavery could also replace the increasingly useless and archaic freehold as a guarantor of 
republican virtue and liberty.  The frank discussions concerning slavery following Nat Turner’s 
rebellion necessitated a stronger defense of the master-slave relationship and the rights of private 
property in slaves.  At the core of all three defenses rested a recognition that slavery’s future 
depended on nonslaveholders, including those in the Northwest.  By extending the advantages of 
slavery beyond the plantation and into every household, business, and polling station, Leigh, 
Dew, and Upshur illustrated the institution’s centrality to all white men.  Though 
northwesterners owned fewer slaves than other regions in Virginia, they enjoyed identical 
privileges and benefits offered to all white Virginians.  The often volatile economic context that 
characterized industrialization in the Northwest might jeopardize a white man’s employment, but 
he could rest assured that he would never fall below the level of an African American.  This 
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hardening of the color line reflected the increasingly popular and powerful southern axiom that 
slavery for African Americans generated and protected liberty and independence for white men.   
Over the proceeding decades, northwesterners internalized and championed these 
political ideas, becoming vocal pro-democratic and proslavery Virginians.  The entrenchment of 
the two-party system in Virginia throughout the 1830s and 1840s assisted this development by 
inaugurating a raucous style of popular politics that elevated the image of and vested political 
power in the common man.  In the slaveholding South, the two-party system pitted politicians 
and partisans against each another in a political struggle over which party provided the strongest 
defense for slavery.89  This brand of politics invited participation among all white Virginians, 
including those in the Northwest who remained disenfranchised.  The political arena of 
northwestern Virginia mirrored other developments across the South, but the region’s proximity 
to northern states also shaped residents’ expectations of their state government.  The constant 
interaction with residents of Ohio and Pennsylvania, two states that offered greater political 
representation to white citizens, intensified northwesterners’ demands for political equality.  
Within these demands, though, northwesterners offered their pledges of fealty to state and 
concessions to slaveholders, a clear reflection that the rhetorical effort begun by Leigh, Dew, and 
Upshur was paying dividends.  The path toward democratic reform would be colored 
distinctively by slavery.   
The entrenchment of the two-party system across the state represented one of the critical 
developments that lent credence to the ideas put forth by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur.  As Michael 
Holt has demonstrated, the two-party system operated effectively on national and state levels 
because it allowed extensive competition along a broad spectrum of issues.  Political parties took 
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opposing sides on pertinent political, economic, and social issues, and offered to voters what 
each party considered the proper means of achieving and maintaining a healthy republican 
government.  A stark demarcation between the two organizations emerged through this process.90  
The two dominant parties during the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs and Democrats, possessed all 
the trappings of modern political parties, including ideologically oriented platforms, caucuses 
and nominating committees, partisan news outlets, and candidates canvassing the region.   
The Northwest was no exception to this development.  The proliferation of partisan 
newspapers, competitive local elections, and the sights and sounds of campaign season clearly 
illustrated that northwesterners participated in one the key political movements of the era.  A 
supporter of Waitman T. Willey instructed him to “mount your horse and scower the County 
maik Stump Speaches etc.” if he desired to win election to the House of Delegates.  Willey, 
though a prominent and respected Whig in Monongalia, still faced intense competition in a 
district that heavily favored Democrats.91  Democrats also performed well in counties along the 
Ohio River, southwestern Virginia, and in areas generally undisturbed by the Market Revolution.  
Whigs garnered the majority of their support in burgeoning manufacturing towns, including 
Wheeling and Charleston, and in counties favorable to internal improvements.92  Both parties 
worked to mobilize white residents to the polls during elections, hopeful that their message (and 
perhaps a few alcoholic beverages) would convince residents to vote for their respective 
candidate.93   
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The two-party system in Virginia proved crucial for creating a political détente between 
western and eastern Virginians, specifically on the issue of slavery.  As William Cooper has 
shown, both Whigs and Democrats portrayed their organizations and ideologies as “safe” on the 
issue of slavery while accusing the opposition of advocating subversive and inimical principles 
that imperiled the peculiar institution.  The “politics of slavery,” according to Cooper, mitigated 
conflict between nonslaveholders and slaveholders and ultimately defined and shaped southern 
politics before the Civil War.94  While Cooper focuses on regions and states across the South 
with large enslaved populations, this dynamic unfolded along the peripheries of the South, too, 
including northwestern Virginia.  When vetting candidates, some residents supported those who 
hailed from southern soil.  Morgantown resident Thomas P. Ray faced a quandary in the months 
leading up to the 1836 presidential election as he preferred neither Democrat Martin Van Buren 
nor Whig Hugh L. White.  But White was a Tennessean.  “I will choose the southern one,” he 
concluded, confident that White’s southern credentials implied his fealty toward the institution.  
Van Buren, a New Yorker, simply could not be trusted to protect slavery.95   
The “politics of slavery” were clearly manifest in partisan newspapers, as Whigs and 
Democrats accused the other of being “unsafe” on the issue of slavery.  “It has been for some 
time drummed in our ears,” a Wheeling Whig newspaper lamented, “that the whigs are 
abolitionists, and that the only safety of the South is in re-electing Mr. Van Buren.”  Supposedly, 
the editor complained, only Democrats could be trusted on the sacrosanct issue of slavery.96  
Whig partisans often denounced Democrats as radical “Loco Foco Abolitionists” who employed 
                                                          
with residents following his nomination.  John Huddeson to Fletcher Brock, April 2, 1855, Fletcher Brock 
Collection, A&M 2869, WVRHC.        
94 Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, xi.   
95 Thomas P. Ray to W.T. Willey, 9 February 1835, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10, Folder 1, 
item 4-9, WVRHC.   
96 Western Virginia Times & Advertiser, February 20, 1840, 1.   
126 
 
unscrupulous tactics and spread false rumors in an effort to debase Whigs’ slavery credentials.  
One Whig newspaper returned such a charge, arguing that Democrats’ attempts to brand Whigs 
as unsafe on the issue of slavery represented desperate and manipulative attempts to destabilize 
the country, a goal Democrats shared with northern abolitionists.97  Even the nomination of a 
southern Whig for president failed to silence some Democrats’ accusations.  Supporters of 
Virginian William Henry Harrison during the 1840 Presidential election denied the general’s 
support of abolitionism, arguing that no politician “has gone farther, in his opposition to the 
schemes of the fanatics.”98   
When not denouncing their supposedly abolitionist foes, Democrats burnished their 
candidates’ proslavery credentials.  Democrats exalted the “patriotism and political integrity” of 
their candidates who advocated sound “Democratic doctrines,” including the protection of 
slavery against federal encroachment.99  A group of Morgantown residents echoed such 
sentiments during a Fourth of July celebration.  Whigs’ disdain for Democratic candidates, one 
reveler proclaimed, resulted from Democrats’ “steadfast principles,” which included a marked 
vigilance on the issue of slavery.100  Indeed, Democrats often found greater success in wielding 
the issue of slavery against their opponents.  A Brooke County newspaper editor, reflecting on 
the conflicts between Whigs and Democrats, admitted that Democrats possessed a “pronounced 
predilection for proslavery ideas.”  Democrats’ political dominance in the county “for a 
generation or more” reflected a widespread acceptance of the party and its proslavery ideas.101  
Even Whigs begrudgingly admitted that Democrats often utilized the issue of slavery more 
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effectively.  One national Whig politician lamented that despite Zachary Taylor’s election in the 
1848 presidential election, Virginians continued to support Democratic candidates, including 
Lewis Cass.  “Old Virginia is still wedded to her idols,” he bemoaned, a clear indication of 
Democrats’ superior ability in this election to use the “idol” of slavery to their advantage.102      
The inclusivity and democratic participation generated by the “politics of slavery” and 
the two-party system in general represented an important characteristic that mobilized 
slaveholders and nonslaveholders, freeholders and nonfreeholders, into the political sphere.  
Here, though they possessed different socioeconomic backgrounds or enjoyed different positions 
of status in the community, their racial status subsumed these differences.  Meetings that often 
numbered in the thousands became commonplace across the Northwest, bringing residents from 
across the region into Wheeling, Morgantown, Bridgeport, and other towns.  Wheeling resident 
Peter Garnall, in a letter to his nephew in Florida, remarked at the “excitement” surrounding the 
upcoming presidential election later that fall.  Approximately “three thousand” Whigs convened 
north of Wheeling while a Democratic meeting equal in number gathered in Bridgeport.  Garnall, 
a Whig, noted that the “overwhelming majority of men women and children” supported the 
Whig candidate, William Henry Harrison.103   
Partisans during these political meetings sought to discredit their opponent’s platform 
while burnishing their own, in the hopes of drawing new adherents.  Nearly twenty-thousand 
Whigs gathered in Wheeling to hear political speeches and witness the operation of a nail 
machine and handle instruments used in glass manufacturing and in the iron foundry.  The 
enterprising spirit exhibited in these three professions represented a marked contrast from 
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Democrats who adhered to traditional agricultural pursuits.104  An advertisement for a Whig 
meeting in Morgantown invited “ALL…WHIG FRIENDS, AND EVERY BODY ELSE” who disapproved 
of the spoils system used by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.105  Conversely, a 
Democratic meeting in Morgantown hoped that the “Democrats of the Mountains” would come 
out in full force to support the Democracy and rescue Virginia from Whig politicians.  
Democrats welcomed their own members and disenchanted Whigs, too, including those in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.106    
The style of interparty disagreement between Whigs and Democrats manifest during 
these meetings carried over into the state legislature.  Delegates, like their constituents, debated 
the National Bank, currency, tariffs, internal improvements, the spoils system, and the scope of 
presidential power supplied fodder for both political parties.  Roll-call votes of Whigs and 
Democrats on many economic issues, such as banking and currency revealed a high level of 
disagreement between 1835 and 1843.  In other economic areas, such as granting corporate 
charters, Virginia fell in line with other states.107  The composition of the state legislature 
likewise reflected this intense party debates.  From 1838 to 1841, for example, Whigs possessed 
a slight numerical advantage over Democrats, often registering somewhere between one and five 
percent.108  This intense partisan conflict ensured that political parties continued to court voters, a 
process that helped mobilize more northwesterners into the political sphere.109  
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While the two-party system encouraged broad participation and intense interparty 
disagreement, this system also reminded Virginians of those who remained disenfranchised due 
to constitutional requirements.  Partisan meetings in the Northwest often invited fellow Whigs or 
Democrats from Pennsylvania and Ohio, too, two states that offered far greater political 
representation for its residents than Virginia.110  Indeed, while the state’s political parties often 
fostered sectional harmony on national issues, the lack of political representation for many 
western Virginians brought some Whigs and Democrats together on the issue of constitutional 
reform.111  As Peter G. Van Winkle suggested, Virginians, regardless of party affiliation, should 
demand with one voice “an adequate remedy for the evils we deplore.”  Those “evils” often 
arose from a constitution Van Winkle and other northwesterners considered broken.112         
Virginians hopeful for constitutional reform, though, confronted opposition from eastern 
elites.  The 1830 Constitution required the state legislature to review census data and reapportion 
representation accordingly, but Tidewater and Piedmont planter-politicians in the General 
Assembly refused to follow through.113  The returns from the 1840 U.S. Census revealed the 
continuation of demographic trends that began decades earlier.  The white population west of the 
Blue Ridge Mountains registered more than that east of the mountains, further validating western 
Virginians’ claims that a minority wielded power over the majority.114  Moreover, though the 
state’s total slave population decreased during the previous decade, this decline occurred 
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primarily on the western side of the Alleghenies.  Numerous counties in the Tidewater, 
Piedmont, and Shenandoah Valley witnessed an increase in their slave populations.115  These 
demographic trends demonstrated to one Wheeling resident that northwesterners have been 
“basely and heartlessly cheated out of our just rights by a minority.”116  This “tyrannical and 
oppressive” form of government, a Lewis County resident declared, required immediate reform 
to stop the eastern minority from continuing to wield “ruthless” power over the majority.117             
The demands and justifications articulated by northwestern residents for a new 
constitution in the 1840s generally mirrored those expressed prior to the 1829-1830 
Constitutional Convention.  Residents’ focused on obtaining universal male suffrage, addressing 
malapportionment in the state legislature, reforming the county court system, allowing for the 
public election of government officials, and creating a state-supported public education system.  
Residents’ justifications for these reforms likewise echoed those leading up to the previous 
constitutional convention.  Some residents harkened back to the memory of the American 
Revolution, where, northwesterners maintained, ordinary men had demonstrated their political 
fitness and boldly sacrificed their lives in the quest for a republican government.  At a 
constitutional reform meeting in Gilmer County, residents assailed the current system used to 
calculate representation, the “mixed basis.”  This “arbitrary and unequal” system of 
apportionment was “wholly irreconcilable with our great revolutionary struggle, which made us 
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free and independent.”  White men, not African American slaves, deserved political 
representation in accordance with the memory of the American Revolution.118       
Residents’ use of the memory of the American Revolution to justify a new constitution 
dovetailed with the “natural rights” argument.  Ordinary men in 1776 clearly illustrated that the 
possession of property, whether landed or human, was unnecessary to determine one’s political 
fitness.  Rather, all white men possessed the natural right to self-government.  At a reform 
meeting held in Wood County, residents professed their belief in the doctrine that “every citizen” 
should be entitled to “absolute and practical equality,” regarding it as “an original or 
fundamental right.”119  In a Fourth of July Speech in Wood County, Peter G. Van Winkle 
supported the “great principle of equality,” denounced the “false distinctions” created by the 
constitution, and “profess[ed] my faith in my fellow man.”  “[T]he people,” he maintained, “are 
the safest depositories of all governmental power.”120  The right of suffrage represented one of 
the “natural rights of man,” Wheeling newspaper editor J.E. Wharton asserted.  Other states 
correctly recognized that “a man holds suffrage as an inherent right vested in him by his Creator” 
while “the demagogue with a few acres of ground” could practically “manufacture” a class of 
citizens beholden to him, not to the state’s interests.121  By reforming the constitution, Virginians 
would ensure the manifestation of Providence’s design and promote a fair and equitable political 
system free from manipulation.    
The spirit and progress of Jacksonian Democracy over the past decade validated 
northwesterners’ arguments that “the people” could be trusted in their exercise of political 
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power.  “Old Virginians,” complained a James E. Wharton of Wheeling, “do not feel that men 
are now able to govern themselves.”  “[B]ut the people feel that they are able,” he stated 
confidently, and deserved the opportunity to demonstrate their political fitness.122  The current 
“age requires no less” than a thorough constitutional revision, one Parkersburg newspaper 
explained, an age where all white men enjoyed the prerogatives of citizenship regardless of 
wealth or social status.123  The spirit of Jacksonian Democracy that had empowered “the people” 
had also inspired southerners to reshape their state constitutions.  This reform occurred without 
endangering slaveholders’ rights, encouraging some northwesterners to look to these southern 
states for guidance.  One northwestern politician advised “following the example of Kentucky 
and making even the judges elective by the people.”124  The popular election of judges would 
help remove the traces of nepotism and corruption that plagued the county court system.  Peter 
G. Van Winkle entrusted his fellow northwesterners to “do what is safely done by the people of 
other states,” specifically the “preservation or…exercise” of political power.125  Slaveholding 
states that had embraced democratic principles failed to devolve into anarchy and slavery 
remained secured, refuting many easterners’ assertions about democracy’s inherent threat to 
private property.126   
The change in social sensibilities manifested in Jacksonian Democracy reflected the 
changing economic context, too.  In the Northwest, the growth of glass works, nail 
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manufacturers, and iron foundries often meant the movement of men and their families from the 
countryside into the towns of Wheeling, Wellsburg, and their surrounding environs.  But as these 
men moved into the cities, their opportunity to obtain a freehold—and illustrate a permanent 
attachment to the community in accordance with republican ideology—diminished.  Though 
these men labored and contributed to the state’s economic health, they lacked political 
representation, an absurdity in the minds of many residents.  “[P]roperty cannot be made the 
evidence of a man’s permanent interest with and attachment to the community,” a Wheeling 
newspaper proclaimed.127  Wheeling, the locus of much of this dynamic economic growth, 
witnessed an increase in demands for political representation as its industrial labor class matured 
during this period.  In nearby Wood County, residents declared in a reform meeting that “the 
possession of property” bestowed neither increased political power to its owner nor should it be 
used to determine political representation.128  One Weston resident believed that the “class…of 
nonfreeholders” who paid taxes or served in the militia demonstrated a “permanent common 
interest with, and attachment to, the State.”129  As the region’s economy developed along a 
different trajectory than other areas in Virginia, its residents would continue to feel the burden of 
a state constitution that, though partially reformed, needed to reflect changing economic and 
social contexts.    
Historians exploring sectional tension in Virginia have accurately recognized other long-
standing grievances and demands articulated by western Virginians.  Alongside important 
political and constitutional reforms, historians observe that western Virginians believed that a 
democratized state constitution would facilitate the creation of a public school system and lead to 
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greater state investment in internal improvements in western Virginia.  Such sentiments were 
widespread throughout the Northwest in the 1830s and 1840s.  Northwesterners blamed their 
failure to achieve political, economic, and social reforms on obdurate eastern slaveholders and 
politicians.  These men, many northwesterners believed, privileged their chattel over white 
equality and sought to consolidate political power in an effort to arrest the development of the 
largely nonslaveholding Northwest.  Subsequent historians have interpreted this evidence to 
explain Virginia’s eventual dismemberment along clear, sectional lines.  Indeed, the frustration 
exhibited by western Virginians during the 1830s and later during the secession crisis appears to 
reaffirm this interpretation.130   
However, extant evidence also reveals an important, complementary narrative.  
Throughout the 1840s, northwesterners expressed their continued fealty toward Virginia, their 
hopes for greater sectional harmony, and a firm belief that slaveholders deserved extra 
safeguards to protect their chattel from external threats.  This evidence, overlooked or dismissed 
by previous historians, offers an interpretation of the state undergoing a “détente” through 
slavery.  Indeed, alongside northwesterners’ demands for constitutional reforms were offers to 
support slaveholders’ pursuit of greater political protection over their chattel.  Northwesterners 
remained hopeful that these public pronouncements would demonstrate their fealty toward the 
state’s foremost institution and that the inclusion of large numbers of nonslaveholders would 
strengthen, not endanger, slavery.  Further, these public pronouncements revealed 
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northwesterners’ support of the ideological reconceptualization of republican thought initiated by 
Leigh, Dew, and Upshur a decade earlier.  Rather than a stumbling block, slavery would become 
the medium through which democratic and constitutional reform would be achieved.     
In October 1845, residents of Lewis County and nearby Harrison County gathered at the 
local courthouse to discuss and debate constitutional reform.  Residents approved the passage of 
six resolutions that contained many of the common political and constitutional grievances, 
including the need to inaugurate the “white basis” in the state legislature and the rightful power 
of majoritarian rule.  After the six resolutions had been read aloud, Judge Edwin S. Duncan 
offered his interpretation of the sectional discord affecting Virginia.  While Duncan castigated 
the “unjust discrimination against the West” by eastern Virginians, he reminded those gathered 
of their past fealty and continued responsibility to the state and its institutions.  “[W]ith what 
care they had watched over the slave interest, peculiar to the East,” he proclaimed.  The 
“obedience and loyalty” northwestern Virginians had exhibited over the past years evinced their 
support for slavery and that they would protect, not threaten, the institution.  Indeed, the 
“security” desired by eastern slaveholders would occur if they extended “justice” to western 
Virginians.  By the meeting’s end, residents unanimously adopted another resolution, stating that 
northwesterners remained “utterly opposed to a dismemberment of the State for any purpose 
whatever….[W]e will not separate from the East, and the East will not separate from us.”  Rather 
than actively pursue a division of the state or attack slaveholders or slavery, these northwestern 
residents professed their unwavering support for the state and offered extra protections for 
slaveholders.  Democratic reform would not harm slavery, residents concluded; it would protect 
and strengthen it.131     
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Northwestern residents and politicians who supported the belief that political reform and 
greater security for slavery could occur simultaneously also demanded that the two elements 
needed to remain in equilibrium.  Reform must not threaten private property, while the need to 
protect slavery could not prevent white equality.  In a letter to constituents, four northwestern 
politicians maintained their support for the “white basis” and refused to concede to the “mixed 
basis” on any new constitution.  While slaveholders were “entitled to efficient protection” on 
their property, that protection could not supersede white northwesterners’ “social and political 
rights.”132  One contributor to the Wellsburg Weekly Herald supported an ad valorem tax that 
would operate equally across the state, an important attribute that would not “oppress the tax 
payer, or his peculiar property.”  Northwestern Virginians “unanimously” supported this plan as 
it would “make Virginia ‘one and indivisible.’”133  Support for policies and safeguards favorable 
to slavery and slaveholders extended into the Shenandoah Valley, too.  “We would not…refuse 
adequate protection in the shape of guarantees, to property, if the East desire it,” one 
Shepherdstown newspaper argued.  This “compromise” would “not injure us” but rather promote 
sectional harmony.134  “We are willing to see it [slavery] properly surrounded by guards against 
improvident legislation, and excessive taxation,” residents admitted, but not “as an element in the 
distribution of political power.”135  Protection for slavery could not supersede political 
representation for whites but rather both should help form a healthier and more durable body 
politic.                  
These public pronouncements extolling the need for political representation and 
protection for slaveholders accompanied expressions of fealty toward the state.  These 
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expressions served to reaffirm northwesterners’ identity as Virginians and as loyal supporters to 
the state’s institutions.  In a reform meeting held at the Wheeling courthouse, residents 
acknowledged the political evils produced by the constitution and the obduracy exhibited by 
eastern politicians.  Still, residents rejected discussion of dividing the state.  “We are opposed to 
anything like drawing invidious lines of distinction” that could precipitate dismemberment, 
residents maintained.136  In Lewis County, the newspaper editor confessed that many residents 
“prefer a division of the State to any other mode of redress.”  These same residents, though, 
prayed that such an occurrence “may never come” and looked longingly for “chords of common 
interest” that would bind all Virginians.137  Parkersburg residents professed that despite the lack 
of political representation, they nevertheless felt “deeply attached to this Ancient 
Commonwealth” and “counted [themselves] among her children.”  Achieving political equality, 
not a division of the state, represented their primary goal.138  Ritchie County residents expressed 
similar sentiments.  They “hope[d] that our brothers of Eastern Virginia” would act with greater 
fidelity to western Virginians as they constituted “children of the same good old 
Commonwealth.”139  Talk of division creeped into some discussions concerning constitutional 
reform, but residents often softened that threat by pledging fealty to the state or wielded the 
specter of disunion to communicate the magnitude of the political injustice northwesterners 
experienced.  Northwesterners considered themselves Virginians first and foremost.       
Opponents to this thinking existed in the region, though.  These residents maintained that 
the presence of slavery prohibited true and lasting democratic reform, and that such reform could 
only succeed once the state removed its slave population.  Such voices, however, remained 
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isolated and marginalized from accepted and established political thought.  In Preston County, 
newspaper editor F.B. Woodward argued that slavery represented “an affliction, a plague, a 
cankering, itching cancer” in need of immediate removal.  Only the removal of slaves from the 
state could assure pure and enduring democratic reform.140  Anson Berkshire in Ohio County 
shared such sentiments.  His newspaper, The Crisis, maintained that some form of emancipation 
would inaugurate political and social freedom for white men.  “The deep-bedded social evil of 
Slavery” demands “decisive, unflinching, [and] uncompromising” action, Berkshire averred.  
How could a state singularly devoted to slavery “constitute a republican government?”141  The 
impassioned pleas from both Berkshire and Woodward, though, represented isolated and radical 
voices on the issue of slavery.  While some northwesterners believed that slavery precluded 
constitutional and democratic reform, few argued that removing slavery was feasible or practical.  
Rather, the majority of northwesterners who demanded political reform understood that it would 
only occur with concomitant pledges to protect slaveholders’ property.    
Residents’ pursuit of another constitutional convention acquired momentum throughout 
the 1840s.  National and international discussions concerning slavery and slaveholders’ rights 
impressed upon some Virginians about the need to resolve domestic disputes.142  
Northwesterners’ continuing pledges of fealty to the state and support for slavery aided such 
thoughts.  Even some eastern Virginians appeared supportive of a new constitutional convention.  
“The press and people of Eastern Virginia,” a Parkersburg newspaper reported, “appear to have 
undergone…a total revolution in sentiment with reference to…a constitutional convention.”  
Such advocacy reflected an awareness on the part of easterners of the “odious” features of the 
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constitution that hampered the entire state, not solely the West.143  Indeed, many northwestern 
legislators heard that a “large number of the Eastern members are in favor of a Convention.”144   
Still, numerous eastern Virginian planters and politicians remained unimpressed by 
northwesterners’ pronouncements or that constitutional reform would preserve slavery or aid the 
Commonwealth.  In two consecutive sessions in the early 1840s, the eastern-dominated state 
senate defeated proposals to call for a convention, and then promptly ignored a similar request by 
the governor a few years later.145  Richmond lawyer Arthur Alexander Morson argued that the 
“mixed basis” was “essential to the protection of eastern Virginia” as western Virginians owned 
few slaves and had displayed hostile attitudes to slavery in past political and constitutional 
conflicts.  Constitutional and democratic reform would place eastern Virginia and its peculiar 
property in a “prostrate” position “at the foot of western Virginia.”  Morson denied the feasibility 
and efficacy of democratic reform in a slaveholding state.146  Barbour County attorney John 
Carlile lamented that northwesterners will “have to wring from the east” any acknowledgement 
of political equality or a call for a constitutional convention.147  Political reform, even if a 
constitutional convention could be achieved, was far from certain.   
Even some northwesterners expressed misgivings about a convention.  Though the “white 
basis” received widespread support in the Northwest and supporters declared that “freemen will 
never tolerate” any other plan, other westerners supported the “mixed basis.”148  John Carlile 
noted that “Valley men and Trans-Allegheny men…are opposed” to the “white basis,” tracing 
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this opposition to residents who “are jealous of the rapid growth of the North West.”  “We 
should not bestow all our censure to the east when we differ among ourselves,” he confessed.149  
Other northwesterners appeared willing to concede to the “mixed basis” if it convinced eastern 
Virginians to convene a constitutional convention.  “Some our members think we ought to be 
willing to compromise [on] the matter,” one northwestern politician reported.150  Other western 
Virginians worried about the breadth and depth of reform.  Morgantown merchant Henry Dering 
admitted that “we need reform,” but wondered if reformers would know “where to stop.”  
Democratic reform could devolve into a “hazardous experiment” that could graft the “wildest 
schemes” imaginable onto the constitution with unknown (and possibly dangerous) 
consequences.151  Further south, Lewis Summers prayed for reform “but without running into a 
Shay’s or Dorr rebellion.”  Once reformers began altering the state’s political foundations, would 
they retain proper safeguards to protect private property and restrain radical political 
elements?152   
The divisions that hampered reformers’ aspirations in 1830 emerged again two decades 
later, revealing once again a divided Northwest and the uneven and uncertain progression of 
democratic principles across the slaveholding South and the nation.  Ultimately reformers 
differed over their interpretation of a democratic Virginia.  Would property qualifications for 
voting be removed or simply lessened?  How would the General Assembly be apportioned?  
How would slavery shape the state’s political structures?  What power should be accorded to 
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private property and its owners in a democratic polity?  Would an expanded electorate comprised 
mostly of nonslaveholders weaken or strengthen the government?  Answers to these questions 
would dominate any constitutional convention.   
In 1849, the eastern-dominated state legislature acquiesced to western demands and 
passed a bill that called for a constitutional convention to be convened on the “mixed basis.”153  
While eastern Virginians conceded to call a convention, it would be assembled on their terms, 
including granting a generous majority of fifteen delegates to their section.  The popular 
referendum that called for a convention on the mixed basis garnered statewide approval, with 
comfortable majorities in the Tidewater and Piedmont and strong opposition in the western 
counties.154  And even though northwesterners avowed they “cannot submit” to this plan and 
considered it a “dishonor,” they consented, believing that any convention provided an 
opportunity to achieve some level of constitutional reform.155  In the fall of 1850, northwestern 
delegates trekked across the mountains to Richmond in search of political equality for their 
constituents, an endeavor far from guaranteed.     
Twenty years after the last constitutional convention, Virginians once again assembled in 
Richmond and in taverns, churches, meeting houses, and courthouses across the state to debate 
constitutional and political reform.  Though northwesterners expressed frustration and 
disappointment over the ratification of the 1830 Constitution, these feelings quickly faded as 
residents considered the benefits of the new constitution and the drawbacks of hasty, reckless 
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actions.  The entrenchment and growth of the two-party system in the region welcomed broad 
participation among voters and non-voters, allowing all men an opportunity to engage in debates, 
meetings, and party functions.  The conflicts between Whigs and Democrats often centered on 
which party best protected slavery and, with it, white men’s political independence.  Through 
these battles, residents understood and accepted the southern axiom that slavery for African 
Americans produced political equality for white men.  This southern axiom, refined and 
promulgated by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur, would become the defining characteristic of Virginia 
politics through the U.S. Civil War.       
 Residents’ engagement in the “politics of slavery” during this twenty year period 
reflected their growing support for the state and slaveholders’ rights.  Rather than actively 
seeking a division of the state or attacking slaveholders or slavery, residents expressed fealty to 
the state, support for extra safeguards for slaveholders, and a belief that democratic and 
constitutional reform could be achieved through the institution of slavery.  Indeed, numerous 
northwesterners believed that greater protection for slavery could be achieved through 
democratic reform, a dynamic that had unfolded with great success in other southern 
slaveholding states.  Opponents in the region denied any compatibility between democracy and 
slavery, but these few voices remained on the periphery of the Northwest’s political culture.  
Democracy and slavery could sustain and strengthen each other, residents believed, ensuring a 
durable and healthy republican government that would diminish sectional tension.  But achieving 
democratic and constitutional reform in 1850-1851 meant persuading eastern legislators and 
slaveholders that nonslaveholders would support, not threaten, their peculiar property.  Many 
easterners, aware of the growth and assertiveness of antislavery groups in national politics, 
balked at such suggestions.  The future of the Commonwealth arguably hinged on the resolution 
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of this pivotal issue, the foremost issue debated during the Constitutional Convention of 1850-












Chapter 4: “Whitening” Politics: Slavery, Politics, and the 1851 Constitution  
In November 1851, the Cooper’s Clarksburg Register began publication.  In its inaugural 
issue, editor and proprietor William Pope Cooper explained his motives for establishing a weekly 
newspaper in Harrison County.  An avowed exponent of the Democratic Party, Cooper believed 
that his newspaper would ably serve northwestern Democrats by offering news and political, 
economic, and social commentary.  His analysis of local, state, and national news would be 
interpreted through a partisan lens, defending the efforts of his party while castigating rivals.  
Cooper believed that the “great principles of Republicanism avowed by Jefferson” represented 
the true source of political liberty and independence for white Virginians.  As editor, Cooper 
solemnly declared to use all his journalistic abilities to support and advance that important 
belief.1   
The establishment of a partisan newspaper should not be surprising, especially during the 
prime of the two-party system, when newspapers acted as a critical medium that disseminated 
and advocated party principles.  But the timing of the newspapers’ founding reflected what 
Cooper and other northwesterners’ considered to be the beginning of a new political and 
constitutional era for Virginia.  Virginians “have just adopted a new constitution,” Cooper 
exclaimed, expunging the “old relics of monarchy” and replacing them with “enlightened and 
liberal” democratic principles.  This inauguration of democratic reform occurred with increased 
safeguards for slaveholders woven directly in the new constitution.  With slavery interlaced 
throughout Virginia’s political and constitutional structures, the symbiotic nature of democracy 
and slavery reached full maturation in the Old Dominion in 1851.  Cooper, a nonslaveholder, 
celebrated the constitution’s adoption and ratification.2   
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After operating approximately two decades under the previous constitution, Virginians 
elected delegates for the task of rewriting their state constitution.  The same democratic reforms 
that northwesterners demanded in the years preceding the previous constitutional convention 
were demanded once more in 1850: universal male suffrage, equalized representation in the state 
legislature, direct election of government officials, and, among other demands, reforming the 
county court system.  Elected representatives assembled in Richmond while northwestern 
residents anxiously read the convention’s proceedings, communicated with their delegates, 
debated their neighbors on the convention’s progress, and anticipated positive news emerging 
from the state capitol.  While the previous constitution disappointed and angered many residents, 
the new constitution adopted by delegates in 1851 received northwesterners’ hearty approbation.  
The 1851 Constitution contained numerous desired democratic reforms, finally freeing 
northwestern residents from what many considered aristocratic and antiquated means of 
determining and vesting power in “the people.”    
William Cooper celebrated the passage of the new constitution and remarked on what he 
considered the important changes contained in the new constitution.  Universal male suffrage 
caught the editor’s attention.  Now, a “large and respectable portion of citizens who have 
heretofore been deprived of the elective franchise” would enjoy their “birth-right” of 
enfranchisement.  While the 1830 Constitution had increased the electorate beyond the colonial 
era limits, this new constitution enfranchised practically all white men.  These newly 
enfranchised northwestern residents could exercise this right when they voted for those public 
officials who “frame[d] and administer[ed]…laws,” notably that of the governor and lieutenant 
governor.  (Seizing on this new political structure, Cooper placed the names of Joseph Johnson 
and Shelton Leake as Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, 
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near the newspaper’s masthead.)  Along with universal male suffrage and the direct election of 
most public offices, a more equalized form of representation in the state legislature and the 
popular election of judges meant increased political power for northwesterners in state and local 
affairs.  This new constitution inaugurated “the dawn of a new era,” exclaimed one northwestern 
politician.3          
For many historians, this “new era” represented one of the final, pitched sectional battles 
before Virginia’s dismemberment during the Civil War.  Earlier historians such as Theodore 
Lang and Granville Davisson Hall maintained that the 1851 Constitution clearly revealed the 
degradation experienced by western Virginians, and that only a division of the state could ensure 
political equality.  Lang contended that “many leading men” in western Virginia “began to 
devise means for separation” following the new constitution’s ratification.4  Democratic reform 
could not overcome the differences manifest in two different societies, differences that Lang 
emphasized stretched back to the region’s “origin of settlement.”5  Hall perceived in the new 
constitution the same “Machiavellian hand” that sought to foment disunion and create a southern 
slaveholding republic, a program solely designed to expand slaveholders’ hegemony.  According 
to this interpretation, western Virginians, confronted with this dilemma plotted to divide the state 
to halt eastern Virginians’ slaveholding program.6      
More recent historians have generally agreed with these previous interpretations.  
William Freehling argues that the 1851 Constitution “only stalled off [a] class and regional 
showdown,” a conflict continually over slavery and one that would inevitably end with West 
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Virginia’s creation.7  Echoing Theodore Lang, Sean Wilentz contends that antislavery appeals in 
western Virginia illustrated that “Virginia consisted of two societies encompassed within a single 
border,” and though the 1851 Constitution inaugurated democratic reform, these measures 
proved insufficient in promoting sectional harmony.8  While the Northwest obtained greater 
political power through the 1851 Constitution, William Link maintains that residents continued 
to experience and exhibit a feeling of “political isolation” during the 1850s.  He argues that 
residents manifested this “isolation” through various means, including pursuing annexation, 
gravitating toward the Republican Party, and rejecting secession in 1861.9  William Shade 
suggests that demographic trends in the 1850s signaled an approaching crisis over the issue of 
slavery.  The declining slaveholder population in the state coincided with an increasing 
nonslaveholder population, especially in the western half of the state.  Nonslaveholders, 
enfranchised by the 1851 Constitution, would invariably, Shade implies, pose an acute political 
threat to slavery’s future in the Commonwealth.10  These historians arrive at the same general 
argument: Virginia’s political system had become too ossified to accommodate an increasingly 
diverse constituency.  Demographic, political, constitutional, and economic trends all indicated a 
looming conflict over the issue of slavery during the proceeding decade.  The 1851 Constitution 
represented only a stop-gap measure, delaying the inevitable rending of Virginia. 
But to many Virginians in 1851, the new constitution did indeed inaugurate the “dawn of 
a new era.”  For decades, western, disenfranchised nonfreeholders demanded political and 
constitutional equality on par with their enfranchised and propertied brethren east of the Blue 
Ridge.  Though western reformers endured setbacks, notably in 1830, the 1851 Constitution 
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represented a resounding triumph.  Northwesterners could now claim membership in an inclusive 
democratic political system, one that offered broad political rights and guaranteed political 
representation for all white men.  Residents cheered the constitution’s recognition of majoritarian 
power, a principle that resonated with the memory of the American Revolution and validated 
arguments about man’s “natural right” to self-government.  The new constitution’s safeguards 
for slavery and slaveholders angered few, with some maintaining that these measures amounted 
to a compromise between eastern and western Virginians that would allay sectional tensions.  
Residents displayed their overwhelming support for the constitution by their actions, too, 
overwhelmingly voting to ratify the constitution.      
The articles concerning slaves and slavery in the 1851 Constitution represented the first 
such references in the state’s constitutional history.  Along with capping the amount slaves could 
be taxed, the new constitution placed restrictions on private manumission and curtailed the 
General Assembly’s power to emancipate slaves.  These articles strengthened and protected 
slavery and slaveholders’ interests, manifesting the ideas envisaged by proslavery advocates 
Leigh and Upshur.  By fusing slavery and republican government, Virginians ensured the health 
and longevity of both institutions, effectively making them inseparable.  As questions concerning 
slavery’s future continued to surface throughout the 1850s, Virginia proslavery advocates took 
solace knowing that white Virginians would interpret any threat to slavery as a threat to their 
political independence.  The new constitution turned white Virginians in all the state’s regions 
into proslavery foot soldiers.      
According to nearly all the previous scholars of the topic, white northwesterners turning 
into proslavery foot soldiers should have increased sectional tension and hastened the statehood 
movement.  But residents deepened their commitment to slavery and the state, embracing the 
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fundamental southern axiom that black bondage protected white liberty.  Residents championed 
the rights of slaveholders, denounced the wicked machinations of abolitionists, and defended 
themselves against accusations questioning their loyalty to slavery and Virginia.  
Northwesterners intensified their engagement in the “politics of slavery” as whiteness emerged 
as the sole factor demarcating freedom from bondage, with residents attacking those who 
threatened to upset established political and racial hierarchies and relationships.  The 
inauguration of democratic reform in Virginia in 1851 deepened northwesterners’ fealty toward 
slavery and the state. 
Delegates to the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention reflected the changing political, 
social, and economic dynamics that had been unfolding in the state over the past two decades.  
The Revolutionary generation had generally faded away, while the number of prominent planters 
and slaveholders had dwindled, too.  Professional men, including lawyers, doctors, and 
merchants, comprised the majority of delegates to the new constitutional convention.  Only a 
handful of planters and even fewer large slaveholders attended.11  Northwestern delegates 
embodied the rise of this new professional class in the Old Dominion.  Over half of the thirteen 
Northwest delegates practiced law, with others claiming occupation as a millwright, saddler, 
merchant, and farmer.12  At least five delegates were born outside of Virginia, notably four born 
in northern, nonslaveholding states.13  Approximately half of the Northwest delegation was 
slaveholders, including Waitman T. Willey, Gideon D. Camden, and Joseph Johnson, though 
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none were planters or large slaveholders.14  Northwest delegates embodied the rise of the new 
professional class, and manifested their identification as Virginians through their status as 
slaveholders.     
Delegates gathered in Richmond in October 1850 to amend the state constitution.  
Northwestern delegates gained an important victory in the convention’s initial month when they 
secured the convention’s adjournment until the following January when data from the 1850 U.S. 
Census would become available.15  The census confirmed northwesterners’ claims about 
Virginia’s antidemocratic and antiquated political structures and functions.  While the majority 
of whites resided west of the Blue Ridge, property restrictions limited their political 
representation and the overall power wielded by residents and their representatives.16  As Taylor 
County residents argued, the “free white population” represented “the only true basis of 
republican government.”  The denial of majoritarian power constituted a tyrannical government 
unfit for free men as it threatened the important principle of “political equality.”  Residents 
demanded what they considered their constitutional rights as a numerical majority.17   
Eastern Virginians, though a minority, wielded majoritarian power and effectively 
controlled the state government.  And many eastern delegates wanted to perpetuate that power to 
protect their interest in slaves.  National events concerning African American bondage during the 
1840s made the institution appear more vulnerable, including the arrival of abolitionism and free 
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soilism on Virginia’s borders.18  Demographic trends within the state augmented those fears, 
notably those unfolding in the Northwest.  Delegates John Knote of Ohio County and Jefferson 
Martin of Marshall County supported publishing the convention’s proceedings in German so 
their German constituents could follow the convention’s progress.19  Many eastern politicians 
considered these German immigrants, refugees of the failed 1848 Revolution, as a dangerous 
populace that understood little of Virginia’s political culture or its institutions.  Virginians’ 
sanguinity expressed prior to the convention faded as they sparred over reforms and the impact 
of those reforms on slavery.  This focus on slavery during the convention differed sharply from 
the previous convention, where reformers and anti-reformers debated the efficacy of the freehold 
and property qualifications.   
During the convention’s opening weeks, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates, wary of the 
possible deleterious effects of democratic reform on slavery, denounced reformers’ schemes and 
ideas as dangerous and subversive.  Reformers’ advocacy of the “white basis” plan of 
representation, universal suffrage, and the popular election of public officials threatened to 
elevate uneducated, crude, nonslaveholders into a position of immense power.  Halifax County 
delegate George W. Purkins contended that “the people” certainly did not include that mass of 
western nonslaveholders who clamored for political representation.  Rather, “the people” meant a 
“political community” of men who shared overwhelming identical interests.  In the context of 
Virginia politics, that “political community” meant slaveholders, a powerful demographic that 
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wielded immense state and local power over their slaves and, according to reformers, exercised 
that mastery over white men, too.20       
But if reformers resented the mastery wielded by eastern legislators over white men, 
these eastern legislators feared that a reformed political system would allow western white men 
to lord over slaveholders.  Richmond delegate R.C. Standard perceived in a “democracy of 
numbers” the characteristics of “naked and unmitigated Dorrism[.]”  Standard’s reference to the 
Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in the early 1840s reminded delegates of the militant and 
aggressive tactics employed by democratic reformers.  Such scenes of anarchy would unfold in 
the Old Dominion if Virginians opened politics to the masses, he warned.21  Fauquier County 
delegate and slaveholder Judge Robert E. Scott, annoyed by reformers’ majoritarian arguments, 
wondered how much longer Virginians would be forced to listen to westerners’ “eternal 
demands” that “mere numbers” should constitute the basis for republican government.  The 
“white basis,” he warned, would not provide “protection to property” but would instead “lay it 
open to be plundered at the discretion of a mere majority.”  Once vested with legislative power, 
nonslaveholders would impose draconian taxes on slaveholders to pay for internal 
improvements, effectively taxing slavery out of existence.  The “mixed basis” provided the “only 
adequate protection” for slaveholders, Scott maintained.  All other schemes of representation 
were hostile to Virginia’s slaveholding interests.22        
Opponents of reform claimed that democratic reform, notably the principle of 
majoritarian rule, closely resembled the dangerous “isms” gaining acceptance in the North.  
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Chief among these was free soilism.  Standard warned that the “white basis,” if inaugurated by 
the convention, would engender the same sentiments in the General Assembly as those harbored 
in the House of Representatives, “that northern…antislavery…almost free soil house.”  Could 
Virginia’s “slaveholding interest expect favor…[or] justice” from either body?23  James Barbour 
of Culpeper County castigated reformers’ who argued that slaveholders’ antipathy for 
majoritarian rule precluded political representation for white men.  Barbour interpreted in this 
argument the ideological foundation “upon which the free soil party of the north bases itself.”  
Westerners’ assertions that “slave labor is an interference with the rights of free men” mirrored 
the free soil and free labor arguments articulated by the nascent and northern Free Soil Party.24  
The presence of free soilism in Ohio and Pennsylvania, along with rumors of free soil meetings 
in Virginia, made such accusations appear more manifest.  Opponents of democratic reform 
perceived in reformers’ cries ideas and values that had been transmitted across the Mason-Dixon 
Line.  “[Y]our democracy is too much of northern origin,” complained one conservative to a 
northwest delegate.25  The moral was clear.  The style of democracy supported by northwestern 
reformers appeared tainted by northern values and ideas, notably a visceral aversion toward 
slavery.  And if free soilism could be inaugurated in the Old Dominion, what other northern 
“isms” could Virginians also embrace?     
Reformers’ arguments extolling man’s natural right to self-government likewise reflected 
an invasion of northern principles designed to undermine slaveholders’ hegemony.  Mecklenburg 
County delegate and planter William O. Goode reminded the convention that a “numerical 
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majority is no where recognized in our system” of government.  Goode seized on a similar 
objection noted by his predecessors in the previous convention.  Did “females” and “little 
children” possess these same natural rights as reformers’ claimed white men held?26  Standard 
furthered Goode’s argument, adding that “convicts and paupers” would be invited to the polls 
under universal suffrage and enjoy representation under the “white basis.”27  Westmoreland 
County delegate and planter Richard L.T. Beale considered the whole natural rights argument an 
“absurdity.”  No “secret law of nature” existed that bestowed political virtue to men or qualified 
them to vote.  The basis for political representation emerged from society, Beale concluded, and 
Virginia’s political community demanded that politics reward property owners.28 
For Beale and his ilk, property qualifications ensured a constant and stable government 
with structures and functions in place that mitigated, if not eliminated, the capriciousness and 
volatility of public opinion.  Indeed, the current structure of the state government prevented what 
Judge Scott of Fauquier considered the “dangerous turbulence of democracy” from convulsing 
the body politic.29  If the convention adopted the “white basis,” uneducated and malleable voters 
(who could be easily plied with alcohol or patronage) threatened to instigate a revolution that 
would overturn established political hierarchies.30  A state government organized under the 
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“white basis” could permit a spontaneous “call [for] a new convention” where that majority 
would “expunge from the constitution any provision” deemed incongruous to political equality.31  
Slaveholder and Prince George County delegate Timothy Rives wondered if reformers’ pursuit 
of democracy would lead them to dismantle the “long tried practice of the past” and “abandon 
customs” that had protected the rights of property holders.  Rives prayed that reformers would 
restrain their “radical hands” before they inflicted irreversible damage.32          
To prevent the inauguration of democratic reform in Virginia, anti-reformers wielded 
every rhetorical weapon in their arsenal.  The memory of the French Revolution once again acted 
as a powerful means to manifest democracy’s excess.  Events like the French Revolution occur, 
an eastern delegate argued, when the government left the “power of the people…entirely 
unrestricted.”33  Indeed, the “blood-stained records of revolutionary France” constituted the only 
evidence needed to elucidate the danger of democratic reform.34  Other delegates equated the 
furor for democratic reform to a volcano.  Volcanoes erupted unpredictability and 
indiscriminately, destroying everything in its path.  The “smoldering volcano” west of the 
Alleghenies threatened to destroy the republic, immersing Virginians into a Hobbesian state of 
nature where brute force and mere numbers, not intellect or private property, would govern the 
state.  The dangers of democratic reform necessitated a full defense of the current structure of the 
state government.35   
 An unabashed defense of slavery and the need to protect slaveholders stood at the core of 
anti-reformers’ arguments.  This focus on the peculiar institution reflected an abandonment of 
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the freehold, a process begun in the post-Nat Turner years and initiated by Leigh, Dew, and 
Upshur.  Delegates’ preoccupation with slavery also reflected their increasing concern over 
slavery’s future in a nation with more voices opposing African American bondage.  
Northwestern Virginians’ demands for reforms, William Goode lamented, “directed the attention 
of the northern abolitionists, and of the English abolitionists” who might conclude that the “slave 
holder is weak in Virginia, and…weak throughout the south.”  Though he denied that 
conclusion, Goode worried that abolitionists reading the debates could infer that proslavery 
advocates in the Old Dominion were on the defensive.36   
Many Tidewater and Piedmont delegates simply believed that enfranchising the state’s 
growing nonslaveholder population would imperil slavery.  Examples of other southern states 
having undergone a thorough democratization without any danger to slave property failed to 
convince eastern delegates.  As Scott argued, the “homogenous interests” in Georgia, 
Mississippi, and Alabama facilitated democratic reform because a majority of the population 
manifested a strong investment in slavery.  The meager slave population in the Northwest and 
across western Virginia illustrated that westerners possessed different interests than easterners.37  
Reformers, cried Standard, asked slaveholders to place “legislative power… in that section in 
which slave property scarcely exists at all.”38  Culpeper delegate James Barbour echoed similar 
sentiments.  “I tremble when I anticipate the day,” he declared, “when the unrestricted control 
over the powers of this government shall pass into hands not interested in the preservation of that 
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property.”39  Reformers possessed no “natural right to seize my property,” Scott declared, and on 
this position many easterners refused to compromise.40        
 Northwestern reformers confronted an immense challenge refuting what Waitman T. 
Willey considered the “inferential impeachment of western integrity,” specifically that western 
Virginians could not be trusted on the issue of slavery.41  Refuting this accusation took different 
forms.  John S. Carlile declared himself to be a “Virginian by birth” and a proud “Southern man” 
who posed no danger to the state’s institutions.42  To demonstrate his constituents’ fealty toward 
slavery and the state, Willey introduced resolutions passed at two different reform meetings held 
in Morgantown.  These resolutions expressed residents’ unwavering support for democratic 
reforms, notably the “white basis,” universal male suffrage, and the election of government 
officials from the governor down to the local courts.  Within these demands, Monongalia 
residents also supported “a sufficient constitutional guaranty” that would “amply and fully” 
protect property rights, specifically that of slaveholders.43  Though “not entitled to 
representation,” private property, including that in slaves, required “just and full protection.”44  
Gideon Camden introduced resolutions adopted at a similar reform meeting in Harrison County, 
reemphasizing his constituents’ belief that democratic reform could occur with greater protection 
for slavery.45  
 Such resolutions extolling northwesterners’ fealty, though, appeared as paper guarantees 
in the eyes of some eastern delegates.  These guarantees could be easily revoked or forgotten 
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once residents achieved reform.  James Barbour of Culpeper stated flatly that he did “not believe 
in these guaranties, or their efficacy,” believing that the majority would “purge” the constitution 
of these safeguards once residents deemed them “onerous” and “objectionable” to political 
equality.46  Marion County delegate James Neeson denied such accusations, reminding eastern 
delegates that the “only protection” for slavery rested on expanding political rights for western 
white men.  National crises concerning slavery should serve to remind slaveholders that true 
security for the peculiar institution rested on securing allies, not alienating neighbors.  Other 
slaveholding states had democratized their state constitutions and “no injury has ever been 
inflicted on slave property,” Neeson maintained.  Slaveholders in these states realized that 
nonslaveholders governed “wisely and faithfully, with due regard to all interests.”  A 
government constructed on “injustice…must fall,” he averred.  But if delegates “constitute a 
government” on democratic principles they would produce “brave and powerful” allies who 
would provide “security” for slaveholders and support their rights during the “hour of…direst 
need.”  A democratic government would strengthen, not endanger, slavery.47   
 Preston County delegate William G. Brown echoed Neeson’s arguments, emphasizing 
that democratic reform would secure allies who would support slavery against foes from within 
and without.  Northwesterners are “loyal to Virginia and to all her institutions,” he declared.  
Brown considered the “duty of society to guard carefully” property rights, including through 
“constitutional guarantees and legal enactments.”  For years, northwesterners had manifested 
their “affections and our support” for slavery, proving themselves loyal allies to slaveholders.  
Brown assured delegates that his constituents’ fealty would continue “in the future” if the eastern 
slaveholders would recognize their transmontane neighbors as “equals.”  But the continued 
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denial of political representation to western whites could prove catastrophic, Brown warned.  
“There can be no peace in Virginia,” he cautioned, “…until all odious political discriminations 
are forever abolished.”48  Like Neeson, Brown expressed little difficulty in granting political and 
constitutional safeguards to eastern slaveholders.  In return, both men asked for political 
representation for their constituents, a move that would promote unity between slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders and ease sectional tensions.    
No other northwestern delegate, though, provided a clearer and more powerful 
articulation of his constituents’ position on slavery and democratic reform than Monongalia’s 
Waitman Thomas Willey.  Willey, a noted Whig, slaveholder, and lawyer who had trained under 
democratic reformer Philip Doddridge, fervently believed that greater security for slavery could 
be achieved through the process of political and constitutional democratization.  He reminded 
delegates that, outside of South Carolina, the majority of states operated under some form of the 
“white basis.”  Importantly, slave property remained secure in those states.49  Eastern delegates’ 
claims that the “possession of lands and tenements, goods and chattles” reflected “superior 
political authority” and required protection through the “mixed basis” were “abhorrent” and 
calculated to increase tensions between slaveholders and nonslaveholders.  Property bestowed 
neither “virtue” nor “wisdom to its possessor,” he argued.  Rather, the memory of the American 
Revolution mandated that all white men possess equal political power regardless of property, 
intellect, or birthright.  By securing majoritarian rule, Virginians would also secure slavery.50   
 Willey believed that Virginia slaveholders needed this extra protection for slavery 
because the institution’s future seemed uncertain.  The “encroachments and menaces of Northern 
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fanaticism” had made slaveholders “justly alarmed” about not only northerners but 
nonslaveholders residing in Virginia.51    But Willey considered the latter fears unfounded and 
“idle.”  The expansion of slavery in the Shenandoah Valley and across southwest Virginia 
ensured that no “western majority would or could oppress the eastern slave holder by exorbitant 
taxation, or by any enactment affecting slave property.”52  Willey even supported a 
“constitutional limitation” on the legislature’s “taxing power” to protect slaveholders’ property.53  
Further, he emphasized his constituents’ fealty toward slavery and their support for extra 
protection for slaveholders.  Northwesterners supported “just and equal protection” for all forms 
of property, including slaves, and delegates needed to only look to the historical record for 
evidence of their unwavering support for slaveholders’ rights.54  Northwesterners had “united” 
with eastern Virginians on the issue of slavery in the past and looked forward to maintaining that 
unity in the future.55     
 But ultimately slavery’s future hinged on democratic reform.  “Give us our natural 
rights,” Willey maintained, “…and you secure our fidelity forever.”  The bonds of common 
interest produced by a thorough democratization of the state constitution would generate a 
powerful and resilient form of political unity that would withstand national or state crises 
concerning slavery.  “You will bind us to your interests and your fortunes, by ties ten-fold 
stronger than any…legislative majority can devise,” he proclaimed.  Northwesterners would 
mobilize “by [the] thousands” against the “leprous hand” of “Northern fanaticism” and against 
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the “dark demon of insurrection.”  Eastern Virginians would not be surprised at this swift and 
passionate response, for northwesterners’ “liberty and honor” would rest on the health of African 
American bondage.56   
 The benefits of a democratic slaveholding republic were immense and profound; the 
failure to inaugurate democratic reform, though, could prove detrimental to slavery’s future in 
Virginia.  If eastern delegates adopted the “mixed basis” over northwestern objections they 
would initiate “tumult and [an] alienation of fraternal feelings” and witness the destruction of 
“peace and concord.”57  Why would northwesterners “ardently and cordially support negro 
slavery, when by so doing they are virtually cherishing the property which is making slaves of 
themselves?”58  Willey dismissed the possibility that abolitionism would gain a foothold in the 
Northwest, but warned that “a hostility to slavery” could develop among residents who believed 
that eastern Virginians cherished their chattel more than white equality.  This “hostility” could 
eventually “excite a species of political abolition” against slavery and “an attitude of 
antagonism” against slaveholders.  The failure to inaugurate democratic reform would produce 
dire consequences.  Increased sectional tensions, widened divisions between slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders, and allies turning into enemies could unfold in the Commonwealth.  Slavery 
would not be protected; it would be placed in greater peril.59   
 Willey’s remarks during the convention provide important insight into how northwestern 
residents understood the dynamic between slavery and democracy.  Much like his constituents, 
Willey did not oppose slaveholders or their right to govern their chattel.60  As a slaveholder 
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himself, Willey considered the “title to this property…sacred.”61  But northwesterners objected 
to eastern slaveholders’ use of slaves and the issue of slavery to deny majoritarian rights.  Such 
actions smacked of a betrayal and a denial of core republican principles achieved during the 
American Revolution, an event that demonstrated the political fitness of all white men.  Eastern 
slaveholders’ insistence on the “mixed basis” appeared to elevate African Americans to a 
position in politics reserved solely for white men.  If forced to choose between protecting slavery 
or acquiring their natural political rights, practically all northwesterners would choose the latter.  
But reform could resolve this conflict.  Residents believed that democratic reform would satisfy 
all Virginians: white, nonslaveholders would achieve the political representation and 
independence they had long sought while slaveholders would gain greater security for their 
chattel.62   
 The pleas and pronouncements from northwestern delegates failed to convince enough 
eastern delegates to adopt reform measures.  The convention deadlocked on multiple occasions 
during early 1851, and whispers of adjournment or a division of the state quickly surfaced.  In 
the Northwest, residents reached out to their delegates to offer advice and present their 
perspective about the convention’s most pressing issues.  George S. Ray, a farmer from Ohio 
County, expressed his fears about the convention’s progress.63  Ray worried that delegates from 
the Shenandoah Valley, aware of slavery’s increasing importance to their region, would “play 
false in the hour of need” and caucus with eastern slaveholders.  This coalition would inevitably 
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foil any attempts at reform.  If this occurred, “our people will be dissatisfied,” he lamented.  
Residents “will naturally begin to enquire into the subject . . . and begin to feel and know that it 
is the slave power that is ruling over them.”  “[A] hostility to the peculiar institution” would 
emerge in the region “which will in the end make Virginia a free state.”   Ray believed that if the 
convention failed to properly situate slavery within the state’s electoral system, northwesterners 
would continue to “feel” that the slave power manipulated politics and that enslaved property 
represented the source of political inequality.   This feeling among residents would manifest into 
an antagonistic spirit toward slavery that could threaten the institution.64      
 Other residents joined in this vibrant debate on slavery and democratic reform.  
Practically all residents assailed the “mixed basis” and eastern legislators’ attempts to use that 
formula to calculate representation.  If easterners ratified a constitution with the dreaded “mixed 
basis,” the Wellsburg Weekly Herald declared, northwesterners would be “Virginia slaves to 
slave masters.”  Western delegates needed to continue supporting the “white basis,” the 
newspaper concluded.65  Fairmont lawyer Alpheus F. Haymond felt his neighbors becoming 
jaded and frustrated because of eastern delegates’ continued intransigence on reforms.  “The 
people of the West,” he asserted, “will no longer submit to the present odious constitution and 
neither will they submit to the mixed basis proper.”66  John G. Burdett, a farmer from Taylor 
County, commented that “a respectable group of citizens are…discussing the pros. and cons. of 
the recent developments” in the convention.  The “feeling of our people,” he concluded, “are 
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against compromis[ing] what is humbly conceived to be our rights.”67  Parkersburg residents, 
though “loyal” to the state, remained “unanimous” in their support for the “white basis.”  Eastern 
Virginians needed to “repent” from their “reckless indifference” toward the West and cease the 
“monstrous” injustice they imposed on northwesterners.68 
 Frequently residents’ discussions of the convention centered on whether western 
Virginians should pursue a division of the state if eastern delegates rejected democratic reforms.  
Nearly all residents declared that such action should only be a last resort or ultimatum used to 
convince eastern delegates to compromise.69  Burdett “hope[d]” that Virginia would remain 
united, finding it “painful” that members of “the same family” bickered over issues that should 
unite, not divide, them.  He supported a “divorce,” though, should eastern Virginians continue to 
place northwesterners in “unequal and degrading conditions.”70  In a constitutional reform 
meeting held in Wood County, residents “deplore[d] any movement tending towards a separation 
of Virginia,” and that dividing the state should only be advocated if the “anti-republican and 
oppressive” mixed basis be adopted.71  Monongalia County attorney Ralph L. Berkshire 
cautioned northwestern delegates about actively pursuing dismemberment.  “[A] division of the 
State will not I am confident, be popular with our people though it may be politic to threaten the 
East with it,” he maintained.  Withdrawing from the convention to precipitate a division should 
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only be a “last resort.”  The widespread support for compromise measures in Monongalia and 
Preston counties convinced Berkshire that residents would approve any new constitution.72   
In nearby Harrison County, Circuit Court Judge George H. Lee, a slaveholder, reminded 
Gideon Camden that of the resolutions passed at a constitutional reform meeting, the first 
“affirmed the close attachment of the western people to Virginia as she is.”73  Harrison County 
farmer and slaveholder Caleb Boggess believed that western Virginians should only separate 
after “having exhausted all…peaceful efforts to attain our rights.”74  The interpretation that 
northwesterners actively pursued a division of the state overlooks the hesitancy and caution 
expressed by residents.  Demanding a division of the state communicated to other Virginians the 
serious injustice of the “mixed basis.”  Northwesterners desired to remain Virginians; they also 
demanded what they considered their fundamental political rights.  On this latter issue few 
residents were willing to compromise.   
 Accomac County delegate Henry A. Wise emerged as the principal figure in brokering a 
compromise between reformers and anti-reformers.  Though a slaveholder from Virginia’s 
Eastern Shore, Wise often caucused with western reformers and supported their pursuit of 
democratic reforms.  His alliance with western reformers manifested his dogmatic belief that 
democratic reform would strengthen and protect slavery, not endanger the institution.75  Eastern 
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Virginians continued resistance and support of a “fundamentally aristocratic and antirepublican” 
electoral system threatened to turn western allies into enemies.76  The “democracy” championed 
by eastern delegates appeared as a derivative of the “Adams school,” a political system 
controlled and manipulated by patricians solely for their benefit.  In embracing this corrupted 
form of “democracy,” eastern delegates “den[ied] the sovereign power of the people!”  And by 
rejecting majoritarian rule, Wise declared, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates threatened to 
destroy the institution they sought to protect.77 
 Wise, an unabashed “pro-slavery man,” believed that the continued denial of westerners’ 
political representation would inexorably array thousands of Virginians against slavery.  The 
“worst enemy of slavery” were not northern Free Soilers or abolitionists, he asserted, but in the 
exclusion of the “free white population in Western Virginia.”  Implementing the “mixed basis” 
represented a misguided and dangerous action on the part of eastern delegates.  For without 
adequate political representation, he warned, northwesterners would perceive themselves as 
equivalent to chattel.  But enfranchising westerners would generate proslavery allies who would 
defend the institution.  Wise’s support for “free, equal and universal suffrage” and the “white 
basis” reflected his belief that democratic reforms offered “the best protection, not only to 
persons but to property.”  True security for slavery and slaveholders rested not in restricting the 
number of those who possessed a stake in the institution; true security for the institution rested 
on showering its benefits on all white men.78   
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 Wise’s political maneuvering and defense of democratic reform helped free the logjam 
that had stalled the convention’s progress.  In the weeks following Wise’s speech, eastern ranks 
crumbled as delegates from Lynchburg, Norfolk, and Richmond recanted their support of the 
“mixed basis.”79  A final bill concerning representation received delegates’ approval in late May 
1851.  In the House of Delegates, the West received eighty-two of the 150 seats, while the East 
obtained thirty of the fifty seats in the Senate.  The bill also stipulated that the General Assembly 
would revisit apportionment in 1865 and, if members could not reach agreement on how 
representation should calculated, four options would be voted on by the public.80   
With representation settled, delegates quickly agreed on other constitutional issues.  
Unlike during the previous constitutional convention, the expansion of suffrage met little 
resistance as Whigs and Democrats across the state sought to increase their electorate.  Though 
some conservatives advocated some form of property ownership for voting privileges, their calls 
appeased few and, by July, delegates passed universal male suffrage.81  Delegates also increased 
the number of popularly elected offices, including that of the governor, lieutenant governor, 
attorney general, and members of the Board of Public Works.  In an effort to reform the county 
court system, the constitution empowered residents to elect all local and appellate judges and 
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justices of the peace.82  These measures, exclaimed the Wellsburg Weekly Herald, illustrated the 
“grand advance” of “liberal principles” in the state, and an important triumph of democratic 
reform over antiquated aristocratic elements.83 
This constitutional triumph of democratic reform also strengthened the institution of 
slavery.  The 1851 Constitution required that any emancipated African American slave would 
“forfeit their freedom” and be reenslaved if they remained in the state beyond one year.84  The 
new constitution also empowered the General Assembly to “impose…restrictions and 
conditions…on the power of slave-owners to emancipate their slaves,” curtailing a slaveholder’s 
prerogative while increasing the power of the General Assembly to legislate such actions.85  
Section 21 of the Constitution prohibited the General Assembly from “emancipat[ing] any slave, 
or the descendant of any slave.”86  Proslavery advocates found much to celebrate in such clauses.  
Virginia’s government and elected officials would be constitutionally obligated to protect 
slavery, ensuring that whatever future conflicts arose concerning African American bondage, 
Virginians would be compelled to support slavery. 
Slaveholders also received extra constitutional protection concerning taxation.  The 1851 
Constitution included an ad valorem system of tax assessment where all forms of property would 
be taxed “in proportion to its value.”  Property in slaves, however, was exempt from that 
assessment.87  Rather, slaves twelve years and older “shall be assessed with a tax equal to and 
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not exceeding…three hundred dollars.”  Slaves under twelve “shall not be subject to taxation.”88  
These articles, similar to proposals offered by Henry Wise, ensured that slaveholders would be 
protected from market changes and hostile nonslaveholders wielding legislative power.89  The 
full weight of the new state constitution supported slavery and slaveholders’ rights while 
simultaneously inaugurating democratic reform.  The democratic revolution of 1851 signaled 
Virginians’ overwhelming commitment to slavery.       
Northwestern Virginians passionately defended and supported the new constitution.90  
One resident exclaimed that the “West ought to be satisfied” with the new constitution “for it is 
more than I ever expected could be obtained.”  “[W]e will have a very democratic constitution,” 
he concluded.91  The Wellsburg Weekly Herald viewed the new “liberal” constitution with 
“entire satisfaction” and believed it “will pass without much opposition.”  Now the “poor 
man…can stand on equal platform at the polls, with his purse proud neighbor,” and obtaining 
political office “must be gained by other means than buying or courting favor at Richmond.”92  
Any faults in the new constitution were “immaterial.”  If “Virginians cannot thrive under” the 
new constitution, the Herald concluded, “their case is hopeless.”93  The Kanawha Republican, 
meanwhile, considered the tax concessions as “a wrong and an injustice.”  But the measures 
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were part of a larger “compromise” adopted by Virginians “for the sake of peace and the 
preservation of the unity of the State.”  The newspaper called upon “all people of all sections [to] 
live up to it in good faith.”94  Wirt County farmer Aaron Ruble celebrated the new constitution.  
He found the new constitution “much better than…anticipated,” and believed that it 
demonstrated the triumph of “Human wrights & Republican Principals.”  The “boys of the 
Western Mountains” had achieved a tremendous victory, he exclaimed.95 
For more than a decade prior to this constitutional convention, northwestern residents 
pledged their support for extra safeguards for slaveholders in union with democratic reform.  The 
new constitution satisfied both arrangements.  Northwesterners celebrated the new constitution’s 
democratic reforms, notably universal male suffrage, the direct election of government officials, 
a more equally apportioned state legislature, a reformation of the county court system, and the 
funding of public education.  All of these democratic initiatives vested political power in “the 
people,” a marked departure from what many residents claimed to be the aristocratic and archaic 
1830 Constitution.  But now “the people” had to protect slavery through the ballot box, 
supporting politicians who pledged to defend slavery and assailing those who threatened the 
institution.  Further, the actions of elected representatives would be under intense scrutiny, lest 
any politician waver on their commitment to African American bondage.  This heightened 
defense of slavery reflected its importance in the state’s body politic.  Virginians situated slavery 
at the core of their political and constitutional system because slavery now officially provided 
political independence and protected liberty for white men.  This “whitening” of the political 
process also cast race as the only demarcation between freedom and bondage, further increasing 
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the political stakes.  Now defending whiteness meant defending slavery, a dynamic that few in 
the Northwest opposed. 
 The euphoria surrounding the new constitution’s adoption carried over into the state’s 
first popularly-elected gubernatorial contest in December 1851.  Previous governors, chosen by 
the state legislature, protected the “slaveholding counties” from majoritarian power, one 
conservative confessed.96  John Carlile, though, characterized the governor as a “Creature of the 
Legislature” who remained “indebted” to legislators while he supposedly represented and served 
all Virginians.97  Now, with the adoption of universal male suffrage, governors appealed directly 
to voters, championing their causes and defending their interests.  While the “politics of slavery” 
existed prior to 1851, this southern brand of politics intensified post-convention, as political 
candidates continually reaffirmed their fealty to slavery and support for slaveholders’ rights.  
These appeals represented more than protecting slavery; they also reflected candidates’ promises 
to protect white men’s political independence. 
 Before the constitution’s ratification in October 1851, Democrats and Whigs had already 
chosen their respective candidates for governor.  Meeting in September in the Shenandoah 
Valley town of Staunton, Democrats chose politician and farmer Joseph Johnson from Harrison 
County.  Whigs, convening in Charlottesville, selected Kanawha County lawyer George W. 
Summers.98  Both gubernatorial candidates were slaveholders, with Johnson owning six slaves 
and Summers five.99  As the campaign unfolded, Summers initially stressed traditional Whig 
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economic policies, notably the creation of state-funded internal improvements and protective 
tariffs.  Slavery, though, quickly trumped these issues and dominated the contest. 
In 1832, as a state representative in the House of Delegates, Summers, then a 
nonslaveholder, announced his support for some form of emancipation.  Further, he echoed 
Thomas Jefferson’s assertions that owning slaves corrupted a slaveholders’ moral compass.  
While such sentiments may have been permissible in the immediate post-Nat Turner context, in 
1851 they appeared subversive, dangerous, and hostile to African American bondage.  Eastern 
Democrats assailed Summers on his supposed infidelity, accusing him of abolitionism.  One 
Charleston supporter of Summers noted that eastern Democrats “are trying to injure him…by 
republishing his speech in 1832.”  He remained optimistic that such efforts “will fail.”100  
Another supporter decried eastern Virginians who attempted to brand Summers as an 
abolitionist.  These attacks sought “to prove that Western men were not then, are not now, and 
ought not hereafter to be trusted on the subject of slavery.”  All western Virginians should 
“resent the insult at once” because, as “sons” of the same Commonwealth, they had remained 
“true to Virginia.”  Summers manifested that loyalty.  The “Western masses” supported 
Summers because of his “loyal and unflinching” advocacy of “Western interests and rights” but 
also because of his devotion “to every interest of all Virginians,” including slavery.  Easterners’ 
characterization of Summers as an abolitionist was ludicrous.  “If he cannot be trusted on the 
subject of slavery,” a partisan declared, “neither can the whole West.”101  
Confronted with such accusations, Summers defended his position on slavery.  Summers 
considered the charge of abolitionism “ridiculous” and solely calculated to produce “false 
                                                          
100 N. Fitzhugh to Waitman T. Willey, 30 October 1851, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10, Folder 
3, item 144, WVRHC.   
101 Hugh W. Sheffey to Waitman T. Willey, 11 November 1851, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10, 
Folder 3, item 145, WVRHC.  [emphasis in original] 
173 
 
apprehension” among voters.  “I am a slaveholder,” he declared, residing in the largest 
slaveholding county west of the Alleghenies and strongly opposed to “all and every scheme” that 
could “affect the security of slave property.”  Summers also reminded voters that he supported 
the constitutional provision denying the state legislature authority to emancipate slaves.  The true 
threat to slavery, he inferred, was his opponent.  Joseph Johnson “lives in a part of the State 
having less interest in that property” than other regions, and Summers was unsure if Johnson 
owned slaves.  Further, Johnson’s former home state of New York welcomed abolitionists and 
helped escaped slaves flee to Canada.  Summers suggested that Democrats carefully scrutinize 
their candidate before casting aspersions on him.102  Despite the “mad-dog cry of abolition” from 
eastern “blood hounds,” Summers remained confident in his chances, and encouraged western 
Virginians to “stand” against these baseless accusations.  For the accusations against Summers’ 
fidelity were more than partisan attacks; rather, they represented “an attack upon the whole 
West,” and all westerners needed to respond.103    
For his part, Johnson, who had served as governor under the previous constitution, 
welcomed the work of those Democratic “blood hounds.”  By December 1851, doubt surfaced 
among Whigs about turnout for their candidate.  In Parkersburg, Peter G. Van Winkle lamented 
that though he expected a majority for Summers in the traditionally Whiggish city, “nobody here 
knows and very few…will venture a guess” at that figure.  The attacks had taken “a slice…off 
here and another there,” leaving little hope that Summers would emerge victorious.  Though 
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Whigs pledged to “do our best,” the accusations against Summers proved too difficult for his 
candidacy to withstand.104     
Johnson won Virginia’s first popularly-elected gubernatorial election by a comfortable 
margin.  Summers received reduced Whig majorities in typical eastern Whig strongholds in the 
Piedmont and Tidewater, as the charges of abolitionism resulted in “a prodegeous falling away” 
amongst once stalwart Whigs.  In the Northwest, party lines generally held sway.  Whig counties 
in the region, particularly Ohio and Wood, generated large majorities for Summers while 
traditionally Democratic counties, including Monongalia, Preston, Marion, and Harrison, 
supported Johnson.105  Northwesterners, honed in the practice of the “politics of slavery,” 
showed little of the violent electoral swings that could have unfolded with the inauguration of 
universal male suffrage.  Though defeated Whigs believed that “the new voters were generally 
on the democratic side,” northwestern voters reflected the continuation of entrenched partisan 
affiliation.106  A few voters probably moved from one party to another, but the majority of voters 
remained loyal to their party.  Whigs believed their candidate would defend slavery while 
Democrats professed the same about their nominee.  The two-party system in the Northwest 
proved resilient and dynamic, permitting broad participation in the post-convention era while 
still manifesting the “politics of slavery.”    
But dissatisfaction with the fusion of slavery and electoral politics appeared to take an 
aggressive turn following the 1851 gubernatorial election.  In early 1853, Brooke County 
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residents convened to discuss annexation to Pennsylvania.  Historians have often interpreted this 
event as a denunciation of the “politics of slavery” and a harbinger of future dismemberment.107  
The causes of this meeting, though, were more complex.  Residents lamented their “dependence 
upon Wheeling,” decrying the favoritism bestowed by Richmond while Wellsburg languished.  
Wellsburg city leaders predicted that their “unfortunate geographical position” would “become 
worse and worse as Wheeling” grew “more influential and populous,” cementing its status as the 
Northwest’s lodestar.108  The state legislature deserved partial blame for refusing to adjudicate 
this conflict.  The “palpable oppression” exhibited by the General Assembly, notably in its 
lethargic pace in granting railroad charters, incensed Brooke County residents.  As Ken Fones-
Wolf has noted, many of Wheeling’s economic, social, and political elite cultivated relationships 
with Richmond politicians, generating ties that bound the two cities together while other 
northwestern cities and towns suffered.109  Wellsburg represented one of those casualties.     
Wheeling residents jeered Wellsburg’s secession movement.  The editors of the Wheeling 
Daily Intelligencer mocked the “proceedings of the Wellsburg night meetings,” where a few 
residents clandestinely convened to express their misguided frustration.  Such meetings occurred 
under the cover of darkness because of Brooke County residents’ strong opposition to 
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dismemberment.110  Indeed, the Intelligencer doubted the “‘natural kinship’” between the 
Panhandle and Pennsylvania, as suggested by some Wellsburg politicians.  Though the 
Panhandle shared a similar geographic position with Pennsylvania, Wellsburg residents held 
more in common with Virginians than residents of the Keystone State.111  The editors of the 
Intelligencer were correct.  Despite the animosity expressed by Wellsburg residents, many 
looked toward possible dismemberment with sadness and “regret,” not alacrity or hopefulness.112  
Yet again, those advocating for a division of the state were few and isolated, often advocating 
dismemberment for other reasons that simply escaping from the state’s slaveholding regime.   
A division of the state, though, according to one historian, remained in the forefront of 
politics as dramatic demographic changes accelerated during the late 1840s and 1850s.113  
German immigrants, fleeing the failed 1848 Revolution and attracted by the Northwest’s 
growing industrial sector, arrived in large numbers in the late 1840s and early 1850s.114  Most of 
these immigrants spoke neither English nor the language of slavery.  During the previous 
constitutional convention, eastern delegates worried that these German immigrants, once 
enfranchised, could elect politicians apathetic or hostile to the state’s slaveholding interest.  The 
rituals and public political displays signaled German immigrants’ presence and demonstrated 
their political fitness.115  But could these immigrants be trusted on the issue of slavery?   
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Some Germans attempted to integrate themselves within Virginia’s slaveholding culture 
by defending slavery and denying charges that they harbored antislavery or abolitionist 
sentiments.  In March 1854, Germans in Wheeling gathered to discuss recent legislative action 
on licensing and temperance.  After a speech by Democratic Congressman Sherrard Clemens, 
gatherers passed a series of resolutions.  The attempt by “unprincipled demagogues” to “drag the 
temperance question” into the political arena reflected the machinations of “Northern fanaticism” 
who sought to disturb national and state tranquility.  These machinations could be clearly seen in 
the efforts of J.E. Wharton, a Wheeling newspaper editor, who published articles appearing to 
condemn slavery.  Rather than allow such inflammatory messages on slavery to slander the 
Northwest, these Germans immigrants sought to “condemn the traitor to our laws, and abhor the 
treason.”  Wheeling Germans “utterly disclaim the slightest sympathy of feeling” with any article 
attacking slavery, considering such positions as “not only disloyal to the city and state, but 
DISGRACEFUL to both.”  As proud Virginians, these Wheeling Germans denounced any attempt to 
undermine the institution that supported their political freedom in their new homeland.116   
The role of Wheeling Germans in supporting slavery extended beyond assailing those 
who spoke against the peculiar institution within the state’s borders.  “[A]s a border people,” 
these immigrants considered themselves sentinels on the state’s “outpost,” offering to defend the 
“cherished institutions of the State.”  These men pledged their support in “repressing the 
invading spirit of Northern fanaticism, in whatever shape presented…by foes without, or less 
honorable…[and] more insidious and cowardly, foes within.”  Wheeling Germans’ fealty toward 
slavery carried over into their support of Virginia.  Though rumors of division occasionally 
surfaced in the region, “we stand by the ancient, faith, policy, and renown of Virginia.”  “[W]e 
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will indignantly repel any attempt to distract and divide” Virginians “or to array any one portion 
of her people against the other upon questions of domestic policy or institution.”  Rather than 
actively pursue dismemberment or attack slavery, these Wheeling Germans supported African 
American bondage, defended the institution from any and all threats, and pledged their fealty to 
Virginia.  Though some eastern planters continued to express fear about this growing new 
electorate, these immigrants sought to dispel such notions.117                    
Expressions of fealty toward slavery and Virginia, including those articulated by 
Wheeling Germans, reflected a larger phenomenon unfolding across the Northwest.  This 
commitment to African American bondage and the state reflected the widespread belief of the 
inextricable and intimate connection between the two institutions.  With slavery interlaced 
through the state’s constitutional and political structures and functions, northwestern residents’ 
defense of slavery illustrated their patriotism; their allegiance to the state likewise reflected their 
attachment to slavery.  Residents manifested the arguments championed by Leigh, Dew, and 
Upshur, who had emphasized the close relationship between the state government and slavery.  
The voices in the Northwest that questioned this important relationship, such as J.E. Wharton, 
were few and isolated, and often invited censure from the public.  Northwesterners’ remained 
committed to the state and to slavery.     
In early January 1853, the Ohio County Court heard the case of a runaway female slave.  
The slave had escaped to Ohio with the aid of a free African American in Wheeling, who 
authorities later captured and detained.  The court found the slave guilty of absconding from her 
owner and sentenced her to two years in jail.  The justice delivered by the court, the Wheeling 
Daily Intelligencer proudly announced, demonstrated the Northwest’s fealty on slavery and 
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slaveholders’ rights.  The “people of the Northwest are behind none in their fidelity to the laws 
designed to protect the institutions of Virginia,” the Intelligencer declared.  Though eastern 
legislators and slaveholders questioned northwesterners’ position on slavery, the court’s decision 
reflected residents’ perspective on African American bondage.  Northwesterners, “though not 
slave owners,” remained “true to the interests of those of Virginia’s citizens who were,” and 
would fight for the right of fellow Virginians to own slaves.  Further, residents 
“opposed…Abolitionism and Free Soil agitation, as any citizens of the State.”  “[N]o one” in the 
region opposed the court’s decision because northwesterners understood the fundamental 
importance of the master-slave relationship.  The master-slave relationship needed “to be 
protected and enforced at all hazzards” because it was “part and parcel of the law of the land.”  
Indeed, because slavery and the master-slave relationship represented the cornerstone of the state 
government, northwesterners would punish “to the utmost rigor of the law, all who seek to 
interfere” with the peculiar institution.118 
Those who sought to disrupt the master-slave relationship, notably abolitionists, drew ire 
and elicited censure from Northwest residents.  Northwesterners ridiculed abolitionists’ 
promotion of social and racial equality, perceiving in such ill-fated efforts a baseless attempt to 
destabilize the country and part of a larger program designed to overturn established hierarchies.  
The Wheeling paper mocked an “anti-Slavery Convention” held in Cincinnati that welcomed 
“Infidels, Negroes, and women in short coats and breeches,” a motley crew of men and women 
seeking to overturn patriarchy and racial hierarchy.  The differences between abolitionists and 
anti-slavery advocates mattered little; their endgame appeared identical.119  A southwest 
Virginian maintained that southerners had “rescued [African Americans] from barbarity, 
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idolitory, cannibalism, and brutality,” Christianizing and civilizing African Americans.  But 
abolitionists’ dogma of “Uncle Tomism” threatened to “shake the world and cause civilization to 
retrograde.”120  In Morgantown, the editor of the Monongalia Mirror mocked the nuptials of an 
African American man and the daughter of a white abolitionist.  The daughter “had been bro’t up 
an abolitionist,” taught to “look upon the negro race with…pity and charity,” and witnessed the 
reception of African Americans into her household “on terms of perfect equality and affection.”  
Though the father objected to the marriage, the two stole away, married, and were now 
expecting.  The Mirror relished in the irony of the situation.  “The fool is caught in his folly,” the 
newspaper proclaimed, and soon the abolitionist would be “saluted by the sweet lisp of half a 
dozen little niggers.”  Abolitionism was a farcical and dangerous doctrine, northwesterners 
believed, designed only to overturn established hierarchies and threaten national stability.121 
Though some northern abolitionists characterized the Panhandle as fertile ground for 
proselytizing, residents denied such baseless characterizations.  “[A]re the people Wheeling 
Abolitionists or free soilers,” the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer rhetorically asked.  “[O]r are they 
Virginians and Southerners in sentiments and interests?”122  “Our sons of the soil are true as steel 
to their Alma Mater, the dear old Commonwealth, and to the institutions of their forefathers,” the 
editors maintained.  Defending the fidelity of Panhandle residents’ seemed unnecessary because 
of the widespread acceptance of slavery and support for Virginia.  Even “most of our adopted 
brethren have the good sense to respect” slaveholders’ rights, slavery, and the institutions of the 
state.123  Followers of these dangerous “‘isms’ of the North…burnt the Bible, the Constitution of 
the United States and the Declaration of Independence, because they sanctioned the institution of 
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slavery.”  Northwesterners denounced such actions.124  Summarizing the position of its citizens, 
the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer proudly proclaimed that they “have taken a firm stand against 
Abolitionism and kindred fanaticism.”125  These denunciations of “isms” and “ists” reflected a 
shared commitment among southern and northern conservatives to marginalize and extinguish 
ideologies that threatened established hierarchies.126  Further, these denunciations also signaled 
northwesterners’ widespread acceptance of established and dominant hierarchies, notably slavery 
and patriarchy.  Northwesterners’ felt neither isolated from the state nor indifferent to its 
institutions; rather, residents closely identified with other Virginians and supported the state’s 
institutions.     
The threat of “isms” or “ists” infiltrating Virginia’s electoral politics appeared manifest in 
the 1855 gubernatorial election.  Democrats selected Eastern Shore politician and planter Henry 
A. Wise as their candidate for governor, the “most popular eastern man in the west,” according 
to a Wellsburg newspaper.127  His supporters argued that his defense of democratic reforms and 
increased protection for slavery during the constitutional convention endeared him to yeomen 
across the state who would help propel him to victory.  A Taylor County resident considered “the 
name of Mr. Wise…a cherish[ed] word in every cabin in W. Virginia,” and “hope[d]…to 
signalise my gratitude in some more tangible form.”128  Before Wise’s official nomination, the 
Cooper’s Clarksburg Register supported his candidacy, reminding readers of his important work 
in the previous convention.  Northwesterners owed Wise their “grateful remembrance” as he 
“contributed…in overthrowing the odious ‘mixed basis’” and helped secure northwesterners’ 
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political representation.129  At a Democratic meeting in Harrison County, residents passed two 
resolutions extolling Wise’s efforts during the convention.  Wise was the “able and fearless 
defender of equal rights and equal laws” who also manifested a “sincere devotion…to the 
interests and institutions of the South.”  Harrison County residents pledged their full support.130      
Whigs, though, faced an existential crisis.  Whigs’ failed attempts to court immigrants in 
the early 1850s alienated nativist voters in the North and upper South, including Virginia.  By 
1854, the party fractured, unable to contain the sectional discord arising from the Kansas-
Nebraska Act.  Fragments of the party (combined with some alienated Democrats) lived on in the 
American, or Know Nothing, Party.  The Know Nothing Party, built upon an anti-immigrant 
platform, purportedly told its followers to claim that they “know nothing” about the 
organization’s functions.  Followers also gained the name “Sam,” a derivative of “Uncle Sam” 
and a reflection of the party’s nativist ideology.131 
By the middle of the 1850s, Know Nothings constituted a prominent political party and a 
threat to Democratic hegemony in Virginia and the South.  Know Nothings enjoyed electoral 
success in Fredericksburg, Norfolk, Lynchburg, and Portsmouth, and an increasing presence in 
Wheeling, Charleston, and Lewisburg on the western side of the Alleghenies.132  One Wheeling 
resident approved the party’s opposition to “political popery,” a stance that opposed the rituals 
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used by the Democratic Party to secure political power.133  The party’s maturation in Virginia 
reflected the concomitant increase in the number of foreign-born residents within the state and 
the Northwest.  Approximately thirty-five thousand foreign-born residents called Virginia home 
in 1850, ranking it as one of the highest totals among slaveholding states.  Most immigrants 
settled in cities such as Richmond, Petersburg, and Wheeling.  Northwestern counties, notably 
Marshall and Ohio, boasted some of the higher figures of foreign-born residents in the state.134  
Democrats welcomed immigrants (and their voting power), believing that their arrival in the 
United States reaffirmed the nation’s exceptional status as a bastion of liberty and freedom.  But 
many residents in the Northwest worried that these immigrants, many of whom were Catholic, 
would maintain their allegiance to the pope and not the president.  Immigrants looked, spoke, 
and acted differently than Anglo-Americans, increasing concerns that immigrants could upset 
established hierarchies.  This fear provided fertile ground for the Know Nothings to build their 
grassroots campaign.       
While Know Nothings could deliver a nativist message, their secrecy and party 
procedures garnered sharp criticism.  This “subterranean organization” operated clandestinely 
and avoided “the free and public discussion of all political questions” that characterized 
American politics, a Clarksburg newspaper charged.135  Secret oaths, night meetings, guarded 
members, and refusing to debate appeared to validate Democrats’ accusations that Know 
Nothings constituted a tangible threat to political stability.  Further, this secrecy that shrouded 
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the party caused some residents to question the manhood of its members.  “[A]bolitionists and 
disunionists,” though preachers of “treasonable” doctrines, were “sufficiently honest and manly 
to boldly avow their principles.”  Know Nothings’ secrecy made members “excessively modest” 
and inculcated a “conscious weakness and unworthyness” among its followers.136  Indeed, some 
Democrats applauded Abolitionists’ “manliness” to maintain their stance and combat Democrats; 
Know Nothings, though, skirted such conflict.137  “In Virginia men are manly,” the Morgantown 
Telegraph declared; “they are not sneaks.”138      
Most Know Nothings expressed little concern about their party’s procedures, but the 
issue of slavery proved nagging and difficult to navigate.  Their candidate for governor in 1855, 
Thomas S. Flournoy, a former Whig congressman, encountered this sharp criticism.  The 
Richmond Enquirer uncovered a speech given by Flournoy that caused some Virginians to 
question his position on slavery.  “No country can be prosperous with a slave population,” 
Flournoy stated, an argument that closely paralleled abolitionist rhetoric.139  In an effort to 
burnish their candidates’ proslavery credentials, Know Nothings across the state maintained that 
their nominees would protect the interests of slaveholders, notably by supporting the Fugitive 
Slave Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and popular sovereignty in the territories.  Know 
Nothings held “sound views of State policy,” notably on slavery, members declared.140  In 
Morgantown, the American Union, one of the few Know Nothing newspapers in the region, 
defended the disenfranchisement of foreigners and Catholics because of the threat they posed to 
slavery.  Such men believed that “ecclesiastical” authority was “superior to…civil power,” 
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regarding their allegiance to the pope as superior to their allegiance to Virginia and its 
institutions.  Foreigners’ “mistaken notions of Liberty, and more erroneous ideas of their 
Constitutional prerogatives as citizens” invariably led them to demand slavery’s abolition, 
joining with other “mad-cap factionists…in a war upon the peculiar institutions of the South.”141  
By restricting foreigners’ political representation and power, Know Nothings sought to halt the 
spread of abolitionism while demonstrating their fealty to slavery.           
These public stances on slavery coincided with Know Nothings’ attempts to disarm 
Democrats’ accusations about their unsafe position on the institution.  Many western Know 
Nothings mocked attempts by Democrats to label Americans as “traitors” to Virginia 
institutions, including slavery.  Know Nothings sought neither the abolition of slavery nor the 
overthrow of established hierarchies; rather, they sought to purify the electoral system from 
Democratic corruption and manipulation.142  A Parkersburg newspaper maintained that Know 
Nothings’ candidate for lieutenant governor candidate, James M.H. Beale of Mason County, 
“avows and entertains the same views on Slavery” as those found in “the whole district, without 
distinction of party.”  Indeed, “all Western Virginia” shared Beale’s proslavery convictions.143  
In Ohio County, Know Nothings denounced Democrats’ fear mongering techniques.  Democrats 
resorted to “detraction and misrepresentation, and falsehood upon falsehood” in order “to injure 
[Know Nothings] in the eyes of the people.”144  “Sundry rumors” designed to cast doubt in the 
minds of voters about Know Nothings’ fealty toward slavery should be vehemently rejected.145     
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Northwestern Know Nothings’ rhetoric and pledges on the issue of slavery, though, often 
conflicted with their national platform.  During their national convention, northern delegates, 
frustrated with the proslavery leanings of the party, rejected the southern plank of their 
organization’s platform.  Northern Know Nothings had passed anti-slavery resolutions in their 
home states and hoped to include these resolutions in the party’s national platform.  But southern 
Know Nothings’ insistence on protecting slavery divided members.  This fissure fueled 
Democratic claims that southern Know Nothings could not be trusted on the question of slavery, 
as they would capitulate to their northern colleagues and seek slavery’s abolition.146   
Northwest Democrats hounded Know Nothings on their supposed threatening stance on 
the issue of slavery, what one leading Democrat considered the “most important” issue of the 
election.147  For Democrats, the connection between Know Nothings and abolitionists was clear 
and compelling.  “[P]rominent abolitionists” in Ohio candidly admitted that “Know Nothingism 
is intended to abolitionize the South” and spread their “infamous doctrines” throughout 
Virginia.148  Democrats charged that James Beale, Know Nothings’ candidate for lieutenant 
governor, declared in a speech in Parkersburg that the “existence…of the institution of Slavery” 
produced the evils that afflicted the state.  This denunciation of slavery sounded less “like the 
speech of a Virginian” and more “like the impious pratings of some suddenly transplanted 
Northern Abolitionist.”149  Know Nothings, in collusion with northern abolitionists, sought to 
repeal the Fugitive Slave Act and the Kansas-Nebraska Act while halting the interstate slave 
trade and abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia.  “Were Virginians ready for this?”  
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Democrat E.W. McComas of Kanawha County averred that such actions “boded no good to 
Southern rights.”150  “Know Nothingism,” the “foe of the South and the ally of Northern 
fanaticism,” deserved a sound rebuke in the upcoming gubernatorial election to demonstrate that 
northwesterners detested their abhorrent doctrines.151   
 Wise defeated Flournoy in the 1855 gubernatorial election by approximately ten thousand 
votes, a similar majority Johnson enjoyed four years earlier.  Traditional Democratic 
northwestern counties toed the party line, as Monongalia, Harrison, Marion, and Preston 
provided majorities to Wise.  Typical Whiggish counties such as Wood and Ohio racked up large 
margins for Flournoy.152  Democrats rejoiced at Virginians’ rejection of northern dogma.  In 
electing Wise, voters illustrated that “they are Virginians; they are not Yankees.”  Virginians 
refused to embrace politics “from such a sink of painful infidelity, shallow learning, lechery, 
corruption, and hypocrisy” that had infected the abolitionist states of Massachusetts and New 
York.153  A Wheeling newspaper celebrated the results, congratulating voters for defeating that 
“new fangled humbug which had its origin in the brain of some Yankee.”154  As during the 
previous gubernatorial election, the “politics of slavery” figured prominently, as partisans 
courted voters by stressing their party’s fealty toward the peculiar institution.  But voters, 
acclimated to this strategy, generally maintained party affiliation because they believed that their 
party offered the strongest defense of African American bondage.  Perhaps most importantly, the 
gubernatorial election and the rise of the Know Nothing Party reflected the dynamic nature of 
Virginia’s electoral system.  Two viable political parties with distinct ideologies and platforms 
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continued to court voters in the Commonwealth, and neither party appeared in danger of fading.  
While national politics appeared to be ossifying in the 1850s, Virginia politics remained 
flexible.155 
 Know Nothings remained an electoral force throughout 1855 and into 1856.  Know 
Nothing politician John S. Carlile of Harrison County won election in the Eleventh 
Congressional District, while the party maintained an organ in Morgantown and looked to 
remain a viable political alternative to Democrats.156  The party held regular meetings and Fourth 
of July parades in the region, maintaining its public presence among residents while remaining a 
thorn in the side of “Dimmykrats.”157  Know Nothings burnished their proslavery credentials, 
too, mocking “Black Republicans” while warning fellow Virginians about abolitionism and free 
soilism, two ingredients found in the “boiling cauldron of Northern fanaticism.”158  Know 
Nothings stated unequivocally that they “are…good and loyal Virginians” who championed 
slaveholders’ rights and defended slavery against all threats.159  Despite their recent 
gubernatorial defeat, Know Nothingism continued to find fertile ground in northwestern 
Virginia.   
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William Pope Cooper, a passionate Democrat and 
editor of the Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, continued to hound 
Know Nothings on the issue of slavery.  Know Nothings, like 
Whigs, exhibited a weakness on slavery that threatened the 
institution and white men’s political independence.  Southern 
Know Nothings appeared “willing to relinquish their 
constitutional rights” to appease “their abolitionist brethren of 
the North,” proving once again that the party’s members were 
not “sound upon the slavery question.”160  African American 
bondage generated and protected white men’s “natural and 
Constitutional rights,” Cooper asserted, and required vigilance 
upon the part of all Virginians to ensure slavery’s health and 
vitality.  Opponents of this fundamental southern axiom had to 
be defeated.161 
On April 4, 1856, Cooper published an engraving that 
he believed revealed Know Nothings’ true motives and actions.  
Under the caption “SAM KNOW-NOTHING,” a young, male 
African American slave rides on the back of a well-dressed white man.  The man dons a top hat, 
a jacket with long coattails, a high dress collar, a cane, and holds a money purse.  A raccoon 
takes the place of the individual’s head.  In bold capital letters under the engraving, Cooper 
wrote, “GOING HOME TO THE NORTH.”  In a brief editorial below the picture, Cooper 
remarked that “Sam Know-Nothing” now found himself “making tracks for Yankee land” 
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following his “fruitless efforts to proselyte” Virginians with his “abominable political heresies.”  
The connection between Know Nothings and northern abolitionists could not be more manifest.  
“Sam,” a “Yankee” exponent, espoused alarming messages that threatened the state’s established 
racial and political hierarchies.  “Sam” had “stolen a nigger and…resolved to devote himself 
more exclusively to that business hereafter.”  The issue of slave kidnapping represented a raw 
nerve in the body politic for many Virginians, notably those in the Northwest, who accused 
abolitionists of absconding with slaves.  Know Nothings, Cooper averred, were complicit in such 
activities and disregarded proslavery legislation.  Cooper, like other Democrats, believed that 
Know Nothings represented apostates to Virginia’s slaveholding interests and had to be branded 
as hostile outsiders. 
The political cartoon’s iconography confirms Cooper’s suspicion that Know Nothings 
represented Whigs incognito.  This disguise, though, could not hide the same fundamental truth: 
Whigs and Know Nothings posed an acute threat to slavery.  The raccoon serving as the figure’s 
head reminded readers that while Know Nothings proclaimed to be a new party, the party 
represented the reincarnation of the Whig Party.  During the 1844 presidential campaigns, Whigs 
used the raccoon and coonskin hat as a means of capitalizing on the rural identity that propelled 
them to victory during the previous presidential election.  Democrats used the raccoon and 
coonskin hat to accuse Whigs of being political manipulators and traitors to the “common man,” 
hiding under a hat rather than revealing their true identity.162  While Know Nothings paraded as a 
new political party, Cooper assured his audience that they were “the same old coon.”163 
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The figure’s fashion also provided important political and social commentary.  The top 
hat, suit, cane, high collar, and coin purse represented the trappings of a northern aristocrat, a 
man of wealth that contrasted sharply with a northwestern yeoman farmer.  Yeomen embodied 
the “homespun ideology” made fashionable during the American Revolution while Know 
Nothings, by contrast, were greedy northern capitalists who had strayed from the ideals of the 
Revolution.164  These references represented more than simple partisan conflict.  Cooper 
illustrated that northwest Virginians would remain vigilant against threats to Virginia’s 
republican institutions, notably slavery.  Northwesterners would continue to identify and 
condemn politicians and parties that threatened the values and interests of “the people,” 
promising to uphold and preserve southern democracy.   
 Cooper’s political cartoon illustrates that northwestern Virginians by the 1850s had 
deepened their commitment to slavery and to the state.  Some residents, though, objected to this 
deepening commitment.  As the Wellsburg Weekly Herald declared, “there are other interests in 
Virginia…besides those pertaining to slavery.”165  “[S]lave influences” had “moulded, cramped 
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and controlled” the “entire legislation of the state” to the detriment of nonslaveholders.  Lest 
residents labeled the newspaper an abolitionist organ, the Herald would remain aware of “all the 
existing interests and grievances of slaveholders” and repudiated the notion that “slavery [was] 
wrong in itself.”  Still, the Herald supported some form of gradual emancipation as it would 
serve and protect the “best interests of the white population of the State.”166  Dissatisfaction over 
the state legislature’s continued reluctance to appropriate funds for internal improvements and 
unfair taxation policies roiled some northwesterners who bemoaned eastern legislators’ 
continued intransigence and the favoritism doled on their section of the state.167   
These dissonant voices, though, remained on the political periphery.  Grievances 
expressed by residents often included continued pledges of fidelity to the state and fealty toward 
slavery.  Northwestern Virginians, “living on…[the] Western border,” still felt “as much pride in 
and veneration” for the state and its institutions all other Virginians.168  As Granville Davission 
Hall later admitted, northwesterners “were Virginian in their traditions and did not give up their 
pride in the historic fame of the Commonwealth.”169  Residents often confessed that they lived in 
one of the most democratic states in the country, and sought not to overturn established 
hierarchies but merely secure and protect the rights of western white men.  
 Many historians contend that during the 1850s, northwesterners drifted further away from 
the state and slavery, growing frustrated with the monomania that characterized Virginia’s 
political culture in regard to African American bondage.  But from the Constitutional Convention 
of 1850-1851 through the middle of the 1850s, northwesterners deepened and intensified their 
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attachment to Virginia and the peculiar institution.  Rather than pursuing division, residents 
sought closer union.  Instead of denouncing slavery, residents defended the institution.  These 
sentiments would continue to pervade northwesterners’ actions and thoughts through the 
secession crisis in 1860-1861.      
As Lacy Ford has illustrated, as the process of democratizing state constitutions unfolded 
in the 1830s, politics emerged as the sole purview of white men as democratic reform flattened 
other distinctions.  And as whiteness became the single characteristic demarcating freedom from 
bondage, white men fought to protect the institution that validated that racial divide and ensured 
their political representation.  The racial and political implications were profound.  The 
“imperatives and prerogatives of whiteness” became “clear and compelling” for white 
southerners, as this racial divide “gave a harder, uglier, and more permanent edge to the idea of 
racial differences.”170  Those who sought to challenge or overturn this fundamental axiom 
elicited the censure of white southerners.   
 This same phenomenon unfolded in Virginia after 1851.  The 1851 Constitution provided 
political representation to all white men regardless of property, status, or socioeconomic status.  
With politics now open to all white men and race as the only division between liberty and 
slavery, white northwesterners passionately defended this axiom with arguably greater vigor than 
in previous years.  Part of this increased intensity reflected the growth of groups hostile to 
slavery.  Abolitionists, free soilers, and anti-slavery proponents all appeared determined to upset 
this ruling southern axiom and deny the benefits of whiteness that northwesterners had long 
sought.  The differences between those extremists mattered little, as their ultimate objective 
appeared identical.  The “politics of slavery,” manifested through the state’s two first popularly-
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elected gubernatorial contests, took on a greater urgency than in previous elections because the 
stakes were higher and more important.  Each sign of political weakness could provide an 
opening for northern extremists to exploit.  Though Democrats considered themselves the 
standard-bearer for protecting slavery, Whigs and Know Nothings engaged in similar tactics, 
professing their hatred for northern “isms” and “ists” while pledging their support for 
slaveholders and slavery.  Political organizations attempting to break ground in the Northwest 
faced an immense challenge.   
 Northwesterners’ increased intensity defending slavery and their fidelity to the state 
further reflected what Leigh, Dew, and Upshur had envisaged years earlier.  By placing slavery 
at the core of Virginia’s republican institutions, delegates at the constitutional convention 
tethered the health and longevity of slavery to that of the state government.  Virginia’s political 
and constitutional structures, interlaced with safeguards for slavery, shielded the peculiar 
institution from enemies within and without.  The few critics who claimed that the state 
constitution furthered and protected the interests of slaveholders were correct; but the state 
constitution furthered and protected the interests of all white men, slaveholders and 
nonslaveholders alike, by promoting and protecting independence and liberty for all white men.  
This powerful dynamic subsumed class and political divisions, promoted sectional harmony, and 
created a united front among Virginians.  Northwestern Virginians remained wedded to slavery 

























Chapter 5: Defeating the “mongrel platform”: Partisan Politics, Slavery, and the Limited Appeal 
of the Republican Party, 1856-1861 
 
 In late January 1861, Hancock County residents convened to discuss the crisis unfolding 
across the nation.  In December 1860, South Carolina had seceded from the Union, and other 
states across the Deep South soon joined the Palmetto State to form the Confederate States of 
America.  Virginia, the largest slaveholding state, remained in the Union, but events within and 
without the Old Dominion challenged its fealty to the nation.  Virginia Governor John Letcher 
convened a special session of the legislature in early January 1861, and delegates approved a 
special election for representatives for a state convention to meet on February 13.  Virginians 
believed that this convention would help determine the Commonwealth’s fate, specifically 
whether it would join other slaveholding states in the new Confederacy or remain in the United 
States. 
 For Hancock County residents, the reasons for remaining in the Union were clear and 
compelling.  Virginians, slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike, “can always obtain…their just 
rights…by remaining with the Union.”  And the “rights” Virginians “now enjoy[ed]” were 
numerous: “the credit and protection of our present government,” along with “a share of the 
common territories, to the arms, the arsenals, the dockyards, and the navy.”  The federal 
government’s military prowess protected Virginians, most recently in October 1859 when federal 
soldiers captured John Brown and his armed rebels at Harpers Ferry.  Further, the nation’s 
international credit facilitated commercial transactions, an attractive characteristic that could 
assist the Northwest’s expanding industrial footprint.1    
 But Hancock County residents understood that the state’s overwhelming investment in 
slavery led many Virginians, especially those east of the Blue Ridge, to aver that a union under a 
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Republican administration would prove fatal to African American bondage.  But these Northwest 
residents found such fears unfounded.  Northwesterners “sincerely sympathize with our Eastern 
Virginia friends in their present alarm, but…assure[d] them that…their fears are groundless and 
arise from a misapprehension of the intentions of our Northern friends.”  Remaining “faithful to 
the Union” represented the safest path for eastern Virginians concerned about their chattel.  
Northerners “will assist them in the maintenance of their just rights and labor with them for their 
enforcement,” northwesterners maintained.  “[S]ome conciliatory plan for the preservation of our 
institutions” should be pursued “without doing violence to the conscientious opinions of either 
Northern or Southern men.”  If Virginians wanted to protect and ensure slavery’s immediate 
future, Virginians needed to remain in the Union.2   
 The argument that slaveholders’ rights and slavery were safer in the Union received 
widespread acceptance in the Northwest.  At a Union meeting in Parkersburg in early January 
1861, residents asserted that secession would prove ruinous to slavery.  Northwesterners 
admitted that their neighbors across the Ohio River “have been guilty of flagrant acts of 
injustice” and had violated the “constitutional rights of slaveholders.”  But secession would 
destroy slavery.  Joining the Confederacy would produce a “connexion fatal to [Virginia’s] 
credit, her prosperity, and to the happiness of her people” by abrogating the constitutional 
privileges slaveholders possessed in the Union.  “[W]e are fully persuaded that all our grievances 
may be redressed under the Constitution,” residents concluded.  Slaveholders’ grievances could 
be addressed if the state remained in the United States; the uncertainty surrounding secession’s 
effect on slavery should give pause to slaveholders as they contemplated Virginia’s future.3  
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 Northwesterners’ declarations asserting their fealty to the Union, even as a Republican 
president assumed office, were common throughout the region.  But historians have unfairly 
overlooked these pronouncements, selecting instead resolutions and declarations demanding an 
adjustment of the state’s ad valorem tax and readjusting apportionment in the state legislature.  
These grievances appear to illustrate a growing antislavery sentiment in the Northwest and 
foreshadow residents’ demand for a new state free from slavery.  Granville Davission Hall 
argued that nearly all northwesterners were “fighting to get away from” slavery as the secession 
crisis unfolded.4  Northwestern Virginians’ “natural association to Ohio and Pennsylvania” 
encouraged residents’ to adopt northern “sentiments” and political “institutions,” according to 
another historian.  In a national crisis concerning slavery, these historians claim, northwesterners 
would align themselves with other northerners and choose the Union and the extermination of 
slavery.5 
 Current historians have reinforced these earlier interpretations, maintaining that the late 
antebellum era witnessed an increase of Unionist and antislavery or antislaveholder sentiment 
among northwestern residents.  The rise of the Republican Party in the Northwest further 
transformed the state’s political calculus, as northwesterners allegedly exhibited their true fealty 
by supporting a party devoted to ending slavery.  Each national and state political contest 
widened the breach between eastern and western Virginians, as the former protected slavery 
while the latter advanced “free labor.”  By February 1861, that breach was a chasm.  And as the 
secession crisis unfolded around them in early 1861, northwestern Virginians preached 
                                                          
economic and social systems.  Stanley Harrold, Border War: Fighting over Slavery before the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), esp. 196-201.       
4 Hall, Rending of Virginia, 50.   
5 Lang, West Virginia, 9.   
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adherence to the Union over protecting slavery, an institution that had long shackled their 
political and economic capabilities.         
In advancing this interpretation, historians echo the Republican memory of Virginia’s 
intrastate conflict.  Northwesterners’ political isolation and alienation from Virginia’s 
slaveholding culture reflected residents’ increasing antipathy toward slavery and an acute 
recognition of slavery’s deleterious political, social, and economic effects.  Further, residents 
expressed a marked determination to destroy the “Slave Power” that wielded inordinate power 
and lorded over white nonslaveholders.  Charles Ambler argued that Republicans “fed upon the 
discontent” manifested in the lack of internal improvements, unequal taxation, and an inadequate 
public education system.  By 1860, Republicans within Virginia constituted a “formidable 
party…resolved to stand by the Union.”6  Henry T. Shanks notes that the geographic 
“dissimilarity” between regions west and east of the Alleghenies exacerbated political tensions 
throughout the antebellum era.  By 1861, few internal improvements existed that could conquer 
these geographic divisions and promote solidarity among Virginians.  With railroads extending 
into northern and western markets, northwesterners drew closer to free states as they exited 
Richmond’s political gravity.7 
The perspective of irreconcilable differences emanating from western and eastern 
Virginia has continued to receive scholarly approval.  Richard Orr Curry, while he challenged 
the Northwest’s alleged monolithic nature, still posits that eastern and western Virginia 
                                                          
6 Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 338.  The dominant motif in Ambler’s Sectionalism in Virginia reflects the 
Republican memory of the state’s sectional conflict.  Ambler, a student of Frederick Jackson Turner, argued that 
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“free labor” and governed by democratic principles.  Eastern Virginia represented the nation’s slaveholding and 
oligarchical past and the base of the “Slave Power.”  Northwesterners, since the early republic and through the 
antebellum era, evinced a clear opposition to slavery and eastern slaveholders because of the continued denial of 
democratic reform, political equality, state-supported internal improvements, and a public education system.        
7 Shanks, Secession Movement in Virginia, 8-14.   
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constituted two separate civilizations on the eve of secession.  Different constitutional and 
political principles combined with the Northwest’s hostile climate for slavery encouraged the 
region to develop along a different trajectory than the rest of the state.  William W. Freehling 
argues that in “vast southern white belt areas,” such as the Northwest, “nonslaveholders felt less 
brotherhood with slaveholders.”  Indeed, the “fault lines” between the two groups continued to 
widen throughout the late antebellum era, turning numerous nonslaveholders into “anti-
Confederates” by 1861.8  William Link contends that “northwestern exceptionalism,” an ethos 
incongruous with proslavery values, reflected years of “eastern domination” in politics and 
slaveholders’ monomania concerning their chattel’s protection.  Northwesterners embraced the 
Republican Party, interpreting in the organization their opportunity to defeat the “Slave Power” 
that had long wielded power over western whites.9   
Other studies exploring sectional tensions in Virginia have approached the late 
antebellum era through different lenses but have arrived at similar conclusions.  Kenneth Noe, 
echoing Henry Shanks’ argument about the lack of economic development in western Virginia, 
contends that the economic and social impact of railroads represented the “leading factor” in 
determining loyalty during the secession crisis.  Northwestern railroads, connected to northern 
and western markets, transported northern goods, values, and institutions into the region while 
alienating residents from the state’s slaveholding culture.  Railroads in southwest Virginia, 
connected to Richmond, increased that region’s commitment to slavery and the state.10  
Northwestern Unionists exhibited most of the characteristics that Daniel W. Crofts identifies 
                                                          
8 Freehling, South vs. the South, 22-23.   
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10 Noe, Southwest Virginia Railroads, 8.  This sense of economic integration within the state’s slaveholding culture 
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among Border South residents, including a firm belief that the Union provided a bulwark for 
slavery against antislavery forces.11  Crofts argues that geographical proximity to northern free 
states, a lack of state-sponsored internal improvements west of the Alleghenies, and a small slave 
and slaveholder population produced a “keen sense of regional isolation and resentment” among 
northwesterners.12  Northwestern residents, expressing their dissatisfaction through “an 
antislavery tone and a threat to divide the state,” would finally achieve liberation during the Civil 
War.13        
This historiographical consensus posits a clean and comfortable interpretation concerning 
late antebellum sectional tensions in the Old Dominion.  Eastern Virginians’ denial of internal 
improvements and political equality, when combined with the Northwest’s geographical 
isolation and residents’ commercial ties to northern and western states, attenuated residents’ 
fealty toward slavery and the state over the preceding decades.  By the late 1850s, 
northwesterners sought refuge in the Republican Party, a political vehicle that could politicize 
their disenchantment and challenge the “Slave Power.”  The Republican Party’s growth in the 
Northwest appeared inevitable, as the region’s political, demographic, economic, and social 
characteristics all appeared to provide fertile ground for the “free soil” and “free labor” party.  
Republicans also provided important leadership during the statehood movement, guiding 
northwesterners from political bondage to freedom in 1863.  Republicans controlled the state and 
its memory.      
Notable flaws, however, weaken this interpretation.  Historians rely on extant Republican 
sources to explain northwesterners’ interpretation of political developments in the late 
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202 
 
antebellum era.  The two prominent Republican newspapers, the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer 
and Wellsburg Weekly Herald, enjoyed limited appeal in the region, providing historians a useful 
but highly subjective and narrow perspective.  Republicans increased in strength during the late 
1850s but their membership remained generally confined to the northern panhandle.  Historians’ 
selective use of the two newspapers, however, mischaracterizes and exaggerates Republicans’ 
strength and appeal in the region.  Northwesterners’ deep engagement in the “politics of 
slavery,” the numerous proclamations of fealty toward slavery and the state expressed by 
residents, and their recognition that black bondage protected white liberty demonstrates 
residents’ firm attachment to Virginia and to African American slavery.  A few northwesterners 
attempted to challenge this dominant paradigm but made little progress, encountering hostility 
from residents who interpreted their ideology as subversive and dangerous to established and 
traditional hierarchies.  Political affiliations remained relatively constant in the region as 
northwesterners maintained that their party protected slavery, patriarchy, and whiteness.       
Historians have often treated Virginia as a microcosm of the national struggle concerning 
slavery.  Decades of conflict in the Old Dominion over slavery and slaveholders’ prerogatives 
and privileges mirrored national crises, as western nonslaveholders and yeoman farmers chafed 
at eastern slaveholding oligarchs who protected their chattel while corrupting republican 
government.  This anachronistic historiographical argument overlooks decades of northwestern 
support for slavery and slaveholders’ privileges, as only a fraction of the population opposed this 
political dynamic.  An armed conflict over slavery in the Old Dominion was not inevitable, even 
by 1861.   Further, historians misinterpret northwesterners’ fealty toward the Union.  Nearly all 
residents expressed unwavering fealty toward the Union but also pledged to protect Virginia and 
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slavery, two institutions that blossomed under the Stars and Stripes and guarded and guaranteed 
their political representation and liberty.   
The late antebellum era in northwest Virginia witnessed residents’ continued struggle to 
protect racial hierarchy, patriarchy, and slavery from dangerous “isms” and “ists.”  Most 
northwesterners viewed Republicans not as saviors but sinners, acolytes of a northern, sectional 
party that advocated principles incongruous with traditional and established hierarchies.  
Northwesterners’ hostility toward Republicans manifested their visceral disgust for a party that 
allegedly promoted racial equality and the overthrow of slavery.  This hostility also manifested 
residents’ continued devotion to other Virginians, including their slaveholding neighbors east of 
the Blue Ridge.  The intrastate sectional struggle that had long characterized Virginia politics 
faded as residents continued to thrive under the 1851 Constitution.  Disputes concerning 
legislative reapportion or ad valorem taxation reflected disagreements over the most effective 
means to protect slavery; they were not proposals to place the peculiar institution on the path 
toward extinction.  Even as secession loomed, northwesterners remained devoted to slavery and 
to protecting eastern slaveholders’ rights.  The political struggles of the late antebellum era 
neither attenuated northwesterners’ fealty toward slavery and the state nor increased residents’ 
political isolation; rather the late 1850s witnessed northwesterners’ strengthening their 
commitment to slavery and Virginia.  Northwesterners were vanguards in Virginia’s proslavery 
defense.  
By 1856, the threats to slavery and slaveholders in Virginia appeared increasingly 
tangible and serious.  Democrats considered themselves the standard-bearers of Virginia’s 
slaveholding interest, identifying and vilifying opponents who showed the slightest weakness on 
the issue of slavery.  Much of Democrats’ derision fell on Know Nothings, a party that continued 
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to recover from its gubernatorial defeat the previous spring.  Know Nothings remained a potent 
political force, sharpening their proslavery message while assailing Democrats who appeared to 
equivocate on slavery.  Northwestern Democrats and Know Nothings continued to operate 
within the “politics of slavery” throughout the 1850s, a reflection of residents’ concern for 
African American bondage.  This political calculus, though, changed as a new threat to slavery 
appeared in the Northwest.    
In early August 1856, the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer published the proceedings of a 
Republican Party meeting held in the city.  The newspaper commented on the meeting’s 
attendance, the national Republican platform, and Republicans’ desire to organize an electoral 
ticket for the forthcoming presidential election.  Though “small in numbers,” Republicans, 
warned the editors, represented a “movement calculated only for bad results.”  A “little 
reflection” among Republicans would manifest the “unfortunate consequences likely to result 
from their action” the editors felt, and would ultimately dissuade them from maintaining the 
party’s presence in the Northwest.14   
The establishment of the Republican Party in the Northwest has received much scholarly 
attention, as historians maintain that the party’s founding hastened secession and the Civil War.  
Granville Davisson Hall celebrated the Republican Party, lauding its increasing membership 
despite increasing threats of violence and abusive epithets from opponents.15  Northwesterners 
embrace of the Republican Party, William Link argues, reflected residents increasing political 
isolation and their determination to arrest the power of the slaveholding regime.16  Republicans 
proved successful in achieving that goal, Richard G. Lowe contends.  Eastern Virginians, fearful 
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of a growing Republican electorate, advocated secession to stymie the party’s expansion.  
Republicans helped guide the Northwest through secession and statehood, liberating white 
northwesterners from the political bondage enacted by eastern slaveholders.17  The founding of 
the Virginia Republican Party, according to historians, placed the Old Dominion on the 
inevitable path toward dismemberment. 
For contemporaries and historians, a Virginia Republican Party centered in the Northwest 
appeared possible, if not plausible.  Several factors appeared encouraging.  The growth of 
southern cities, including Baltimore, St. Louis, and New Orleans, inaugurated a form of urban 
politics often incongruous with traditional “planter-influenced politics.”  Slaveholders worried 
that this increasingly heterogeneous urban population possessed values opposed to slaveholding 
interests, notably an affinity for “free labor” politics and an apathy or hostility toward slavery.  
Republicans, meanwhile, envisioned these urban dwellers establishing “bridgeheads for a 
Republican Party invasion of the South.”  Through patronage and political favors, Republicans 
could nurture these southern pockets of Republicanism and challenge slaveholder hegemony.18   
The growth of southern cities in the 1840s and 1850s reflected an important demographic 
trend.  Immigrants, notably Germans fleeing the failed 1848 Revolution, represented one of the 
largest constituencies in these southern cities and Wheeling was no different.  Though Germans 
had immigrated to Wheeling during the preceding decades, their numbers increased following 
1848 as thousands flooded the city in search of employment.  By 1860, immigrants or their sons 
constituted approximately one-half of the city’s voting-age male population, with most of these 
families residing in Wheeling’s southern wards and specializing in trades and less-skilled 
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occupations.  Many Republicans believed that these plebeian laborers would embrace the party’s 
“free labor” ideology, a tenet that emphasized social and economic mobility and the dignity of 
labor.19  This assumption carried some legitimacy.  While the majority of pre-1848 German 
immigrants supported the Democratic Party, those arriving after the Revolution gravitated 
toward the Republican Party.  The continued arrival of these Revolutionary Germans meant an 
increasing Republican electorate, too.20   
The influx of German immigrants to Wheeling reflected the city’s dynamic economic 
growth.  Ironworks flourished in the 1850s, with rolling mills and foundries dotting the city’s 
landscape.  Glassworks, tanneries, and tobacco and cotton manufacturers continued to thrive, 
too.21  This growth appeared to distance Wheeling’s residents from Virginia’s planter-centered 
political economy.  Manufacturers in Richmond and Petersburg often relied on agricultural 
goods produced by slave-labor, including tobacco, cotton, and hemp, generating ties between 
slaveholders and business leaders.22  But manufacturing in Wheeling, centered on the glass and 
iron industries, relied on few, if any, agricultural goods produced with slave labor.23  As one 
contemporary later reflected, Wheeling’s “interests were industrial rather than agricultural,” 
leading few to cultivate relationships with slaveholders and fewer still to own slaves.24    
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These demographic and economic trends suggested that northwesterners might embrace 
the Republican Party.  Virginia’s intrastate sectional tensions also offered Republicans an 
opportunity to test the party’s “Slave Power” thesis.  Republicans argued that a conspiratorial 
“Slave Power” manipulated the U.S. Constitution and corrupted democratic politics to protect 
slavery and slaveholders’ interests.25  The work of the “Slave Power” colored Virginia’s history, 
Republicans maintained.  For decades, eastern slaveholders denied western nonslaveholders 
political representation and equality, and used the structures and functions of the state 
government to shield the institution and further slaveholders’ privileges.  Opposing the “Slave 
Power” could result in “blood or banishment,” one Republican warned.26   
Republicans hoped to politicize Virginia’s sectional discord and channel it into party 
politics.  Virginia Republicans could effectively check slaveholders’ power and address the few 
political and constitutional inequalities that remained on the books.  A Virginia Republican Party 
could also, Republican editor John G. Jacob believe, provide “organization and concert” for men 
not “habitually disposed to dabble in politics.”  Jacob and other Republicans worried that many 
farmers, laborers, and yeomen avoided politics because Democrats and Know Nothings 
championed the slave interest over all others.  Without Republicans’ assistance, these 
northwesterners “are practically disenfranchised,” making their party invaluable.27  Republican 
success in Virginia could translate into similar movements in other southern slaveholding states, 
including Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, where Republicans would continue to battle the 
“Slave Power.” 
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Despite these favorable characteristics, Republicans discovered that northwestern 
residents were not as receptive as initially conceived.  Few residents recanted their previous 
proclamations concerning slavery and slaveholders’ rights, especially since many had deepened 
their engagement in the “politics of slavery” following the ratification of the 1851 Constitution.  
The “high minded loyal citizens of the Commonwealth” rejected Republicans who sought to 
“bring us to a level with negroes and Yankee pedlers.”  Speaking against slavery was tantamount 
to attacking the political prerogatives of all white men, an action that could elicit a violent 
reaction.  “Wheeling cannot consent to become the asylum for politicians of the black creed,” 
one northwestern newspaper editor averred.  “Trifle not with public sentiment.  Defy not the will 
of the people,” he warned Republicans.28  After learning that another Republican meeting would 
be held in Wheeling, the “Union and Constitution-loving men of the South…advise[d] the 
members of that party to change both time and place.”  The editors of the Wheeling Daily 
Intelligencer warned Republicans that those opposed to this meeting would “protect” the city’s 
reputation.29 
Such veiled threats of violence against Republicans carried legitimacy.  A melee ensued 
in Wheeling following a Republican meeting as the speaker, Dr. G.P. Smith, was “met with 
rough handling” following his speech.  Smith defended himself with a knife against assailants, 
leaving two men with lacerations and the doctor in jail.  The editors of the Wheeling Daily 
Intelligencer were “not surprised that our citizens are incensed at this Republican effort.”  
Outbreaks of violence directed toward Republicans could be excused because “this little band” 
possessed “aims [that] are at war with the institutions of Virginia.”  Republicans’ opposition to 
slavery’s expansion appeared tantamount to abolitionism, a dangerous doctrine that threatened 
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established political and social hierarchies.  Northerners attempting to settle in Virginia needed 
to understand what it meant “to be true to Virginia.”  Being faithful to the Old Dominion meant 
supporting and defending slavery.30     
 The attacks levied against Republicans signaled northwesterners continued struggle to 
protect whiteness.  “Abolitionists, Atheists, Socialists…Disunionists, negro worshipers in 
theory…Beechers and Stowes” all supported the same “mongrel platform” that Republicans and 
Know Nothings championed.  In short, Republicans “advocate every change from the established 
order of things, no matter how ruinous to society.”31  All white men stood to lose if Republicans 
abolished slavery.  Abolition would “at once place the poor white man and free negro upon the 
same level,” dragging the “white laborer down to the same wretched pittance and…degraded 
condition and level” that African Americans occupied, a Democratic newspaper insisted.32  
Northwesterners would “spurn…all new-fangled, false philanthropic, degenerating, 
disorganizing attempts of brainless innovators upon her ancient and well tried institutions.”33  
Republicans threatened the Union, southern society, and the household, all domains structured 
on patriarchy.  Further, the political rights white northwesterners acquired only a few years 
earlier would be devalued or eliminated with Republican political dominance.  Republicans’ 
attacks on slavery targeted more than the institution; they targeted all parts of southern society.    
 As the 1856 presidential election approached, residents increased their engagement in the 
“politics of slavery.”  Know Nothings, embittered by their recent gubernatorial defeat, attempted 
to distance themselves from Republicans and abolitionism.  Accusations concerning Know 
Nothings’ abolitionist sentiment “won’t lie, though every one who makes it does,” the 
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Morgantown American Union declared.34  Any association “between Black Republicanism and 
Americanism” represented an egregious “mistake,” as Know Nothings held nothing in common 
with the “‘wooly heads’” of the Republican Party.35  Those “Ultraists of the North…originated a 
crusade upon slavery” and had to be defeated, Know Nothings declared.36  Though Republicans 
professed not to meddle with slavery where it existed, the “rankest and most ultra ABOLITION 
sentiments and appeals” had infected the party and soon Republicans would demand slavery’s 
abolition.37  The sectional nature of the Republican Party signaled more trouble on the issue of 
slavery.  “Black Republicanism cannot reconcile our difficulties, because it is…sectional” and 
“both its candidates [are] from the North.”38  How could a sectional, northern party be trusted to 
protect slavery?  Further, the proslavery, anti-foreign Know Nothing Party would disenfranchise 
the “foreign vote” in the North, a “pestiferous source of Abolition power.”39 
Democrats could not escape Know Nothings’ criticism either.  Know Nothings 
questioned two Democratic state legislators who allegedly voted against a bill that would have 
increased slave patrols on maritime commerce to prevent runaway slaves from absconding.  
“They ain’t Black Republicans, too, are they?”  Charges by Democrats that Know Nothings 
sought to repeal proslavery legislation amounted to “deliberate falsehood[s]” designed to 
discredit Know Nothings’ proslavery position.  True protection for slavery, Virginia, and the 
nation rested in the Know Nothing ticket.  By electing Millard Fillmore, Virginians would ensure 
the perpetuity of the Union, repudiate “Black Republicanism,” and secure allies who would 
ensure slavery’s protection.      
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Democrats assailed both Know Nothings and Republicans on their supposed infidelity 
toward slavery, maintaining that African American bondage “was the issue of the canvass and on 
it alone the contest would be decided.”40  Know Nothings constituted a favorite target for 
Democrats who believed that the party’s clandestine nature and northern membership 
demonstrated the American Party’s weakness on slavery.  The American Party represented the 
northern “stepping stone” that allowed the “black clan” to elect Republican representatives, 
senators, and governors.41  Under pressure from its northern wing, Know Nothings, Marion 
County lawyer Alpheus F. Haymond alleged, had “became sectional and abolitionized.”42  
Rumors of Know Nothings celebrating Republican John Fremont’s victory in Pennsylvania 
validated Democrats’ accusations of their opponents’ “sympathies for the black flag of 
niggerism.”43  
While engaged in the “politics of slavery,” partisans often engaged in questionable tactics 
to demonstrate their opponents’ weakness on slavery.  A Know Nothing elector from the 
Shenandoah Valley canvassing the Northwest supposedly confessed that Millard Fillmore “was 
prejudiced against slavery,” a charge Democrats had long suspected.  Further, Virginians were 
“foolish” to fight for slavery in the territories; as a political minority in Congress, southerners 
should “compromise with Northern fanaticism or be driven to the wall.”  Democrats found his 
conclusion repulsive.  Virginians should “give up all their natural and Constitutional rights, and 
cry ‘amen’ to the fanaticism of the nigger stealers.”44  While the newspaper’s transcription of the 
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speech can be questioned, Democrats wanted the message to be clear: a Know Nothing victory 
imperiled slavery.   
Republicans posed an equally dangerous threat to slavery, Democrats asserted.  While 
northern Know Nothings dictated the party’s platform, Republicans purely sectional and northern 
electorate forecasted danger for southern institutions.  “Fremont has a ticket in every Northern 
States,” one newspaper editor warned, “but no Southern State” had been canvassed by 
Republicans.45  John C. Frémont, the “Republican-Abolition candidate,” according to a 
Democratic organ, sought to abolish slavery and champion “Free Love and Polygamy.”  
Republicans’ desire to destroy slavery and inaugurate these two lifestyles threatened white men’s 
patriarchal power in both the public and private spheres.46  Democrats were incredulous that 
even a small number of Virginians supported Frémont knowing that his party threatened 
patriarchy.  “[I]s it possible, that men in Virginia…prefer Fremont to Buchanan,” a Democratic 
partisan questioned.  The Old Dominion and its institutions deserved Virginians’ “undying 
protection” from the “damnable doctrines” of northern abolitionists who sought to upset 
established hierarchies.47  Only the election of James Buchanan, a Pennsylvania Democrat who 
would equally abhorred these “doctrines,” could prevent such calamities from unfolding across 
Virginia and the South. 
 The partisan attacks coupled with the innuendo and misinformation surrounding 
Republicans stunted the party’s growth.  Few northwesterners supported the party, leaving the 
handful of Virginia Republicans to lean on Ohio or Pennsylvania Republicans for political and 
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emotional support and speakers for meetings.48  Violence plagued Republicans, too.  In 
Wellsburg, the staff of the Wellsburg Weekly Herald hoisted an American flag above their 
printing house in support of Republican John Frémont.  Their neighbors interpreted the flag as 
the banner of “black Republicanism” and “swore that down it must come.”  A “poor, crazy 
lunatic” performed this “damning deed,” and served as a warning for other northwestern 
Republicans who supported Frémont.49    
 Despite the criticism and physical threats levied against Republicans, members continued 
to convene in the region and recruit other northwesterners into their party.  During Republican 
meetings, members expressed maintained the steady drumbeat of “free soil” and anti-“Slave 
Power.”  In Wheeling, Republicans condemned both Democrats and Know Nothings for 
christening “the extension of slavery the paramount object of government” while marginalizing 
all other interests.  Republicans reaffirmed their position that Congress could not “interfere with 
any of the States in regard to the ‘peculiar institution,’” but supported Congress’ power to 
“prohibit the extension of slavery” into the territories.50  This “free soil” platform would protect 
white laborers’ social and economic mobility in western territories.  Equally important, “free 
soil” would halt the expanding “Slave Power.”     
Virginia Republicans believed that the “Slave Power” operating in the Old Dominion had 
retarded economic growth and undermined political equality.  Hancock County Republicans 
reaffirmed their support for “free soil” for western territories because of slavery’s deleterious 
effects in the Northwest.  Slavery acted as an “incubus upon the energies of the white population, 
keeping a large part…in ignorance and poverty.”51  Further, the Virginia “Slave Power” had long 
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protected its chattel by “violating the constitution,” notably “by passing laws abridging the 
freedom of speech and of the press.”  The “Slave Power” decreed that “equality cannot be 
recognized but by an investment…in the purchase of Slaves” but acquiring slaves “would but 
strengthen the fetters which now trammel us in our state affairs.” Every slave that entered 
Virginia strengthened the institution and the “Slave Power” while other interests suffered.  Faced 
with this conundrum, northwestern Republicans longed for 1865 when, according to the 1851 
Constitution, Virginians could reapportion the state legislature.  Apportioning both houses on the 
“white basis” would “proclaim to the world that Virginia is redeemed” and liberate the “free 
white race in Virginia” from political bondage.52 
The returns of the 1856 presidential election revealed to Republicans that the “Slave 
Power” continued to maintain its hold on politics.  Most residents interpreted the election as a 
affirmation of the “politics of slavery” and the continued dynamism of the Northwest’s two-party 
system.53  Residents recognized that the “slave question was the sole issue in the election,” and 
declared by their votes that Democrat James Buchanan would protect slavery.54  Buchanan easily 
carried the Northwest and Virginia, with Know Nothing candidate Millard Fillmore finishing 
second and Republican John Frémont a distant third.  As with previous presidential and 
gubernatorial elections, northwesterners’ traditional political affiliation held sway.  Buchanan 
performed well in the northern panhandle counties of Brooke, Hancock, and Ohio, along with 
                                                          
52 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, September 12, 1856, 2.  For other references of Republicans proclaiming 1865 to be 
the year of white northwesterners’ liberation from slaveholders, see [Wheeling] Daily Intelligencer, June 10, 1859, 
2; June 20, 1859, 2; and March 13, 1860, 2.     
53 My interpretation concerning the significance of the 1856 presidential election on Virginia politics differs from 
that of William Link.  Link argues that the presence of the Republican Party, though infinitesimal, suggested the 
existence and growth of opponents to Virginia’s “southern rights agenda.”  Enough Republicans existed in the 
Northwest, he suggests, to “give pause to the slave regime.”  This argument, though, exaggerates Republicans’ 
presence and reveals foreknowledge of the continued growth of the Republican Party.  Further, the election returns 
strongly suggest the continued entrenchment of the two-party politics, a system that revolved around the protection 
of slavery.  Link, Roots of Secession, 167-168.     
54 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, November 7, 1856, 2.   
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Monongalia, Harrison, Marion, and Preston.  Fillmore fared better than previous Whig/Know 
Nothing candidates in the state, carrying, among others, Kanawha and Marshall counties.   
Frémont, receiving 291 votes or 0.2% of all ballots cast statewide, failed to carry a single 
county.  He received his strongest support in the northern panhandle counties of Hancock, Ohio, 
and Brooke, along with a few scattered votes in Monongalia and Upshur.55  Republicans’ 
lackluster turnout depressed members, as one solemnly remarked that the election passed 
“quietly and soberly” with “large democratic majorities” in numerous precincts.56  This 
Republican’s dour observation reflected most Republicans’ uncertainty of whether their party 
could thrive on southern soil.  The lack of voter turnout further reflected residents’ skepticism of 
Republicans’ political ideology and the continued entrenchment of the two-party system.  
Republicans, unable to tailor their message to the “politics of slavery,” remained peripheral and 
alien to most northwesterners in 1856.        
Republicans’ poor showing revealed the Northwest’s political dynamics.  The continued 
use of viva voce balloting probably frightened a handful of Republicans who wanted to vote for 
Frémont but reconsidered when faced with threats, intimidation, and ostracism from neighbors.  
Still, that number would not have been significant enough to swing any county.  Rather, 
residents’ continued engagement in the “politics of slavery” and their defense of “whiteness” 
contributed to Republicans’ low turnout.  For decades, residents had extolled their nominee’s 
proslavery credentials while characterizing their opponent as weak on this seminal issue.  This 
practice held firm in the election.  The majority of northwesterners believed that Republicans’ 
                                                          
55 These figures are derived from election returns reprinted in Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, December 5, 1856, 2 
and Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, December 12, 1856, 3.  Frémont received 108 votes in Ohio County; 100 in 
Hancock; 40 from Brooke; 2 in Monongalia; 20 from Marshall; and 10 in Upshur.  Other Virginia counties that 
supported Frémont included Alexandria (1 vote); Shenandoah (5); and Scott (5).    
56 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, November 7, 1856, 2.   
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political ideology threatened slavery and whiteness, 
two cornerstones of Virginia’s political culture.  
Republicans’ alleged support of abolitionism, 
amalgamation, polygamy, socialism, and atheism, ran 
counter to white northwesterners’ beliefs and 
threatened to upset established political, racial, 
economic, and social hierarchies.  Northwesterners 
were pleased by the Republicans’ trouncing; they had 
defeated another dangerous northern “ism.” 
Northwestern Democrats rejoiced at 
Buchanan’s victory, interpreting it a reaffirmation of 
their party’s “safe” stance on African American 
bondage.  To celebrate their “GLORIOUS VICTORY,” 
Democrats planned a “TORCH-LIGHT PROCESSION” 
through the streets of Morgantown in Monongalia County.  The advertisement for the procession 
included a wood engraving of the three presidential candidates astride three different animals.  
James Buchanan, or “Buck,” represents the figure on the right riding a male, antlered deer, and 
winning “THE GREAT RACE OF 1856.”  The two other figures represent Buchanan’s defeated 
opponents.  The middle figure, John Frémont, rides a black horse, a reference to the denigrating 
“black” epithet opponents associated with Republicans.  Frémont also brandishes a whip, an 
instrument wielded by slaveholders to punish and compel slaves to work, and a tool that 
Republicans would use on white southerners if elected.  Millard Fillmore, the Know Nothing 
nominee, represents the figure on the left.  Fillmore sits atop a wolf in sheep’s clothing, 
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reflecting Democrats’ accusations that Know Nothings proclamations extolling their position on 
slavery rang hollow.  The dark lantern held by Fillmore signals his party’s clandestine suspicious 
nature.  As Democrats maintained, the “allied armies of Black Republicanism and Know-
Nothingism” could not be trusted on the issue of slavery; Virginians needed to rely on 
“indomitable and invincible” Democrats to protect African American bondage.57 
Though northwestern Democrats claimed victory in 1856, nearly all northwesterners felt 
that the election reaffirmed their fealty toward slavery.  “No portion of Virginia is more loyal to 
the institutions of the State,” exclaimed a Charleston newspaper, “or more devoted to the rights 
of the South, than the Trans-Alleghany.”  Practically all residents were “proslavery” in 
sentiment.58  The same newspaper supported legislation that would exempt slaveholders from 
paying taxes on one slave, allowing all Virginians the opportunity to purchase a slave and 
“rapidly diffuse slaves in every portion of the State.”  This would further generate a “strong pro-
slavery sentiment” throughout the region.59  At a Democratic meeting in Harrison County, 
residents denounced the “erroneous belief abroad that Virginia is not a unit on the question of 
slavery.”  The “West is now, and ever has been devoted” to slavery, and challenged anyone to 
contradict this assertion.60  Further, residents’ paternalistic arguments reflected their deep 
investment in slavery, maintaining that slaveholders provided “all his slaves with good food and 
raiment whether they earn it or not.”  Moreover, “slave labor” was much more “lenient” than 
Republicans’ “free labor.”61  Travelers in the region noted the prevalence of southern attitudes, 
notably the hostility directed toward those who hailed from northern states.  Upon visiting 
                                                          
57 [Unknown newspaper][n.d.] Monongalia County Scrapbook, A&M 1007, WVRHC.   
58 Kanawha Valley Star, August 31, 1858, 2.   
59 Kanawha Valley Star, September 15, 1857, 2.   
60 Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, November 12, 1858, 2.   
61 Fairmont True Virginian, April 19, 1856, 2.   
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Fairmont, one northerner “learned that northern men were not wanted in any part” of the 
Northwest.62   
These pronouncements defending slavery and Virginia left many northwestern 
Republicans dumbfounded.  For decades, Republicans exclaimed, eastern slaveholders had 
cowed and duped white northwesterners while retarding the state’s economic growth and 
undermining political equality.  Virginia’s “nigger interest have ever been hostile to the interests 
of the wool growers,” a Northwest Republican organ explained, “[and] has ever been dead 
against the iron interest of the country.”  Northwesterners’ representatives had done little to 
resolve this situation.  Instead of securing economic freedom and political equality, these 
politicians “have frequently gone into elaborate expositions to show that we…were all right on 
the peculiar question.”  By supporting Virginia’s slaveholding regime, northwesterners defended 
planters and elites who disregarded western interests.63  These “poor emasculated drivels of a 
Turkish harem” have been “bagged neck and heels for the use of the Sublime Porte at 
                                                          
62 C.R. Pomeroy to Waitman T. Wiley, 24 July 1857, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10, Folder 5, 
item 228, WVRHC.  Northwesterners’ southern attitude carried over into their interpretation of Preston Brooks’ 
caning of Charles Sumner.  Residents defended Brooks’ action, placing the blame on Sumner as “abolitionists 
recognized no gentle manly responsibility.”   Sumner possessed no privilege “to heap violent abuse upon another,” 
and deserved the punishment Brooks doled out.   “Every man who has the least spark of southern feeling” believed 
that Sumner’s “insulating language” constituted “sufficient provocation.”    Even the Republican Wellsburg Weekly 
Herald characterized Sumner’s denunciatory speech of Brooks’ relative, Senator Andrew Butler, as “severe, 
indisputably and no doubt its severity was not softened by anything in the manner of the Speaker.”   Such attitudes 
reflected continued animus toward abolitionists, and the alignment of northwesterners’ attitudes with that of other 
southerners.  Star of the Kanawha Valley, June 4, 1856, 2; Star of the Kanawha Valley, June 11, 1856, 2; Cooper’s 
Clarksburg Register, June 6, 1856, 2; Fairmont True Virginian, May 31, 1856, 2; and Wellsburg Weekly Herald, 
May 30, 1856, 2.             
63 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, April 2, 1858, 2.  The Intelligencer’s hostile stance toward slavery can be explained 
by the newspaper changing hands in 1856 when Archibald W. Campbell, along with John F. McDermot, purchased 
the paper.  Republicans’ financial support of the paper following the 1856 Presidential election, along with 
Campbell’s advocacy of freedom of the press, led to the publication of many antagonistic arguments directed against 
slavery, eastern Virginians, and those in western Virginia who supported the state’s slaveholding interests.  This 
change in proprietorship did not go unnoticed by other newspaper editors loyal to slavery.  The editor of the 
Fairmont True Virginian denounced the work of Campbell who “has been pouring out some of the vials of his Black 
Republicanism upon us.”  Fairmont True Virginian, November 7, 1857, 2.  William Cooper, the editor of the 
Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, labeled Campbell a “nigger stealer” and that “Woolly Filthy in Wheeling.” Cooper’s 
Clarksburg Register, August 20, 1858, 2.      
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Richmond,” the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer lamented.64  Cowed into submission by the “Slave 
Power,” northwestern representatives secured little for their constituents as “all legislation, great 
and small” supported eastern Virginia.65  
 No piece of legislation embodied northwesterners’ submission to eastern slaveholders 
than the state’s ad valorem tax, Republicans argued.  While Virginia taxed all forms of private 
property ad valorem, slaves younger than twelve were exempt while the state capped the tax on 
those twelve and older at $300.  The increasing value of slaves in Virginia now made this policy 
especially onerous and objectionable to nonslaveholders, Republicans alleged.66  Eastern 
Virginians implemented these tax exemptions “to encourage and foster slavery,” shielding 
slaveholders from burdensome taxes while the “non-slaveholder and laboring white man” paid 
the full allotment of taxes.67  “Equality in taxation is what we want, be the taxes high or low,” 
demanded Republicans, “and anything else is both degrading and oppressive.”68  But why had so 
few residents publicly condemned this policy or the “Slave Power” in Richmond?  “Were it not 
that the fear of being called ‘abolitionists’ deters you, you would have repudiated this reign on 
iniquity long ago,” Republicans claimed.  But the “spell of enchantment” placed on 
northwesterners by eastern slaveholders convinced them that all white Virginians possessed 
similar interests.  Republicans wanted to break that spell.69          
Chief among Republicans’ attempts to defeat the “Slave Power” was emphasizing the 
benefits of “free labor.”  Slavery bred “vice and slothfulness” wherever it expanded, endangering 
                                                          
64 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, January 15, 1858, 2.   
65 Pruntytown Visitor, republished in Daily Intelligencer, April 23, 1860, 1.   
66 Tarter, Grandees of Government, 149-150 and 413, n. 25.  Tarter estimates that the selling of Virginia slaves to 
southern markets represented the Commonwealth’s top commodity by the end of the 1850s. 
67 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, May 11, 1860, 2 and Wellsburg Weekly Herald, September 18, 1857, 2.   
68 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, February 24, 1860, 2.   
69 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, May 11, 1860, 2.   
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the Northwest’s “free laboring classes.”70  But further economic decay, emigration, and poor 
work habits could be prevented if Virginia would “commit the industrial interests of the State to 
intelligent Anglo-Saxon labor.”71  Western Virginia’s abundant natural resources and burgeoning 
industries required “free labor” for the region to achieve its full economic potential.  The 
salubrious effects of “free labor” were clear at the Belmont Nail Works, the second largest nail 
factory in Wheeling and location of one of two blast furnaces in the city.72  The “enlightened and 
intelligent appearance of the operatives, from the highest to the lowest in station” provided clear 
evidence that “free labor” benefited all white workers regardless of status.  Further, the generous 
wages these employees earned provided clear evidence that “free labor” could thrive in 
northwestern Virginia.73   
Embracing “free labor” would strengthen northwestern laborers and transform many of 
them to stalwart Republicans.  But in order to defeat the “Slave Power,” northwesterners needed 
to appreciate the power and operations of this conspiratorial cabal.  For decades, eastern 
Virginians had deemed “the price of niggers the rule by which to determine any question of State 
policy.”74  What were the results of this policy?  “Free speech is suppressed and freedom of the 
press abridged by the populace, where” such words “infringe[d] upon the sacredness of slavery.”  
“Mob law” reigned, as northwesterners intimidated and lashed out in violence against those 
opposed to slavery.75  “[C]otton, tobacco, and niggers” represented the state’s prevailing 
interests.76  But Republicans identified a silver lining.  The Northwest’s declining slave 
                                                          
70 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, February 5, 1858, 2.   
71 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, April 13, 1857, 2.   
72 Ohio County Public Library, “The Belmont Nail Works, Wheeling, WV,” Ohio County Public Library 
[http://www.ohiocountylibrary.org/wheeling-history/the-belmont-nail-works-wheeling-wv/2707][accessed 3 June 
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73 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, August 5, 1857, 2.   
74 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, September 15, 1857, 2.   
75 Wellsburg Weekly Herald, January 27, 1860, 2.   
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population forecasted the impending collapse of the “Slave Power.”  Boosterism literature for 
Parkersburg extolled the city’s commercial advantages while noting that “slavery in North 
Western Virginia is an institution existing only in name.”  Indeed, “free white labor is the 
productive power of the region” and immigrants would not compete with African American 
slaves.77   The Northwest’s declining slave population, an “inexorable” trend, would continue 
unabated regardless of “impotent protests and pseudo indignation resolutions” that claimed 
northwesterners’ fealty toward slavery.  A waning slave population would weaken residents’ 
support for slavery and ultimately decrease the dominion of the “Slave Power.”  Freed from 
political bondage, northwestern residents “true interests” with the “border free states” would 
become realized.78 
Republicans’ optimistic outlook, though, clashed with reality.  Dissatisfaction with the 
tax exemptions enjoyed by slaveholders existed and many residents demanded a resolution.  But 
other political or constitutional issues had been resolved through the 1851 Constitution.  
“Western Virginia acquired great political power” with “the adoption of the new Constitution,” 
the Kanawha Valley Star declared, removing the “feeling of political inequality” that had 
characterized intrastate sectional relations.  Former opponents of slavery “now argue that African 
slavery…is a social, moral and political blessing,” the newspaper averred, and those who had 
“desired a division of the State” had recanted their apostasy.  The editor charged that a 
“hallucination” impaired Virginia Republicans from acknowledging these new developments.  
Whether “Whigs, Know-Nothings, or Democrats,” northwesterners are “thoroughly imbued with 
States Rights’ principles and are warmly attached to…the welfare of Virginia and the interests of 
                                                          
77 Benjamin Henry Latrobe, Notices of Parkersburg, Virginia, as it is in July, 1860 (Baltimore: John W. Woods, 
1860), 12.   
78 Daily Intelligencer, January 11, 1860, 2.   
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the South,” he concluded.  The Northwest’s political fissures that Republicans had hoped to 
exploit had been closed and the bonds between residents strengthened by Virginia’s proslavery 
and democratic constitution.79               
More political realities became manifest to Republicans during the 1859 gubernatorial 
election.  Democrats and Oppositionists (a mixture of alienated Democrats, Know Nothings, and 
Whigs) fielded candidates for the state’s third popularly-elected gubernatorial contest; no 
Republican ran for office.  Oppositionists, meeting in Richmond in February 1859, nominated 
Bedford County attorney and planter William L. Goggin for governor and Monongalia County 
lawyer and slaveholder Waitman T. Willey for lieutenant governor.80  One northwestern 
Oppositionist exclaimed that Willey’s nomination represented an “honor conferred…upon our 
section of the State and…County.”81  While Oppositionists statewide applauded their party’s 
ticket, Democrats faced internal discord. 
Following the death of Richmond Enquirer editor and state Democratic leader Thomas 
Ritchie in 1854, a power vacuum emerged in the Virginia Democratic Party.  Governor Henry A. 
Wise and Senator R.M.T. Hunter both vied for the mantle of Democratic standard-bearer, 
generating an internecine conflict within their party.  Hunterites supported Rockbridge County 
slaveholder and newspaper editor John Letcher while Wise and his backers opposed Letcher 
because of his endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet in 1847.82  Because Letcher believed that 
                                                          
79 Kanawha Valley Star, September 22, 1857, 2.  [emphasis in original] 
80 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Southern Revenue District, Bedford, Virginia; Roll: M653_1335; Page: 664; 
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“Western Virginia would be better off without than with negroes,” a northwestern newspaper 
observed, “he is not fit for a Governor.”83  Fairmont lawyer Francis H. Pierpont believed that 
“the ‘negroocracy’ of Virginia” advanced these arguments “as cogent reasons why Letcher 
should be defeated.”84  Though Letcher secured the party’s nomination in December 1858, his 
previous stance on slavery threatened to derail his candidacy.85 
Most northwestern Democrats supported Letcher, dismissing his endorsement of the 
Ruffner Pamphlet and highlighting his work in the previous constitutional convention.  At a 
Democratic meeting in Harrison County, Democrats rejected eastern Virginians’ accusations that 
Letcher was “unsafe” on slavery.  Such accusations, which northwestern Democrats considered 
“unjust” and “calculated to excite a sectional feeling,” generated the “erroneous belief abroad 
that Virginia is not a unit on the question of slavery.”  Letcher’s “public life” and slaveholding 
status exhibited his “fealty to the Democratic party and the South,” evidence that should placate 
eastern Virginians.  Further, his “manly course” during the previous constitutional convention 
helped secure a democratic and proslavery constitution.  Letcher was “now, and ever has been 
devoted” to the “‘peculiar institution.”86 
In an effort to boost his candidacy and quiet critics, Letcher penned an open letter where 
he once again abnegated his support of the Ruffner Pamphlet (something he had already done in 
1850) and extolled his soundness on the issue of slavery.  An “owner of slave property, by 
purchase and not inheritance,” Letcher denied ever considering slavery a moral blight.  He 
recanted his “erroneous” conclusions concerning slavery’s detrimental political and economic 
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influences, condemned the “exceptional” arguments contained in the final version of the Ruffner 
Pamphlet, and candidly “acknowledged my error” in supporting its publication.  Letcher’s public 
apology revealed the deepening importance of slavery in the post-convention years.  Since 1851, 
the slavery question “has been much better understood, not only in Virginia, but throughout the 
South” as slavery “has been discussed with an ability never before expended upon it.”87  The 
ratification of the new constitution deepened residents’ participation in the “politics of slavery” 
because the constitution placed slavery and whiteness at the center of all political discussions, a 
“revolution of public sentiment” according to Letcher.  Any weakness or equivocation exhibited 
by politicians of any stripes concerning slavery or whiteness elicited censure and condemnation 
from residents across the state for their political independence and liberty hung in the balance.   
Oppositionists doubted Letcher’s sincerity.  At their nominating convention in Richmond 
in early February 1859, Oppositionists denounced Letcher’s “willingness to divide this ancient 
Commonwealth, for the purpose of exterminating slavery” in western Virginia.88  Oppositionists 
convening in Norfolk in January 1859 argued that Letcher’s nomination “threatens the ultimate, 
if not speedy overthrow of African slavery.”  His support of the Ruffner Pamphlet, a document 
containing “sentiments more foully abolition than ever fell from the lips” of northern 
abolitionists, revealed Letcher’s true character.89  Letcher’s endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet 
coincided with the establishment of a “powerful party” that launches the “most bitter and 
determined assaults upon our institutions.”  This former endorsee of the Ruffner Pamphlet “now 
demands the suffrages of Virginia slaveholders for the office of their Chief Magistrate, the 
                                                          
87 Quoted in To the People of Virginia!  John Letcher and his Antecedents.  Read and Circulate.  (Richmond: Whig 
Book and Job Office, 1859), 6-7.   
88 Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, February 15, 1859, 2.     
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conservator of their sectional rights, and guardian of their peculiar institution!”90  Protecting 
slavery required Virginians to move beyond party loyalty and prioritize the cornerstone of their 
state’s political foundation.  Though “party has ties and obligations,” Oppositionists reminded 
Virginians that “state and sections had ties and obligations of a far higher, stronger, and a more 
sacred character.”  Norfolk Oppositionists encouraged all Virginians who supported slavery to 
endorse Goggin and defeat Letcher.91   
This proslavery rhetoric found a receptive audience in the Northwest.  Northwestern 
Oppositionists rhetorically questioned how residents could “conscientiously and patriotically 
vote for a man…who was…a foul-mouthed Abolitionist a few years ago.”92  Letcher’s 
endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet manifested his “unsoundness on the slavery question, and 
his consequent unfitness for” governor.93  Indeed, Letcher’s alleged “abolitionism” was “killing 
him in every slave district” in eastern Virginia, an Oppositionist newspaper charged, forcing him 
to focus his campaign west of the Blue Ridge.  But because slavery concerned all Virginians, 
Oppositionists maintained Letcher’s prospects in the Shenandoah Valley, Southwest, and 
Northwest were equally as fleeting.94  Letcher’s abolitionism was so apparent that Oppositionists 
predicted that he would receive the “anti-slavery vote in Northern and Northwestern Virginia 
bordering on Pennsylvania and Ohio.”95         
While Oppositionists painted Letcher as “unsound” on slavery, their candidates burnished 
their proslavery credentials.  In a speech in Wheeling, Willey stated his continued belief in the 
“principles that which had been enunciated at Richmond” in 1851, specifically that democratic 
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reform and increased protection for slavery secured the “best interests of the State and the 
nation.”  Willey considered this the “correct” position for all Virginians across the state.96  
Oppositionists considered Willey’s position on slavery as in “perfect propriety” with the “most 
rabid pro-slavery man in Eastern Virginia.”97  Indeed, Willey was “as true a Virginian, and as 
loyal a friend of slavery, and as staunch a Southern man, in all his impulses, principles, and 
purposes” as any Virginian east of the Blue Ridge.98  Goggin’s record on slavery was “fair and 
untarnished” and his “soundness on [slavery] had never been called in controversy.”99  Banker 
and businessman Chester D. Hubbard characterized Goggin’s speech in Wheeling as “very 
effective” and “gained [him] many friends,” although Republicans denounced him because of his 
“slavery proclivities.”  Hubbard dismissed Republicans’ opinion of Goggin, characterizing the 
party as “only a corporal guard at best and more impracticable than the Democrats.”  Though the 
Republican Party persisted in the Northwest, its incremental growth and failure to field 
candidates or win numerous legislative seats convinced Hubbard and other northwesterners’ that 
Goggin’s proslavery speech, not Republicans’ platform, defined Virginia politics.100   
Slavery’s increasing importance to Virginia’s electoral politics once again became 
manifest.  Oppositionists agreed with Letcher’s assessment of the post-1851 years, arguing that 
the 1851 Constitution solidified slavery’s centrality to politics and white men’s political 
independence.  “Slavery or anti-slavery,” an issue that held “so little interest in our midst a few 
years since, has grown in consequence, in magnitude, [and] in momentousness,” Oppositionists 
declared.  Now, the “very soul and centre of our social compact and being” centered on African 
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American bondage.101  Oppositionists and Democrats declared that their candidate and ideology 
protected slavery, secured slaveholders’ rights, and defended whiteness for all white Virginians.  
These assertions were more than political rhetoric; they constituted the ruling political paradigm.  
Republicans witnessing the election unfold mocked this spectacle of political 
cannibalization.  The contest, which “hinge[d] on the everlasting nigger question,” provided 
residents the choice of electing “tweedle-dum” or “tweedle-dee” to carry on the mission of the 
“ultra niggerites.”102  Democrats’ and Oppositionists’ monomania concerning slavery reflected 
Virginians’ overwhelming interest in the peculiar institution, a dynamic Republicans lamented.  
“Its politics—its democracy—its constitutionalism,” the Republican Wheeling Daily 
Intelligencer groaned, “and its [sic] all hangs and swings upon the idea of a universal nigger 
dominion.”103  Those opposed to this political dynamic felt trapped.  Northwestern political 
organs were “either too hopelessly bigoted or too fearful of being called Black Republican” to 
challenge this ruling political paradigm, the Wellsburg Weekly Herald charged.104  Anyone 
opposed to the prevailing “nigger interest” would be labeled an “abolitionist,” “traitor,” or 
“conspirator” by Democrats and Oppositionists.105  Though Republicans suggested that the 
“politics of slavery” had “played out” in the Northwest, they were mistaken; slavery dominated 
the gubernatorial contest.106   
Letcher won the contest by approximately five thousand votes.  This margin represented 
four thousand fewer votes than what Wise received in 1855, a result some Democratic partisans 
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attributed to Letcher’s former “free soil proclivities.”107  The slim margin also evoked concern 
from Democrats about their waning hegemony over state affairs.  William Link argues that the 
gubernatorial contest, compounded with Democratic congressional losses in June 1859, 
“provided…evidence of the erosion of Democratic domination.”   Northwestern residents 
expressed “an anti-Democratic tradition” that opposed Democrats’ proslavery platform and 
proslavery politics in general, he maintains.  This waning Democratic support, Link contends, 
increased larger intrastate tensions concerning African American bondage and provided an 
opening for Republicans to exploit.108 
Anti-Democratic politics in the Northwest, though, did not represent antislavery politics.  
The 1859 gubernatorial contest featured two proslavery candidates and passionate debates 
among partisans on both sides who extolled their party’s sound position on slavery.  Much to 
Republicans’ chagrin, the election failed to show residents’ waning fealty toward slavery; rather, 
the election reaffirmed slavery’s centrality to politics and residents’ worldview.  Further, the 
continued viability of a second party in the Northwest reflected a continuation of politics that had 
commenced during the 1820s and 1830s.  The establishment of these two parties also 
inaugurated the “politics of slavery,” and this brand of southern politics continued to dominate 
the political landscape.  Finally, the gubernatorial election confirmed residents’ political 
affiliation.  Traditional Democratic counties, such as Monongalia, Preston, Harrison, and Marion 
returned majorities for Letcher; Marshall, Ohio, Kanawha, and Wood, all Whiggish counties, 
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supported Goggin.109  The electoral patterns exhibited in the 1859 gubernatorial election 
confirmed Oppositionists’ observation: slavery dominated politics.     
 Slavery dominated northwesterners’ political worldview and took on greater importance 
in the wake of John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry on October 16, 1859.  Brown’s audacious 
plan stoked fears among slaveholding Virginians about their nonslaveholding neighbors’ fealty, 
notably those along the state’s northern and western borders.  But northwesterners’ condemned 
the raid, labeling Brown a northern abolitionist radical and a possible harbinger of future conflict 
over slavery.  A Parkersburg resident characterized the raid as “evidence of the intense 
fanaticism which exists among some persons on the subject of slavery.”  “[J]ustice” would be 
brought to bear on the “ringleaders” of this raid, a Parkersburg newspaper predicted, as they 
would “scarcely escape hanging.”110  Preston County locomotive engineer Patrick Plummer 
considered the “insurrection” the work of “Black Republicans,” but noted that Brown met his 
fate at the gallows.111  Lewis County attorney Joseph Spalding supported Governor Wise’s 
aggressive response to Brown’s raid, applauding his stance despite the “threats or imprecations” 
from the “friends and sympathizers of these blood stained emissaries of Black 
Republicanism.”112  The Republican Wheeling Daily Intelligencer also condemned this 
“suicidal” attack from a “fanatical renegade.”113  But the raid could turn public opinion in favor 
of colonization, Virginia Republicans hoped.  A “large and degraded class of humanity” resided 
within Virginia and appeared poised to revolt against white Virginians, Republicans erroneously 
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speculated.  Much like San Domingo and Southampton, Harpers Ferry should remind Virginians 
that an “irruption” threatened to decimate society.114                     
This “irruption” could be prevented, Virginia Republicans maintained, by electing 
Abraham Lincoln for president in November 1860.  For decades, the national government had 
operated like a “machine for the propagation of the institution of slavery” by increasing the 
number of slaves and augmenting slaveholders’ power while the 1851 Constitution induced 
Virginians into “ten years sleep” by providing democratic reforms but enslaving white men.115  
But Lincoln would prohibit the extension of slavery into the territories, protect the interests of 
white laborers, and defeat the national “Slave Power.”  And as the national “Slave Power” 
withered, the Virginia “Slave Power” would weaken, too.  Virginia Republicans believed that his 
election would accelerate the party’s growth.  As one national Republican predicted, Lincoln’s 
“triumph…would give the cause of Free Soil a powerful propulsion” in the Old Dominion and 
“in all the border slave states.”  In a few years, Virginia Republicans could secure a “free soil 
balance of power” over state politics that would soon liberate Virginia from the “incubus” of 
slavery.  White Virginians would finally be freed from the “Slave Power.”116 
Republicans envisioned a whole sequence of political and social changes that would flow 
from Lincoln’s victory.  The “unequal and unfair operation of pro-slavery legislation upon 
Western Virginia” would be stymied, specifically the constitutional provision exempting full 
taxation on slaves and the continued use of the “mixed basis” to determine state Senate 
apportionment.117  The “gradual emancipation sentiment” that had long existed among residents 
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would soon “triumph.”  Slavery’s demise in the Northwest manifested the “order of nature” and 
“fate itself,” finally freeing residents to pursue closer relations with their northern neighbors.118  
The Northwest’s “free laboring white men” would experience liberation from the state’s 
slaveholding “Olegarchy.”  For decades, this slaveholding cabal “aim[ed] for the destruction of 
all the industrial interests of Western Virginia,” sanctioned the construction of “railroad and 
other public improvements” east of the Blue Ridge, and considered white northwesterners “more 
subservient to their interest and dictation than the degraded African.”  The “sacred guarantees of 
Constitutional liberties” extended to white northwesterners in exchange for their political 
submission only strengthened this “Olegarchy.”119  The “mighty movement” of Republicanism 
would soon instigate a “radical change in our organic laws” that would liberate white 
northwesterners and destroy the “Slave Power.”120 
Though the confidence expressed by Republicans ran counter to political developments 
in the Northwest over the previous decades, Republicans believed they could politicize the 
intrastate animosity that existed in the state.  But Republicans’ sanguine outlook contained 
numerous flaws.  Republicans often exaggerated their numerical strength, admitting that the 
majority of their strength, “with few exceptions, reside in the Panhandle” and the “great bulk of 
them in [Wheeling].”121  Taylor County farmer Fabricius A. Cather attended a “Republican pole-
raising” in late September 1860 but noticed the lackluster attendance, noting “[n]ot a very large 
turnout” for this Republican gathering.122  John G. Jacob, editor of the Republican Wellsburg 
Weekly Herald, understood the party’s challenge to building a grassroots movement.  Jacob 
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“[e]ncourage[d]…outsiders…to break through the shackles” while Virginia Republicans “put in 
an occasional modest lick.”123  Jacob blamed the epithet “Black Republicanism” for suppressing 
Republican membership, finding it “difficult to induce men to subscribe their names” to 
Republican organs.124   
Republicans also faced difficulties in overcoming northwestern residents’ established 
political affiliations.  For over three decades, Democrats, Whigs, Americans, or Oppositionists 
courted voters with well-defined and accepted ideological platforms based on protecting slavery 
and whiteness.  Attracting an electorate would be difficult for Republicans, notably because of 
the party’s association with some avowed antislavery politicians and abolitionists.  As one 
Democratic newspaper declared, Virginia Republicans worked with “that greasy, manumitted 
African, Fred Douglas,” a relationship that would compel its members to support racial 
equality.125  Though Republicans claimed to protect the interests of white men through “free 
labor” and “free soil,” northwestern residents believed that protecting slavery offered the best 
defense of whiteness.  Republican doctrines, conversely, appeared to threaten whiteness.     
The 1860 presidential election demonstrated northwesterners’ concern for protecting 
slavery and whiteness.  Four candidates vied for the White House, including two Democrats.  
Southern Democrats had walked out of the national convention after northern delegates refused 
to support a plank that would have protected slave property in all territories.  The remaining 
Democrats nominated Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas.  Douglas, an exponent of “popular 
sovereignty” in the territories, represented the only nomine who could prevent the “Black 
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Republicans” from destroying the Union, a Fairmont supporter declared.126  Though “[s]outhern 
papers” questioned “Douglas’ peculiar dogma,” the Little Giant’s doctrine of “popular 
sovereignty” provided stability and security for slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike.  
Douglas’ “popular sovereignty” also separated him from the notorious “free-soil party” that 
sought slavery’s extinction.127   
Douglas’ national appeal made him a more viable candidate than his Democratic 
counterpart, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.  Douglas Democrats maintained that 
Breckinridge represented the “Seceders” and supported a “sectional party” that would repel 
northern voters.128  Wheeling banker Chester D. Hubbard considered Douglas the “stronger” 
Democratic candidate “in this part of the state,” predicting that the Illinois Senator would “poll 
two votes to his [Breckinridge] one.”129  Hubbard was sanguine about Douglas’ electability 
because his platform protected white men’s interests.  Following a Douglas rally, white laborers 
paraded the streets of Wheeling while they displayed their trade tools.  The “bricklayer with his 
trowel and a wheelbarrow full of bricks, the blacksmith with his hammer and tongs, [and] the 
carpenter with his saw and adze” endorsed Douglas because unlike his opponents, the Little 
Giant championed the interests of white men.130 
 Vice President John C. Breckinridge was the other Democratic nominee.  Breckinridge 
supporters characterized Republicans and their other opponents as unsound on slavery, the 
seminal issue of the election.  Republicans “favor[ed]…negro equality,” Breckinridge partisans 
declared, and “wanted to free all the negroes who would come in competition with the white 
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laborer, and by working for low wages make hard times among the white folks.”  The 
“Republican Party is not the white man’s party” while Breckinridge “was the true friend of the 
laboring white man.”  Breckinridge supporters considered Douglas’ doctrine of popular 
sovereignty “as not much better than the Lincoln doctrine in regard to the territories.”  
Northerners’ alleged superior mobility meant that they “could gather their little dunnage in a 
bandana handkerchief and with a few clocks…hurry into a new territory and make a patent free 
state in three months.”  Popular sovereignty forecasted doom for white southerners, Breckinridge 
Democrats argued.  Douglas’ plan amounted to southern submission to northerners; white 
southerners who cherished their constitutional rights to take their property into the territories 
needed to endorse Breckinridge.131 
Though Breckinridge enjoyed widespread support throughout the Deep South, his 
prospects in western Virginia were equally encouraging.  One Barbour County resident argued 
that the “Northwest is for Breckinridge & Lane.”  So confident was this resident in 
Breckinridge’s prospects that he chastised eastern Virginians for their lukewarm support for him.  
“Are they all teeming Free Soilers” east of the Blue Ridge?  “[I]f so, let them go, as the 
Northwest has more than once saved the Democratic party.”132  Western Virginians needed to 
endorse Breckinridge because his platform championed African American bondage, the 
wellspring of white men’s political independence.  “Negro slavery protects the white laborers’ 
interests,” maintained one western Virginia Breckinridge organ, as slavery placed the “white 
laborer in the south…upon a perfect equality with his employer.”  A Republican victory would 
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upset that hierarchy.  Only a Breckinridge victory could prevent that calamity from unfolding, a 
dire situation for all white Virginians.133             
 Former Whigs continued to be a potent political force in 1860, reorganizing as the 
Constitutional Union Party and nominating Tennessean John Bell for president and 
Massachusetts politician Edward Everett for vice president.  Bell and his supporters proclaimed 
that the Constitution contained the remedy for the ills that afflicted the republic.  The rights of 
slaveholders, Constitutional Unionists declared, were safer in the Union and under the 
Constitution where their grievances could be redressed and the power of the Constitution 
compelled northerners to respect southerners’ constitutional rights.  This message found wide 
acceptance in the Northwest.  Taylor County newspaper editor Daniel S. Morris “expect[ed] to 
fight hard for Bell and Everett,” while Constitutional Unionists in Upshur County reported that 
“Bell and Everett poles are going up all over the [c]ounty.”134  Wheeling insurance agent 
Nathaniel C. Arthur noted that the “Bell & Everett stock” was “on the increase here and is 
increasing everywhere.”135   
 Bell’s popularity reflected white northwesterners’ belief that Bell, unlike his opponents, 
provided white northwesterners the greatest economic and political security.  Kanawha County 
slaveholder George W. Summers warned northwesterners that a Breckinridge administration 
would reopen the African slave trade, a practice that “would ruin the slave interests of 
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Virginia.”136  Wheeling lawyer and slaveholder A.B. Caldwell “convict[ed] the Republican Party 
of Abolitionism and Sectionalism,” noting the presence of few southern Republicans.  Without a 
southern wing, he inferred, northern Republicans could declare war on slavery.137  Randolph 
County lawyer and slaveholder David Goff, a Bell supporter, believed the contest to be between 
“Bell & Lincoln.”  The “whole south should unite…in order to defeat black republicans.”138  In 
Wheeling, Waitman Willey emphasized the danger of a Republican president.  Willey predicted 
“hordes of free negroes running loose here amongst us freemen, and competing in labor with our 
honest artizans.”139  During a meeting, Constitutional Unionists declared their nominee’s 
“allegiance to support [southern] institutions…and [that] the North and the Republican party” 
should not meddle in southern affairs.  White southerners could rest assured that Bell would 
secure their interests.140  Such fealty toward the Constitution and to slavery provided “every 
assurance” to Chester Hubbard that Bell would carry Virginia.141   
Virginia Republicans attempted to engage in the “politics of slavery” but with mixed 
results.  Republicans championed “loyalty to party, loyalty to State, [and] loyalty to Southern 
institutions,” uttering “not a single word in derogation of such a sentiment.”  Yet many 
Republicans also considered this unquestioned loyalty “political suicide” and characteristic of 
the “empty ideas of Southern society.”142  In a Republican meeting in Hancock County, 
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Republicans stressed that “we are loyal to the constitution and laws of our own state…and 
ready…to defend our institutions and soil from invasion of fanatics.”  Further, northwestern 
Republicans’ “fealty and kindness to the State of Virginia and to our Eastern brethren” was 
unmatched.  But these Republicans also condemned the “Constitutional wrongs and Legislative 
enactments of this Commonwealth,” labeling them a “stain” on the state’s dignified history.  
Republicans’ pronouncements concerning slavery obfuscated their message of “free labor” and 
“free soil,” casting further doubt about their party’s political motives.143    
While Republicans struggled to navigate “politics of slavery,” they emphasized their 
overwhelming concern for whiteness, an important interest for white northwestern laborers.  
Republicans manifested their advocacy of whiteness by holding rallies and meetings at 
northwestern industries, notably iron mills.  This appropriation of the Northwest’s industrial 
context held deep political meaning.  Since the 1820s and 1830s, courthouses represented the 
locus and projection of state power and white men’s political independence and liberty.144  Both 
Democrats and Whigs appropriated the courthouse during election season to manifest their 
party’s defense of whiteness and white men’s political privileges.  Republicans envisaged the 
Northwest’s industries commanding the same political and cultural significance as the 
courthouse.  Labor generated self-worth, dignity, and independence in white men, important 
virtues that carried over into politics.  The state no longer represented the source of political 
independence for white men, generating greater distance between the laborer and the values and 
institutions that shaped the state.  The “four hundred people” in attendance at a Republican 
meeting at La Belle Rolling Mill in Wheeling celebrated more than the Republican ticket or the 
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employment provided by the mill; they manifested their political independence.  These attendees 
“will be found voting the glorious Republican ticket,” the Daily Intelligencer reported, as these 
men considered labor the wellspring of their political independence.145  
Virginia Republicans understood the challenges they faced heading into the presidential 
election.  To mobilize northwestern voters, Republicans encouraged the formation of Wide 
Awake organizations and held numerous pole raisings throughout the region.  Republicans hoped 
that these civic functions would “stir up a spirit of enthusiasm and secure a full turn out of the 
Republican strengthen of the city at the election.”146  Wheeling Germans often enrolled as Wide 
Awakes, a paramilitary organization that courted young voters and encouraged political 
participation.147  Members held the proceedings and adopted a Constitution in German, often 
inviting the “German public…to attend” these gatherings.148  Republicans also held pole raisings 
throughout the region and extended invitations to “any of the friends of Lincoln.”  The 
attendance of Republican neophytes during these gatherings offered a clear signal to 
northwestern Republicans of their party’s ascendency and popularity.149    
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On the election’s eve, Republicans expressed optimism about their electoral chances in 
the Northwest.  Many Republicans appeared “in good spirits” as they looked ahead toward a 
“bright, political sky before them.”150  Hancock County farmer Abraham Pittenger remarked that 
the “Rail Splitter has lots of friends here.”151  Republicans received further encouragement with 
news that Francis Pierpont was “stirring up the sovereigns in the mountain counties,” showing 
residents slaveholders’ tax receipts and the exemptions the state provided them.152  As 
Republicans argued during their state convention in Wheeling, the “non-Slaveholding farmers, 
mechanics and workingmen of Western Virginia” had been “oppressed and weighed down with 
taxation for the benefit of Eastern Virginia Slave capitalists.”  But Lincoln’s election would 
represent a watershed moment in the state’s history.153  “The great cause of free labor, free 
speech, and free homesteads” would encourage northwesterners to elect Abraham Lincoln, the 
“champion of all their best hopes.”154 
Even if Lincoln failed to carry Virginia, the votes northwesterners cast for him would 
represent a stinging rebuke to eastern slaveholders.  Northwesterners “should vote for Lincoln 
and Hamlin…because they have been told in some quarters that they would not be allowed to 
vote that ticket.”  Such a denial fed Republicans’ arguments that the “Slave Power” despised and 
manipulated democracy and would prevent white men from choosing the candidate of their 
choice.  “The right to vote as a man pleases is the very corner stone of free institutions,” 
Republicans declared, and a vote for Lincoln would illustrate northwesterners’ “independence” 
and “their abhorrence of the treasonable sentiments of the secession democracy.”  Ballot by 
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ballot, Republicans would defeat the “Slave Power” and achieve political liberation for white 
northwesterners.155 
The election returns demonstrated that Republicans still operated on the Northwest’s 
political margins.  Constitutional Union candidate John Bell narrowly carried the state over 
Democrat John C. Breckinridge by a few hundred votes.  Lincoln failed to win the state or a 
single county, even in the supposed fertile soil of the Northwest or northern panhandle.  While 
Republicans captured the White House, his vote total in Virginia illustrated his party’s limited 
appeal.  Lincoln received 1,929 votes or approximately 1.2% of all ballots cast statewide; both 
the aggregate and the percentage represented increases from Frémont’s candidacy four years 
earlier.156  Yet Republicans failed to win a single county, even though Democrats offered a split 
ticket.  Lincoln performed well in Hancock and Brooke counties; both counties, though, 
supported Breckinridge.  In Ohio County, Lincoln finished just ahead of Douglas but still two 
hundred votes short of Breckinridge and five hundred votes behind Bell.157  What accounts for 
these voting patterns and Republicans’ continued poor showing?     
Republicans pinpointed the continued operation of the viva voce method of balloting but 
those prevented from voting for Lincoln would not have been enough to swing a count in his 
favor.  Entrenched political affiliations continued to frustrate Republicans who failed to dislodge 
residents from their party loyalties.  Traditionally Democratic counties once again provided 
important majorities for Breckinridge or Douglas, with Brooke, Hancock, Harrison, Lewis, 
Marion, and Preston counties all supporting the former.  Monongalia County was one of the few 
across the state that Douglas carried.  Over fifty-percent of northwestern voters supported 
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Democratic candidates.158  Whiggish northwestern counties, including Kanawha, Marshall, and 
Ohio, supported Bell.159  These partisan affiliations had remained relatively stable since the 
1820s, an important roadblock Republicans failed to remove prior to the election.   
The campaign revealed residents’ continued deep engagement in the “politics of slavery.”  
Whiteness and the protection of slavery represented the central issues of the election and all four 
parties cast their candidate as the “safest” choice for voters.  Democrats and Constitutional 
Unionists experienced little difficulty in this political practice; Republicans, though, found it 
difficult to navigate the latter.  While Republicans cast their party as the “white man’s party,” 
their membership included some antislavery politicians and even a few abolitionists.  How could 
a party associated with such “radicals” truly protect white Virginians’ interests?  Republicans, 
unable to provide a sufficient answer for such a question, failed to significantly increase its 
northwestern membership.  No party or politician in Virginia could succeed without finding the 
right answer to this question.   
Northwesterners’ expressed disappointment with Lincoln’s election but recognized that 
his administration could do little to interfere with African American bondage.  Fairmont Clerk of 
the Circuit Court Thomas G. Watson “acknowledge[d] the election of Lincoln…but it goes hard” 
among his Marion County neighbors.160  Chester Hubbard maintained that “Mr. Lincoln can not 
move a step…and will be checkmated at every turn” if he attempted to interfere with slavery in 
Virginia or across the South.  If Lincoln “stands by the Constitution with all its compromises and 
enforces the laws,” Virginia’s institutions would be secured.161  Monongalia farmer William 
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Price, who, though he opposed Lincoln’s election “with all my might and advocated that of Bell 
as strenuous,” found no constitutional grievance with Lincoln “until he commits some 
unconstitutional act.”162  At a meeting in Triadelphia, residents “regret[ted] his success” and 
“emphatically denounce the cardinal principles of the party which elevated him to power,” but 
considered Lincoln’s election as “prescribed by law.”  Northwesterners would accept his 
administration until he “clearly violates their constitutional rights.”163  Though many 
northwesterners deplored Lincoln’s election, most believed that the Constitution and the federal 
government’s system of checks and balances would restrain his administration from meddling 
with Virginia’s peculiar institution.  Slavery in Virginia would continue to thrive under the Stars 
and Stripes.   
Virginia Republicans celebrated Lincoln’s election, interpreting it as a transformative 
moment in Virginia politics.  “The aristocracy of niggerdom will no longer be dominant,” the 
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer exclaimed.  Northwestern voters would no longer be shackled to 
the Richmond “Slave Power,” subordinating their interests to those of “Eastern Virginia’s nigger 
interest.”  Residents would be unafraid to elect officials “for their soundness on our own 
interests” rather than “being selected for their soundness on the nigger.”164  And with 
“Republicanism…the growing element…in Western Virginia,” the political calculus in the state 
would never be the same.  Soon, Republicans would inaugurate a true ad valorem tax, commence 
construction on internal improvements west of the Blue Ridge, achieve equal representation in 
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both state houses, and unleash the economic power of western Virginia.  These changes in state 
and constitutional policies would hasten the collapse of the Virginia “Slave Power.”165   
While northwesterners formulated two different interpretations concerning Lincoln’s 
election, other white southerners interpreted his election as the death knell of the Union.  South 
Carolina seceded in the wake of Lincoln’s election, with Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, and Texas following the Palmetto State’s action in January and February 1861.  The 
dissolution of the Union and the subsequent formation of the Confederate States of America 
initiated meetings and debates across the Northwest concerning Virginia’s future.  Most 
meetings evinced residents’ determination to resist secession and remain in the Union.  Hancock 
County residents maintained that they “can remain loyal to both” the United States and Virginia, 
arguing that their institutions depended on the Old Dominion remaining in the Union.  These 
gatherers also assured “our Eastern brethren” that “their fears are groundless and arise from a 
misapprehension of the intentions of our Northern brethren.”  As “long as they remain faithful to 
our State and Union,” Hancock County residents would use “our best efforts” to secure “their 
just rights, and labor with them for their enforcement.”  Bound by a shared goal, Virginians in all 
regions of the state would protect slavery and slaveholders’ prerogatives.166   
Similar meetings in Wheeling, Wellsburg, and Preston County manifested 
northwesterners’ belief that remaining in the Union provided the greatest security for slavery and 
slaveholders.  Most residents supported the Crittenden Compromise as a “final compromise of 
the vexed question of slavery,” arguing that this constitutional “remedy” would resolve “any and 
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all aggressions.”167  Democratic Congressman Sherrard Clemens maintained that the U.S. 
Constitution provided Virginia “greater protection than she will ever obtain” in the 
Confederacy.168  Waitman Willey recounted how the “Northern press and pulpit” had 
“persistently assailed” African American bondage, and believed that such abuses by northerners 
“ought to excite indignation and do demand resistance” from white northwesterners.  But the 
federal government had always acted faithfully toward slaveholders, providing protection and 
ensuring the recapture of fugitive slaves and would mitigate this conflict.  “What infraction of 
Southern rights has the General Government ever committed?  Can any Southern man find any 
defection here?”  Willey found it equally “remarkable…that Northern Presidents have always 
been faithful to Southern rights” and believed that Lincoln could do little to interfere with 
slavery.  Secession, a “degrading” action and a “virtual acknowledgement of southern inferiority 
and inability to maintain her rights and vindicate her character,” would threaten African 
American bondage.  Slavery would continue to thrive under the federal government and 
Constitution.169    
Not all white northwesterners, though, agreed that the Union would continue to protect 
slavery.  In a meeting in Ritchie County, residents denounced the “spirit and legislation of Black 
Republicanism in the North, the unconstitutional enactments of the Northern States, and the 
denial of equal rights in the territories.”  How would remaining in the Union resolve these 
grievances?  While residents “deprecate[d] disunion,” Virginia should secede if northern states 
continued to deny white southerners “equal right[s].”170  Some Parkersburg residents expressed 
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similar grievances.  The “nullifying action of Northern States” and the “encroachments of the 
North upon our rights” provided enough evidence for these Wood County residents that only 
secession could secure their constitutional rights.171  During a public meeting in Gilmer County, 
residents denounced the actions “fanatical, sectional Black Republican[s]” who have “arrogated 
to themselves the dangerous privilege of interfering…with our domestic institutions.”  How 
could northwesterners trust northern Republicans who labored for slavery’s “ultimate 
extinction”?172  The Fairmont True Virginian reminded residents that “Virginia claims your 
allegiance,” an important reminder considering that Lincoln possessed the “power…to force you 
to be a butcher of your own brethren.”  Aggression against any slaveholding state should compel 
Virginians to defend their fellow southerners.173   
Residents’ disagreements concerning Virginia’s future in the Union reflected disputes 
about the Northwest’s future if the Old Dominion joined the Confederacy.  Republicans 
maintained that Virginia’s secession would justify residents’ pursuit of dismemberment and the 
creation of a new state.  Secession, the pet project of eastern slaveholders, would drag white 
westerners into a union with other slaveholders who likewise prized their chattel over white 
equality.  White westerners would resist such action and break their political bondage by creating 
a new and free state.  If Virginia “shows herself unfaithful, it will be at the expense of a division 
of the State,” John G. Jacob declared.  Northwesterners would “repudiate the hasty and fanatical 
Southern sentiment so prevalent East of the Blue Ridge.”174  If dismemberment occurred, “it was 
not the West, but the East, not the free labor, but the slave labor half” that deserved blame and 
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condemnation, he concluded.175  Republican Archibald W. Campbell concurred, declaring that 
“no affinity” had ever existed between eastern and western Virginians.  Differences in “climate,” 
“geography,” and “slave populations” divided the Commonwealth.176  At a Union meeting in 
Wheeling’s Fifth Ward, gatherers averred that should Eastern Virginians be “untrue to the Union 
and secede therefrom,” these slaveholders “must go by themselves” as northwesterners 
“procure[d] the establishment of a separate, sovereign State.”177  Hancock County residents 
maintained that their “particular geographical position” made it “incumbent” upon them to 
adhere to the Union, even if it meant Virginia’s division.178 
Northwestern residents unaffiliated with the Republican Party downplayed the threat of 
dismemberment, considering it a last resort or ultimatum.  Chester Hubbard believed that he and 
fellow northwesterners could “keep Virginia” under the Stars and Stripes, while exuding 
confidence that the “‘handle’ will stick to the ‘pan.’”179  A few weeks later, Hubbard judged that 
only the “smallest number” of residents “advocate a division of the state at present except under 
strong provocation from Eastern Va.”  Still, if Virginia only fought in “defence of her rights 
under the Constitution,” he predicted that the state “will be a unit.”180  Ritchie County residents 
considered the “division of the State by any line…as worse than a dissolution of the National 
Union.”181  Reflecting on the secession crisis, Waitman Willey considered a “division of the 
state” as the “‘only alternative’” available to residents if war commenced.182  Northwesterners, 
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continuing a line of thinking present over the previous three decades, lamented a division of the 
state and would postpone such action until they exhausted all other options. 
The formation of the Confederacy compelled the Virginia state legislature, under the 
instruction of Governor John Letcher, to convene an assembly of elected representatives to 
discuss this national crisis.  Representatives elected by northwestern voters evinced slavery’s 
continued importance in the region and in any decision residents would reach concerning 
secession.  Preston County attorney William G. Brown, one of the largest slaveholders in the 
region, held seven slaves.183  Monongalia County attorney Waitman Willey and Ohio County 
Democratic congressman Sherrard Clemens both owned two slaves.184  Clemens’ also possessed 
familial connections to the Deep South as his wife, Betty, hailed from Louisiana.185  Braxton 
County lawyer Benjamin Byrne and John Carlile of Harrison County were both slaveholders, 
too, owning three and one slaves respectively.186  While not a slaveholder, Benjamin Wilson, a 
lawyer representing Harrison County, used his legal training to protect slaveholders.  Wilson 
acted as prosecuting attorney when Harrison County indicted three individuals, including Horace 
Greeley, for circulating the “incendiary” New York Tribune in the Northwest.187   
Further south, in Kanawha County, George W. Summers held fourteen African American 
slaves while Spicer Patrick, a planter, owned twenty-two slaves.188  The election of these western 
representatives demonstrated that residents still sought to protect and champion slaveholders’ 
privileges even though the majority of residents were nonslaveholders.  These privileges were 
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more secure in the Union than the Confederacy, residents argued, and demanded that their 
representatives pledged themselves as unconditional unionists.  Chester Hubbard characterized 
the election for representatives as a “strong rebuke to Disunion in all shapes,” believing residents 
had correctly manifested its fealty toward the Union.189  Residents concluded that this adherence 
to the Union could only be severed by popular referendum.190   
While most northwesterners opposed secession, many believed that the convention 
offered an opportunity to redress some lingering constitutional grievances.  Parkersburg 
newspaper editor Charles Rhoads hoped that the convention would apportion the state senate on 
the white basis, “equalize taxation” on all forms of property, and “abolish the County Court 
system.”  Rhoads, though, dismissed accusations that such demands represented an ultimatum 
where a failure to satisfy northwesterners would trigger dismemberment.191  One Preston County 
resident considered western Virginia the leading actor in the upcoming convention, as western 
delegates would “amend the Constitution” while eastern representatives “will have to take a 
‘back seat.’”  Any sectional drama would be driven by westerners, the author concluded.192  
Clarksburg lawyer John Stringer Hoffman predicted that eastern delegates “will…yield uniform 
ad valorem taxation on all property,” a grievance aired by many residents.193  The convention 
provided northwesterners an opportunity to reform the state constitution, not to precipitate a 
division of the state. 
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As northwestern representatives travelled to Richmond in early February 1861, the future 
appeared uncertain for northwestern residents and all Virginians.  Would Virginia secede and 
join the Confederacy?  If the state left the Union, how would northwestern residents respond?  
Was slavery’s future more secure in the Confederacy?  If the state remained in the Union, could 
slavery be maintained, even in the Northwest?  Northwesterners’ election of unconditional 
unionists reaffirms Daniel Crofts’ argument concerning these “reluctant Confederates.”  
Residents’ economic interests and Whiggish political tendencies aligned them with similar 
northerners and westerners.  Crofts, though, portrays Virginia’s intrastate sectional conflict as 
inevitably concluding in dismemberment, an interpretation that marginalizes contingency and 
foreshadows West Virginia’s creation.194  Few residents, except primarily Republicans, 
expressed a desire to pursue a division of the state.  Most residents preferred remaining in the 
Old Dominion. 
Residents’ desire to remain in the Union and their marginalization of Republican 
ideology exhibited the political dynamics that had unfolded across the region over the previous 
years.  Republicans had attempted to politicize what they interpreted as northwestern residents’ 
ardent desire to defeat Virginia’s “Slave Power” and free their region from political bondage.  
Demographic, economic, and geographical trends appeared favorable for a Republican Party to 
acquire a foothold in the Northwest.  A burgeoning immigrant population, a declining slave and 
slaveholder population, commercial ties to northern and western markets, and an increasing wage 
labor population appeared to provide an opportunity to establish a Virginia Republican Party that 
could wield “free soil” and “free labor” politics in state affairs.  Republicans’ increasing national 
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popularity suggested that Virginia Republicans would receive patronage and assistance from a 
national party unafraid of “doughface” northerners.  White northwesterners’ political redemption 
was at hand. 
Republicans, though, misjudged the popularity of their message and residents’ antipathy 
toward slavery.  The inauguration of universal suffrage in 1851 deepened residents’ engagement 
in the “politics of slavery” and made them more acutely aware of threats to whiteness.  Eastern 
Virginians’ fears that universal suffrage would threaten slavery were unfounded; universal 
suffrage strengthened residents’ commitment to slavery and slaveholders’ interests.  This 
commitment carried over into residents continued political affiliation, as Democrats and 
Oppositionists continued to dominate the political landscape.  Though these parties differed in 
their approach to protecting slavery, patriarchy, and white supremacy, their positions gathered 
more support than Republicans.  Northwestern residents were “reluctant Confederates” not only 
because of the economic and political tendencies Crofts identifies; their reluctance reflected their 
belief that their established and traditional hierarchies depended on slavery’s survival.195  And 
nearly all residents maintained that slavery was safer in the Union and under the Constitution.   
Northwesterners’ belief that the Union protected slavery and slaveholders represented a 
fundamental disagreement with many eastern slaveholders.  Tidewater and Piedmont residents 
elected the majority of representatives who favored immediate secession, arguing that a 
Republican administration would place slavery on a path toward extinction.  Only a union with 
the Confederacy could protect African American bondage.196  Northwesterners’ loathed 
Republicans, too, but maintained that Lincoln and his ilk would be constitutionally restrained 
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from interfering with slavery.  Republicans could be defeated, northwesterners argued, by 
remaining in the Union, electing proslavery politicians, and fashioning new alliances with 
northern and western constituencies.  Leaving the Union meant forgoing the checks and balances 
that constrained Lincoln and his Republican operatives, allowing them to inaugurate conflict on 
slavery.  By early 1861, most northwestern residents expressed a firm attachment to the Union 
not as a manifestation of their antislavery position but rather as an argument that their political 













Chapter 6: Preserving the Union and Slavery: Secession and the Statehood Movement, 1861-
1862 
 In early January 1862, the Clarksburg National Telegraph continued to warn 
northwesterners about the Confederacy.  The “destruction” of the Confederate States of America 
“is foredoomed,” the newspaper predicted, and pinpointed the “actions of the secession leaders” 
who “are afflicted with madness” as the cause for the southern confederacy’s impending doom.  
This “madness” was manifest in Confederates’ decision to secede and wage war against the 
United States.  These men “profess to be fighting for their rights in slavery when they are doing 
the very thing that will injure the institution….[or] destroy it.”  African American bondage 
thrived under the Stars and Stripes because the federal government “has always…protect[ed] it,” 
notably from hostile European nations who would now seek slavery’s abolition.  Slavery’s future 
in the Confederacy appeared fleeting.1         
 For northwesterners, slavery’s perpetuation ensured that racial hierarchy and patriarchy 
would continue to operate for the benefit of all white men, regardless of their slaveholding status.  
Northwesterners’ political rights would remain sacrosanct, too.  But the Confederacy’s political 
principles threatened those hierarchies and those rights.  The Confederate States sought to 
“immediately establish a strong Aristocracy or a Monarchy,” the National Telegraph declared.  
This patrician ruling class would pronounce slavery as the Confederacy’s “grand desideratum,” 
restricting suffrage to slaveholders and using slavery as “the stepping-stone to both official and 
social position.”  Unlike northwesterners who claimed political independence without owning a 
slave, the status of a “free man” in the southern confederacy would only be achieved with the 
purchase of human chattel.2   
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 The National Telegraph revealed northwesterners’ central objective as the Civil War 
entered its second year.  The majority of residents demanded to remain in the Union, refusing to 
join the Confederacy at any cost.  The newspaper’s anti-Confederate stance reinforces prevailing 
historical scholarship that recognizes the Unionist grounds the Northwest occupied during the 
war.  Unionists contended that the federal government provided slaveholders the greatest 
protection for their property, arguing that constitutional checks and balances, national political 
structures, and the armed forces all assisted slaveholders in maintaining power over slaves.  
Secessionists fundamentally disagreed and cited the growing Republican threat as evidence that 
slavery would soon be abolished.   Though a minority, secessionists existed and operated 
throughout the region, often with impunity.  Still, the majority of northwesterners’ political 
compasses pointed to the Union.     
The newspaper’s commentary on slavery revealed the fruits of the 1851 Constitution.  
Politically and constitutionally empowered by that document, white, nonslaveholding 
northwesterners enjoyed tremendous political power.  These men elected government officials 
from the governor to local judges, exercised suffrage without owning any property, and claimed 
the status of a “free man” without purchasing a slave.  The Confederacy threatened those rights, 
as noted planters and patricians in that nation hoped to limit democracy and disenfranchise large 
numbers of Confederates.  This project, begun before the war and with disciples in Virginia, too, 
revealed to white northwesterners the immense power they exercised and the fragility of that 
power.  Slavery and democracy coexisted and strengthened each other, northwesterners declared, 
providing the proper political and constitutional foundation for their independence. 
The National Telegraph published this commentary on slavery at an important time in the 
Northwest.  Approximately two months prior, northwesterners had voted overwhelmingly to 
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ratify a division ordinance that accelerated western Virginia’s separation from the rest of the 
commonwealth.  A constitutional convention in session at Wheeling now attempted to craft a 
state constitution that voters would ratify and Congress would approve.  Two previous 
conventions also held in Wheeling, however, revealed diverse opinions concerning slavery’s 
future in a new state.  Few delegates or residents appeared willing to let slavery, reflecting the 
broad acceptance the institution enjoyed.            
 That northwesterners would still remained attached to the peculiar institution as late as 
1862 challenges historians’ arguments concerning northwesterners’ interpretation of the 
secession crisis and the initial stages of the statehood movement.  Contemporaries, including 
Union veteran Theodore Lang and Wheeling Daily Intelligencer report Granville Davisson Hall 
identified slavery as producing the “inequalities and injustice” that divided Virginians.  This 
division became manifest in 1863, as the creation of West Virginia “brought the proud old State 
down from its ancient grandeur to its later humiliation.”  Westerners, unattached to slavery like 
their neighbors in Ohio and Pennsylvania, escaped this “humiliation.”3  Charles Ambler provided 
a fitting coda to contemporaries’ hagiographic interpretation of northwesterners’ attitudes toward 
slavery during the secession crisis.  “[L]ess than one year” after the 1860 presidential election, 
Ambler argues, “more than one-half” of voters in what would become West Virginia had become 
Republicans.  A Republican electorate would assuredly not tolerate slavery or secession on 
behalf of slavery.4     
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 Modern historians have generally agreed that as the secession crisis intensified and war 
commenced, northwesterners desired slavery’s abolition.  Northwesterners operated in similar 
fashion to northerners, William Freehling argues, with most apathetic (if not supportive) of 
slavery but resistant to attempts by the “Slave Power” to enslave white men alongside black 
slaves.  Northwesterners’ concerns with equalizing taxes on slaves rather than attacking a 
Republican administration, though, further divided and alienated northwesterners from eastern 
Virginians.5  Daniel Crofts argues that the “shrill manifestations of western indignation about 
eastern dominance and mistreatment contained both an antislavery tone and a threat to divide the 
state.”6  William Link agrees with Crofts’ explicit connection between northwesterners’ 
antislavery attitudes and the creation of a new state.  “By 1860-61,” Link argues, “many 
northwesterners” had developed a “new political consciousness” that “offered an aggressive 
critique of the politics of slavery.”  Dissatisfied with slaveholders’ abuse of power over the past 
half-century, northwesterners drifted away from slavery and closer to their free state neighbors.7  
The intrastate drama between eastern and western Virginians, Crofts and Link maintain, mirrored 
the national crisis and would reach a similar conclusion concerning slavery’s future, as well.8     
 A fatal struggle between democratic reforms and slavery represents the central argument 
for these historians.  Decades of national and state conflict centered on nonslaveholders resisting 
slaveholders’ increasing dominion over political operations and structures, a characteristic that 
complemented Republicans’ “Slave Power” thesis.  The creation of a “modern proslavery and 
antidemocratic state” in 1860-61 represented the culmination of those political trends, Stephanie 
McCurry argues.  This project defied western political traditions by restricting political 
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representation and by creating a republic solely for white men.  The “hubris” exhibited by white 
men who believed that slaveholding would trump democracy and restrict “the people” was 
“stunning,” according to McCurry.  The “reckoning” that unraveled the Confederate project 
represented a testament of the internal weakness and the “impoverished political vision” of 
Confederate leaders.9 
McCurry’s argument complements the body of historiography that posits increasing 
tension between democratic-minded northwesterners and eastern slaveholding oligarchs.  Indeed, 
the statehood movement, a process decades in the making according to most historians, reflected 
a seemingly natural, if not inexorable, conclusion to Virginia’s intrastate drama.  For decades, 
eastern Virginians, under the pretext of protecting their chattel from western nonslaveholders, 
used constitutional, legal, and political powers to deny their transmontane brethren any measure 
of political equality.  Eastern Virginians’ decision to secede to protect their chattel over 
northwesterners’ protestations destroyed any remaining ties residents held for slavery and 
Virginia.  Northwest Virginians would no longer support slavery nor would they support 
Virginia.  This interpretation has served as the dominant memory of the subsequent statehood 
movement, portraying the dismemberment of the state as a revolution against eastern Virginia 
slaveholders and slavery.   
As revealed by the National Telegraph, this body of scholarship misinterprets how white 
northwesterners interpreted the dynamic between slavery and democracy during the secession 
crisis and early stages of the Civil War.  Empowered by the 1851 Constitution, northwesterners 
wielded tremendous political and constitutional power and enjoyed rights practically on par with 
eastern slaveholding oligarchs.  A few constitutional grievances remained, notably the tax 
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restrictions on African American slaves, but these were resolvable.  Indeed, removing the tax 
restrictions placed on chattel would remove a festering inequality and grievance against slavery.  
Northwesterners declared that with Virginia in the Union and slavery secured, all white men 
regardless of their slaveholding status could rightfully claim the mantle of a “free man.”  Put 
simply, slavery had perfected the political power white men enjoyed.  But Virginia’s secession 
challenged that dynamic.  White northwesterners believed that they had effectively checked 
Virginia planters’ political hegemony over the past decade, but secession brought those planters 
together in a formal political alliance with likeminded Deep South planters and patricians.  Much 
like these cotton aristocrats, Old Dominion planters had sought to stem and reverse the 
democratic tide that had washed away their aristocratic political structures and functions.  The 
state’s membership in the southern confederacy deepened that desire.  Faced with the prospect of 
losing their hard fought political and constitutional rights, northwesterners began the process of 
creating a new state.     
But historians err in interpreting this move toward creating a new state centered in the 
Northwest as an antislavery reaction.  Over the preceding decades, northwesterners had deepened 
their fealty toward slavery and recognized the political independence they derived from the 
institution’s presence.  Abolishing the institution threatened to destabilize or destroy those rights 
and upset the established and traditional hierarchies that also buttressed African American 
bondage.  Rather, Unionist northwesterners initiated a counterrevolution to protect slavery and 
democracy, maintaining that the perpetuation of each institution would ensure the survival and 
continuation of their political representation.10  This counterrevolution centered on resisting 
                                                          
10 Manisha Sinha argues that South Carolinians, distrustful of democratic trends and consumed with consolidating 
their slaveholding power, instigated a “counterrevolution” to take their state out of the Union to protect African 
American bondage.  I argue, though, that northwesterners initiated a similar “counterrevolution” to protect slavery 
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secession through the ballot box and enlistment in the armed forces.   These forms of resistance 
acted as a prelude to northwesterners’ central objective of this counterrevolution, to create a new 
state where democracy and slavery would continue to exist in equilibrium.  The statehood 
movement’s initial stages reveal that though northwesterners understood the political obstacles 
incumbent in creating another slave state given the context, few relented.  Slavery and 
democracy would continue to thrive in the hollows and hills of the Northwest.     
On February 13, 1861, representatives from across the state gathered in Richmond to 
debate the state’s future.  Approximately one-sixth of these delegates championed immediate 
secession, with most representing counties with dense slave populations east of the Blue Ridge.  
Another one-sixth of delegates considered their fealty to the Union supreme to all other issues; 
most of these hailed from western Virginia and the Northwest in particular.  The remaining two-
thirds were conditional unionists, representatives that sought to preserve Virginia’s place in the 
Union but wary of Republican coercion.  Most delegates waited to see how Lincoln and his 
administration would react to the secession crisis unfolding across the nation before deciding 
Virginia’s future.  Despite these differences, these delegates professed the same goal of 
protecting slavery.  How to protect slavery, though, represented the fundamental difference that 
divided delegates.11   
  The beginning weeks of the convention contradict many historians’ arguments 
concerning the Northwest’s monolithic support for the Union.  As Marion delegate and lawyer 
Ephraim B. Hall predicted, northwesterners “are going to have trouble here & some of our 
                                                          
but this protection would occur within the Union.  Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and 
Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).       
11 Freehling and Simpson, Showdown in Virginia, X-XIV.   
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western men will not pull true” to the Union.12  His prediction was accurate.  If a conflict 
concerning residents’ “allegiance” arose, Barbour County attorney Samuel Woods declared that 
his constituents would “yield obedience to the State of Virginia.”13  Woods argued that 
“[m]idnight robbers and assassins” had violated northwesterners’ “RIGHTS” and exhibited a 
“sentiment hostile to [Virginia’s] institutions.”  “[I]nfuriated negroes, with pikes in their hands” 
aided these northern agents while northerners “canonized” radical abolitionists like John Brown 
as “saints and martyrs.”  John Brown’s raid manifested the venom with which abolitionists had 
poisoned the northern body politic, turning northerners against southern institutions and society.  
Secession, Woods averred, would protect his constituents from northern voters who allegedly 
demanded racial equality at all costs.14   
A meeting in Woods’ district bolstered his secessionist stance.  Barbour County residents 
“denounce[d] the doctrine of Federal coercion” and pledged their “obedience and allegiance to 
[Virginia] alone.”  The Old Dominion, along with other southern states, have “borne so patiently 
the encroachment of Northern fanaticism” until residents could no longer bear such injustices.  
The election of Abraham Lincoln now christened his party as the “dominant party” and would 
empower northern radicals to “perpetuate those grievances.”  Raids such as that perpetrated by 
John Brown would increase in frequency with an antislavery party in control of the White House.  
Faced with continued northern assaults on southern rights, these Barbour County residents 
prayed that Virginia would “immediately withdraw” from the Union.15 
                                                          
12 Ephraim B. Hall to Francis H. Pierpont, 15 February 1861, Francis Harrison Pierpont Collection, A&M 9, Box 2, 
Folder 22, WVRHC and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: District 4, Marion, Virginia; Roll: M653_1361; Page: 569; 
Image: 129; Family History Library Film: 805361 [Ancestry.com][accessed 15 June 2015].   
13 Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861, February 13-May 1, ed. George H. Reese (Richmond: 
Virginia State Library, 1965), 1:131 [hereafter cited as 1861 Proceedings] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Barbour, 
Virginia; Roll: M653_1334; Page: 212; Image: 218; Family History Library Film: 805334 [Ancestry.com][accessed 
11 June 2015]. 
14 1861 Proceedings, 2:586.   
15 1861 Proceedings, 1: 632-633.   
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Wetzel County lawyer Leonard S. Hall agreed with his Barbour County colleague.  Hall 
believed that abolitionists’ machinations would become more widespread with a Republican 
president.  “The press, the pulpit, the school-house and the Sabbath school,” Hall declared, “all 
exert their influence in hostility to the institutions of the South.”  These institutions could 
broadcast their hatred of slavery and southern society with Lincoln granting impunity to such 
messages.16  Further, Wetzel’s proximity on the Ohio River made it an attractive “terminus” for 
the “underground railroad,” forcing residents to abandon slavery lest “emissaries” abscond with 
their human chattel across the river.  But the presence of only a few slaves and slaveholders 
should not cloud other Virginians’ interpretation of Wetzel’s citizens.  “[N]o sounder State-rights 
people” existed in the state than Hall’s constituents, and these residents believed that 
northerners’ increasing hostility toward slavery forecasted future conflicts concerning the 
institution.  Only an alliance with the Confederacy could secure slavery and stymie the work of 
“emissaries” lurking along Wetzel’s borders.17     
Though most northwestern delegates opposed Woods’ and Hall’s secessionism, all 
agreed that slavery and slaveholders’ rights demanded protection.  They believed that disrupting 
the master-slave relation threatened all northwesterners, whether or not they owned slaves.18  
Harrison County lawyer Benjamin Wilson worried that abolition would unleash a “half-caste 
race” that lacked the “capacity for self-government.”  Soon, the “time of our courts would be 
occupied in trying them for crime” while the state would be “heavily taxed to defray their 
criminal expenses.”  Perpetuating slavery ensured that African Americans remained in their 
                                                          
16 1861 Proceedings, 2:398 and 1850 U.S. Federal Census: District 64, Wetzel, Virginia; Roll: M432_981; Page: 
41A; Image: 87 [Ancestry.com][accessed 11 June 2015]. 
17 1861 Proceedings, 1:133.   
18 Northwestern Republican organs generally denounced this fealty.  John G. Jacob, editor of the Wellsburg Weekly 
Herald, groaned that he was “sick of this eternal pulling about ‘loyalty to Virginia.’”  Wellsburg Weekly Herald, 
March 1, 1861, 2.    
261 
 
proper place.19  Sherrard Clemens, representing Ohio County and an owner of two slaves, 
rejected claims that he “stood upon a platform which was advocated by the editor of the 
Wheeling ‘Intelligencer.’”  That Republican organ, Clemens argued, evinced its hostility to 
slaveholders and the institution through its free labor and free soil diatribes.20  Harrison County 
attorney John S. Carlile, a slaveholder, emerged during the convention as one of slavery’s most 
vocal advocates.  Carlile considered the institution a “social, political, and religious blessing,” 
and declared himself a “slaveholder, not by inheritance, but by purchase.”  His declaration of 
purchasing rather than inheriting slaves functioned as a powerful shibboleth in late antebellum 
Virginia.  Carlile manifested his approbation of the institution and proslavery credentials through 
deliberate choice, not empty rhetoric.  This financial stake in African American bondage proved 
useful in bolstering his support for tax reform and remaining in the Union.  Such steps, he 
avowed, would protect his investment along with thousands of other Virginians.  His election to 
this convention testified to his constituents’ approval of his status as a slaveholder and his 
proslavery ideas, as well.21   
Many northwestern delegates stressed their constituents’ fealty toward slavery, reminding 
colleagues of northwesterners’ unwavering support for the institution.  Carlile averred that 
though few northwesterners held a “pecuniary interest” in African American bondage, all 
residents championed the axiom that “‘African slavery…is essential to American liberty.’”22  
                                                          
19 1861 Proceedings, 2:360 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Clarksburg, Harrison, Virginia; Roll: M653_1351; Page: 
757; Image: 247; Family History Library Film: 805351 [Ancestry.com][accessed 11 June 2015].  
20 1861 Proceedings, 1:143; 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Ohio, Virginia; Roll: M653_1368; Page: 450; Image: 462; 
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21 1861 Proceedings, 1, 468; 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Clarksburg, Harrison, Virginia; Roll: M653_1351; Page: 
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County, VA [Ancestry.com][accessed 11 June 2015].  
22 1861 Proceedings, 1: 457-458.  The Republican Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, though it disagreed with Carlile’s 
proslavery stance, applauded him for being “sound on the great issue of Secession or Union, law or anarchy.”  He 
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Doddridge County lawyer Chapman J. Stuart proclaimed that his constituents have been “loyal 
and true to the institutions of their State…especially to the institution of slavery.”  
Northwesterners had “stood up for the institution and the rights of slavery” and Virginia 
slaveholders would continue to “find us at our posts ready to do battle for it.”23  The “people are 
as sound and as emphatically Southern as the people of Richmond,” Marion County lawyer 
Alpheus Haymond explained.  “[N]o want of loyalty to any of the institutions of Virginia” 
existed among his neighbors.24   
As during the Reform Convention a decade earlier, Monongalia County lawyer and 
slaveholder Waitman T. Willey emerged as the Northwest’s principal spokesman.  He dismissed 
eastern Virginians accusations concerning the Northwest’s unsoundness on the issue of slavery, 
reminding delegates that more passionate supporters of the institution could not be found outside 
of the Northwest.  A “very serious misapprehension” and “intimations and insinuations 
prejudicial to the character” of his district had “been busily circulated” but such claims were 
unfounded, Willey declared.  Monongalia County residents were ready to “defend [Virginia’s] 
rights to the death,” a “universal” sentiment in the trans-Allegheny.  Unconvinced delegates 
needed only to reflect upon his constituents’ history in defending and supporting Virginia 
slaveholders.       
In what portion of our history can a single incident be pointed to that would subject us to 
the ban of your distrust?  In what have we been derelict?  In what have we been faithless? 
When did we not come up to the full demands of justice to the East on all questions? 
Never.25     
                                                          
“has done his duty as a Western man, as a Virginian, [and] as an American citizen.”  Daily Intelligencer, March 11, 
1861, 2.       
23 1861 Proceedings, 3:51 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Doddridge, Virginia; Roll: M653_1342; Page: 482; 
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Eastern delegates’ baseless accusations represented the true danger to slavery, Willey asserted, 
not his northwestern neighbors.  Their continued attacks on northwesterners’ proslavery 
credentials threatened to turn residents against the institution.  Such a turn of events would prove 
disastrous for slaveholders.  For if a national conflict arose concerning the institution, where 
would eastern Virginians “get the strong arms to defend your slaves?”  “From our glorious 
mountains of the West,” he answered.  Eastern Virginians needed northwesterners’ support.26   
Northwesterners’ continued support for eastern Virginians’ chattel could be secured 
through two important measures.  The first was to remain in the Union.  Though secessionists 
claimed that remaining in the Union would prove the death knell of slavery, northwestern 
unionists maintained that the federal government strengthened and protected the institution.  
Delegates needed to look no further than to John Brown’s failed raid in 1859.  Carlile reminded 
delegates that when the abolitionist attempted to incite a slave rebellion, “fourteen…marines 
belonging to the Federal Government” captured Brown and delivered him to Virginia authorities.  
He doubted that a Confederate army stationed in Richmond could mobilize with greater speed in 
future crises.27     
The federal government’s response to Harpers Ferry demonstrated to Carlile the Union’s 
continued defense of slaveholders’ rights.  Under “our common Constitution,” the “army,” 
“navy,” and the “gallant voters of the non-slaveholding states” will “battle in defence of our 
rights.”28  Willey agreed, reminding delegates that the “Supreme Judicial tribunal” had 
“guarantee[d]” the “right of every slaveholder…to carry his property into all the territories.”29  
                                                          
26 1861 Proceedings, 3: 5.   
27 1861 Proceedings, 1: 477. 
28 1861 Proceedings, 1: 458.   
29 1861 Proceedings, 1: 361.  Willey referenced the 1857 Dred Scott decision, where the U.S. Supreme Court argued 
that slaveholders could take their property into the territories.     
264 
 
This federal assistance would continue unabated even with a Republican in the White House.  
The “Black Republican” Party only controlled the “powerless” executive branch and “can do no 
harm” to slavery unless Virginians secede, Carlile stressed.30  But if eastern Virginians dragged 
the state out of the Union, he predicted that slavery would “not exist in Virginia five years after 
the separation.”  The “whole civilized world” demanded slavery’s “ultimate extinction,” he 
claimed.  Only the U.S. government, not the impotent Confederacy, could guarantee slavery’s 
existence.31   
Willey echoed Carlile’s fatalistic prediction concerning slavery in the Confederacy.  
Virginia’s secession would “bring Canada to our doors,” increasing slaves’ “motive to escape.”  
Northwestern slaveholders, fearful of losing their property, would “themselves remove farther 
South, or…sell their slaves to be sent farther South.”  Slavery’s erosion along the South’s 
periphery would produce tremendous harm.  The region’s political clout would decrease, 
empowering Republicans to reach deeper and more aggressively into the South.  Southerners 
would be “hemmed in by a cordon of hostile elements,” he concluded.32  The boundaries 
between Virginia and its northern neighbors would become a conflict zone, threatening to “make 
North-Western Virginia the Flanders of America.”  Confederate soldiers would be unable to 
rescue northwesterners, as Virginia legislators had failed to provide sufficient “legislative aid to 
                                                          
30 1861 Proceedings, 2: 315.  Willey also emphasized the constraints that Lincoln faced even as he assumed control 
of the executive branch.  Before the secession of other southern states, Lincoln “could not have appointed an officer 
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31 1861 Proceedings, 1: 469.   
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transpierce these mountains” that divided the state.  This apocalypse could only be prevented by 
remaining in the Union.33  
Remaining in the Union provided security and safety for northwestern slaveholders and 
their chattel.  The Union also protected northwesterners from the antidemocratic mindset that 
Deep South planters and patricians had exhibited over the years.  This mindset, residents 
observed, had deepened with the creation of the southern confederacy.  In a meeting held prior to 
the convention, Morgantown residents declared their opposition to being placed under the “rule 
of King Cotton.”34  The epithet of “King Cotton” meant more than the overwhelming economic 
importance placed on cotton production while other agricultural and commercial interests 
suffered; rather, “King Cotton” symbolized the political tyranny exhibited by Deep South 
slaveholders.  These cotton planters considered the Confederacy’s establishment as a “moment 
of possibility” to purge “corrupting democratic tendencies” that had infected southern states.  
Chief among these “tendencies” were universal male suffrage, frequent elections, and unmooring 
property from politics.  Deep South elites believed these democratic reforms compromised 
slavery and threatened to inaugurate “Yankee” politics on southern soil.35     
This phenomenon unfolded in Virginia after the ratification of the 1851 Constitution.  
That democratic document empowered nonslaveholders across the state through universal 
suffrage, direct election of government officials, and greater representation in the state 
legislature.  The result was a more transparent and open political system that checked planters’ 
political hegemony.  But foes of Virginia’s democratic transformation existed.  One Virginian 
decried the reign of “King Numbers,” fearing the “deep and radical changes” that this ruler 
                                                          
33 1861 Proceedings, 1: 370.   
34 Daily Intelligencer [Wheeling], February 7, 1861, 2.   
35 Michael T. Bernath, “The Confederacy as a Moment of Possibility,” Journal of Southern History, 79, no. 2 (May 
2013): 325-335.   
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would inaugurate.  “[C]herished and venerated institutions” would be destroyed and “long 
established opinions and principles” would be overturned.36  John Coles Rutherfoord, a lawyer, 
slaveholder, and member of the House of Delegates, expressed similar fears.  “[P]ublic 
opinion…is king,” he lamented, “making and unmaking the laws or setting them at naught…and 
sweeping away whatever it opposes.”37  Southerners needed to “modify” their political 
institutions, proslavery theorist George Fitzhugh asserted, to dethrone “King Numbers.”  
Modifications included “remov[ing] the people farther from the direct exercise of power,” 
“lengthen[ing] the tenure of office,” and shielding representatives from public opinion.  He 
applauded South Carolina for already implementing such measures.  “Aristocracy is the only 
safeguard of liberty,” he concluded, and stressed that unless planters restricted political 
representation, the South, much like the North, would soon devolve into “pure democracy” and 
“anarchy.”38   
Northwesterners’ feared that Virginia’s membership in the Confederacy could assist these 
antidemocratic foes in manifesting their desires.  The “political views of the South Carolina 
school of politicians,” Wellsburg residents declared, rejected majoritarian rule and restricted 
political participation to only slaveholders.  How could northwesterners’ democratic rights be 
protected in a union with such politicians?39  The Wheeling Daily Intelligencer reported that a 
recent issue of the Richmond-based Southern Literary Messenger contained articles that 
denounced “universal suffrage of the white man” as a “disgraceful failure.”  “African slavery” 
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would provide the foundation for the southern confederacy, thereby consolidating political power 
in the “fewest possible numbers” and forcing the “poor white man to emigrate.”40  The “ballot-
box,” that “mighty engine for the redress of grievances,” would be inaccessible to white men 
unless they owned African American slaves.  “[A]ristocrats say they will do…[the] 
thinking…legislating and governing” for all white men.41       
The abrogation of northwesterners’ democratic rights in the Confederacy constituted a 
central argument during the convention.  “South Carolina initiated this movement,” John Carlile 
reminded delegates, and that state “will control this movement.”  The Palmetto State’s property-
holding requirements for political office would be replicated in the Confederate national 
government, too, forcing nonslaveholders into a state of political bondage.42  Confederates had 
already constructed a government lacking “popular sanction,” Willey observed, as Jefferson 
Davis had been appointed, not popularly elected.  He predicted that the southern confederacy 
would soon be ruled by an “oligarchy, or constitutional monarchy, or military despotism.”43  And 
with cotton planters controlling the government and reluctant to relinquish that power, the future 
appeared bleak for white nonslaveholders in the Confederate States.  “It seems to me this 
Southern Confederacy,” Willey warned, “is disposed to repudiate the principle that the political 
power resides in the people.”44  In Morgantown, merchant Henry Dering supported his delegate’s 
conclusions.  Monongalia County residents “will not be put along with the Cotton States,” he 
declared, and “pray[ed]” that Willey and other northwestern delegates would “keep Va. in her 
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present position.”45  Northwesterners opposed any measure that would “precipitate the old 
Dominion out of this glorious Union, [and] into the treasonable bosom of King Cotton.”46  
Membership in the Confederate States endangered slavery and democracy, the two wellsprings 
of northwesterners’ political rights.  Remaining in the Union, though, would ensure their 
perpetuity.   
 Remaining in the Union represented northwestern delegates’ primary objective in the 
convention and would deepen northwesterners’ desire to protect eastern Virginians’ chattel.  
Reforming the tax code, specifically by equalizing taxation across all property, constituted the 
second measure northwestern delegates believed would further solidify their constituents’ fealty 
toward easterners’ property.47  These exemptions, enacted by the 1851 Constitution, generated 
sectional and class friction while providing fodder for Republicans who believed that the 
exemptions reflected the machinations of the “Slave Power.”  Resolving this taxation issue, 
northwesterners assured the convention, would not destroy the institution.   Rather, eliminating 
these restrictions would ease sectional and class tension and strengthen residents’ support for 
slavery.  As Alpheus Haymond explained, equalizing taxation would “harmonize this 
Commonwealth from one end to the other” and make Virginians “one and indivisible in 
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sentiment and feeling.”  An ad valorem tax on slaves would not endanger the institution; it 
would strengthen it.48   
 The debate concerning taxation commenced on March 7 when Preston County attorney 
William Guy Brown moved that the convention establish a committee to explore ad valorem 
taxation on all forms of private property.  Brown’s initial argument in offering this motion 
centered on the need to equip, arm, and feed an army should military conflict break out.  Brown 
observed that “Eastern citizens are prepared now…to subject their property to equal 
taxation…[to] help us now raise the sinews of war.”49  The convention tabled Brown’s motion 
69-41, but Willey introduced a similar measure nine days later, garnering the approval of 
northwestern secessionists and unionists.50  Secessionist Samuel Woods of Barbour County 
observed that the “common masses of the people…are at a loss to understand” why the state 
fully taxed land yet exempted African Americans under the age of twelve.51  Ephraim B. Hall 
bemoaned the “odious distinction” and “inequality” created by these restrictions, and believed 
that this “inequality” should be resolved before delegates settled Virginia’s future.52  Benjamin 
Wilson predicted that a “dire and awful conflict” between the “laboring man and the slave 
owner” would unfold in the Old Dominion unless delegates resolved this issue.  Wilson 
reminded delegates that “[m]ore true and more loyal friends of the negro interest are no where to 
be found than in the Western party of the state.”  Providing justice to northwesterners would 
ultimately strengthen the bonds between them and slaveholders, an important task given the 
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national political climate.  Refusing to yield on this issue, however, threatened to attenuate those 
bonds.53   
William Brown expounded on his earlier support for the ad valorem tax on slaves.  As an 
owner of seven slaves, he was “interested directly in the institution of slavery” and its 
preservation.  Brown expressed similar paternalistic attitudes as other Virginians, professing that 
the institution was “ordained of God himself for the purpose of redeeming the African race from 
barbarism.”  The Northwest’s scarce slave population, though, should not persuade fellow 
Virginians that his neighbors believed differently.  Though northwesterners “may not have as 
much of that peculiar kind of property as” eastern Virginians, slavery “will never be injured or 
disturbed” by the “people of North-western Virginia.”  By removing the tax restrictions on 
slaves, delegates would ensure that all citizens “bear [the] equal proportion of the burdens of 
Government.”  This equality would deepen his constituents’ paternalistic and proslavery 
sentiments.54         
Willey, a slaveholder like Brown, provided a full defense for removing the tax 
restrictions on black slaves.  The “laggard” construction of western internal improvements was a 
visual representation of this policy’s operation.  Lacking sufficient roads, canals, or railroads to 
eastern markets, northwesterners used natural channels to transport goods to northern and 
western markets.  This flow of commerce to external markets consolidated capital in northern 
states while “Northern population,” “power,” and “the ratio of representation against us” 
increased.  Republicans, now the dominant party in the North, benefited from this arrangement.55  
The operation of this tax policy among nonslaveholders was equally appalling.  Willey confessed 
                                                          
53 1861 Proceedings, 2: 16.   
54 1861 Proceedings, 2: 6-8.   
55 1861 Proceedings, 3: 6.   
271 
 
that he felt a “sense of mortification” knowing that the state taxed “every cent” that belonged to 
his “non-slaveholding neighbor” while his property was “exempt from taxation.”56  Though 
northwesterners had spearheaded this movement to equalize taxation, he denied any sectional 
prejudice.  Taxation “is not a sectional question,” he declared, but a “question between the non-
slaveholding and the slaveholding portions of the people of Virginia.”  White laborers in 
Richmond, Petersburg, and Lynchburg along with white farmers in the countryside paid a full 
share of taxes while a slaveholders’ chattel labored and masters paid only a fraction of taxes.  
This scenario represented the true threat to slavery, Willey inferred, not that slaveholders paid 
more taxes.57   
Despite their efforts to show the injustices created by the tax restrictions, northwestern 
delegates failed to persuade Piedmont and Tidewater delegates.  These eastern delegates 
maintained that the convention should settle federal matters before addressing issues such as 
taxes or representation in the state legislature.  Petersburg merchant and slaveholder Thomas 
Branch declared that he would consider a “re-organization of the organic law” on taxation after 
the “Convention shall have determined that the State shall leave the Union.”58  “That is the way 
the whip is cracked over the head of Western men,” complained the Wheeling Daily 
Intelligencer.59  Ephraim Hall stated that secessionists’ suggestion to “buy us” while offering “all 
we asked on the question of negro tax” received quiet endorsement from some colleagues.60  
Lewis County attorney Caleb Boggess confirmed such divisions, admitting that “a great number 
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of the Valley members and some of the Western Members…are opposed” to removing tax 
restrictions on slaves.  Plagued by divisions, northwesterners attempts to reform the tax code had 
stalled by early April.61  By mid-April, though, northwesterners’ prospects improved as the 
convention approved Willey’s motion to form a committee to explore removing the tax 
restrictions on slaves.62   
Even with this important victory, the convention’s laggard pace coupled with 
secessionists’ obduracy frustrated northwestern residents and delegates.  This frustration 
persuaded some northwesterners that dismemberment should remain on the table.  Barbour 
County delegate Samuel Woods lamented a “rupture of the good old Commonwealth of 
Virginia” but maintained that representatives in Richmond needed to provide “equal justice to 
every section” of the state to prevent such a calamity from unfolding.63  In Morgantown, Henry 
Dering demanded “our just rights” and “equality in our own state, or in lieu of it, a division of 
the state.”64  The Virginia Plain Dealer in Tyler County maintained that if eastern delegates 
“give us our rights—make us freeman and equals by the law with themselves,” northwesterners 
“will be the last to ask for a division of the state.”  “[G]ive us what rightfully belongs to us,” the 
newspaper concluded, “and we will never say division, Never, Never, Never.”  Refusing to 
provide northwesterners justice, though, would intensify the demands for dismemberment.65   
By early April, events within and without the convention provided mixed signals 
concerning Virginia’s future.  On April 4, delegates voted 90-45 against immediate secession.66  
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In Washington, D.C., Augusta County delegate John B. Baldwin met secretly with President 
Lincoln to ascertain his intentions concerning Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor and the 
unfolding national crisis.67  While the vote rejecting secession encouraged northwestern 
delegates, Baldwin’s visit proved disappointing, as Lincoln had allegedly supported resupplying 
troops in Fort Sumter with food and other essentials without first consulting Virginia unionists.68  
Other delegates, unaware of this visit, agreed to send three representatives on a similar fact-
finding mission Baldwin undertook a few days earlier.  During their meeting on April 13, 
Lincoln informed the three delegates that the “unprovoked assault” on Fort Sumter the previous 
day would compel the president to “repossess” any and all federal forts lost to the Confederacy.69 
The firing on Fort Sumter, though, failed to turn unionists into secessionists or convince 
delegates that war was inevitable.  Delegates offered a variety of explanations for the assault on 
the federal installation.  Some accused South Carolina for instigating the conflict while others 
were confident that the conflict would be localized to Charleston harbor.  Some unionist 
delegates believed that their compromise measures would be considered more seriously by all 
parties now that fiery rhetoric had turned into open hostilities.  Immediate secessionists like 
former governor Henry A. Wise were apoplectic that Virginians dithered while war was afoot.70  
But on April 15, President Lincoln’s request for 75,000 troops, including 2,340 officers and men 
from the Old Dominion, changed the convention’s atmosphere and numerous delegates’ stance 
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on secession.71  Delegates convened in secret session, with Wise and George Wythe Randolph of 
Richmond declaring that the welfare of the republic required an immediate military response to 
Lincoln’s “coercive” declaration before public ratification of a secession ordinance.72   
Wise’s assertion that military mobilization against the Union must occur prior to popular 
approval or rejection of secession infuriated northwestern unionists.  Sherrard Clemens of Ohio 
County declared that delegates “must await the decision of the people upon” the secession 
ordinance before Virginians seized military installations or aligned with the Confederacy.73  
Wood County lawyer John J. Jackson was “astounded” that secessionists planned to capture 
“public property within the limits of Virginia” before Virginians offered their blessing to such 
actions.  Indeed, Jackson considered Wise’s suggestion a “sham” and a “solemn farce” that 
would place Virginians in a “peculiar embarrassment.”  Virginians would be in political limbo as 
the state collaborated with the Confederacy but remained in the Union until the public approved 
of secession.74  Secessionists’ desire to withdraw the state without the consent of the body politic 
would prove the death knell of slavery, Willey predicted.  “We are certainly not yet out of the 
Union,” he declared, warning that this “hasty measure” will “destroy the loyalty of the best 
friends that ever your slaveholders had.”  Secessionists’ headlong rush to sever Virginia’s ties to 
the nation “will dissolve the state,” placing easterners’ property in a precarious situation.75 
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Such pleas, however, failed to stop the convention’s march toward secession.  Delegates 
approved the ordinance, 88-55, with a popular vote on the ordinance to occur on May 23.  A 
handful of northwestern delegates voted in favor of the ordinance, while one abstained and the 
majority voted against its ratification.76  Though the public would vote on the ordinance in 
approximately one month, the scenes around Richmond convinced one northwestern delegate 
that Virginia’s fate was with the Confederacy.  Benjamin Wilson marveled at the “excitement 
and action of the people” outside the convention.  “Companies are leaving every day,” he 
observed, while residents exhibited a “furnished determination to seize all public property within 
the state” and “almost every man & boy…has a gun and sword in hand.”77  Many Richmonders 
saw no point in waiting for public ratification of the ordinance; Virginia was no longer in the 
Union.78   
Unionist northwesterners felt despondent about the convention’s action but determined to 
continue their fight for slavery, democracy, and the Union.  John S. Burdett of Taylor County left 
Richmond on April 17 to inform his constituents of the convention’s decision; a few days later, 
John Carlile and most other northwestern delegates had left the convention and arrived in the 
Northwest by April 21.  Carlile convened a meeting in Clarksburg on April 22 and over one-
thousand residents answered the call to attend this unionist rally.  These northwestern unionists 
decried secessionists’ actions in seizing federal installations and custom houses in the state 
capital without sanction from voters.  The “people of Virginia…by their votes, and through the 
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ballot-box” would solely determine whether the Old Dominion would remain in the Union or 
join the Confederacy.  The extralegal actions undertaken by secessionists lacked legitimacy 
because they occurred without popular sanction.  Now northwesterners existed in a political 
purgatory as this “fearful emergency” unfolded across the nation and the state.  To help 
northwesterners’ navigate this fluid and hostile political climate, Carlile endorsed the passage of 
a resolution that enjoined residents to “appoint…their wisest, best, and discreetest men” for a 
meeting set to convene in Wheeling in May.  Northwesterners would find a democratic path out 
of this national crisis.79   
Not all northwesterners supported Carlile’s “Clarksburg Convention” or expressed 
dismay about the convention’s decision, however.  Upon returning to Wheeling, Chester 
Hubbard remarked that the “secession element is very active” in the city and that a tenuous 
“peace” existed between unionists and secessionists.80  Adding to the tense atmosphere in 
Wheeling, the Daily Union maintained that “every citizen, native and naturalized” must 
“acknowledge allegiance to Virginia alone.”  “Self preservation and the best interests of the 
State” required this unquestioned fealty toward Virginia.8182  A Parkersburg resident remarked 
that though a “large majority” supported the Union, a “very considerable minority of as rabbid 
secessionists as could be found in South Carolina” resided in Wood County.  These secessionists 
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were “openly and secretly plotting the overthrow” of the federal government, he warned.83  
Upshur County farmer Lewis Lunsford observed that those “who love Virginia[,] her laws[,] 
institutions[,] and dictations in this particular vicinity, are surrounded…by…people whose 
Northern feeling and Abolition sentiments are proclaimed among us with impunity.”  These 
unionists enraged Lunsford.  Such northwesterners mocked their birthright and empowered 
“Lincoln and his Abolition allies,” men who had “usurped the powers of…[the] Constitution.”  
Lunsford feared that his Union neighbors would “put their threats into execution” and, in so 
doing, upset the state’s “laws” and “institutions.”84        
The convention’s adoption of the Ordinance of Secession further illustrated that the 
Northwest remained divided, not monolithic.  Taylor County farmer Fabricius Cather witnessed 
this division firsthand.  Unionists “hissed down” secessionist Samuel Woods during his speech 
and showered “secession troops” mobilizing in Grafton with “hisses & groans.”85  In Wellsburg, 
John G. Jacob noted that a “formidable and active body of secessionists” operated in “every 
community” across the region, including Hancock County.86  On April 26, four days after 
Carlile’s “Clarksburg Convention,” secessionists gathered in the city for a “STATES-RIGHTS 
MEETING” to decry northerners’ “long continued hostility” against the slaveholding South.  These 
residents applauded the work of their elected representatives in Richmond in removing Virginia 
from a nation ruled by a “despot” who wielded the “power of a military Emperor” against the 
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South’s “free government and enlightened institutions.”  Northwestern unionists deserved equal 
condemnation.  Such men disparaged the memory of the American Revolution and their 
birthright as Virginians.  Further, their desire to detach the Northwest from Virginia and become 
a “fragmentary bastard corner of Pennsylvania or Ohio” or an independent “helpless, renegade 
community” would generate “civil strife” and expose “families and…property to murder, rapine, 
fire, and general devastation.”  Carlile’s attempt to establish a “Provisional Government” in 
Wheeling lacked “law or authority” from the people and would surely fail.  Accordingly, these 
northwestern secessionists “utterly condemn[ed] the proposition to divide the State, and…loath 
and abhor the diabolical manner in which it is proposed.”87                    
This secessionist meeting in Clarksburg contributed to what Waitman Willey considered 
unionists’ “embarrassed position in the N. West.”  His return to Morgantown convinced him that 
secession had “greatly divided” residents, creating doubt about whether the Northwest would 
remain in the Union or join the Confederacy.  “[W]e do not now know, how strong the Union 
sentiment is in the N. Western counties,” he lamented.  Willey’s uncertainty reflected the 
region’s fluid political climate, as he remained unsure whether his constituents would ratify or 
reject the secession ordinance.  He believed that the upcoming vote on the Ordinance of 
Secession would provide a “reliable index” in measuring residents’ unionism but worried that 
overwhelming support for ratification would prove disastrous for unionists.  “If we are in a 
minority in the N. West, what shall we do?”  A lopsided defeat of the ordinance, though, could 
assist in securing a division of the state.  Though the “idea of a division of the state is new to the 
people,” Willey expressed confidence that Virginia’s allegiance with the Confederacy would 
deepen that desire.  Still, he cautioned against pursuing any “further and ultra movements” if 
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residents’ demanded division, including against slavery.  Willey was not prepared to propose 
slavery’s abolition in a new state.88 
Further dividing northwesterners was news from Richmond that on April 26 the 
convention had removed the tax restrictions on African American slaves.  Many secessionists, 
after securing the passage of the secession ordinance, supported full taxation on slave property to 
foster unity among Virginians and heal the sectional divisions the convention had exposed.  
Jeremiah Morton of Greene County and George W. Randolph of Richmond, both slaveholders, 
spearheaded this movement to equalize taxation.  Morton maintained that western delegates 
would return home “triumphantly” having secured a constitutional guarantee of equal taxation on 
black slaves, a measure that would further promote a “united” Virginia during this national 
crisis.89  Randolph concurred, arguing that western delegates, notably those who ratified the 
secession ordinance, deserved a “satisfactory adjustment” on taxation.90   
Some northwesterners agreed with secessionists’ arguments.  Benjamin Wilson of 
Harrison County, who remained in Richmond after the vote on secession, believed that this 
amendment would promote “unity” in a region that had expressed “dissatisfaction” with 
secession.  Indeed, removing the tax restrictions on African American slaves would “defeat” 
those who used such exemptions to foment “discord and division” in the Northwest.91  The 
Fairmont True Virginian agreed.  With easterners paying “three times as much tax” as 
westerners, Virginia would be “one and indivisible.”92  The Republican Wellsburg Herald, 
however, considered the amendment one of the convention’s “artful dodges” designed to make 
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the secession ordinance more palpable to northwestern voters.   Still, the Republican organ 
worried that “many good Union men” would fall into the “trap” set by secessionists, specifically 
that unionists would be tricked into voting in favor of equalize taxation and the secession 
ordinance.93   
The Wellsburg Herald and unionists across the Northwest looked toward the First 
Wheeling Convention for guidance during this fluid political climate.  Convened on May 13, the 
convention included over 400 attendees, with a handful of northwestern counties providing over 
half the delegation.94  Divisions immediately surfaced among delegates over what mode of 
redress northwesterners should pursue and when to place such plans into motion.  Parkersburg 
lawyer John J. Jackson “opposed…any definite or decisive action” on the part of the convention, 
arguing that moving for a division of the state was “premature,” “revolutionary,” and “altogether 
unwise” until northwesterners had “exhausted” all other options.  Jackson urged the publication 
of resolutions expressing the “wrongs” suffered by the Northwest while exhorting delegates to 
campaign against the secession ordinance’s ratification.95  Carlile rejected Jackson’s cautious 
nature and his “paper resolves.”  “[L]et us show our loyalty to Virginia and the Union,” he 
declared, “and let us maintain ourselves in the Union at every hazard.”  Such prompt action and 
determination among unionists would furnish clear evidence of residents’ fealty toward the 
federal government, a loyalty that would compel the government to provide northwesterners 
military assistance.96  While Brooke County delegate and merchant Campbell Tarr agreed with 
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Carlile’s position, Willey stood with Jackson, arguing that residents looked to the convention for 
a thoughtful, not a hasty, response.97     
This division among delegates about the proper course for northwesterners characterized 
the First Wheeling Convention.  As Carlile remarked, delegates evinced a “unanimous 
determination” to defeat the Ordinance of Secession and remain in the Union but bickered over 
the proper “means of resistance” against the Confederacy.98  Though Carlile maintained that 
dismemberment represented the “only legal, constitutional remedy” available to residents during 
this crisis, others disagreed.99  Clarksburg lawyer John J. Davis avowed that “hasty action would 
not do,” and prayed that Virginians would defeat the ordinance and keep the state “one and 
indivisible.”100  Constitutional requirements for creating a state from an existing state presented a 
formidable obstacle for dismemberment, as nearly all delegates recognized that the Virginia 
General Assembly would not assent to such a request.101  At the end of the convention, delegates 
passed a series of resolutions enjoining residents to defeat the secession ordinance, denouncing 
the Richmond convention’s actions in severing the state’s ties to the Union without first securing 
the “consent of the governed,” and pledging their loyalty to the U.S. Constitution and federal 
government.102  Prior to adjournment, Carlile made one more impassioned plea for a new state.  
He urged the “erection of a New State,” by “blood” if necessary, to help preserve Virginia’s 
institutions.103  Willey, acting as Carlile’s political and constitutional counterweight, encouraged 
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northwesterners to first “kill” the secession ordinance at the ballot box; a constitutional path 
would emerge from this action and guide northwesterners to safety.  Though Virginia’s 
membership in the southern confederacy appeared as a fait accompli, dismemberment still 
appeared possible but not inevitable.104 
The First Wheeling Convention’s missive following the proceedings reflected this 
division concerning statehood and the overall precarious situation northwestern unionists 
occupied.  Delegates avoided any mention of the Richmond Convention’s recent removal of tax 
restrictions on African American slaves, afraid that even a passing reference to that action would 
legitimize the convention’s other initiatives.  Delegates carefully chose their words concerning 
slavery, too, avoiding avoided any discussion of African American slavery.  Rather, the 
convention used the word “slavery” to elucidate the Richmond convention’s recent activities.  
“Eastern despots” had “tyrannized over” residents and had attempted to “enslave” 
northwesterners by removing Virginia from the nation without the people’s consent.  This 
“crime” had robbed white northwesterners of their political and constitutional rights.  Between 
the First Wheeling Convention’s conclusion and the commencement of another convention set to 
convene in early June, delegates urged continued resistance to the “disunion majority” assembled 
in Richmond.  Such resistance would demonstrate to Virginia authorities that white 
northwesterners would not be dragged into the Confederacy like black slaves.105 
The results of voting on the secession ordinance and taxation amendment on May 23 
provided mixed results for northwestern unionists.  Eleven northwestern counties ratified the 
Ordinance of Secession while extreme northwestern counties along the Ohio and Pennsylvania 
borders returned solid majorities against secession.  Even in these counties, though, 
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northwesterners cast ballots in support of the ordinance.106  Over one-hundred residents voted for 
secession in Brooke County, while twenty-three ratified the ordinance in Hancock County.  In 
his History of Brooke County, John G. Jacob recognized that a “very strong southern element” 
existed in the county.  The “doctrine of States rights,” he observed, “had as staunch advocates” 
in Wellsburg as in Richmond.107  The Wellsburg Herald lamented that “so large a proportion” of 
“misguided” residents had become “traitors” to the United States.  Such citizens deserved to be 
recognized, the newspaper determined; the editors printed the names of those who voted in favor 
of the ordinance.108   
In Ohio County, the Daily Intelligencer undertook a similar action against secessionists.  
Over one-hundred and fifty Virginians, including eighty-one in Wheeling, voted to ratify the 
ordinance.  The Republican Daily Intelligencer printed the broadside “Traitors in Wheeling,” 
identifying those who had voted for secession.  These secessionists often had close political or 
economic ties to state authorities in Richmond, and the prospect of a divided Virginia threatened 
those ties.109  Scattered newspaper reports suggest that though unionists defeated the secession 
ordinance in most northwestern counties, a strong secessionist element existed in each county.110  
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But with statewide approval of the ordinance, this northwestern secession element would likely 
receive aid and support from Richmond.  The Northwest would continue to be a divided region.   
Three days after the vote on the secession ordinance and tax amendment, the federal 
government responded to unionists’ pleas.  Major-General George B. McClellan led Union 
troops into Wheeling to protect ostracized unionists and secure the region’s railroads and 
waterways for transporting troops and matériel.111  McClellan ordered his soldiers to respect 
“persons and property,” to be merciful to “misguided” secessionists, and allow the “loyal men of 
Western Virginia…to organize and arm.”112  McClellan fashioned himself as northwesterners’ 
savior from the “machinations of a few factious rebels in your midst.”  These rebels had 
prevented men from “expressing your loyalty at the polls” and would attempt to make Unionists 
“yield to their schemes and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy” of the Confederate 
States.  McClellan emphasized that northwesterners’ constitutional and personal rights would be 
“religiously respected” by the federal government.  Chief among such property rights was 
slaveholding.  Though secessionists maintained that the federal government would wage war on 
slavery, McClellan denied such rumors.  The federal government would “abstain from all such 
interference” on slavery, but would use its “iron hand” to “crush any attempt at insurrection” on 
the part of slaves or secessionists.113 
                                                          
movement provides the closest approximation to the vote on the secession ordinance.  He estimates that over 30,000 
northwesterners voted against the ordinance while slightly over 10,000 voted in favor.  Curry, A House Divided, 
142-144.  Missing vote totals on the ad valorem tax amendment likewise hamper further analysis on that subject.  
John E. Stealey reports that there are no extant voting results for fifteen counties in present-day West Virginia: 
Brooke, Doddridge, Hancock, Jackson, McDowell, Marion, Marshall, Monongalia, Pleasants, Preston, Ritchie, 
Roane, Taylor, Wetzel, and Wood.  Still, in present-day West Virginia, Stealey finds that 28,037 voted for the 
amendment, while 2,934 opposed it.  Stealey, West Virginia’s Civil War-era Constitution, 69.    
111 William G. Thomas, The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern America (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011), 74 and MacKenzie, “Fifth Border State,” 168.     
112 George B. McClellan, quoted in Curry, A House Divided, 55.   
113 George B. McClellan to the Union Men of Western Virginia, 26 May 1861, reprinted in The Civil War Papers of 
George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 
1989), 26.   
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McClellan’s presence and rhetoric calmed unionists’ fears.114  The federal government 
extended shelter and protection to besieged unionists while respecting the property rights of all 
citizens.  Willey later hailed McClellan’s respect for slaveholders’ rights, noting the “supreme 
satisfaction” northwesterners’ felt as the general vowed to protect their chattel.115  McClellan’s 
aid was critical as unionists reconvened in Wheeling in early June to discuss the reorganization 
of the state government and the propriety of dismemberment.  Though a month removed from 
the First Wheeling Convention, no consensus existed concerning a division of the state.116  This 
disharmony became manifest as the Second Wheeling Convention progressed.117  On June 13, 
two days after its commencement, the convention passed a declaration denouncing the recent 
actions of Virginia Governor John Letcher and the Richmond Convention in denying Virginians 
an opportunity to ratify or reject the secession ordinance prior to the state levying war against the 
Union.118  Northwesterners considered the actions separating the state from the Union as enacted 
                                                          
114 John J. Davis believed that the “presence of Federal troops” in the Northwest “saved the Union men from being 
crushed & persecuted to death by the Secessionists.”  He noted that prior to McClellan entering the Northwest, 
Union men in Taylor and Barbour counties “were persecuted most shamefully,” with some “imprisoned” and others 
“forced to take the oath of allegiance to the Southern Confederacy.”  John J. Davis, quoted in F. Gerald Ham, “The 
Mind of a Copperhead: Letters of John J. Davis on the Secession Crisis and Statehood Politics in Western Virginia, 
1860-1862,” West Virginia History, 24, no. 1 (October 1962 to July 1963): 99.   
115 Waitman T. Willey, Speech of Hon. W.T. Willey of Virginia, on the Object of the War; Delivered in the Senate of 
the United States, December 19 and 20, 1861 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Globe Office, 1862), 5.   
116 Kingwood Chronicle, June 8, 1861, 2.  George and Amos Row, publishers of the Kingwood Chronicle in Preston 
County, argued that the Northwest’s “position is to adhere to the old State Constitution.”  Virginia officials had 
vacated congressional and state offices, mandating that northwesterners fill those positions while maintaining its 
presence in the Union.  The actions of eastern Virginians, the publishers concluded, required northwesterners to 
assume governing responsibilities, not to create a new Virginia.  Part of northwesterners’ hesitancy to create a new 
state may have reflected the success of Union forces in the region.  Union victories across the Northwest, including 
at Philippi and, later, Rich Mountain, may have persuaded some northwesterners that the Civil War would be short-
lived.  Any drastic change advocated by residents could be abandoned if conflict ceased, leaving pro-statehood 
northwesterners in an awkward political position once relations with eastern Virginia returned to antebellum status. 
117 Unlike the first convention, more of the 105 delegates hailed from Virginia while slaveholding continued to be an 
important characteristic for some members.  MacKenzie, “Fifth Border State,” 148.  MacKenzie concludes that ten 
delegates owned a total of fifty-one slaves, with Lewis Ruffner of Kanawha County owning half of those slaves.    
118 John Letcher disagreed with the convention’s argument concerning his and the Richmond Convention’s 
antidemocratic behavior.  In a letter “To the People of Northwestern Virginia,” Letcher maintained that the 
“sovereign people of Virginia…by their own free choice, have…severed the ties” to the federal government.  The 
“majority is against you,” Letcher argued, and thus it became the “duty of good citizens to yield to the will of the 
State.”  The Virginia governor called upon northwesterners to reflect upon their shared birthright, heritage, and 
memories with eastern Virginians, their brethren who had recently displayed their “magnanimity” in equalizing 
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“without authority” and therefore “void.”119  The convention reestablished the offices of 
governor and lieutenant governor and elected delegates to meet in a legislative body in the city.  
Delegates selected Francis H. Pierpont of Marion County and Daniel Polsley of Mason County 
for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively.120   
Pierpont’s two addresses to the convention reflected northwestern unionists’ concern with 
protecting slavery and democracy.  Confederates declared that “the people are not the source of 
all power,” an axiom that represented the antithesis of what northwesterners had argued over the 
preceding decades.  These traitors maintained that only the “educated class” should possess 
political representation, not “laboring classes.”121  Importantly, Pierpont denied that the 
“protection of negro slavery was the great object” of the war.  The blame for the war rested on 
southern patricians.  These aristocrats had grown “dissatisfied with the Union” and used slavery 
as a “pretext” to overthrow the current government and institute “one more suited to their tastes 
and habits of life.”  By branding southern patricians, not slavery, for instigating the war, Pierpont 
disarmed those who may have considered action against the institution a necessary prerequisite 
in destroying the Confederacy.  Northwesterners should concern themselves with quelling the 
rebellion and reorganizing the state government, Pierpont declared, not in interfering with 
African American slavery.122   
                                                          
taxation.  John Letcher, “To the People of Northwestern Virginia,” 17 June 1861, John Letcher papers, Mss1 L5684 
a FA2, Series 6, Folder 401, VHS.      
119 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 86-87.   
120 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 92, 140-141.   
121 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 144-145.   
122 A State of Convenience: The Creation of West Virginia, “Proceedings of the Second Wheeling Convention, June 
17, 1861,” West Virginia Archives & History: West Virginia Division of Culture and History 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/wheelingconvention20617.html][accessed 2 July 2015].  Waitman 
Willey supported Pierpont’s assertion that southern planters and aristocrats who despised democracy instigated the 
war.  Willey argued that “dissatisfaction with the principles and operation of democratic government” and a 
“hostility to the simplicity and equality of republican institutions” drove these southern patricians to secede and 
declare war on the United States.  Willey, Object of the War, 11.     
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The motion to reorganize the state government and not to pursue dismemberment divided 
the convention.  John Carlile, a passionate and ardent supporter of a separate state a month 
earlier, expressed more caution during this latter meeting.  He confessed that he “first started the 
little stone down the mountain” but now believed it prudent to “apply the rubbers to other 
gentlemen” who advocated immediate division.123  Chester Hubbard of Ohio County agreed, 
arguing that delegates were “not here to create a State, but to save one.”124  Other delegates 
insisted that the convention must consider constitutional obligations, especially because the 
federal government had provided the necessary security for protecting this convention.125   
Delegates advocating immediate dismemberment were few and held little sway in the 
convention.  Monongalia delegate George B. Dorsey characterized dismemberment as a “dire 
necessity” that would permanently separate two “entirely antagonistic” peoples.  Virginia’s 
“history” provided sufficient evidence to Dorsey that western Virginians’ shared few, if any, 
“interests” with their eastern brethren.126  Dorsey and fellow pro-statehood members failed to 
convince their colleagues about the immediate need for separation, however.  John J. Davis 
believed that “Black Republicans” were the “strongest supporters and advocates” for immediate 
separation, a scheme that appeared more of a “revolution” than a “legal, constitutional action.”127  
                                                          
123 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 125.   
124 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 123.   
125 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 106-107, 110-111.  John D. Nicholls of Brooke County and Chapman J. 
Stuart of Doddridge cautioned delegates about undermining constitutional principles in creating a new state out of 
an existing state.  Peter G. Van Winkle of Wood County worried about the boundaries of the new state being drawn 
during the early stages of the war, especially when secessionists still controlled some western counties.     
126 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 104-106.   
127 John J. Davis to Anna Kennedy, 13 June 1861, John J. Davis Family Papers, A&M 1946, Box 1, WVRHC.  
Davis admitted that he “felt Virginian all over” during these proceedings, especially when that “negro loving” 
abolitionist John C. Underwood applied for admission to the convention. [emphasis in original] 
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Though the Second Wheeling Convention agreed to consider separate statehood at a future 
meeting in August, divisions and accusations prevented delegates from cohering on this issue.128 
The divisions expressed by delegates concerning separation should not be surprising or 
that advocates for division remained in the minority.  Over the preceding decades, 
northwesterners wielded dismemberment as a threat against eastern legislators who had abused 
political power and refused to extend political equality to all white men.  Even when 
northwesterners discussed dismemberment, opposing voices noted serious political, economic, 
and constitutional issues could derail the movement.  Common bonds of heritage, history, and 
religion further dampened such talk.  The 1851 Constitution extinguished any discussion of 
disunion in the state, as northwesterners finally achieved the equality that had been denied to 
them.  The onset of war, though, challenged residents’ fealty toward the state.  Secessionists’ 
extralegal maneuvers infuriated northwesterners who interpreted such actions as that of a master 
compelling his black slave.  Questions loomed in northwesterners’ minds.  Could 
northwesterners trust these secessionists if they occupied the same body politic following the 
war?  Would a decisive Union victory displace these secessionists from positions of power and 
place northwesterners in control of the state government?  How would secessionists’ actions 
impact slavery?  Could northwesterners’ satisfy constitutional requirements if they desired 
division?  These questions confounded northwesterners.  Lacking sufficient answers to these 
questions, most northwesterners preferred resistance to secessionists, not revolution, in 1861.   
                                                          
128 Even the Republican Wellsburg Herald, an advocate for separate statehood, realized that “common sense” and 
the “natural run of events” convinced delegates to postpone talk of division.  The newspaper hoped that once “affairs 
take a more settled shape,” delegates and northwesterners would be able to revisit this question.  Wellsburg Herald, 
June 14, 1861, 2.  A few weeks later, John G. Jacob, editor of the newspaper, argued that “if the new State is to be a 
free State, we are for it; otherwise, we are for the old State.”  He lamented that an element existed in the region that 
“still consider slavery as the one thing needful for the salvation of the State.”  Wellsburg Herald, July 19, 1861, 2.  
[emphasis in original].  See also Wellsburg Herald, July 26, 1861, 2.       
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When the Second Wheeling Convention reconvened in early August,129 Confederate 
fortunes had improved immensely.  Confederate victories, notably at Manassas in late July, 
persuaded many northwesterners that the war would not end quickly and possibly without a 
decisive Union victory.130  A Confederate victory or truce between the two belligerents would 
create an uncertain future for northwestern unionists and for slavery and democracy in the 
region.131  Faced with improving Confederate military prospects, delegates at the Second 
Wheeling Convention further distanced the Northwest from the reach of the Richmond 
government, declaring all constitutional, legislative, and policy actions enacted by that body 
“illegal, inoperative, null, void, and without force or effect.”132  On the convention’s seventh day, 
the Committee on a Division of the State offered its ordinance for dividing the state, maintaining 
that a division would improve the “social, commercial and political condition” of western 
Virginians.  Though more delegates supported dismemberment than a month prior, dissenting 
voices still existed.133 
                                                          
129 During the interim between the Second Wheeling Convention in June and in August, the reorganized government 
convened in Wheeling from July 1-26.  On July 4, President Lincoln informed Congress that he recognized the 
Wheeling government as the legitimate government for Virginia.  This recognition from Lincoln aided the 
convention’s work.  Delegates elected Waitman T. Willey and John Carlile as U.S. Senators for Virginia, replacing 
the seats vacated by James M. Mason and Robert M.T. Hunter.  This reorganized government of eight state senators 
and thirty-two house delegates focused primarily on western Virginia’s military and financial matters.  Only during 
the latter part of the session did the General Assembly take up the question of a division.  The House of Delegates 
voted down the measure while the state senate tabled it.  Every delegate except one returned in August when the 
Second Wheeling Convention reconvened.  Tarter, Grandees of Government, 220 and A State of Convenience: The 
Creation of the State of West Virginia, “Legislature of the Reorganized Government of Virginia meets in Extra 
Session, July 1-26, 1861,” West Virginia Archives & History: West Virginia Division of Culture and History 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statehood08.html][accessed 3 July 2015].   
130 Charles H. Ambler and Festus P. Summers, West Virginia: The Mountain State (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1958), 204.   
131 William G. Brown expressed such fears as the Second Wheeling Convention adjourned in late June.  Brown 
argued that securing an “early division of the State” was of the “utmost importance,” believing that the antipathy 
between eastern and western Virginians made reconciliation impossible.  This project needed to be completed 
“before the parties are done fighting,” he emphasized, and further hoped that a new state would be a “home for 
Union men who may be driven from other parts of the State.”  William G. Brown to Francis H. Pierpont, 24 June 
1861, Francis Harrison Pierpont Papers, A&M 9, Box 2, Folder 23, WVRHC.  [emphasis in original].   
132 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 195.   
133 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 204.   
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Committee chairman James G. West, a farmer from Wetzel County and former opponent 
of the statehood movement, dismissed concerns that fluid and hostile boundaries between union 
and secession counties should be resolved before creating a state.134  Marion County merchant 
John S. Barnes, though, emphasized the “impropriety” of creating a new state, arguing that its 
creation should be done in “accordance with the Constitution.”  Would Congress admit Western 
Virginia on a “mere technicality?”  Barnes also stressed that residents in numerous counties 
included in the initial boundaries of the state had embraced secession only months earlier.  
Barnes urged his colleagues to first exhaust “all peaceful and legal means of obtaining a 
separation,” even if that meant consulting the “whole state.”  The war, he concluded, had been 
waged over the “maintenance of the Constitution,” thereby requiring unionists to strictly adhere 
to constitutional principles lest their actions undermine the federal government.135  But Wetzel 
County farmer Reuben Martin asserted that a new state would manifest the “line between us” 
that the “God of nature” had drawn between eastern and western Virginians.  Northwesterners, in 
fashioning a new state, would simply be following Providence’s will.136           
The issue of slavery entered the discussion as delegates continued to debate 
dismemberment.  Andrew F. Ritchie, a farmer from Marion County, believed that the 
convention’s effort to create a new state would produce irreparable harm for the federal 
government.  Dividing Virginia, he asserted, would be a “violation of the spirit, if not the letter 
of the [Federal] Constitution.”  The Constitution provided specific instructions for creating a new 
state; western Virginia failed to satisfy those requirements.  An attempt to apply to Congress for 
                                                          
134 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 206-208 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Wetzel, Virginia; Roll: 
M653_1384; Page: 29; Image: 33; Family History Library Film: 805384 [Ancestry.com][accessed 5 July 2015].   
135 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 208-210 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: District 4, Marion, Virginia; Roll: 
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statehood would “embarrass the action” of the federal government in its attempt to “put down the 
rebellion.”  Attempting to create a state without fully addressing the “slavery question,” he 
emphasized, would “only create controversy in Congress.”  Controversy would also extend into 
the Northwest, where a “divided sentiment” existed among residents concerning the institution.  
Republicans, still an alien organization to most residents, would not rest until slavery ceased to 
exist in the region, Ritchie insisted, thereby creating a division that would destroy the 
reorganized government.  The Lincoln Administration had not interfered with slavery or the 
rights of slaveholders in its war against the Confederacy; how could western Virginians 
inaugurate or tolerate such action in their own state?137   
Other delegates agreed with Ritchie’s rationale concerning slavery.  Fontain Smith, a 
lawyer from Marion County, maintained that geography and climate could resolve the question 
of slavery in western Virginia, freeing delegates from any action on the issue.  Still, African 
American bondage was “constitutionally right,” he declared.138  Charles S. Lewis, a slaveholder 
and lawyer in Harrison County, resisted secession because he believed the Confederacy “would 
strike a death blow at the institution,” not save it.  Lewis dismissed the “ravings of the 
abolitionists” in demanding emancipation and cautioned delegates about the “danger” of turning 
western Virginia into a free state.  Instead of permitting the “emancipationist…[to] raise his head 
                                                          
137 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 218-220 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: District 4, Marion, Virginia; Roll: 
M653_1361; Page: 608; Image: 168; Family History Library Film: 805361 [Ancestry.com][accessed 5 July 2015].  
Ritchie also presented to the convention a letter from U.S. Attorney General Edwin Bates who advised the 
convention to avoid introducing “any new elements of revolution” and to adhere to constitutional outlines for 
creating a new state.  Bates feared that erecting a new state from an existing one without the consent of the latter 
would validate a “new and hazardous experiment.”  Edwin Bates to A.F. Ritchie, 12 August 1861, quoted in Lewis, 
How West Virginia Was Made, 219-220.       
138 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 221-222 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: District 7, Marion, Virginia; Roll: 
M653_1361; Page: 710; Image: 272; Family History Library Film: 805361 [accessed 5 July 2015][accessed 5 July 
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in our midst,” Lewis urged delegates to allow the “silent laws of political economy” to determine 
slavery’s fate.139 
The slavery question continued to vex delegates.  Wood County delegate Arthur I. 
Boreman asserted that a constitution submitted to Congress that contained no provision for 
ending slavery would be rejected.  Such an action by the Republican legislature would “foment 
such an excitement in Western Virginia as was never witnessed before.”  Could this 
“excitement” evolve into secessionism?140  Ohio County banker Daniel Lamb agreed with 
Boreman’s conclusion.  Though Lamb admitted that the territory proposed for the new state 
contained a small slave population in comparison with eastern Virginia, he became concerned 
that this statehood movement would evolve into an “abolition movement.”  If the convention 
petitioned Congress for statehood with slavery, Republicans would deny admittance.  Why “push 
such a question upon the councils of the nation” while the federal government waged war, Lamb 
wondered.141  Lieutenant Governor Daniel Polsley maintained that “he was as good a pro-slavery 
man as any one in the State,” but confessed that he would abandon slavery if it meant the 
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Waitman Willey and Taylor County merchant and fellow slaveholder John S. Burdett agreed with Lewis.  In a 
speech in the U.S. Senate, Willey argued that Virginians and all Americans should “leave slavery where the 
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salvation of Virginia and the federal government.142  As Republican John G. Jacob later 
admitted, though the Northwest was “on the margin of the slaveholding community” by 1861, 
residents expressed “a good deal of interest” in the institution and its maintenance.  In “various 
ways” and “by association” slavery impacted each and every resident, he observed.143  Jacob was 
correct.  Though few slaves and even fewer slaveholders resided in the Northwest, the institution 
enjoyed broad acceptance and countless advocates.  Cognizant of residents’ support for slavery, 
delegates remained uncertain about the prospects of a new state or the institution.        
When the convention adjourned on August 21, delegates passed “An Ordinance to 
Provide for the Formation of a New State out of a Portion of the Territory of this State” by a 50-
28 margin, a reflection of persistent divisions.144  Delegates tackled the issue of slavery by not 
addressing it at all; the ordinance made no reference to slaves or slavery.  Residents would vote 
on the ordinance, along with a slate of delegates to attend a constitutional convention set to 
convene in November if the ordinance carried, on October 24.  Dismemberment and the creation 
of the new state of Kanawha were on the horizon but without a resolution on slavery, Kanawha’s 
admittance into the Union appeared uncertain.145 
Residents remained conflicted as the October vote loomed.  In a mass meeting held in 
Wheeling, Governor Pierpont emphasized that Confederates’ “leading object…was not only to 
keep their negroes enslaved, but to enslave the whole working classes of the country.”  Securing 
a division of the state would save white laborers from political bondage.146  An anonymous 
writer in the Daily Intelligencer argued that the vote represented an “opportunity of freeing” 
                                                          
142 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 277.   
143 Jacob, History of Brooke County, 163.   
144 Other issues outside of slavery created more divisions among delegates.  These included the proposed state’s 
borders, debt assumption, and Virginia’s intrastate tensions over the preceding decades.  Lewis, How West Virginia 
Was Made, 210, 224-225, 237-238.   
145 Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 284-300.   
146 Daily Intelligencer, September 26, 1861, 3.   
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northwesterners “from the yoke of the oppressor.”  Virginia’s “history” and “geography,” 
notably the “mountain barriers” that no internal improvement had “hewn down or pierced,” 
should provide sufficient evidence to all voters that eastern and western Virginia possessed 
divergent “interests.”147  The editors of the Daily Intelligencer believed that the “day that is to 
sever us from our political connection with Eastern Virginia” would soon become manifest.148  
The newspaper dismissed the slavery issue, reminding readers that Kanawha’s future resembled 
that of its free state neighbors Ohio and Pennsylvania.  Regardless of future action on slavery, 
“natural laws” and the “irresistible march of events” would eventually make Kanawha a free 
state, too.149   
The Wellsburg Herald expressed more concern and doubt than its fellow Republican 
organ.  “The signs in the political heavens are unpropitious.”  Though optimistic about the 
ordinance receiving residents’ approval, the newspaper believed that congressional approval for 
a new slave state was unlikely.  A “civil war” would commence, dividing residents into those 
who demanded the “abolition of slavery” and those “whose rallying cry will be death to the 
Abolitionists.”  Civil war would engulf the region.150  John J. Davis, a delegate to the Second 
Wheeling Convention who had voted in favor of the division ordinance, “hope[d]…[that] the 
measure will carry with the people and relieve West Va.”  Still, he found the timing “inopportune 
during the continuance of hostilities.”151  A convincing Confederate victory in the Northwest 
could force Davis and other unionists “to say farewell to the land of my birth” and imperil the 
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statehood movement.152  Lewis County attorney Caleb Boggess noted that a “large majority” of 
northwesterners favored division but worried that achieving “Congressional consent” would 
derail the movement.  This “doubt” concerning congressional approval expanded the “diversity 
of opinion” already existing on the subject.  Could a resolution on this issue be achieved that 
satisfied voters?153 
The results on the division ordinance revealed residents’ desire for dismemberment but 
presented a cautionary tale about aggressive action concerning slavery.   Over eighteen-thousand 
residents voted in favor of the ordinance, while less than five-hundred rejected it.154  John J. 
Davis celebrated the “overwhelming” margin in favor of division.  He “hope[d] Jeff Davis will 
let us depart in peace now,” as the election results provided “unmistakable evidence of our 
unwillingness to become subjects of his.”155  Though one hurdle had been cleared, several more 
remained with slavery being the most imposing.  An anonymous writer remarked that “the 
people are not yet prepared for a rejection of slavery” and argued that it constituted “too great a 
change” for many to consider.  Could a free state be realized?156  The Wellsburg Herald was 
“satisfied” with the results but cautioned that the issue of slavery still loomed.  The Herald 
predicted that a “provision for gradual emancipation, would probably not abolish slavery under 
25 or 30 years” in the Northwest, and instead recommended that residents let slavery perish from 
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“natural decay.”  Any aggressive action concerning African American bondage, including a 
gradual emancipation clause, threatened to derail the statehood movement.157  In Wheeling, the 
Daily Intelligencer appeared less concerned about the issue of slavery.  The newspaper 
castigated those who “bring forward Mr. Nigger on all occasions, and use him as a getter up of 
prejudice,” notably those who characterized the statehood movement as an offspring of 
“abolitionism, or some other obnoxious ism.”  The issue of slavery, the newspaper confidently 
predicted, would be easily resolved in the coming months.158 
The Daily Intelligencer expressed a confidence concerning slavery and the upcoming 
constitutional convention that appeared justified.  Northwestern Republicans believed that the 
war manifested the bitter fruits of the peculiar institution and its subversive effects on democratic 
government.  Republican John G. Jacob recognized that the “incompatibility of African slavery 
with republican institutions and the development of the American idea of self-government” 
produced the troubles that afflicted both the nation and the state.159  The actions of the Richmond 
Convention and Henry Wise and his ilk in levying war against the Union prior to public 
ratification of the secession ordinance smacked of tyranny as it constituted an affront to 
republican government.  Such actions, Republicans averred, reflected slavery’s corrupting 
political influence.  As the war continued and the deaths mounted, Republicans reasoned that any 
remaining proslavery sentiment in the Northwest would dissipate.  The vote on the division 
ordinance further clarified and strengthened Republicans’ interpretation concerning slavery and 
the statehood movement.  Residents demanded a new state, one free from slavery’s baneful 
reach.               
                                                          
157 Wellsburg Herald, November 29, 1861, 2.   
158 Daily Intelligencer, November 12, 1861, 2.   
159 Wellsburg Herald, July 26, 1861, 2.     
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The Daily Intelligencer poorly misread northwesterners’ interpretation of African 
American bondage, a misinterpretation that has shaped the historiographical debate concerning 
West Virginia statehood and the issue of slavery.  Northwesterners’ adhered to the Union and 
rejected the Confederacy not because they desired slavery’s extinction; rather, residents 
remained committed to the Union because slavery would continue to flourish under the Stars and 
Stripes.  The hierarchies constructed on the peculiar institution, notably racial supremacy and 
patriarchy, would remain inviolable in the Union.  Further, northwesterners’ democratic rights—
rights obtained after decades of struggle and debate—would remain protected from overzealous 
planters who wished to stem the tide of democratic reform across the South.   
The “Slave Power” that Republicans castigated existed under the guise of “King Cotton” 
in the Deep South and parts of eastern Virginia.  But unlike in South Carolina, Alabama, or 
Mississippi, northwesterners believed that their constitution properly situated power in the hands 
of nonslaveholders while checking the power of such patrician-minded slaveholders.  
Empowered by universal suffrage and more legislative representation, northwestern 
nonslaveholders believed that they wielded tremendous political power and, in general, they 
were correct.  Though a few grievances remained on the books that expanded slaveholders’ 
power, nonslaveholders believed they could resolve those issues by appealing to democratic 
sensibilities.  Few, if any, non-Republican northwesterners, though, sought to use that political 
power to disturb the master-slave relationship.       
The preservation of the master-slave relationship and protecting democratic rights 
constituted northwesterners’ primary objectives during the Richmond Convention, important 
objectives that historians have overlooked.  Unionists and secessionists disagreed over the proper 
means of securing both but agreed that their preservation was vital.  For unionists like William 
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G. Brown and Waitman Wiley, the means for securing both rested on staying in the union and 
taxing African American slaves at their full market value.  Such a move, they declared, would 
remove an odious feature that irritated nonslaveholders and would ultimately make the institution 
more secure, not endanger it.  Rather than an abolitionist scheme as interpreted by some 
secessionists, northwesterners sought only to strengthen the institution.  Northwestern 
secessionists generally agreed that removing tax restrictions on slaves would promote unity and 
raise much-needed revenue.  But such actions should occur in concert with Virginia’s 
membership in the southern confederacy.  Secessionists’ desire to protect their chattel persuaded 
many to sanction Henry Wise’s extralegal actions and that of the convention as a whole, notably 
as the convention began to sever Virginia’s bonds to the Union before the people voted on the 
Ordinance of Secession.  Unionists bemoaned the convention’s decision, interpreting the triumph 
of “King Cotton” over republican government and principles.  Faced with a hostile populace, 
many northwestern delegates returned home and contemplated what move unionists could take in 
this national crisis.   
For some northwesterners the next move was to adhere to the Union but remain loyal 
Virginians.  The national crisis would soon be resolved through diplomacy or military conflict, 
and soon residents could return to their antebellum political status.  Others, though, believed that 
secessionists’ actions forced northwesterners to explore a division of the state.  For decades, 
northwestern residents and politicians had wielded dismemberment as a signal of their 
dissatisfaction with their lack of political equality and as a threat to extract concessions from 
obdurate easterners.  Now, with a war expanding in scope and cost and faced with an uncertain 
future, northwesterners took the next step in exploring dismemberment and statehood.  But their 
desire for a new state did not necessarily reflect their desire for a free state, a premature 
299 
 
conclusion too many historians have supported.  While some residents endorsed gradual and 
compensated emancipation for loyal slaveholders, other northwesterners maintained that slavery 
must constitute the foundation for any new state.  Anything short of that feature could imperil the 
whole movement.  The unionist coalition that had steered the Northwest through the initial 
phases of the Civil War would be tested in the coming months on the paramount issue of the day: 















Chapter 7: (Some) Mountaineers are Always Free: Statehood and Preserving Racial Hierarchy, 
1862-1863 
On June 20, 1863, West Virginia entered the Union as a slave state.  In his inaugural 
address as the state’s first governor, Republican Arthur Ingraham Boreman characterized the 
Mountain State’s creation as a manifestation of the intrastate sectional tension that had 
threatened to dismember Virginia multiple times over the preceding years.  Eastern Virginians 
had “always” considered the trans-Allegheny an “outside appendage” or “territory,” Boreman 
insisted, as constitutional, political, and economic structures favored eastern Virginians at the 
expense of their transmontane neighbors.  Empowered by the “original Constitution of the 
State,” eastern Virginians had “collected heavy taxes from us” to construct “railroads and canals 
in the East” while they “withheld appropriations from the West.”  West Virginia’s “natural 
channels” meant that “[o]ur markets, our trade and our travel” occurred with northern and 
western states, generating “little intercourse” among eastern and western Virginians.  Differences 
in “nature, our commerce, travel, habits, associations, and interests” coupled with eastern 
Virginians’ support for the “fatal doctrine of secession” strengthened Boreman’s interpretation 
that “two peoples” occupied the same state, making the Old Dominion’s dismemberment 
inevitable.1 
 Boreman’s memory of Virginia’s sectional history reflected the difficulty leading a state 
still struggling with the issue of slavery.  West Virginia’s path to statehood was fraught with 
numerous obstacles and divisive issues, most notably slavery.  In 1861, Northwest residents 
pledged loyalty to the United States for, among other reasons, the government’s unwavering 
commitment to slavery and slaveholding interests.  Northwest politicians carried this message to 
                                                          
1 Arthur I. Boreman, “Inaugural Address of Governor Arthur I. Boreman,” West Virginia Archives & History: West 
Virginia Division of Culture and History [www.wvculture.org/history/boremania.html][accessed 21 June 2013]. 
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Richmond in 1861, attempting to convince their fellow Virginians that their constituents 
supported slavery and would protect slaveholders’ chattel from meddling abolitionists and a 
Republican president.  Northwesterners’ support for easterners’ property, though, was contingent 
upon remaining in the Union, for an alliance with Deep South planters imperiled the political 
rights guaranteed by the 1851 Constitution.  Any disruption of equilibrium between slavery and 
democracy threatened to destroy both institutions.  Despite northwesterners’ protestations, 
Virginia seceded and joined the Confederate States of America. 
The commencement of civil war divided Northwest residents.  Secessionists’ applauded 
the Richmond convention’s decision and promised to defend the state and new nation from 
northern enemies.  Many northwesterners considered secession an unforgivable act and grounds 
for dismemberment, however, while others stressed caution and deliberation, wary that hasty 
action would precipitate further calamities or a speedy conclusion to the war would embarrass 
the movement.  Confederate military victories, though, impressed upon the majority of 
Northwest unionists that dividing Virginia would protect African American bondage and 
democratic rights.  A series of meetings and conventions established a reorganized government 
for loyal Virginians and laid the groundwork for the statehood movement.  But the statehood 
movement, rather than promoting cohesion and unity, fostered more division and acrimony.         
The statehood movement’s divisiveness centered on the issue of slavery.  Politicians and 
residents had expressed caution tackling the subject because of the institution’s centrality to 
northwesterners’ political thinking.  Northwest Republicans emerged as vocal supporters of 
abolishing slavery to save the Union and to hasten West Virginia’s creation.  Republicans, aided 
by the presence of federal troops and their identification with the statehood movement, stressed 
that slavery’s abolition in western Virginia would liberate white residents from the political 
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tyranny imposed by eastern Virginia oligarchs.  Slavery, the central cause of secession and the 
Civil War according to Republicans, had severed the remaining bonds of union between eastern 
and western Virginians; removing this cancer from the body politic represented a lasting rebuke 
to the Richmond “Slave Power” and those who performed that cabal’s bidding in the Northwest.  
Slavery’s destruction in western Virginia would also undermine Confederate efforts, hasten the 
war’s conclusion, and preserve the Union.  “Shall we object that slavery is destroyed…if the 
Union is thereby saved,” Boreman questioned.2  Republicans’ leadership in the new statehood 
movement increased their popularity, allowing them to control the direction of the state and the 
memory of its formation.      
Republicans’ eagerness to abolish slavery encountered intense opposition.  Many non-
Republicans who supported the statehood movement suggested measures that prohibited 
importing African Americans into the state while others insisted that market forces would slowly 
drain that population southward.  Other westerners were more vocal in their opposition.  
Conservative northwesterners—some who expressed varying degrees of support for statehood 
while others outright opposed it—worried about the broadening scope of war, notably 
Republicans’ flagrant dismissal and denigration of fundamental constitutional rights.  Foremost 
among these rights were those of slaveholders.  “[W]aging…a war for the abolishment of slavery 
in the southern States is in open violation of the Constitution,” the Clarksburg Patriot insisted.3  
A war to save the Union had evolved into a war to destroy slavery, a development that 
unconditional unionists before the war had not supported and now strongly opposed.  John 
Carlile maintained this position, arguing that directions from congressional Republicans to create 
                                                          
2 Boreman, “Inaugural Address.”  
3 Clarksburg Patriot, April 3, 1863, 2.   
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a new state amounted to congressional dictation.  The creation of West Virginia reflected 
political submission, conservatives averred, not liberation.   
The Union’s victory over the Confederacy in 1865 overshadowed conservatives’ 
arguments, a phenomenon that has shaped the memory and historiography of West Virginia’s 
founding.   The seemingly inevitable conflict of slaveholding states and nonslaveholding states 
has colored historians’ arguments concerning the inevitable conflict between eastern 
slaveholders and western nonslaveholders in Virginia.  Western nonslaveholders, aware that their 
political liberation was near, helped overthrow the Richmond “Slave Power,” destroy African 
American bondage, and separate from eastern Virginians.  As Charles Ambler argued, these 
developments in Virginia represented a “microcosm” of the national struggle.4  Decades of 
conflict concerning slaveholders’ prerogatives, slavery’s political characteristics, geographical 
isolation, and political inequality led to the creation of West Virginia, William Freehling argues, 
leaving Virginia “shattered” by 1863.5    
This argument concerning the inevitable and inexorable conflict between western and 
eastern Virginians has received broad scholarly support from contemporary and current 
historians.  Theodore Lang averred that during the “thirty years before the Rebellion,” a 
“condition of absolute hostility” existed between eastern and western Virginians.  Matters of 
political inequality, specifically limited suffrage, unequal representation, and unfair taxation, 
contributed to this “hostility.”  Further, “in order to secure the suffrage of people of his district,” 
Lang claimed that prospective candidates for political office had to “pledge…to the principle of a 
division of the state.”  Politics in the Northwest, therefore, centered on dismemberment.6  
                                                          
4 Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 335.   
5 Freehling, Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumph, 526.   
6 Lang, Loyal West Virginia, 3-4.   
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Charles Ambler argued that the creation of West Virginia arose from the Old Dominion’s 
sectional conflict, a development that was “impossible” to prevent.  The “radicals of the 
northwest” succeeded in 1863 in “dismembering the ‘Mother of Commonwealths,’” he 
concluded, a fitting coda to a process decades in the making.7  Henry Shanks maintained that the 
“separate state movement was part of a long, sectional rivalry” that had been building for 
decades over the political issues raised by Lang and Ambler.  Northwesterners’ nearly 
unanimous opposition to secession while eastern Virginians embraced the Confederacy 
represented the final act in this intrastate sectional struggle.  And this struggle not only led to 
West Virginia’s founding but the long-awaited death knell of slavery, too.8    
Modern historians have generally agreed that Virginia’s decades-long sectional struggle 
culminated in the statehood movement, a movement driven by the same tensions and forces that 
tore the nation apart in 1861.  Daniel Crofts emphasizes that years of “intense” sectional 
animosity in Virginia generated the “most explosive regional antisecession movement” of the 
war.  Northwesterners, “exploited” and “neglected” by eastern Virginians, argued that the state 
failed to “provide tangible benefits” for their region while slaveholders enjoyed special 
privileges.  Secession increased sectional tension to a breaking point.9  The “formation of West 
Virginia…represented a culmination of trends evident” in preceding years, specifically in 
Virginians’ disagreement over slavery’s role and power in electoral politics, William Link 
argues.  By the 1850s, William Link argues that “West Virginia exceptionalism emerged and 
blossomed as a social and political phenomenon.”  Residents, imbued with this ethos, challenged 
                                                          
7 Charles H. Ambler, “The Cleavage between Eastern and Western Virginia,” American Historical Review, 15, no. 4 
(July 1910): 780.     
8 Shanks, Secession Movement in Virginia, 211-212.  Other earlier historians have echoed this interpretation.  
Granville Davisson Hall, Virgil A. Lewis, and George E. Moore contend that sectional grievances dating back to the 
American Revolution set in motion the creation of West Virginia, an inevitable result considering eastern 
Virginians’ refusal to embrace democratic reforms and abandon slavery.     
9 Crofts, Reluctant Confederates, 159-160.   
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eastern slaveholders’ hegemony while articulating militant antislavery appeals.  The widespread 
acceptance of antislaveryism provided the contours for West Virginia’s establishment as a free 
state in 1863.  Thus, the “same narrative of sectional conflict” that unfolded across the nation 
during the Civil War era was manifest in Virginia, too.10          
The statehood movement’s culminating phases appears to bear out that interpretation, 
specifically in regard to abolishing slavery.  Northwest Virginia represented what William 
Freehling considers one of the South’s “white belts,” areas where geographic features prevented 
widespread plantation agriculture and large slave populations.  With little personal, financial, or 
political investment in the institution, northwesterners faced little difficulty in resolving the issue 
of slavery on the path toward statehood.11  James Oakes maintains that only western Virginians’ 
“deference to the property rights of slaveholders,” not their deep investment in racial hierarchy 
or defense of slavery, convinced them to initially “block the adoption of a gradual emancipation 
clause in the new state constitution.”12  Northwestern Republican organs during the war offered 
similar arguments concerning slavery’s fate in the new state.  As a writer in the Wellsburg 
Herald explained, slavery had placed eastern and western Virginia in its “conflicting position,” 
making it “unjustifiable” and “reprehensible” that northwesterners should further condone that 
institution.13  Residents’ eventual and overwhelming support for gradual emancipation in 1863 
provided “an unmistakable indication” that northwesterners demanded a free state.14  
A closer analysis of the statehood movement suggests a more divided constituency and 
uncertainty surrounding slavery’s future in the Northwest and West Virginia.  Far from a 
                                                          
10 Link, “‘This Bastard New Virginia,’” 38-40.   
11 Freehling, South vs. the South, 23.   
12 James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2013), 295.   
13 Wellsburg Herald, September 20, 1861, 2.   
14 Daily Intelligencer, April 22, 1862, 2.   
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comfortable or clean divorce from the institution, northwesterners experienced a protracted and 
difficult debate concerning African American bondage.  Residents acknowledged slavery’s vital 
importance to political rights and wondered how to reconstruct white liberty without black 
bondage.  Northwesterners’ reluctance to embrace emancipation also reflected their hatred for 
abolitionists who allegedly desired to foist immediate emancipation and racial equality upon 
West Virginians.  But emancipation on northwesterners’ own terms made emancipation more 
tolerable, a sentiment that increased in popularity as guerrilla conflict continued in the mountains 
and the Civil War’s conclusion appeared uncertain.   
The changing war context, though, provided only part of the reason for northwesterners’ 
ratification of gradual emancipation.  Following months of intense popular debate, statehood 
promoters convinced residents that racial hierarchy would survive without slavery, as African 
Americans would remain subordinate while white residents retained their superior political, 
social, and economic statuses.  An exodus of slaves and freed blacks following statehood would 
produce a demographic “whitening” of West Virginia, supporters declared, preserving the new 
state for white residents only.  The few remaining freed blacks would labor in menial, service 
positions, a visual manifestation of the racial hierarchy West Virginians sought to perpetuate.  
Restrictive laws, including corporal punishment, extended antebellum “justice” on African 
Americans into the statehood years, too.  Though slavery eventually ceased to operate within the 
Mountain State, the institution’s effects lingered.  Residents’ belief in liberty for whites and 
slavery for blacks, a stance derived from and animated by residents’ deep engagement in the 
“politics of slavery” over the preceding decades, provided the foundation for West Virginia’s 
establishment.      
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The Constitutional Convention convened in Wheeling on November 26, 1861.  Critical 
issues lay ahead for delegates, notably defining the state boundaries, settling on a name for the 
new state, and, above all, settling the issue of slavery.  As John Stealey III has noted, delegates 
approached resolving these issues through two methods.  Some delegates suggested that the 1851 
Constitution required only slight modifications while others maintained that eastern Virginians’ 
rebellion required westerners to overhaul that constitution and write a new one.15  James H. 
Brown of Kanawha County and Peter G. Van Winkle from Parkersburg articulated these two 
positions.  Brown, a lawyer and slaveholder, argued that anything “Virginian commends itself to 
my approval first and foremost.”  Brown admonished those delegates who considered it “a mark 
of degradation…[and] opprobrium” to borrow constitutional or political principles “that is 
Virginian.”16  Van Winkle, though, disagreed.  “We are here with a blank sheet of paper on 
which we are to write a constitution,” he declared.  He opposed Brown’s motion “to take the old 
constitution and patch it here and there.”17  Whether or not these framers would write a new 
constitution that mirrored Virginia’s constitutional history represented a central theme of the 
convention. 
Delegates first tackled the state’s boundaries.  The secession ordinance ratified by voters 
in October identified those counties included in the new state, but statehood opponents suggested 
adding more counties in an effort to foil the movement.  On December 3, the Committee on 
Boundary reported that in addition to the original thirty-nine counties contained in the October 
                                                          
15 Stealey, West Virginia’s Civil War-Era Constitution, 74-75.   
16 Debates and Proceedings of the First Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 20 December 1861 [hereafter 
cited as Constitutional Convention of West Virginia] [http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc122061.html] 
[accessed 14 July 2015]; 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Charleston, Kanawha, Virginia; Roll: M653_1356; Page: 161; 
Image: 168; Family History Library Film: 805356 [Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015]; and, 1860 U.S. Federal 
Census – Slave Schedules: Kanawha, Virginia [Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015].   
17 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 20 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc122061.html] [accessed 14 July 2015] 
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ordinance, committee members proposed an additional thirty-two counties.18  Most of these 
counties, located in the Shenandoah Valley and southwest, had supported secession and 
remained under Confederate control.19  Committee members defended these new boundaries.  
Chapman J. Stuart of Doddridge County argued that including these counties shielded unionists 
there from the “oppression and tyranny of eastern Virginia.”  Such men endured the same 
political inequality as northwesterners and deserved protection from a new government.20  
Brown concurred with Stuart.  Echoing a previous argument made by Marion County delegate 
Ephraim B. Hall, Brown argued that the presence of “one solitary Union man in those counties” 
should compel the convention to expand the state’s boundaries.  These unionists deserved our 
“protection and aid, and we ought to include them and save [them].”21    
Other delegates doubted the sincerity of such pronouncements.  Ohio County merchant 
James W. Paxton predicted that this expanded boundary would “embarrass, retard, and…defeat 
this whole new state project.”22  Fellow Ohio County delegate and Methodist minister Gordon 
Batelle agreed, characterizing the expanded boundary as “dodge” designed to destroy the 
                                                          
18 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120361.html][accessed 14 July 2015].  Curry notes that whether by 
design or not, convention president John Hall of Mason County appointed opponents of the statehood movement to 
the Boundary Committee.  Included in this committee was Stuart J. Chapman of Doddridge County, whom Curry 
characterized as the “most effective obstructionist” in the convention.  Curry, House Divided, 87.     
19 Curry, House Divided, 87.   
20 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 9 December 1861  
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120961.html][accessed 14 July 2015]  
21 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 7 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120761.html][accessed 14 July 2015].  The previous day, Ephraim 
B. Hall asked the convention if delegates would “disregard the interests of the loyal people of those counties, 
because…there are disloyal persons there?”  Such a contingency would disqualify practically all northwestern 
counties, Hall noted.  Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 6 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120661.html][accessed 14 July 2015].   
22 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 9 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120961.html][accessed 14 July 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: 
Wheeling Ward 3, Ohio, Virginia; Roll: M653_1368; Page: 174; Image: 182; Family History Library Film: 805368 
[Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015].     
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movement.23  Adding a large number of secessionists worried William G. Brown, who quipped 
that these Confederates could elect a secessionist governor in the new state.24  Creating a new 
state provided western Virginians’ an opportunity to break away from the “old slave oligarchy” 
that ruled the state and declared war against the Union, Cabell County lawyer Granville Parker 
declared.  The Massachusetts-born lawyer suggested that the convention distance themselves 
from the committee’s proposal; if not, “nothing – nothing! – will carry us through” Congress.25 
Parker’s argument concerning the proposed state’s affiliation with eastern Virginians 
reflected some delegates’ concern about increasing Kanawha’s slave population.  Delegates 
already doubtful of Congress admitting another slave state predicted that increasing the proposed 
state’s slave population would foil statehood.  John M. Powell, a minister from Harrison County, 
remarked that adding more slaves “would destroy us in Congress.”26  Others dismissed such 
concerns.  Waitman Willey considered slavery “doomed,” and asserted that “the friends of the 
institution have brought the doom upon it by their own conduct.”  He predicted that every slave 
in the proposed counties would be freed soon through self-emancipation or by the Union army.  
Adding a few slaves, he concluded, should not prohibit delegates from considering additional 
counties.27 
                                                          
23 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 10 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc121061.html][accessed 14 July 2015].   
24 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 7 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120761.html][accessed 14 July 2015]. 
25 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 11 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc121161.html][accessed 14 July 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: 
Guyandotte, Cabell, Virginia; Roll: M653_1338; Page: 61; Image: 67; Family History Library Film: 805338 
[Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015].   
26 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 10 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc121061.html][accessed 14 July 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: 
Millford, Harrison, Virginia; Roll: M653_1351; Page: 771; Image: 261; Family History Library Film: 805351 
[Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015].     
27 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 11 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc121161.html][accessed 14 July 2015]. 
310 
 
Following ten days of what one observed called a “long and profitless debate” concerning 
the boundary, delegates opposed to the expanded boundaries defeated the committee’s proposal, 
28-17.28  Delegates added nine southern counties while permitting seven Shenandoah Valley 
counties to vote on admission.29  Solidifying the new state’s boundaries reopened discussion of 
the new state’s name.  “Kanawha” supporters maintained that creating a new state required a 
name unaffiliated with its progenitor, especially one that had offered nothing but “oppression” to 
their western brethren, Daniel Lamb of Wheeling maintained.30  “[W]e are…casting off the 
fetters,” Peter Van Winkle exclaimed, and retaining any affiliation with “Virginia” required 
westerners to “bow the knee to Old Virginia.”  Any “soubriquet” like “West,” “New,” or “Little” 
would continue to “degrade us in comparison with” easterners.31    
But opponents of “Kanawha” stressed that the state’s bitter sectional history should 
convince delegates to embrace the moniker of “West.”  “Western Virginia has been made dear to 
all of us” through years of struggle for “western Virginia rights,” Marshall County lawyer Elbert 
H. Caldwell insisted.32  “[W]e have fought this fight under the name of West Virginia,” Waitman 
Willey stressed, and adopting “West Virginia” reflected residents’ “love of right and of 
                                                          
28 Chester D. Hubbard to William Hubbard, 20 December 1861, Hubbard Family Papers, A&M 805, WVRHC.   
29 MacKenzie, “Fifth Border State,” 191.  The nine counties included were Boone, Logan, Mercer, Wyoming, 
Raleigh, McDowell, Greenbrier, Monroe, and Pocahontas.  The Shenandoah Valley counties of Pendleton, Hardy, 
Hampshire, Morgan, Berkeley, Jefferson, and Frederick voted in favor of joining the new state except the last 
county.  Not all northwestern delegates, though, approved of this measure.  Henry Dering, of Morgantown, though 
he supported including these counties in the new state, believed that this “additional Territory will prove disastrous.”  
He confessed that he voted for the measure because the railroads in these counties “are a Commercial and may be at 
some future day a Military necessity.”  Henry Dering to Waitman T. Willey, 13 December 1861, Charles H. Ambler 
Collection, A&M 122, Box 10, Folder 7, item 354, WVRHC.   
30 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statename.html][accessed 14 July 2015].   
31 31 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statename.html][accessed 14 July 2015].   
32 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc120361.html][accessed 14 July 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: 
Moundsville, Marshall, Virginia; Roll: M653_1360; Page: 195; Image: 201; Family History Library Film: 805360 
[Ancestry.com][accessed 14 July 2015].   
311 
 
liberty.”33  Chapman Stuart believed that the same “fire and patriotism” that previous western 
Virginians exhibited in defending the state and nation was manifest in “the people of 
northwestern Virginia.”  Retaining the name of “Virginia” honored the Revolutionary spirit that 
continued to animate northwesterners.34  Proponents of “West Virginia” carried the day, with a 
strong majority pulling in favor over “Kanawha” or “Western Virginia.”35 
First and Second Wheeling Convention delegate John J. Davis worried that the 
convention’s progress outpaced residents’ desires.  A “body of radicals and extremists” seized 
control of the convention, Davis lamented, and threatened to “change in toto the character of our 
State government.”  Such men wanted to “give us a Yankee constitution and laws,” a prospect 
that “will defeat the whole movement in West Va.”36  These “Yankee” sentiments were manifest 
in debates on the viva voce voting system.  Republican Granville Davisson Hall later proclaimed 
that this “open” voting system perpetuated the “domination of the slave aristocracy.”37  Some 
delegates arrived at similar conclusions and mentioned the May vote on secession for evidence.  
Hancock County minister Joseph S. Pomeroy remarked that “if it had not been for the viva voce 
plan of voting Virginia would never have voted herself out of the Union.”38  The “present mode 
of voting…give[s] an undue power to men of wealth, influence and position – especially party 
leaders,” Gordon Battelle asserted.39  Secessionist merchants in Taylor County reportedly filed 
                                                          
33 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statename.html][accessed 14 July 2015].   
34 Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 3 December 1861 
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suit against approximately twenty unionists who refused to elect a secessionist delegate to the 
Richmond Convention.  Such were the “evils resulting from viva voce voting,” mechanic 
Harmon Sinsel of Taylor County quipped.40               
But proponents argued that open voting displayed a man’s political independence.  
“[T]he poor man feels his consequence, self-respect and equality with the highest and richest in 
the land,” James Brown of Kanawha stressed.  The “viva voce system tends to encourage a 
manly independence in the voter, and leads him to prize the privilege of voting more highly.”  
Opponents’ attempts to inaugurate a secret ballot threatened to turn these independent men into 
“cowards and slaves” who “will not dare to come up to the polls like men and speak aloud their 
preferences.”  Brown finally appealed to Virginians’ fondness for this oral tradition. Oral voting 
“is a Virginia system, long and dearly cherished by our people.”41  Chapman Stuart agreed with 
Brown.  Stuart failed to “detect any corruption” concerning open voting, but asserted that the 
“independent character that seems to be stamped and inherent in the principles of Virginia” 
emanated from viva voce.42  Despite claims that viva voce inculcated independence, the 
convention voted to implement the secret ballot and, in the words of Morgantown merchant 
Henry Dering, maintain the “security” and “purity of the ballot box.”43   
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When the constitutional convention adjourned on December 20, delegates had decided 
the new state’s name, boundary, and method of election.  But the “more difficult question of 
slavery is as yet untouched,” Wheeling banker Chester Hubbard observed.  Hubbard suggested 
that the convention’s reluctance to tackle African American bondage signaled delegates’ 
realization that the “whole movement for division was premature and can not be accomplished at 
present.”  Without a resolution on slavery, the new state movement could not proceed.  Some 
“prefer saying nothing about slavery in the constitution while others are for putting the 
declaration in the” document.  Proponents of the former, like Willey, argued members should 
“say nothing, [and] do nothing” concerning slavery.  Members of the latter, including Gordon 
Battelle, were “disposed to give the subject an airing.”  Hubbard suggested that the convention 
should “indicate our future policy on this question” but offer no firm declarations concerning 
slavery’s future.44 
Some delegates forced the convention to open this discussion on slavery prior to the 
December adjournment.  On November 30, Boone County minister Robert Hagar introduced two 
resolutions concerning the institution.  The first resolution identified “Negro slavery…[as] the 
origin and foundation of our national troubles, and the cause of the terrible rebellion in our 
midst.”  Hagar considered the institution “detrimental to the interests of free people.”  These 
conclusions led him to propose “gradual emancipation” in the second resolution.  James Brown 
of Kanawha characterized any discussion of slavery as “unwise and impolitic,” and suggested 
that the state legislature handle this matter.  A majority of delegates shared Brown’s opinion and 
tabled Hagar’s resolutions.45  Two weeks later, Gordon Battelle introduced a similar gradual 
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emancipation clause but included a prohibition on importing slaves into West Virginia.  
Delegates tabled Battelle’s motions, too.46  These gradual emancipation resolutions worried 
northwestern delegates.  “I am sorry [Battelle] has introduced the subject,” Henry Dering 
lamented.47  But after conversing with Peter G. Van Winkle, Dering cheerfully reported that only 
“a handfull” supported Battelle’s plan and that delegates “will not have any trouble in keeping 
the vexed question out of the Constitution.”48  
The march of democratic reform in the convention’s first month encouraged free state 
supporters that slavery would soon be expunged, too.  Hagar, Battelle, and the Daily 
Intelligencer believed that West Virginia’s future mirrored that of its free state neighbors.  “[W]e 
can never be a Southern State,” the Daily Intelligencer declared.  “We may say that we are a 
Southern State, and that we ought to have a negro policy, just as many foolish people in Western 
Virginia have said for years past,” but such thoughts only “mock, deride, and curse us.”49  But 
such thoughts still remained in the minority, despite Campbell’s assertions.  Northwestern 
delegates had long maintained that democratic reform and slavery were compatible, if not 
symbiotic.  Moving toward a secret ballot would not inaugurate slavery’s demise or undermine 
slaveholders’ power; other southern states operated with the secret ballot and slavery thrived.50  
Nor would later actions undertaken by the convention threaten the institution, including 
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replacing the county court system with townships or instituting ad valorem taxation or creating a 
system of free public schools.51  Northwesterners had long supported these initiatives and 
dismissed concerns that democratic reforms would disturb the master-slave relationship.  Rather, 
these reforms would strengthen white equality and marginalize criticism of slavery and 
slaveholders. 
That gradual emancipation supporters faced a hostile audience, then, should not be 
surprising.  Cabell County delegate Granville Parker later remarked that the institution held a 
“mysterious and over-powering influence” that became manifest when Battelle introduced his 
resolutions.52  The “influence” Parker observed represented slavery’s continued centrality to 
political matters, and that delegates’ constituents remained reluctant to abandon African 
American bondage even as the Civil War continued.  This “influence” also reflected residents’ 
hatred of abolitionism.  As the Clarksburg National Telegraph averred, “fanatical abolitionists” 
like Battelle who advocated emancipation “cling to the ebony, woolly-headed god of their 
idolatry.”  Battelle should labor for the “preservation of the liberties of the twenty millions of 
white people who are fighting to retain their free institutions than to be wasting time in 
endeavoring to liberate the few thousand slaves of West Virginia.”  Further, if Battelle and his ilk 
succeeded in foisting emancipation upon West Virginians, what other legislation would they 
enact?  Would they seek racial equality at the ballot box?53  Unless free state advocates could 
ensure the perpetuation of racial hierarchy without slavery, West Virginia’s prospects as a free 
state appeared fleeting. 
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The constitutional convention reconvened in early January 1862 following a brief recess.  
Gordon Battelle introduced similar resolutions on slavery, including a colonization plan and 
pushing back gradual emancipation until July 4, 1865.  Delegates tabled those resolutions.54  
Henry Dering chastised Battelle for “press[ing] this subject upon us,” and feared that further 
agitation on slavery “will prove the opening of Pandoras Box.”55  Dering further admonished 
Battelle for such resolutions, insisting that these actions would “prove…fatal before the people.”  
Battelle and his ilk “will not be able to carry his proposition,” Dering predicted but feared that 
this constant agitation would “produce disturbance[s]” in West Virginia and other Union slave 
states.56  The Wellsburg Herald agreed with Dering’s conclusion.  “The people will not vote for 
gradual emancipation or any other interference with the rights of slave owners.”  Many delegates 
will “snap and snarl” if Battelle continued to persist in his antislavery mission, jeopardizing the 
entire movement.57      
Battelle persisted despite these fatalistic predictions.  On February 12, he introduced a set 
of similar resolutions.  Battelle supported a prohibition on African Americans entering the state 
after the constitution’s ratification and paired this with a more lenient gradual emancipation 
clause.  West Virginia voters, not constitutional delegates, would either ratify or reject these 
resolutions.58  Battelle demanded an open and candid discussion on slavery, quipping that he 
“hope[d] that no such gag rule will be instituted here in this Convention.”59  Chapman Stuart 
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chided Battelle, declaring that the issue of slavery was “not debatable.”  Delegates tabled these 
resolutions, too, 24-23.60  The following day, Hancock County minister Joseph Pomeroy 
suggested a compromise.  West Virginians “do not want free negroes here,” Pomeroy declared, 
leading him to recommend the adoption of Battelle’s prohibition on African Americans entering 
the state following the constitution’s ratification.  By a 48-1 margin, delegates adopted Battelle’s 
motion.  Following the vote, Marion County delegate Hiram Raymond instructed Battelle to 
“never mention slavery here again.”61 
The convention adjourned a few days later after formally adopting a new state 
constitution.  Despite dire warnings from proslavery advocates that “a body of radicals and 
antislavery sympathisers” would inaugurate a “Yankee constitution,” the final draft of the 
constitution demonstrated that West Virginians “were also Virginians.”62  This Virginia mindset 
was manifest in how delegates resolved the issue of slavery.  Battelle’s resolution prohibiting the 
importation of any African Americans, free or enslaved, amounted to a disappointing defeat for 
“free soil” advocates.  An anonymous Tyler County resident derisively referred to it as “our pro-
slavery Constitution” and doubted that Congress would approve this constitution.63  The 
Wellsburg Herald, though, acknowledged the difficulty in introducing Battelle’s prohibition 
measure.  A “direct emancipation clause…would have shocked long-existing prejudices of a 
majority of the people,” the newspaper reasoned.  Aggressive advocates of emancipation “make 
a great noise, [but] in numbers they don’t amount to much outside of the Panhandle.”  The 
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“people,” it concluded, “are not yet ripe for that question.”64  Though some Republicans and free 
state supporters hoped that West Virginia’s climate and lack of southern staples would compel 
African Americans to move to warmer climates, natural reproduction would likely ensure 
slavery’s presence in the new state.65  Many West Virginians “seem to rely with implicit 
confidence upon the silent innovations of future years for [slavery’s] elimination from our 
midst,” an unnamed resident remarked.  “The voice of history is a disappointment to their 
cherished hopes.”66  For free state promoters, Battelle’s resolution failed to resolve the slavery 
question.   
But for some West Virginia politicians and residents, Battelle’s resolution amounted to a 
compromise that saved the statehood movement.  Henry Dering predicted that had the 
convention adopted all three of Battelle’s resolutions, “the whole…Sou[th] Western Delegation 
would have left…and have got their whole people to oppose it.”  The new constitution “would 
have been voted down by the Counties from Harrison [County] to the Kentucky line.”67  Dering 
later reported that the convention’s ratification of all three of Battelle’s resolutions would have 
“kill[ed] the new state” in the Kanawha River Valley.68  Taylor County farmer William W. 
Warder maintained that delegates constructed “a firstrate constitution” and had “settled the niger 
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question without any excitement.”  He predicted that the compromise “will be received by all 
parties with sadisfaction.”69  A Preston County resident believed that the new constitution would 
receive the “suffrage of every friend of a New State, whatever may be his proclivities in regard to 
the colored race.”70  Chester Hubbard applauded the “compromise” enacted by the convention, 
as African Americans would either “flourish or perish as the case may be.”71  The Wellsburg 
Herald agreed with Hubbard’s conclusion.  The new constitution would “not interfere with the 
master’s rights” but simply allowed slavery to either “stand” or “fall.”72   
West Virginia Republicans and other free state supporters applauded the “onward spirit 
and progressive tendencies” of the new constitution’s democratic reforms but loathed the 
convention’s refusal to make the new state a free state.73  A Hancock County writer characterized 
the “compromise” on slavery as a “subterfuge” to deceive the public.  Virginians had exported, 
not imported, slaves for decades and slavery continued to expand; how would this measure 
hasten the institution’s extinction in West Virginia?74  In a mass meeting in Upshur County, 
residents maintained that the “interests of the white laboring population” opposed the “peculiar 
course of legislation” that the “protection of slavery” demands.  Those West Virginians who 
“love slavery…that they cannot consent to have it ever removed are no friends of a new State,” 
gatherers concluded.75   
Supporters of a free West Virginia denounced their neighbors’ attempts to brand 
Battelle’s resolution as an “abolitionist scheme.”  One Monongalia County writer admonished 
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constitutional convention delegates who had been “gulled and bamboozled by…advocates and 
representatives of the small ‘nigger interest’ in Western Virginia.”  These delegates had 
“shrunk…at the old cry of ‘abolitionism’ sounded by those who own a part of the little stock of 
niggers now in the west.”76  The constitutional convention’s refusal to allow public ratification 
on Battelle’s resolutions reminded Brooke County residents of the “Lecompton stratagem” that 
proslavery politicians in Kansas inaugurated in the 1850s.  West Virginia politicians beholden to 
the institution rejected voters’ opinion on slavery because they feared residents’ antislavery 
sentiments.77  Republicans lamented that the “old standard slang about ‘abolition’ has been 
poured out day by day to serve a personal and partisan purpose.”78  Despite Republicans’ 
protestations, the “abolitionist” shibboleth still commanded tremendous power and influence 
across West Virginia.       
On April 3, West Virginia voters approved the new constitution by a wide margin, 18,862 
in favor to 514 opposed.  In some precincts, residents could also vote on a nonbinding gradual 
emancipation clause.  As with the new constitution, West Virginians overwhelmingly supported 
gradual emancipation, 6,052 to 616.79  The gradual emancipation proposal mirrored that offered 
by Battelle, as slaves born after 1870 would be freed upon reaching twenty-eight years for males 
and eighteen years of age for females.  Slaves would continue to reside in the region well into the 
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twentieth-century.  Free state supporters believed that this informal election provided “an 
unmistakable indication that our people want to make their State a free State.”80  The Wellsburg 
Herald declared the informal poll on gradual emancipation “a blow at slavery, and…[it] cripples 
the rebellion more than the defeat of an army.”81  Others were less sanguine, however.  Peter G. 
Van Winkle considered the “grand experiment of taking a vote on emancipation at the late 
election…a fizzle” that had frustrated free state supporters.82  John G. Jacob inferred that strong 
support for gradual emancipation reflected residents’ desire to control possible emancipation 
without congressional interference, not a reflection of West Virginians’ antislaveryism.83   
Historians have generally interpreted the informal poll on the gradual emancipation 
clause as revealing West Virginians’ desire to liberate their region from slavery’s deleterious 
effects.  Granville Davisson Hall proclaimed that the vote demonstrated that West Virginians 
“were ready to accept emancipation—eager to do so—as giving their new State its fitting status 
at home.”84  Richard Curry declared the vote a “turning point in the history of statehood 
politics,” igniting residents’ latent and long-held antislavery sentiment.85  For some West 
Virginians, the vote on the gradual emancipation represented their opportunity to destroy the 
institution that had instigated the war and torn asunder the Union.  These residents also blamed 
slaveholders who prized their chattel over white political equality for the constitutional ills that 
had plagued the Northwest over the preceding decades.  “The wicked rebellion, as well as all the 
past and present injustices suffered by Western Virginia,” Upshur County resident William M. 
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Shinn declared, “are due to Slavery and the evil principles engendered by it.”86  Residents’ vote 
on April 3 confirmed their resolve to hasten slavery’s demise, the source of the political and 
economic inequality that had plagued their region for decades.  As Preston County merchant 
Harrison Hagans maintained, the “masses were sincere” in their vote, believing that a “New State 
meant not only loyalty, but prospective deliverance from slavery.”87   
For other West Virginians, the informal poll represented their opportunity to take control 
of the statehood movement from misguided delegates.  Disappointed that delegates during the 
constitutional convention had capitulated to slaveholding interests, these residents would use the 
ballot box to admonish their representatives and manifest their desires concerning slavery.  
Lewis County physician Newton B. Barns reported that the “great masses fully expected the 
convention to propose the new state freed of slavery.”  Residents reacted with “surprise…and 
regret” that the convention included only Battelle’s prohibition measure.88  Residents understood 
that their petition to Congress for admission would be stronger if the state sought entry as a free 
state, not a slave state, a move that reflected political pragmatism rather than deeply-held 
emancipationist sentiments.  As a Ritchie County resident argued, the “road by which slave 
States have traveled into the Union, has become so slippery with the blood of the brave men of 
our nation that it cannot be traveled any more.”  The war had made slavery unpalatable and West 
Virginia’s admission as a slave state unfeasible.  Placing slavery on a path toward gradual 
extinction would ensure the state’s admission to the Union.89   
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Other West Virginians wanted to control the statehood movement because they feared 
congressional interference and abolitionist meddling.  As Arthur I. Boreman reported, “many 
good men in Wheeling, who generally took no part in politics, were opposed to congress 
prescribing the provisions of our constitution on any subject embraced in it.”  This fear of 
“congressional dictation” received widespread support from John Carlile.90  Carlile and other 
conservatives feared that the war and demands for unquestioned patriotism provided a “pretext 
for transcending Constitutional limits,” notably private property rights.91  As the Republican 
Wellsburg Herald explained in its defense of the Union army confiscating slaves, the “present 
emergency” necessitated such actions to prevent Confederates from exploiting slaves’ 
“intelligence” and “military aid.”92  Such arguments smacked of congressional tyranny, 
according to some conservatives.  “Congress has no right to go further and inquire into the 
domestic institutions of the state,” the National Telegraph maintained.  “The people of the State 
themselves must be left free to regulate their own domestic affairs,” the newspaper stressed.  The 
prospect of “Congressional dictation” took on added urgency as the “negro loving fanatics in 
Congress” appeared bent on making West Virginia a free state without “the people determin[ing] 
the question for themselves in in their own way.”93     
West Virginians’ fear of “Congressional dictation” reflected their hatred for abolitionists.  
Abolitionists’ advocacy of racial and political equality threatened the hierarchies that residents 
had championed and defended over the preceding decades.  Recent actions by the federal 
government concerning slavery augmented those fears.  In March 1862, Waitman Willey 
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denounced the bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia in March 1862, castigating the 
legislation as neither “essential, nor even beneficial, in prosecuting the war and restoring the 
peace.”  Willey further doubted that emancipating slaves would change African American’s 
status in the body politic.  “You may emancipate the slave, and call him free,” he affirmed, “but 
he is still a slave.  He can never be anything else in this country.”  Abolitionists’ attempts to turn 
African American slaves into “freemen…is utterly fallacious,” he insisted.94  Morgantown 
merchant Henry Dering agreed with Willey.  The “whole series of Nigger bills which are being 
introduced into Congress are all wrong, untimely and calculated to do mischief,” he declared, 
“and the abolition of slavery in the district…is exceedingly unfortunate.”95  Congress should 
“leave [slavery] to Providence and our people to work out,” he concluded.96 
Residents’ informal ratification of gradual emancipation also signaled their attempt to 
limit the power wielded by West Virginia Republicans, a group that often appeared allied with 
northern abolitionists.  Chester Hubbard reported that “Republicanism has full sway in the 
Panhandle,” and that Republicans “are making every thing bend to the behest of party.”97  The 
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer’s stance on gradual emancipation in connection with statehood 
“has been jesuitical,” Van Winkle grumbled.  Newspaper editor Archibald Campbell and his ilk 
opposed the “New State unless the Abolitionists can rule,” what Van Winkle considered a 
“humiliating condition.”98  He later prayed that this Republican “clique will be able to lay the 
                                                          
94 Waitman T. Willey, Speech of W.T. Willey of Virginia, on the Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia, 
Delivered in the United States Senate, March 20, 1862 (Washington, D.C.: Towers, Printers, 1862), 5, 8.   
95 Henry Dering to Waitman T. Willey, 29 April, 1862, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 11, Folder 1, 
item 399, WVRHC.  [emphasis in original] 
96 Henry Dering to Waitman T. Willey, 18 June 1862, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 11, Folder 2, 
item 414, WVRHC.   
97 Chester Hubbard to William Hubbard, 26 September 1861, Hubbard Family Papers, A&M 805, WVRHC.   
98 Peter G. Van Winkle to Waitman T. Willey, 10 June 1862, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 11, 
Folder 1, item 411, WVRHC.   
325 
 
devil [of emancipation] they have raised.”99  John J. Davis, disgusted with the “Anti-Slavery 
parasites” in the state legislature who attempted to foist emancipation on West Virginians, voted 
against an antislavery measure.100  He later predicted that the Daily Intelligencer would provide 
“Comments” on this negative vote and that the newspaper along with other Republicans would 
encourage his constituents to convene “another indignation meeting” against him.  By 
determining how West Virginians would control and resolve the issue of slavery, Davis and 
others believed that they could remove such “parasites” from the body politic before they 
infected it with radical ideas.101   
Residents’ aspiration for a new state deepened in mid-1862 as Major-General George B. 
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign appeared poised to capture Richmond and end the war before 
an independent West Virginia had been secured.  Indeed, Governor Francis Pierpont, confident 
that the “rebellion” would “shortly [be] put down,” contacted President Lincoln inquiring about 
treatment of former Confederates and their political status in the Reorganized Government of 
Virginia.102  Other West Virginians shared this same expectation throughout early 1862.  “We 
are watching and waiting with anxious hearts for the fall of Richmond,” Morgantown attorney J. 
Marshall Hagans reported.103  Residents’ anxiousness, though, coexisted with trepidation of 
reuniting with Confederates.  “Wo be to the West,” Rev. James L. Clark warned, “if we have to 
go back under the dominion of Richmond.”104  If Richmond fell and Virginia remained 
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undivided, Harrison Hagans of Preston County explained, the “rebel constituency in the East 
will…send men to represent them, who will tax the West to pay this rebel war debt, and rule it 
with an iron rod.”  The “pitiless storm of wrath” that westerners had endured over the preceding 
decades would be “made hotter by disappointed ambition in this wicked rebellion.”105  Unable to 
create a national “cotton oligarchy,” one Clarksburg newspaper predicted that these embittered 
Confederates would establish a similar “aristocratic structure” in Virginia where the “wealthy” 
controlled the government and diminished “the influence of the poor man.”106  West Virginians, 
faced with possible reunion with secessionist Virginians, prayed that a new state would deliver 
them from their former brethren.     
On May 6, 1862, Francis Pierpont convened the General Assembly of the Reorganized 
Government of Virginia in Wheeling to satisfy constitutional requirements concerning the 
establishment of a new state.  In his address to the legislature, Pierpont stressed that Virginia’s 
“history, geography, and social relation[s]” required dismemberment.  Burdensome taxation, 
unequal representation, and easterners’ preference of slave labor over westerners’ “free labor” 
had generated conflict over the preceding decades.  The rebellion’s possible conclusion 
threatened to reunite West Virginians with easterners, a prospect many residents loathed.  West 
Virginians needed a new state.107  One week later, the legislature granted permission.108  On May 
29, Senator Waitman Willey presented West Virginia’s petition for admission to the Senate, 
recapitulating the events of the previous two years and the difficult position West Virginia 
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unionists occupied during the war.   The “loyal spirit of the people of northwest Virginia,” he 
declared, “revolted” against secession and adhered to the Union.  “Public mass meetings” held 
across the Northwest announced “our allegiance to the United States” and sought how to “protect 
ourselves from the remorseless despotism of the usurpers.”109  Willey, like Pierpont, insisted that 
Virginia’s diverse geographic, commercial, and social institutions produced two civilizations 
possessing “interests fundamentally different” from the other.110  West Virginia’s marginal and 
declining slave population manifested residents’ “free labor” interests while the proposed state’s 
climate and geographic proximity demonstrated that “slave labor cannot be profitable there.”  
Armed with evidence of slavery’s inevitable extinction in West Virginia, Willey assured 
northern Republicans that the Mountain State would be a slave state in name only.111 
The Senate Committee on Territories received Willey’s petition and committee chairman 
Benjamin Wade of Ohio instructed Virginia Senator John Carlile to compose West Virginia’s 
statehood bill.  The bill the committee returned on June 23 shocked and disappointed West 
Virginians.  Carlile, in his effort to adhere to strict constitutionalist grounds and defeat the 
statehood measure, altered Willey’s petition.  He increased West Virginia by adding fifteen 
counties and included a gradual emancipation clause that a new constitutional convention would 
have to ratify.  The emancipation clause mandated that all slaves born on or after July 4, 1863, 
would be free.112  Carlile’s political chicanery appeared to doom the statehood movement.  “The 
bill carries death to our new state,” Henry Dering lamented.  The slave population included in the 
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additional fifteen counties would rankle northern Republicans while the entire bill “ignores the 
action of our loyall people in West Va.”  Many West Virginians now expected Congress to deny 
admission.  “Our people are in despair and many have now given up all hopes of a new state.”113  
Methodist Episcopal minister Moses Tichenell of Marion County implored Willey to remove the 
additional counties from the statehood bill.  Shenandoah Valley residents possessed “sympathies, 
habits, and…interests” identical to those of the “strong niggerdum of the east” and antagonistic 
to West Virginians.  Though his neighbors “are not Abolitionists in the present acceptation of the 
offensive term,” they despised the “rule of southern slave[ry]” and sought freedom from the 
“tyranical lash of the proud nabobs of eastern Virginia” at any cost.114  Morgantown resident J. 
Marshall Hagans agreed.  Though the “vox populi” of West Virginia had not placed their official 
“stamp” on a gradual emancipation clause, he believed residents would approve that plan if 
Congress granted admission.115 
Carlile’s political subterfuge elicited censure from many West Virginians who viewed his 
actions as a denial of majoritarian power.  In a meeting in Wetzel County, residents labeled 
Carlile a “political desperado,” a “disgrace,” and a “w[i]llful deceiver of his constituents.”  He 
acted as one of Jefferson Davis’ “minions,” truckling to West Virginia Confederates who wished 
to join the Confederacy and wage war against the Union.116  Residents in Taylor County agreed, 
denouncing their senator for “willfully misrepresent[ing] the loyal people of West Virginia.”  
Carlile must resign lest he continue ignoring and misrepresenting voters.117  Though Carlile’s 
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mouthpiece, the Clarksburg National Telegraph, declared him a “true and loyal statesman” who 
had “been assiduous in his works of loyalty and for the good of West Virginia,” few residents 
agreed.118   
Senate debate on West Virginia’s admission focused on the issue of slavery.  Republican 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a prominent abolitionist, opposed the gradual emancipation 
clause as it “recognize[d] the existence of slavery during the present generation.”  One extra day 
was “too long for slavery,” he announced.  He proposed adding a clause that would free all 
slaves on July 4, 1863.119  Willey, though, doubted the efficacy of Sumner’s proposal.  
Providence had ordained that West Virginia “must…be free forever,” and his work was already 
unfolding in the state.  West Virginia’s climate, soil, geographic position, and declining slave 
population demonstrated the institution’s fleeting prospects.120  Political complications, however, 
would arise with congressional emancipation.  Willey acknowledged that a “very considerable 
amount of secession sentiment” existed in the proposed state, and that these secessionists would 
wield the issue of slavery to “stir up the prejudices of the people” and “defeat” the statehood 
movement.  Though he preferred senators abstain from interfering with slavery in West Virginia, 
Willey recognized that abolitionists and northern Republicans would never consent to another 
slave state.  Confronted with this dilemma, Willey sought compromise.121 
 Willey proposed emancipating all slaves born after July 4, 1873, a measure that rankled 
antislavery northerners and abolitionists.  He then introduced a similar measure written by 
Representative William G. Brown of Preston County that would free slaves born after July 4, 
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1864 and banned future importation of slaves into the state.  With assistance from Kansas 
Senator James Henry Lane, Willey amended his proposal to include a more comprehensive 
gradual emancipation policy.  The “Willey Amendment” would free slaves born after July 4, 
1863, while those younger than ten would be liberated upon turning twenty-one; slaves older 
than ten but younger than twenty-one would remain enslaved until they reached twenty-five.  
The “Willey Amendment” also contained a ban on importing African American slaves into the 
state.  Senators approved the compromise and West Virginia’s admission by a 23-17 vote.122  
When the House of Representatives reconvened in December, former opponents of West 
Virginia’s admission emerged as supporters because slavery’s demise in the state appeared 
certain.  Thaddeus Stevens of Massachusetts endorsed West Virginia’s application, noting that 
the added provision “makes [West Virginia] a free State.”  Schuyler Colfax of Indiana agreed, 
expressing his “peculiar pleasure” that West Virginians “have provided for the ultimate 
extinction of slavery.”123  On December 10, representatives passed West Virginia’s statehood 
application, 96-55.  West Virginia’s statehood bill next required Lincoln’s signature.124 
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 The bill admitting West Virginia arrived on Lincoln’s desk on December 22.  Lincoln felt 
conflicted.  Issues of slavery, constitutionality, and timing vexed the president, leading him to 
solicit arguments from cabinet members concerning the state’s admission.125  On December 31, 
1862, President Lincoln concurred with those cabinet members who agreed that West Virginia’s 
admission was “expedient” and constitutionally sound.  West Virginians’ loyalty to the Union 
and their “aid” in fighting the rebellion manifested residents’ unwavering devotion to the federal 
government, Lincoln declared.  The addition of the “Willey Amendment” ensured that “slave 
soil” would become “free,” what Lincoln considered an “irrevocable encroachment upon the 
cause of the rebellion.”  The president applauded West Virginians’ “secession in favor of the 
constitution” and granted their request for statehood.126   
West Virginia’s admission into the Union would become official pending ratification of 
the “Willey Amendment” by a constitutional convention and by public referendum.  But as 
Willey acknowledged, secessionists in the proposed state would wield the gradual emancipation 
clause against statehood supporters.  These secessionists constituted a mixture of Confederate 
sympathizers, residents opposed to “congressional dictation,” or opponents to statehood on all 
grounds.  Secessionists’ planned to defeat the amendment by branding it as an abolitionist 
attempt to foist racial equality upon white West Virginians, what John J. Davis characterized as 
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“degrading terms” for statehood.127  African Americans, opponents declared, would flood West 
Virginia and demand full and equal access to employment opportunities and the ballot box.  To 
perpetuate and protect racial hierarchy, West Virginians must reject the “Willey Amendment.”   
From early 1862 through 1863, pro-statehood West Virginians launched a counter-
offensive against their opponents.  These proponents campaigned to convince white West 
Virginians that ratifying the “Willey Amendment” would strengthen, not threaten, racial 
hierarchy.  Gradual emancipation would hasten slavery’s decline in the region, accelerating a 
demographic “whitening” already unfolding across the region.  This erosion of slave labor would 
facilitate the expansion of “free labor,” transforming West Virginia into an industrial state like 
Ohio and Pennsylvania.  Removing slaves from the state would also remove West Virginia 
beyond “Jeff. Davis’ kingdom,” an aristocratic nation allegedly bent on disenfranchising poor 
white men.128  Access to the ballot box in West Virginia, though, would continue for white men 
regardless of wealth while the state’s few African Americans would be disenfranchised.  West 
Virginians’ abolition of slavery would hasten the war’s conclusion, a stinging rebuke to eastern 
Virginians whose zeal to protect their slave property now threatened its existence.  West 
Virginians, supporters proclaimed, would continue to enjoy the benefits of slavery as 
“whiteness” would reign as the principal political ethos.  
West Virginians in favor of statehood stressed the benefits of “free soil,” crafting 
arguments that touched on contemporary political developments and Virginia’s sectional history.  
Upon hearing the news that the House of Representatives approved West Virginia’s admission, 
an anonymous writer in the Daily Intelligencer celebrated West Virginia’s policy of “equal 
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taxation, [and] equal representation.”  These democratic principles “have animated…all true 
Western Virginians for many long years.”129  In a meeting in Marshall County, Brooke County 
merchant Campbell Tarr, a Wheeling convention delegate, blamed the “slaveholding oligarchy 
of Eastern Virginia” for the “whirlpool of destruction” that now engulfed the country.  Tarr 
expressed little remorse for the “poor Eastern Virginia rebel wretches…suffering all the horrors 
of a desolating and destructive war.”  This cabal had governed by the maxim “‘rule or ruin’” 
over the preceding decades, and without western allies, eastern Virginians faced certain 
destruction.130  A Marion County resident reported that his neighbors “are highly gratified with 
the cheering prospect of being separated from Eastern Virginia.”  For decades, western 
Virginians had lived in “Niggerdom,” where all political matters centered on slavery.  But West 
Virginia’s establishment and slavery’s inevitable demise had overthrown the “king” and 
“master” of this tyrannical domain.131  Though secessionists “might prate forever about rights, 
and might appeal to all our Virginia-ism, and all our nominal connection with the institutions of 
the South,” West Virginia was not a southern state, the Daily Intelligencer asserted.  Richmond 
legislators’ attempts to make the Northwest “southern” failed because residents shared more in 
common with their “free soil” neighbors than eastern Virginians.132     
West Virginia’s transformation into a free state mirrored geographical realities, 
proponents maintained.  As the Daily Intelligencer explained, “natural causes, silently and 
uncontrollably at work, were…ridding Western Virginia of slavery,” as the region’s “climate” 
and “soil” were hostile to this “foreign institution.”  Further, West Virginia’s proximity to Ohio 
and Pennsylvania shaped residents’ interpretation of African American bondage.  The 
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“influence,” “politics,” “industries,” and “sentiments” of West Virginia’s neighbors “were 
steadily destroying the hold of slavery” in the region.133  Abolishing slavery promised to expand 
industrial development and place the state on a similar economic trajectory as that of Ohio and 
Pennsylvania.  The “black spots that has given us so much trouble and retarded our growth and 
prosperity so greatly” would be removed, Henry Dering predicted.134  Slavery had “paralyzed” 
West Virginia’s economic development over the preceding decades, Willey declared, while the 
“rapid progress” evinced by Ohio demonstrated the benefits of “free soil” and “free labor.”  With 
slavery removed, West Virginians would finally unleash the state’s “inexhaustible mineral 
resources” that had remained undisturbed for decades.135   
The labor force required to transform West Virginia into an industrial state rested on the 
state’s “intelligent freemen.”  Such “men work for a purpose,” one statehood proponent declared, 
as these white laborers sought to secure their “destiny in their own hands.”  Unlike slaves whose 
masters compelled them to labor, white workers labored because they “have families to rear and 
educate, and friends to entertain, and a fortune” to acquire.  These “purposes” promoted a 
healthy body politic, “free labor” advocates declared, encouraging the development of 
independence, comity, and erudition.  A slave’s labor, though, solely benefited his master and 
sharpened divisive class distinctions.136  The “hardy sons of toil in our mountains” opposed 
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placing “free labor…on equality with slave labor,” Willey declared.137  “Vote in the New State,” 
he instructed Wheeling laborers, and “[y]ou will have…free labor.”138  
The economic prosperity wrought by “free labor” would also protect white men’s 
political rights.  Confederates sought to establish an aristocratic government and place white 
laborers in the same economic stratum that African American slaves occupied, statehood 
supporters alleged.  In a meeting in Triadelphia, Governor Francis Pierpont declared that 
Confederates believe “that the working classes are the mudsills of society” and that “capital 
should own labor.”  These beliefs revealed Confederates’ true character.  “Aristocracy never 
could tolerate the idea that the country should belong to those who rightfully cultivate it,” he 
proclaimed.139  George Porter, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates in Wheeling, agreed 
with Pierpont.  In a gathering in Wheeling, Porter confirmed that Confederates “are not a 
democratic people.”  They opposed “a government of all the people” and sought to restrict the 
“right of suffrage” until only property owners could vote.140  In a mass meeting in Philippi, 
residents maintained that Confederates sought to create a government “in which negro slavery 
shall be made a fundamental principle of government.”  Slaveholding would constitute the “basis 
of civil preferment, [and] of elevated social positions and distinctions.”  Confederates, to achieve 
this goal, would “open and maintain the African slave trade in all its barbarous cruelty and 
injustice.”  West Virginia’s creation, however, would protect residents from these antidemocratic 
Confederates.141 
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The “secessionists” that Willey feared often articulated similar arguments offered by 
statehood supporters.  Carlile’s organ, the National Telegraph, remained staunchly unionist and 
opposed to the Confederacy.142  The National Telegraph celebrated West Virginia’s natural 
resources,” predicting that the state would become “powerful and…wealthy” in the “not far 
distant” future.  West Virginia should separate from the “Eastern portion of the State,” the 
newspaper continued, as “impassable mountains” and divergent “commercial interest[s]” 
demonstrated that the two sections possess “nothing in common.”143  Carlile expressed his 
continued hope for a new state, too.  He remained steadfast that his actions against the new state 
in the Senate “will not delay our separation from Eastern Virginia.”144  The Morgantown 
Monitor, edited and published by William P. Willey and George C. Sturgis, expressed their 
“general acclamation” and “relief” that residents appeared willing to accept the new state with a 
gradual emancipation clause.  Though Congress had “intermeddled” with the state’s constitution, 
Willey and Sturgis believed that the “people of the counties composing the proposed new State” 
would ratify the new constitution.145   
Though these “secessionists” expressed varying degrees of opposition, their hatred for 
and fear of abolitionists united them.  Abolitionists, conservatives maintained, sought to 
transform West Virginia into a colony for freed blacks, initiating a demographic “blackening” of 
the region” and dismantling the region’s racial hierarchy.  Defying congressional emancipation 
would hopefully convince northern Republicans and their Northwest allies that residents would 
not submit to the “Wheeling Abolition clique.”146  This clique, West Virginia conservatives 
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charged, attempted to foist a constitution crafted by northern abolitionists and their allies upon 
residents to maintain “themselves in power and carry out their promise to the Abolitionists of 
New England to give the New State to them.”  The new constitution offered little benefit for 
white West Virginians.147  Indeed, a state constitution tinctured by abolitionism threatened all 
residents.  “No matter where abolition touches,” the National Telegraph maintained, “it palsies, 
pollutes and destroys.”148  
Conservatives hoped to seize upon residents’ widespread hatred for abolitionism by 
blurring distinctions between Republicans, abolitionists, and statehood advocates, a tactic that 
centered on the “inevitable nigger question.”149  Gradual emancipation would not “whiten” the 
state but “blacken” the mountains, conservatives alleged, as African Americans would flood the 
state seeking employment and political and civic equality.  Aided by northern abolitionists and 
their West Virginia allies, freed blacks would control the state.  Skeptical residents needed to 
only look at Lincoln’s draconian policies on political opponents and slaveholders for evidence of 
abolitionists’ increasing power over the president and the administration’s prosecution of the 
war.  Abolitionists had transformed a war for the Union into a crusade for racial equality, a 
transformation that now targeted West Virginia.  
John Carlile emerged as a prominent exponent of such views.  Carlile had initially 
attempted to defeat the statehood movement in the Senate by enlarging West Virginia’s proposed 
boundary, a move that signaled his wariness of the state’s constitutionality.  His efforts in 1862 
and 1863 centered on his hatred for northern abolitionists, a group he worried would foist racial 
equality upon white residents.  In a speech in Clarksburg, Carlile “classed all friends of the New 
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State Bill in the same category with Wendell Phillips and J.R. Giddings.”  The “Secessionists of 
this vicinity were greatly pleased with the remarks,” reported Union soldier E.C. Moderwell, 
while “many undoubted Union men felt outraged by the same.”  Carlile “advised his hearers to 
resist Congressional interference or dictation, if needs be with the sword.”150  Carlile carried this 
message beyond West Virginia.  In Indianapolis, he assailed Republicans for “turning this war 
for the Constitution and the Union, into a war for the negro over the prostrate bodies of both the 
Constitution and the Union.”151  Republicans insisted that “the existence of the institution of 
slavery…is incompatible with the existence of the Union,” a claim Carlile labeled a “slander” 
against the nation’s founders and motivated by visions of “power, and place, and treasuries to 
plunder.”152  But if Republicans succeeded in abolishing slavery, these freed blacks “would 
scatter over the different States, and be brought into competition with the laboring whites.”  The 
“free labor” that Republicans championed would be a chimera, while all white residents would 
feel abolitionism’s denigrating effects.  “Your alms-houses, prisons, and poor-houses would soon 
inform you, if you had not known it before,” Carlile asserted, “that the Abolitionists’ dream had 
been realized.”  White men in West Virginia and across the nation had to resist abolitionism.153   
Achieving abolitionists’ “dream” of racial equality began with attacking slavery.  Carlile 
considered the institution a “right established by the Constitution,” and that he “would not 
abolish the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.”  Loyal southerners should 
determine slavery’s fate, he stressed, not northern abolitionists.154  The Wheeling Daily Press 
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worried that statehood proponents, including Waitman Willey, exaggerated the institution’s 
adverse characteristics in compliance with abolitionists’ wishes.  “Willey enlarged considerably 
on the evils of slavery,” the newspaper charged, as such accusations threatened “the very 
framework of our existing civilization.”  Abolishing slavery would only appease northern 
abolitionists like “Sumner,” “Lovejoy,” and “Wendell Phillips,” along with Daily Intelligencer 
“Editor [Archibald] Campbell and the Custom House clique.”155  At an anti-statehood meeting in 
Parkersburg, gatherers worried that abolitionists “claim a great moral victory” with slavery’s 
destruction in western Virginia.  Any resident who voted for the “Willey Amendment” and 
statehood in general sanctioned the “purpose and principles of the Abolition party, whether they 
are so in heart or not.”  A vote for statehood only strengthened abolitionists, opponents 
declared.156     
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation deepened conservatives’ convictions that 
abolitionists demanded slavery’s destruction.  Lincoln “obey[ed] the behests of the insane 
fanatics he has encouraged around him,” the National Telegraph alleged, notably those “most 
ultra men of the northern faction.”  Unionists in Kentucky, Missouri, and Western Virginia, 
confronted by the president’s “contemptuous disregard” for their loyalty, now “must surrender to 
the fanatics of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the Western Reserve.”157  The enlistment of 
African Americans incensed conservatives.  West Virginia politicians who supported such a 
measure “must think [their] constituents [to be] among the most narrow, hidebound and 
contracted of men, if they would support an act, so objectionable” that the bill’s “grossness” was 
manifest to everyone.158  Arthur Boreman reported that numerous Union soldiers “are opposed to 
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the arming and making soldiers of negroes,” and predicted that the policy would “produce 
disquietude, desertions, and…serious demoralization.”159  Still, Republicans persisted in arming 
African Americans, a policy that would lead to the “extermination of both races in the 
slaveholding States.”  These same men, claimed the National Telegraph, also endorsed the 
“Willey Amendment.”160       
The 1862 mid-term elections offered hope to conservatives that “Abolition rule is 
drawing to a close” and that the statehood movement would be foiled.161  West Virginia 
conservatives interpreted Republicans’ loss of thirty-two seats in the House of Representatives as 
a repudiation of Lincoln’s unconstitutional policies, including the suspension of habeas corpus 
and authorizing military trials for “all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors…and all 
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal 
practice.”162  This blanket condemnation smacked of executive tyranny and abolitionist 
meddling, according to conservatives.  Lincoln’s “band of demons may be able to construe 
anything they like into disloyalty,” the Charleston Guerilla charged.163  These “arbitrary 
arrests…were not made for the benefit of the country, but in behalf of the Abolition party,” the 
Wheeling Daily Press exclaimed, as the arrests “reduce[d] the opponents of that party to such an 
extremity of fear and trepidation that they would offer no political resistance to its universal 
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domination.”  Governor Pierpont allegedly “hankered” after similar power, “copying upon the 
Washington tyrants” to remove “obstacle[s] to his political projects,” including the creation of 
West Virginia.164 
 Pierpont’s quest for unconstitutional executive powers akin to Lincoln’s demonstrated to 
conservatives that the statehood movement represented an abolitionist scheme to impose racial 
equality.  Republicans, allied with abolitionists, promised much with West Virginia’s creation 
but their promises rang hollow.  “Coming in as the Free Speech, Free Vote, Free Soil and Free 
man’s party,” Republicans offered “flimsy fictions about what great things are come to the New 
State” the Wheeling Daily Press claimed.165  Republicans’ “sole aim,” “every act,” and “highest 
ambition…irrespective of their own race or their government,” the Morgantown Monitor 
protested, “is for the negro.”  Republicans’ “speeches are for the negro; their votes are for the 
negro; [and] their taxes are for the negro.”  Despite the “wild and reckless theories” expounded 
by “Abolitionists, fanatics, and many leaders of the Republican party,” African Americans 
constituted an “inferior race, deficient in judgment, and incapable of self-government.”  This 
“inferior race” would clamor for political and social equality with West Virginia’s founding; 
would residents sanction such actions?166  Triadelphia residents would resist such efforts.  “We 
look upon the effort to place the African upon an equality with the white man in Western 
Virginia as vain and foolish,” residents declared during a mass meeting.  Previous attempts of 
imposing racial equality had failed, “bring[ing] demoralization and ruin to both” races and had 
threatened to “destroy the best interests of our country.”  Welcoming “free negroes into Western 
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Virginia,” Triadelphia residents further averred, was “unwise and ruinous to the order and good 
morals of our society.”  These West Virginians promised resistance to abolitionists’ efforts.167 
West Virginians’ opposition to the “black toadies” that advocated statehood reflected 
their concern that a new state would overturn the region’s established racial hierarchy.168  A 
“majority” of residents opposed the “negro-equalizing amendment” known as the “Willey 
Amendment,” one conservative newspaper declared, but military and political authorities at the 
behest of abolitionists prevented a full and open discussion of the issue.169  West Virginians are 
to be “enslaved, and…Africanized” if voters ratified the “Willey Amendment,” the Clarksburg 
Patriot warned.170  Wheeling abolitionists “would not pass the New State bill without imposing 
the condition that it should be an Abolition State, and a roosting and lurking place for the 
negroes.”171  Statehood supporters hoped to transform West Virginia into “a colony for runaway 
negroes,” welcoming African Americans with the promise of liberation by the “Willey 
Amendment.”172  The National Telegraph suggested renaming the amendment “An act to 
Africanize North Western Virginia, and to enslave the white inhabitants thereof,” a more 
accurate representation of the amendment’s purpose.173  “Give us a new State, un-
Abolitionized,” the Wheeling Daily Press demanded, “a new State without the secret machinery 
which is to guide its control and direction into Abolition.”174  Protecting West Virginians’ racial 
hierarchy demanded that residents oppose this abolitionist attempt to foist gradual emancipation 
upon unwilling residents, even if this opposition undermined the statehood movement.  As the 
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Clarksburg Patriot proclaimed, “every man who is opposed to making Western Virginia a free 
negro colony” must reject the new state.175 
 Statehood proponents, though, maintained that West Virginia’s creation guaranteed and 
protected “whiteness,” even without slavery.  West Virginia’s admission into the Union ensured 
that, regardless of the war’s outcome, Deep South planters would not politically enslave white 
residents or consider them “like slaves on the block.”176  The “Willey Amendment” would 
compel slaveholders to sell or emancipate their chattel, while the prohibition on importing slaves 
would further “whiten” the Mountain State.  And with a climate inhospitable for freed blacks or 
plantation agriculture, African Americans had little incentive to remain in the state.  The 
demographic “whitening” that would unfold across West Virginia promised a thorough 
“whitening” of the political process, too.   
 West Virginia’s demographic “whitening” had been unfolding for years, statehood 
proponents declared, as census data revealed a decline in the slave population.  “The end of 
slavery is a foregone conclusion,” the Wellsburg Herald insisted, with the institution’s 
“health…beyond the skill of the leech.”177  In the northern panhandle, both slavery and “free 
negroes” have been “dead letters,” and John G. Jacob believed that the “entire free black 
population can be counted on the fingers.”178  Waitman Willey, a slaveholder, agreed with Jacob.  
Willey considered the number of African American slaves in West Virginia “too small to stand 
in the way of the public good.”  Further, the state’s “geographical situation” meant “that slavery 
could never exist here to any great extent, even if it were desirable to have it.”  West Virginians’ 
agricultural and manufacturing interests required free labor, Willey asserted, not slave labor.  
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“Why then should we want slavery here?”  Faced with a declining slave population, Willey and 
other pro-statehood members implored West Virginians to hasten that demographic shift and, in 
the process, fully inaugurate free labor.179   
 Emancipating African American slaves raised the question of freed blacks’ status in the 
new state.  West Virginians held a “deep and universal prejudice against this class of persons,” 
confessed one statehood proponent.180  Statehood opponents wielded this question “with 
considerable success,” William P. Willey boasted, as he and his ilk predicted that West 
Virginians “will soon be overrun with them.”181  Waitman Willey acknowledged that adversaries 
“clamor[ed] about the danger of free-negro-ism,” but he and other advocates believed that 
African Americans would not constitute a problem in West Virginia.182  A “very large proportion 
of the slaves will be converted into money and started Southward,” the Wellsburg Herald 
declared.183  “[O]ur Northern negrophobists” further reasoned that “free negroes will remain 
where they were born and continue to work for their masters,” especially those on southern 
plantations.  The Herald predicted that the Emancipation Proclamation would accelerate the 
“current of negro travel…southward,” draining the African American population and whitening 
the Upper South.184           
 But would the few African Americans who remained increase competition in the job 
market and depress wages?  Statehood opponents maintained that West Virginia’s founding 
would trigger a flood of freed blacks, where “every nigger” would push “a white man out of 
employment” and Wheeling “Germans…would all be turned out of employment and free 
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negroes substitute[d] in their stead.”185  Statehood promoters dismissed this baseless rumor.  
African Americans “will seek menial employment as they always and everywhere do,” one 
supported declared.186  “The hotel, the barber shop, [and] the steamboat, are the paradise of the 
free negroes,” answered another proponent, as blacks would labor as “waiters, porters, barbers or 
hostlers” while avoiding any “mechanical employment.”  These service occupations reinforced 
racial hierarchy, as African Americans would labor in subordinate industries while white 
residents occupied more prestigious positions.  This unnamed author assured West Virginians 
that African Americans “naturally adapt themselves” to those “peculiar services,” calming fears 
that freed blacks would challenge that labor hierarchy.187   
African Americans’ subordinate position reflected the will of Providence, a universal 
truth that statehood supporters endorsed.  “How can the negro, whom God has made so inferior 
to the white, morally, intellectually and physically, ever be made his equal[?]”188  West 
Virginians received confirmation of such beliefs from minstrel shows.  These shows, performed 
in Wheeling since the early 1850s, offered a popular cultural performance that allowed audience 
members to express their racial anxieties and collective fears of African Americans.189  For 
example, in March 1863, Sam Sharpley announced that his noted “Ethiopian Iron Clads” would 
perform in Wheeling.190  The Wheeling Daily Intelligencer reported that the minstrels’ comedic 
performance “makes hosts of friends and admirers,” and that Sharpley “has few if any 
superiors.”191  Minstrels’ mockery of African Americans reinforced statehood advocates’ 
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assertions that the “ignorant African slave” and its “offspring” were unsuited to the labor 
required in West Virginia’s economy.  White laborers in West Virginia, not African Americans, 
would provide the labor needed to unleash the new state’s mineral resources.192  
 The menial employment African Americans occupied reflected their political status in the 
new state, too.  “The hackneyed song of negro equality, negro jurors, and the like, is the old 
argument of secessionists,” complained a resident in the Daily Intelligencer.193  This “old 
argument” was impossible in West Virginia, supporters explained, because the new state “will 
have the strongest anti-free negro laws of any loyal State in the Union.”  West Virginia would 
enforce the “old laws of Virginia,” laws characterized as “severe and restrictive enough to meet 
the fears of the most timorous.”194  Article 11, Section 8 of West Virginia’s proposed 
constitution stated that the “common law and the laws of the State of Virginia” concerning free 
African Americans would remain untouched.  These laws included forced removal of freed 
blacks older than twenty-one; imprisoning individuals who transported blacks into the state; and 
imposing fines on African Americans who refused to leave the state.  Corporal punishment 
against this last group would also be enforced.  Slavery’s shadow would still linger over the 
mountains even though the institution would soon no longer officially exist.195 
 Slavery’s demise not only benefited West Virginia but the entire state, as the institution’s 
death in the Mountain State would hasten the war’s conclusion.  “This is a Pro-Slavery 
Rebellion,” the Fairmont National declared, “fomented by slaveholders, and for Slavery’s sake.”  
West Virginia’s admission would assist in slavery’s “overthrow and extinction.”196  Many 
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statehood advocates endorsed Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as a similar means of 
destroying the Confederacy and ending the war.  The Wellsburg Herald believed that the 
proclamation would “speedily bring the war to an issue.”197  In a new state mass meeting in Ohio 
County, residents “hail[ed] the President’s emancipation proclamation as an efficient means of 
destroying the prime cause and backbone of the present malignant and unholy rebellion.”198  
Ending the war would also hopefully end the guerilla conflict that had terrorized residents.  
Arthur Boreman reported that counties below the northern panhandle were “not safe for a loyal 
man” and recommended that loyalists remain within “sight of the Ohio River.”199  Virginia 
Representative Jacob B. Blair of Parkersburg instructed Willey to hold “the election [on the new 
constitution] as early as possible before warm weather when the guerrillas can infest the 
mountains and prevent the people from voting.”  With the state’s future assured, such attacks 
would hopefully cease.200  
 The constitutional convention that reconvened in February 1863 enacted few substantive 
changes to the constitution ratified by voters the previous year.  Compensating loyal slaveholders 
emerged as the most divisive issue, with James Brown of Kanawha demanding federal 
compensation for loyal slaveholders who immediately emancipated their slaves and James S. 
Wheat of Morgan County suggesting that funds derived from sale of Confederate property, 
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including slaves, be directed to loyal slaveholders.201  Delegates narrowly defeated Wheat’s 
proposal, 28 to 26, while Brown’s proposal suggesting immediate emancipation failed to garner 
much support.202  Rather, in a unanimous vote, delegates approved the “Willey Amendment,” 
54-0, while agreeing to petition the federal government for two million dollars for loyal 
slaveholders.203  West Virginia voters would ratify or reject the new constitution on March 26, 
the final obstacle to statehood.    
 On March 26, West Virginia residents and soldiers voted overwhelmingly to ratify the 
new state constitution with the “Willey Amendment,” 28,318 in favor to 572 opposed.204  Upon 
receiving the returns, on April 20 President Lincoln issued a proclamation that West Virginians 
had satisfied all constitutional obligations and West Virginia would be admitted into the Union 
on June 20, 1863.205  The Daily Intelligencer celebrated the “wonderful” results, regarding the 
wide margin as a “grand and overwhelming…triumph.”206  West Virginians’ demonstrated that 
they “didn’t need a new nigger State” but a “free State,” even though “such men as 
Carlile…were for the niggers” and attempted to persuade voters to that perspective, too.207  The 
Daily Intelligencer applauded West Virginians for abolishing slavery through the ballot box, a 
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process that other southerners should undertake, too.  Residents “did what very few people in 
this generation have done,” the Intelligencer declared, for “they abolished slavery by their 
votes.”  While other southerners “have talked” about abolishing slavery, West Virginians “talked 
it and voted it.”208    
Historians have echoed the laudatory tone expressed by the Daily Intelligencer.  
Granville Davisson Hall believed that the vote demonstrated that West Virginians were “ready to 
accept emancipation” and place the state on that “irresistible march” toward slavery’s 
abolition.209    Charles Ambler and Festus P. Summers considered West Virginia’s 
“admission…a triumph for Abolitionists,” as residents finally inaugurated a gradual 
emancipation process to remove slaves from the state.210  Slavery’s demise via the ballot box 
appears to validate interpretations offered by Sean Wilentz, William Freehling, William Link, 
and Stephanie McCurry.  These historians emphasize the fatal struggle between African 
American bondage and democracy, characterizing southerners’ attempts to promote equilibrium 
between the two institutions as ill-fated and myopic.  Previous scholars of West Virginia’s 
history echo that interpretation.  Mountaineers, cognizant of slavery’s incongruity with “modern” 
democratic principles, demanded liberation from eastern oligarchs and their peculiar institution.  
The Civil War offered West Virginians the opportunity to emancipate themselves from such 
tyranny, a microcosm of the national struggle.211 
 This interpretation, however, reflects the Republican memory of West Virginia’s 
sectional history and the Civil War and overlooks the protracted and often bitter debates 
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concerning slavery, emancipation, and statehood.  West Virginians’ initial policy on slavery only 
prohibited the importation of African American slaves, a resolution that signaled residents’ 
reluctance to dismantle the institution.  Congressional pressure compelled West Virginians to 
pursue compromise, but the accord reached by politicians and ratified by voters reflected 
residents’ continued endorsement of proslavery beliefs and democratic principles.  From a 
practical standpoint, slavery would continue to operate in the new state for decades.  The “Willey 
Amendment” delayed emancipation for thousands of young slaves while older slaves would 
remain in bondage until death.  African Americans could acquire freedom through self-
emancipation or through a generous master but some slaveholders, wary of losing their 
investment, could look for prospective buyers in nearby Kentucky or Missouri.  African 
American bondage in West Virginia would likely continue into the twentieth-century, when a 
majority of statehood leaders would have entrusted their descendants to tackle the final stages of 
emancipation.  Could shifting political and racial norms reignite this emancipation debate?  How 
would an independent and permanent Confederate nation shape this debate?  With no 
prospective conclusion to the Civil War by 1863, slavery’s future remained uncertain but few 
predicted the institution’s demise in the Union within only a few years.  Still, regardless of the 
Civil War’s outcome, the “politics of slavery” would figure prominently over the coming 
decades, cementing slavery’s centrality to politics.         
Slavery’s influence was manifest in the new constitution.  While emancipation unfolded 
over the proceeding decades, laws imposed on African Americans promoted and perpetuated 
racial hierarchy.  Corporal punishment remained on the books, authorizing white authorities to 
mete out punishment on unrepentant blacks.  Freed blacks would perform menial labor, 
occupying low-level service positions while white laborers occupied more prestigious and 
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lucrative positions.  African Americans would not “blacken” West Virginia’s growing industrial 
sector.  This economic segregation carried over into politics.  Statehood leaders’ refusal to 
endorse African American political and civil rights or countenance any status for blacks other 
than slavery reflected their desire to “whiten” the Mountain State.  Disenfranchised and 
marginalized freed blacks provided similar visual evidence as enslaved African Americans 
before the war: politics remained the purview of white men.  West Virginians’ embrace of 
democratic reform with a new state exhibited neither a clean break from slavery nor their 
Virginia heritage that historians suggest.  Rather, the political “whitening” residents sought with 
statehood reflected a continuation of antebellum norms concerning race and politics, norms 
constructed and refined through residents’ defense of African American bondage and political 








Conclusion: The Long Shadow: The Politics of Slavery in West Virginia, 1863-1865 
 In April 1864, a slave auction occurred in Morgantown, an event the Morgantown Weekly 
Post reported had “not been witnessed in our town before for many a long day.”1129  The estate 
of Alpheus C. Dorsey placed two slaves for sale to “liquidate a debt” of the late master.  
Morgantown attorney William A. Hanway purchased African American Stephen Trimble, known 
as “‘black Steve’” to locals, for $326.  Alpheus’ widow, Eliza, purchased the other slave, 
Elizabeth, for $71.  The relationship, if any, between the two slaves remains unclear.1130  The 
Morgantown Weekly Post noted a “great deal of interest was manifested on the occasion,” 
characterizing “sales of this kind” as a “rare occurrence in West Virginia.”  One year removed 
since statehood, West Virginians continued to exploit slavery’s manifold benefits for white 
residents, notably commodifying slaves to settle debts.1131 
 Statehood failed to remove slavery or the “politics of slavery” from West Virginia.  In 
many instances, the Mountain State’s creation intensified this southern brand of politics.  On 
June 20, 1863, the Morgantown Monitor assailed what it characterized as “Abolition Unionism,” 
a political stance shared by Republicans and abolitionists and imposed upon white Americans.  
Republicans and their abolition allies “would rather the Union should be eternally destroyed than 
that it should be restored, with slavery as an institution recognized and protected by” the 
Constitution, and believed in “elevating the black race to a level with the white man.”  This 
“nonsensical fanaticism” opposed what the Monitor believed most West Virginians professed, 
specifically that “this Government was made for the WHITE MAN and not for blacks or a mongrel 
                                                          
1129 Morgantown Weekly Post, April 16, 1864, n.p. 
1130 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Morgantown, Monongalia, Virginia; Roll: M653_1364; Page: 18; Image: 24; Family 
History Library Film: 805364 [Ancestry.com][accessed 7 August 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: 
Morgantown, Monongalia, Virginia; Roll: M653_1364; Page: 14; Image: 20; Family History Library Film: 805364 
[Ancestry.com][accessed 7 August 2015].  The 1860 U.S. Federal Census shows that Dorsey owned four slaves, two 
male (ages 36 and 18) and two female (ages 21 and 17).  The census, however, does not record their names.       
1131 Morgantown Weekly Post, April 16, 1864, n.p. 
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race.”  On West Virginia’s founding, the Monitor reminded its audience that the nation and the 
state remained the purview of white men, not African Americans.1132       
 Conservatives continued to warn residents about the dangers of freed blacks in the 
Mountain State.  During his congressional campaign in 1863, Willis De Hass, a self-proclaimed 
Democrat and conservative, reminded voters that he was “the White Man’s Candidate.”  His 
opponent, Jacob B. Blair, “is the Candidate for the NEGRO.”  While De Hass supports the 
“UNION” and “DEMOCRACY,” Blair advocated “DIS-UNION” and “ABOLITIONISM.”1133  The “friends 
of Mr. Lincoln and the African” had protracted the war so “that the institution of slavery…be 
wiped out” and “the white people themselves…be swept from the face of the earth,” claimed the 
Wheeling Daily Register.  The Register supported a change in leadership before abolitionists’ 
dreams became manifest.1134   
Leading up to the 1864 presidential election, conservatives continued to remind West 
Virginians that abolitionists and some Republicans sought to undermine racial purity and 
hierarchy.  The Weekly National Telegraph in Clarksburg assailed “misguided philanthropists” 
who “place[d] [African Americans] upon an equality with the white man.”  This equality 
extended into the political and social spheres.  Abolitionists “would not only have [African 
Americans] vote in elections, but permit him to testify in courts of justice against a white man, 
and occupy the same jury box with him,” empowering freed blacks with “all the privileges and 
immunities of the white man.”  Though West Virginians and residents of other union slave states 
“have their prejudices against anything that savors of negro equality,” abolitionists persisted with 
their “infernal radicalism.”  The freedom that abolitionists provided African Americans 
                                                          
1132 Morgantown Monitor, June 20, 1863, 2.   
1133 Daily Intelligencer, October 22, 1863, 2.   
1134 Wheeling Daily Register, June 13, 1864, 2.   
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constituted the “freedom to commit crime,” including “[d]runkeness, debauchery, riot and 
bloodshed.”  Emancipation was a “damnable” policy, the Telegraph insisted.1135  Such 
accusations assisted Democratic nominee George McClellan’s presidential candidacy.  Though 
McClellan lost the state, his performance in West Virginia worried Republicans that the “politics 
of slavery” would continue to shape elections.1136             
 As before public ratification of the “Willey Amendment,” Republican and pro-statehood 
organs and members attempted to convince West Virginians that their new state and federal 
government would continue to protect white interests.  The Wellsburg Herald predicted 
“little…trouble” with African Americans “because happily, we have few free negroes among us 
and nothing to invite their immigration.”  Other regions across the nation, notably the South, 
would not be as fortunate as West Virginia.  Southern states, inundated with a population 
“helpless almost as children and ignorant as savages,” could expect “more than the average 
amount of crime,” notably “riots and insurrections.”  The Herald hoped the federal government 
would provide some form of schooling and assistance to educate and elevate African 
Americans.1137   
These benefits provided to freed blacks, though, paled in comparison to the advantages 
offered to white residents now emancipated from slaveholders’ political tyranny, the Fairmont 
National insisted.  “[W]e imperatively declare that all the good that the black minority will win 
from the abolition of slavery is eclipsed by the surpassing good to the white majority.”  This war 
to abolish slavery would ultimately benefit white residents, while merely providing the “justice” 
                                                          
1135 Weekly National Telegraph [Clarksburg], August 5, 1864, 2.   
1136 Fairmont National, November 12, 1864, 2; Daily Intelligencer, November 11, 1864, 2; and Daily Intelligencer, 
November 14, 1864, 2.  Vote totals for some northwestern counties showed a close race between Lincoln and 
McClellan.  Lincoln carried Ohio County by a mere 131 votes and Wirt County by 54 votes.  Lincoln, though, won 
Marion by a more comfortable 569 vote margin and Taylor County by 436 votes.  Lincoln won West Virginia, 
receiving 23,799 votes to McClellan’s 11,078.   
1137 Wellsburg Herald, July 24, 1863, 2.   
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that African Americans deserved.1138  The Fairmont National encouraged residents to avoid 
“missegenation” with African Americans, a lifestyle it characterized as “social degradation.”  
Though such racial mixing occurred between masters and slaves, West Virginians “are opposed 
to the mixing of the white with the black races.”  Interracial West Virginians undermined the 
clear racial divide that residents and the state’s founders envisioned and promised in 1863.1139      
 One of those founders faced an intense reelection campaign in 1865.  Waitman Willey’s 
expiring senatorial term encouraged some West Virginians to oppose his reelection because of 
his previous stances on slavery.  “Mr. Willey has always been the inveterate partizan of slavery,” 
the Fairmont National declared.  Though Willey blamed slavery for the current rebellion, “he 
votes steadfastly and consistently against knocking that prop from under it.”1140  Opponents also 
charged him for “being an enemy to the separation of West from East Virginia” and denounced 
his apparent “reluctance to save the New State.”1141  Indeed, Morgantown resident and West 
Virginia Speaker of the House Leroy Kramer informed Willey that some delegates “are very 
radical on the Slavery question” and “expressed fears that…you would be too pro Slavery.”1142  
Some West Virginians supported Daily Intelligencer editor Archibald Campbell.  His supporters 
characterized Campbell as “the inveterate enemy of slavery and all forms of aristocracy,” though 
he possessed “good common sense” to reject the sentiments of a “small class of the New 
England anti-slavery men.”1143  Morgantown attorney Edward C. Bunker reported that Campbell 
was “using every means” to defeat Willey, including claiming “he is entitled to all the credit for 
                                                          
1138 Fairmont National, April 9, 1864, 2.   
1139 Fairmont National, July 16, 1864, 2.   
1140 Fairmont National, January 14, 1865, 3.   
1141 Fairmont National, January 28, 1865, 2.   
1142 Leroy Kramer to Waitman T. Willey, 25 January 1865, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 11, 
Folder 6, item 612, WVRHC [emphasis in original] and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Morgantown, Monongalia, 
Virginia; Roll: M653_1364; Page: 9; Image: 15; Family History Library Film: 805364 [Ancestry.com][accessed 11 
August 2015].   
1143 Fairmont National, January 14, 1865, 3.   
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the admission of W Va.”1144  Willey won reelection despite Campbell’s efforts but the debate 
surrounding his candidacy revealed that the “politics of slavery” would not dissipate for some 
time.              
        West Virginia’s founding did little to destabilize the brand of politics that had defined the 
rituals and rhythms of political life in the Northwest over the preceding decades.  Since the 
second two-party’s inception in the 1820s and 1830s, the “politics of slavery” shaped parties’ 
platforms, candidates’ speeches, and voters’ preferences in the Northwest.  Economic, 
ethnocultural, and myriad political issues competed with slavery during campaign season, but 
each party and candidate had to convince voters that their stance on such issues would not 
interfere with the master-slave relationship.  Though few slaves and fewer slaveholders resided 
in the Northwest, the institution still exerted a tremendous and powerful influence in the region.   
 Not all Virginians, though, believed that the Northwest followed similar political rules as 
other areas more heavily invested in slavery.  For decades, eastern Virginians had shaped and 
controlled the structures and functions of the state government to further their section’s interests, 
notably slavery.  Northwesterners’ efforts to reform and democratize the state constitution 
encountered stiff resistance from eastern elites and slaveholders who feared democracy’s 
deleterious effects on their peculiar institution.  These eastern elites doubted slavery’s 
compatibility with democratic government.  Viewed from Virginia’s eastern shore, western 
Virginians’ attempts to democratize the state allegedly reflected mountaineers’ antislaveryism.  
During the Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates defeated 
numerous attempts to reorganize representation on the “white basis” and to enfranchise all white 
                                                          
1144 Edward C. Bunker to Waitman T. Willey, 24 December 1864, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 
11, Folder 6, item 598, WVRHC and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: District 2, Monongalia, Virginia; Roll: 
M653_1364; Page: 74; Image: 84; Family History Library Film: 805364 [Ancestry.com][accessed 11 August 2015].   
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men irrespective of property qualifications, initiatives advocated by western reformers.  Slight 
alterations in voting prerequisites, however, broadened enfranchisement, though not as far as 
reformers’ desired.  Western Virginians expressed their disappointment by overwhelmingly 
voting against the new constitution’s ratification, while some contemplated a division of the 
state. 
 The frustration and apoplexy expressed by residents in 1830 convinced contemporary and 
modern historians that Virginia’s “drift toward dissolution” accelerated when residents ratified 
the new constitution.  A democratic, free labor west allegedly groaned under the dominion of an 
aristocratic, slaveholding east, a microcosm of the national struggle beginning to unfold. A closer 
analysis of residents’ reactions following the constitution’s ratification provides another 
narrative.  Some residents endorsed the new constitution, celebrating the more lenient suffrage 
requirements as evidence of democracy’s inevitable, if slow, march in the Old Dominion.  Other 
residents voiced more practical concerns about annexation or dismemberment.  Annexation to 
Pennsylvania threatened to strangle the Northwest’s burgeoning industrial sector, as the 
competition between Pittsburgh and Wheeling would become more intense.  Above all, the 
majority of northwesterners opposed dividing Virginia because they identified themselves as 
Virginians and refused to countenance any discussion of dismemberment.  Only a handful of 
western Virginians appeared to advocate separation, a small minority whose power and influence 
historians have exaggerated over the preceding years.    
 Northwesterners deepened their fealty toward the state and slavery during the proceeding 
two decades.  The two-party system fostered statewide alliances irrespective of sectional 
affiliation and encouraged broad participation in local events and campaign even though some 
residents remained disenfranchised.  The proslavery ideology crafted by Benjamin Watkins 
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Leigh, Thomas Dew, and Abel P. Upshur in the wake of the 1829-1830 Constitutional 
Convention and Nat Turner’s Rebellion emphasized the myriad benefits provided to 
nonslaveholders by African American bondage.  Slavery’s benefits extended beyond the 
plantation, these authors declared, as all white men regardless of birthright, socioeconomic 
status, occupation, or political affiliation found their political freedom in African American’s 
enslavement.  This recruitment of northwestern allies proved important as the national crisis 
concerning slavery expanded in the 1850s while Virginians set about to reform their constitution 
yet again.   
 The 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention brought slavery and democracy into sharp 
relief.  Northwestern delegates insisted that their neighbors remained committed to the master-
slave relationship and sought only to democratize the state government, not interfere with chattel 
slavery.  Indeed, democratic reform would quiet the few lone voices opposed to Virginia’s 
slaveholding interests.  Defections from eastern ranks and support from Henry A. Wise further 
emboldened northwesterners who achieved an important victory with the adoption and 
ratification of the 1851 Constitution.  The constitution represented a blending of proslavery and 
democratic thought.  Universal male suffrage, greater representation in the state legislature, and 
the direct election of public officials opened politics to all white men while statutes concerning 
African Americans and the ad valorem taxation policy wedded slavery to the state.  This 
development became manifest as northwestern residents deepened their engagement in the 
“politics of slavery” in subsequent gubernatorial and presidential elections.  Indeed, eastern 
slaveholders’ fears prior to the convention proved unfound, as northwesterners emerged as vocal 
and active allies of slaveholders across the Commonwealth and South.          
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This influence was manifest in residents’ reaction to the rise of abolitionism and the 
Republican Party.  Whigs and Democrats blurred the distinctions between those two groups, 
portraying Republicans as abolitionists in disguise or as abolitionists’ political allies.  Both 
Republicans and abolitionists sought racial equality at the ballot box and in the household, 
opponents charged, threatening racial hierarchy and patriarchy.  By portraying Republicans and 
abolitionists as dangers to these two traditional and established hierarchies, Whigs and 
Democrats appealed to practically every white man in the region, regardless of his slaveholding 
status.  Though Republicans’ professed to protect white residents’ political interests through 
“free soil” and “free labor,” few northwesterners believed such remarks.  The Republican Party 
remained foreign to voters, as most residents retained their traditional political affiliations, even 
when the Whig Party collapsed.  Politics and slavery remained inseparable during the 1850s.  
 The secession crisis in 1860-1861 did little to disturb the prevailing political dynamic of 
the Northwest.  Residents and their representatives demanded slavery’s protection but divided 
over the best means to achieve that end.  Most northwesterners believed that political 
compromises, court decisions, and constitutional principles shielded slaveholders from meddling 
Republicans and abolitionists, even with a Republican in the White House.  Remaining in the 
Union also protected white nonslaveholders from Deep South cotton planters, a class of elites 
wary of democratic government.  A vocal minority protested unionists’ position.  The 
Confederate States, not the United States, offered slaveholders the maintaining that the 
Confederate States, secessionists insisted.  Lincoln’s call for troops intensified this debate, as 
delegates adopted the Ordinance of Secession but many northwesterners remained committed to 
the Union.  Secessionists, however, operated in the Northwest and plagued residents’ attempts of 
achieving consensus on statehood. 
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 Northwesterners’ tortuous route to embracing and achieving statehood and adopting 
gradual emancipation reflected their desire to perpetuate established and traditional hierarchies.  
Foremost among these was racial supremacy.  Residents agreed that “proper” racial hierarchy 
should continue but divided whether that could be achieved in a new state.  Statehood proponents 
pointed to the demographic “whitening” already unfolding across the proposed state as evidence 
of residents’ declining support for chattel slavery.  This demographic reconfiguration reflected 
residents’ increasing acceptance of “free soil” and “free labor” principles and that the proposed 
state’s climate and proximity to northern states precluded plantation agriculture.  Ratifying the 
“Willey Amendment” would accelerate this “whitening,” too, removing African Americans from 
the Mountain State while creating a hostile environment for those blacks that remained.  West 
Virginia’s creation would not challenge racial hierarchy but rather reaffirm it.   
 Statehood opponents agreed that African Americans’ inferiority remain undisturbed but 
questioned whether statehood could achieve that goal.  These detractors worried that national 
Republicans and their abolitionist allies would foist civil and political equality between whites 
and blacks, treating the Mountain State into an interracial experiment.  The “Willey 
Amendment” appeared poised to “blacken” the mountains by transforming West Virginia into a 
safe haven for African Americans.  The overwhelming vote in favor of statehood, while 
celebrated by contemporary supporters and modern historians, obscures the common ground that 
statehood advocates and enemies occupied.  Both groups demanded the perpetuation of racial 
hierarchy, African Americans’ subordination, and democracy for white men; only the means of 
achieving that goal separated them.   
 West Virginia’s creation upon the basis of racial democracy diminishes the celebratory 
and self-affirmative narratives offered by numerous modern historians.  William Freehling, Sean 
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Wilentz, and Stephanie McCurry, for example, emphasize slavery’s impending destruction as 
democratic reforms transformed the slaveholding South’s political landscape.  Slavery’s 
incongruity with “modern” democratic principles allegedly became unbearable for white 
southerners, especially for nonslaveholders in western Virginia.  This interpretation, however, 
overlooks the strong proslavery element in the region and residents’ refusal to abandon racial 
supremacy.  Indeed, West Virginians’ desire to maintain racial supremacy tempered enthusiasm 
for statehood and threatened to derail the entire project, with some leaders doubting West 
Virginia’s creation.  West Virginia’s founding in the midst of the Civil War reflected residents’ 
unwavering belief that racial subordination constituted a fundamental element of democratic 
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